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Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the European Parliament (EP). The most direct consequence is the withdrawal of the 73-member strong UK contingent and the changing size of the political groups. Yet, the impact of... more
Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the European Parliament (EP). The most direct consequence is the withdrawal of the 73-member strong UK contingent and the changing size of the political groups. Yet, the impact of Brexit is also felt in more oblique ways. Focussing on the role and influence of the EP in the EU-UK negotiations, and of the British delegation in the EP, this article shows that the process, and not just the outcome of Brexit, has significant organisational implications for the EP and its political groups. Moreover, it also showcases the importance of informal rules and norms of behaviour, which were affected by Brexit well ahead of any formal change to the UK status as a Member State. The EP and its leadership ensured the active involvement of the EP in the negotiating process-albeit in different ways for the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship-and sought to minimise the costs of Brexit, reducing the clout of British members particularly in the allocation of legislative reports.
The consensus among most historians of European integration and political scientists is that Jacques Delors, who served as President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, was the most successful holder of that post to date. His... more
The consensus among most historians of European integration and political scientists is that Jacques Delors, who served as President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, was the most successful holder of that post to date. His agenda and accomplishments include the EU single market, the Single European Act, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the rapid integration of the former German Democratic Republic into the European Community. His combination of coherent agenda-setting and strong negotiating skills, acquired through long experience of trade union bargaining and years of ministerial responsibilities in turbulent times, puts Delors above other Commission Presidents, whether in terms of institutional innovation or the development of new Europe-wide policies. He also showed himself able to react swiftly to external events, notably the collapse of the Soviet bloc, whilst building Europe’s credibility on the international stage.
This Briefing records Delors' life across its crucial stages, from trade union activist, senior civil servant, French politician, and Member of the European Parliament, to the helm of the European Commission, where he left the greatest individual impact on European integration history to date. It also traces the most important ideas that guided Delors in his national and European roles. Finally, it describes the political events and key actors which made Delors' decade in office a time of important decisions and progress in the process of European integration and, in doing so, it draws on recent academic literature and on speeches Delors gave in the European Parliament.
Drawing from work on deliberation and information-access, this paper conceptually frames why and when different types of interests mobilize across the parliamentary policy cycle. We posit that each policy stage holds its own deliberative... more
Drawing from work on deliberation and information-access, this paper conceptually frames why and when different types of interests mobilize across the parliamentary policy cycle. We posit that each policy stage holds its own deliberative purpose and logic, leading to a variation in the type and volume of information demanded. The legitimacy of the expertise interest groups provide is affected by their organizational characteristics. To ensure the smooth flow of the policy process, members of parliament encourage groups that legitimately hold relevant information to mobilize at each policy stage, while lobbyists choose to mobilize when their expertise allows them to better influence policy-makers' debates. We test our argument in the context of the European Parliament, following a unique survey of the 8th legislature (2014–2019). The responses lend support to our model. In a policy process that contains various stages of deliberation, different organizations hold an information expertise key that gives them access at different stages. Significantly, less studied groups, such as think tanks and consultancies, mobilize well ahead of others in the cycle's initial phases; while lobbyists representing public constituencies dominate in the final stages. The paper contributes to broader theoretical discussions on pluralism, bias, and deliberation in policy-making.
When Walter Hallstein became the first President of the European Economic Community Commission, in 1958, a long career already lay behind him: legal scholar, university professor, research manager, diplomat and German government... more
When Walter Hallstein became the first President of the European Economic Community Commission, in 1958, a long career already lay behind him: legal scholar, university professor, research manager, diplomat and German government representative at the conferences drafting the founding treaties of the European Coal and Steel Community and then the European Economic Community. The federalist ideas he developed and the emphasis he placed on supranational institutions remain among his most important legacies. Equally significant was his administrative capacity to build an institution of a completely new type and to anticipate policies that seemed utopian at the time but turned out to be necessary many years later. This impetus to push for further integration earned Hallstein strong opposition from several national leaders, and eventually led to his precipitous departure. This briefing recalls three principal aspects of Hallstein's life: as a scholar and research administrator, as a protagonist of German foreign policy and, of course, as a crucial architect of the early period of European integration.
