Yulia Kazdobina

The bilateral security agreements signed by Ukraine and, so far, 17 partner states (hereafter the Bilateral Security Agreement, or BSA, states) could be seen as the first step towards forming a new approach to European security architecture that includes Ukraine and is designed to deter Russia rather than integrate it. Viewed with scepticism in Ukraine for not being legally binding and falling short of NATO Article 5 guarantees, the agreements do contain commitments from Ukraine's partners to provide long-term security assistance as Ukraine fights to restore its sovereignty and 1991 borders. Current military and political dynamics, however, indicate that the approach developed at the height of Ukraine’s military success is not adequate to meet the unrelenting Russian threat. A key question is whether the implementation of the agreements will be conducted and coordinated jointly by a coalition of the BSA states or bilaterally. Finally, it is important to define the relationship between the security framework formed by the bilateral agreements and the goal of Ukraine’s NATO membership.

The Crimean package of Western sanctions is supposed to stay in force until Russian troops leave the occupied peninsula. It has had a significant economic impact on Crimea’s economy but has failed to check the continuing militarisation of Crimea as well as human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The package is rather strong; yet, Russia has adapted to the restrictive measures and has learned to bypass some of them. The article argues that the occupation of Crimea has to be viewed in a wider context; violations of the sanctions should be investigated and corrected where necessary, and additional sanctions should be imposed.

What had once seemed an insignificant land grab in European backwater has turned into a major land and hybrid war in Europe with far reaching global consequences. Concentrating on conflict resolution in the east of Ukraine while leaving Crimea out of the equation allowed Russia to militarize the peninsula, occupy the sea of Azov and the Black Sea and use it as a launchpad for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2023. Striving not to escalate, many politicians and observers were ready to agree that Crimea held a special place for Russia and de facto acquiesce to President Putin’s claim that the issue had been settled and Crimea had become Russian for good. Rekindling the war, however, not only added urgency to Ukraine’s desire to liberate the peninsula but also put the issue of Crimea back on the table.

At the last round of negotiations with Russia in March 2022, Ukraine was ready to concentrate on achieving the end of hostilities first and negotiate Crimea’s fate for 10-15 years afterward. Since then, Ukraine’s position has hardened and grown firm. President Zelenskiy clearly stated that Ukraine would never forget that the Russian war had started with Crimea, and emphasized that the war would end with Crimea. Ukraine’s repeatedly stated prerequisite for peace talks is complete withdrawal of the Russian troops from Ukrainian territory within its internationally recognized borders. Regular attacks on the Russian military infrastructure in Crimea, attacks on the Kerch Strait bridge, and Russian ships and port infrastructure indicate that Ukraine is serious about achieving the goal.

Some politicians and analysts are weary of this intention believing that the loss of Crimea is unacceptable to the Kremlin and may unleash an uncontrolled escalation the west has been careful to avoid. The paper will argue that such fears are mostly a product of mirror imaging and that the liberation of Crimea is necessary to ensure security of the Black Sea region, Ukraine’s military and economic security, Crimea’s economic development, human rights of its residents, and achieve lasting peace based on key international law principles.

Two years into the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine is facing an acute manpower shortage. Although it tried to reform its mobilization system on the eve of the war, the changes had not been sufficient and had not been implemented in time to meet the wartime mobilization needs. While a large share of Ukrainian males liable for military service understand that mobilization is necessary, they believe that it needs to be just and better organized. Among things that deter people from going to the army are fears of the lack of proper training and ending up under a bad commander.

To improve the situation, Ukraine is taking a wide range of measures which include punishing corrupt mobilization officials, digitalizing military record keeping, introducing professional recruitment, making amendments to the mobilization law, and trying to balance its economic and military needs. While the process is generally democratic and there is an open discussion, Ukraine’s institutional weakness and the lack of clear leadership on the part of the country’s top officials make it disorderly and slow. This also opens up a window of opportunity for the Russian propaganda that has been active since as early as 2014 trying to undermine Ukraine’s willingness to fight.

Three ideal-typical narratives seek to reject, question or diminish the significance of the events of February–April 2014 as the start of the war. The three approaches are usually mixed with each other and can be observed in both Moscow’s worldwide Russian propaganda campaign to justify its aggression and non-Russian apologists’ discourses that rationalize the apathy, equivocation or enmity of their own country vis-à-vis Ukraine. The deep impact of these three narratives on international outlooks on the Russo-Ukrainian War is the main reason why many people outside Ukraine believe that the Russo-Ukrainian War began on 24 February 2022.
This report debunks these three naive or manipulative narratives on the start or origins of the Russo-Ukrainian War.