Living With Nuclear Weapons. [American Journal of Physics 52, 88 (1984)]. Albert Carnesale Author, Paul Doty Author, Stanley Hoffmann Author, Samuel P. Huntington Author, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Author, Scott D. Sagan Author, JE Gordon.... more
Living With Nuclear Weapons. [American Journal of Physics 52, 88 (1984)]. Albert Carnesale Author, Paul Doty Author, Stanley Hoffmann Author, Samuel P. Huntington Author, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Author, Scott D. Sagan Author, JE Gordon. Keywords ...
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Over the past fifteen years, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons has been a staple in International Relations courses because of its brevity and crystal-clear explanations. The new edition, An Enduring Debate, continues the important discussion... more
Over the past fifteen years, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons has been a staple in International Relations courses because of its brevity and crystal-clear explanations. The new edition, An Enduring Debate, continues the important discussion of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of a nuclear-armed world. With new chapters on the questions surrounding a nuclear North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and the potential for a world free of nuclear weapons, this Third Edition will continue to generate a lively classroom experience.
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I enjoyed reading the thoughtful article by Scott Sagan and Allen Weiner.1 Yet, I write to point out some oaws in Sagan and Weiner’s assertion that the prohibition on civilian reprisals in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva... more
I enjoyed reading the thoughtful article by Scott Sagan and Allen Weiner.1 Yet, I write to point out some oaws in Sagan and Weiner’s assertion that the prohibition on civilian reprisals in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) applies to the United States.2 In 1987, the United States objected to the reprisal ban in Protocol I3 because it would “remove a signiacant deterrent that protects civilians and war victims on all sides of a conoict.”4 Abraham D. Sofaer, legal adviser to the U.S. Department of State, provided
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ABSTRACT
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In a recent issue of International Security, Scott Sagan argues that the current U.S. policy of “calculated ambiguity” is oawed.1 This policy regards the use of chemical or biological weapons against the United States as a serious act of... more
In a recent issue of International Security, Scott Sagan argues that the current U.S. policy of “calculated ambiguity” is oawed.1 This policy regards the use of chemical or biological weapons against the United States as a serious act of aggression and threatens an overwhelming response to such attacks, although the means of retaliation are intentionally left ambiguous. The policy is intended to strengthen the ability of the United States to deter a chemical or biological attack, by leaving open the possibility that the United States will respond to such an attack with a nuclear strike. Sagan contends that reliance on calculated ambiguity may give rise to a commitment trap, where “the U.S. president would feel compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons in order to maintain his or her international and domestic reputation for honoring commitments” (p. 87). Sagan argues that the United States should abandon the calculated ambiguity doctrine and replace it “with a stronger commitment to respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons with prompt and devastating conventional retaliation” (p. 86). Sagan’s argument suffers from two problems. First, he does not explain why, under the doctrine of calculated ambiguity, a decision by the United States to respond to the use of chemical or biological weapons with conventional means would give rise to negative reputational effects. Clearly, if the United States decided not to respond at all, its reputation and credibility would suffer. But if it responds with conventional weapons instead of nuclear weapons, as long as the conventional response is devastating enough to outweigh the gains from aggression and serve as a deterrent to the future use of chemical and biological weapons, it is not clear why any loss of credibility would occur. In other words, negative reputational effects follow from the failure to carry out the threatened punishment, not from the failure to carry out the threatened punishment by a particular means. This is illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis, Sagan’s own example of a commitment trap. As Sagan notes, “In a September 13 press conference, [President John F. Kennedy] Correspondence Susan B. Martin
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Studies of nuclear proliferation share five serious problems. First, nuclear programs' initiation and completion dates are ambiguous and difficult to code, but findings are rarely subjected to sufficient robustness tests using... more
Studies of nuclear proliferation share five serious problems. First, nuclear programs' initiation and completion dates are ambiguous and difficult to code, but findings are rarely subjected to sufficient robustness tests using alternative codings. Second, independent variables overlook important factors such as prestige and bureaucratic power and often use poor proxies for concepts such as the nonproliferation regime. Third, methodologies and data sets should be tightly coupled to empirical questions but are instead often chosen for convenience. Fourth, some findings provide insights already known or believed to be true. Fifth, findings can ignore or gloss over data crucial for policy making and wider debates. This article reviews new quantitative research on nuclear proliferation, noting improved analysis and lingering problems. It highlights the 1999 Kargil war to explore dangers of relying on stock data sets and the need for research on statistical outliers. It concludes with...