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Parliament (EP) the power to consent on the terms of the withdrawal agreement between the exiting state and the EU. As Brexit is the first case where art. 50 has been invoked, the role... more
Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Parliament (EP) the power to consent on the terms of the withdrawal agreement between the exiting state and the EU. As Brexit is the first case where art. 50 has been invoked, the role of the EP in such a procedure is uncharted territory. This article assesses to what extent the EP has
contributed to the Brexit negotiations until November 2018. Drawing on official documentation and thirteen original interviews with EU policy-makers, it maps the Parliament’s organisational adaptation to prepare itself for the challenge. Through its steering group and coordinator, and by carefully issuing resolutions, the EP has managed
to become a ‘quasi-negotiator’. More difficult to detect is the EP’s actual influence, as its preferences were closely aligned to those of the other EU institutions. Overall, the EP had a selective attention in the process, primarily focusing on citizens’ rights.
The constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union has become a quasi-legal concept not only in academic discourse but also in the EU treaties themselves. Democratic government is of course an important part of this... more
The constitutional identity of the Member States of the European Union has become a quasi-legal concept not only in academic discourse but also in the EU treaties themselves. Democratic government is of course an important part of this identity. However, as the 2009 judgment ...
Over the past years the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have pushed for adoption of legislative acts after the first reading. Many MEPs have started to see this increased efficiency coming at a political price. First, it... more
Over the past years the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have pushed for adoption of legislative acts after the first reading. Many MEPs have started to see this increased efficiency coming at a political price. First, it reduces opportunities for the Parliament to be perceived by the public and the media as an arena for political arbitrage. Second, some authors hold that it changes the playing field for different categories of stakeholders. This paper investigates the widespread claim that business interests may be better equipped to influence the outcome of early adoptions than other groups. Based on a case study in climate policy utilizing structured qualitative interviews with key negotiators, both inside and outside the institutions. We examine hypotheses concerning the relative impact of for-profit and not-for-profit actors and the relative weight of the Parliament and the Council. The results show that business stake¬holders adapt better to the new setting. The paper concludes that early adoptions may have implications concerning the democratic deficit in EU law making and lead to a biased distribution of influence between different actors.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Im Juni 2004 wurde das Europäische Parlament zum sechsten Mal für weitere fünf Jahre direkt gewählt. Die Wahlbeteiligung, das Wahlergebnis sowie die intraparlamentarischen und interinstitutionellen Organisationsprozesse geben Anlass zur... more
Im Juni 2004 wurde das Europäische Parlament zum sechsten Mal für weitere fünf Jahre direkt gewählt. Die Wahlbeteiligung, das Wahlergebnis sowie die intraparlamentarischen und interinstitutionellen Organisationsprozesse geben Anlass zur interdisziplinären, wissenschaftlichen und vorausschauenden Analyse. Dabei stehen als Kernfragen u.a. im Vordergrund: Wie ist die Europawahl zu bewerten? Mit welchen Aufgaben werden die Abgeordneten, Fraktionen, Ausschüsse und weiteren Gremien in der kommenden Legislaturperiode konfrontiert? Schließlich sind die Rollen und Funktionen des Parlaments in wichtigen Politikfeldern und Schlüsselprojekten der EU, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Finanzverfassung der EU, die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, und die Umweltpolitik zu untersuchen. Das sich aus den Analysen ergebende Bild ist vielschichtig.
Research Interests:
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and up to the adoption of the draft constitution by the IGC in June 2004, the European Parliament has acquired growing legislative influence, redefining its relationship with the... more
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and up to the adoption of the draft constitution by the IGC in June 2004, the European Parliament has acquired growing legislative influence, redefining its relationship with the Council and modifiying the balance of powers among the three institutions, arguably to the detriment of the Commission. In contrast, a number of new provisions of the constitution, especially the “presidential” innovations, are designed to increase the Member States' influence. Only few areas of shared sovereignty are added, important fields of activity are left untouched or appear to be shifted under executive domination. This is particularly
manifest in foreign and macro-economic policy. Furthermore, the accession of ten new Member States, introducing new decision-making dynamics and enhanced socio-cultural and socio-economic diversity, combined with the historically novel coincidence of a liberalconservative Commission and a Parliament dominated by liberal-conservative groups, could reduce legislative proposals with redistributive or harmonizing ambitions. Borrowing instruments from both historical institutionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, we analyse selected institutional novelties of the constitution which will transform the future functioning of policymaking in the Union. In particular, the focus of the EU's activities could increasingly shift from the legislative to the executive domain, which raises the question of how, in which policy fields, and with which institutional interplay the Union will probably carry out its tasks under the new provisions in the foreseeable future, with rather limited resources.