Law

What renders a tax amnesty program successful? Tax amnesty programs have long been used by governments as policy tools to produce both short and medium-term benefits. Despite the criticism that such tools have received for being inefficient and unfair, tax amnesties remain a very popular choice amongst policymakers nonetheless. However, as recent experience has shown, tax amnesty programs are often unappealing amongst taxpayers and fail to achieve the short-term and medium-term goals set by governments. This Article critically discusses the latest international tax amnesty in Greece that took place in 2010 and provides an overview of its advantages and disadvantages. By reviewing the said tax amnesty and comparing it with the tax amnesty of Argentina and Italy, this Article makes significant conclusions about what renders a tax amnesty scheme successful and prompts taxpayers' participation.

International investment law has developed separately from and was, for a long period, perceived as incompatible with human rights law.  Despite, however, the tendency to distinguish the evolution of these two fields of international law, they are not completely dissimilar, as, inter alia, they both aim to safeguard investors’ right to property, promote respect for due process  and address the undisputed position of power of the State against the individual.  In situations of sovereign default, the assymetry between the powers of the State and the rights of investors is even more clearly demostrated, even within the European Union. Indeed, although, EU primary law provides several safeguards to avoid sovereign default,  it does not, however, regulate the implications in case such default occurs, leaving investors confronted with a regulatory vacuum, subject to states’ willingness for “collaboration”. Protection awarded by Investment Treaties is not always sufficient, as there is considerable variation in the terms of the various BITs negotiated by different countries, while often investors aren’t covered by any investment treaty.
This paper explores the developments brought about by the financial crisis of 2007 and the actions taken by Greece affecting foreign investors and study the human rights implications of such actions, as these were examined in this and other cases of debt structuring, both in human rights venues, as well as in international investment tribunals and as these can arise through the interpretation of human rights’ treaties, such as the ECHR, in the context of investment law. Through this study it is finally demonstrated the need for human rights law to complement and interact with investment treaties, to effectively safeguard and protect investors’ rights.

The Cyprus Banking Haircut of 2013 (Cyprus Haircut or Haircut) was unprecedented and had devastating implications for investors. However, more than four years after the Cyprus Haircut of 2013, account holders and shareholders in Cyprus’ two largest banks at the time—Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank—still do not have any available recourse for their losses. Indeed, despite account holders having resorted to national courts in the Republic of Cyprus, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and international tribunals, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Despite making human rights’ claims in all such proceedings, nonetheless, none of these forums has effectively dealt with the substantive elements of the Cyprus Haircut to date. This Article will explore the implications of the Cyprus Banking Haircut on bondholders from a human rights perspective, reviewing investors’ rights and remedies once a claim is brought before the Court most appropriate to deal with human rights’ violations, namely the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

This Article seeks to determine if there is a legal basis for European Union (" EU ") Institutions to be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member State in cases of financial distress. The Article begins by exploring the concept of sovereignty and then evaluates the limitations placed on state sovereignty by participation in the EU. Next, it explores the definitions of economic coercion and countermeasures and considers whether the actions taken by EU institutions in the context of the Cyprus banking haircut would satisfy either of these definitions. Lastly, this Article studies whether EU law can provide a basis for liability of EU institutions in case of acts adopted by such institutions to address a financial crisis in a manner that targets the rights of investors and, in particular, in the Cyprus Banking Haircut.

The Greek Debt Restructuring of 2012 has had a significant impact
on bondholders that have sustained onerous losses. Despite having
resorted to the justice system to find reparation for such losses, to date,
neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have awarded
investors the desired compensation. This Article explores the reasons
that led to the failure of bondholders’ cases against Greece and
explores whether there is room for a different result for bondholders
before investment tribunals. This Article evaluates and analyses the
possible outcome of bondholders’ claims under investment treaty law
for breach of standards of treatment (including Most Favored Nation,
Fair and Equitable Treatment, Expropriation and Umbrella Clauses)
and investigates potential defenses that could be raised by Greece to
such claims. Lastly, this Article suggests alternative ways bondholders
may obtain reparation, including Credit Default Swaps.

This Article seeks to determine if there is a legal basis for European Union (“EU”) Institutions to be held accountable for measures taken by an EU Member State in cases of financial distress. The Article begins by exploring the concept of sovereignty and then evaluates the limitations placed on state sovereignty by participation in the EU. Next, it explores the definitions of economic coercion and countermeasures and considers whether the actions taken by EU institutions in the context of the Cyprus banking haircut would satisfy either of these definitions. Lastly, this Article studies whether EU law can provide a basis for liability of EU institutions in case of acts adopted by such institutions to address a financial crisis in a manner that targets the rights of investors and, in particular, in the Cyprus Banking Haircut. Cite as: Venetia Argyropoulou, Acts of Financial Distress in the EU: Is the EU to Blame?, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 485 (2018).

The outputs of EURO-EXPERT include academic publications, CULTEXP - the first multilingual and cross-jurisdictional database on cultural expertise, data visualisation of in-court and out-of-court cultural expertise, a toolkit for the use of cultural expertise, and publications for the general public. This dataset is the EURO-EXPERT data summary for Greece

The outputs of EURO-EXPERT include academic publications, CULTEXP - the first multilingual and cross-jurisdictional database on cultural expertise, data visualisation of in-court and out-of-court cultural expertise, a toolkit for the use of cultural expertise, and publications for the general public. This dataset is the EURO-EXPERT data summary for Cyprus