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The case studies presented in this volume are valuable contributions to the literature on nuclear security, as they bring to light new evidence of instances when nuclear test sites, weapons in transit, and deployed weapons were threatened... more
The case studies presented in this volume are valuable contributions to the literature on nuclear security, as they bring to light new evidence of instances when nuclear test sites, weapons in transit, and deployed weapons were threatened during times of political instability. The authors did not, of course, discover instances in which nuclear weapons were actually stolen or used by rogue officers, revolutionary mobs, or terrorists. So there is a significant puzzle about how best to interpret the “close call” incidents highlighted in these cases. Organizational scholars James March, Lee Sproull, and Michal Tamuz have argued:
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In this essay, I propose five principles to make U.S. nuclear deterrence policy more just and effective in the future: sever the link between the mass killing of innocent civilians and nuclear deterrence by focusing targeting on... more
In this essay, I propose five principles to make U.S. nuclear deterrence policy more just and effective in the future: sever the link between the mass killing of innocent civilians and nuclear deterrence by focusing targeting on adversaries’ military power and senior political leadership, not their population; never use or plan to use a nuclear weapon against any target that could be destroyed or neutralized by conventional weapons; reject “belligerent reprisal” threats against civilians even in response to enemy attacks on one's own or allied civilians; replace nuclear “calculated ambiguity” threats against biological or cyberattacks with “deterrence by denial” strategies; and work in good faith toward eventual nuclear disarmament.
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In their contributions to the symposium “Just War and Unjust Soldiers,” Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and Robert O. Keohane add greatly to our understanding of how best to study and apply just war doctrine to real-world conflicts. We... more
In their contributions to the symposium “Just War and Unjust Soldiers,” Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and Robert O. Keohane add greatly to our understanding of how best to study and apply just war doctrine to real-world conflicts. We argue, however, that they underestimate both the degree to which the American public seeks revenge, rather than just reciprocity, and the extent of popular acceptance of violations of noncombatant immunity by soldiers perceived to be fighting for a just cause. We call on empirical political scientists, lawyers, psychologists, and historians to engage with moral philosophers and political theorists in debates about the influence of just war theory and the laws of armed conflict.
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In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize... more
In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United Stat...
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Contains Replication Data for: Kettle of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Non-Combatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel
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Living With Nuclear Weapons. [American Journal of Physics 52, 88 (1984)]. Albert Carnesale Author, Paul Doty Author, Stanley Hoffmann Author, Samuel P. Huntington Author, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Author, Scott D. Sagan Author, JE Gordon.... more
Living With Nuclear Weapons. [American Journal of Physics 52, 88 (1984)]. Albert Carnesale Author, Paul Doty Author, Stanley Hoffmann Author, Samuel P. Huntington Author, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Author, Scott D. Sagan Author, JE Gordon. Keywords ...
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Traditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in... more
Traditional just war doctrine holds that political leaders are morally responsible for the decision to initiate war, while individual soldiers should be judged solely by their conduct in war. According to this view, soldiers fighting in an unjust war of aggression and soldiers on the opposing side seeking to defend their country are morally equal as long as each obeys the rules of combat. Revisionist scholars, however, maintain that soldiers who fight for an unjust cause bear at least some responsibility for advancing an immoral end, even if they otherwise fight ethically. This article examines the attitudes of the American public regarding the moral equality of combatants. Utilizing an original survey experiment, we find that the public's moral reasoning is generally more consistent with that of the revisionists than with traditional just war theory. Americans in our study judged soldiers who participate in unjust wars as less ethical than soldiers in just wars, even when their...
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... and followed by en-dorsements from similar sets of former leaders from the United Kingdom, Ger-many, Poland, Australia, and Italy ... tently lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging US allies currently liv-ing under “the US... more
... and followed by en-dorsements from similar sets of former leaders from the United Kingdom, Ger-many, Poland, Australia, and Italy ... tently lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging US allies currently liv-ing under “the US nuclear umbrella” of extended deterrence to pursue ...
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ABSTRACT
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ABSTRACT
... The Pakistani missile tests that occurred right after the BJP election victory did not cause Vajpayee's decision but were rather (in a phrase attributed to Brajesh Mishra, later... more
... The Pakistani missile tests that occurred right after the BJP election victory did not cause Vajpayee's decision but were rather (in a phrase attributed to Brajesh Mishra, later Vajpayee's national se-curity advisor) a good enough excuse to go ahead with the nuclear tests ...
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Research Interests: Political Philosophy, Art, Terrorism, Politics, China, and 11 moreVietnam War, World War II, Powers, Power, Nazism, Policies, Neorealism, Nazi, Force, Atomic, and Brent
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... Rationale for No First Use', Arms Control Today, JulyAugust 1999; on defensive last resort see McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe, Jr and Sidney D. Drell, 'Reducing Nuclear Danger', Foreign Affairs ... Praful Bidwai,... more
... Rationale for No First Use', Arms Control Today, JulyAugust 1999; on defensive last resort see McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe, Jr and Sidney D. Drell, 'Reducing Nuclear Danger', Foreign Affairs ... Praful Bidwai, 'Nuclear South Asia: Still on the Edge', Frontline Magazine, vol. ...