Julien Morency-Laflamme

Benin and Togo have much in common: both countries are former French colonies; throughout the 20th century, both have achieved a comparable level of economic development; both are characterized by a postcolonial history marked by coups d’états and waves of protestations in favour of democracy in the 1980s. Moreover, in both cases, these waves of protestations resulted in National Conferences and multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Yet, in spite of these similarities, only Benin has succeeded in establishing a democratic state. This thesis attempts to determine why this is the cases. By examining the influence of the opposition parties’ strategies in the overall transition process of Benin and Togo, one concludes that the degree of unity among opposition groups and the various compromises made with the government exerts a critical influence on the success or failure of democratic transitions.

Benin and Togo’s postcolonial histories have been shaped by the actions of military personnel. In both cases, governments were either placed into power or toppled by the military. This trend ended in Benin after 1991, when the military returned to the barracks. In Togo, as of 2020, Faure Gnassingbé’s government still relies on the armed forces to remain in power.

To understand this path divergence, it is necessary to look at the regimes that arose in 1967 in Togo and 1972 in Benin. After years of coup cycles and failed civilian or military governments, two leaders—Mathieu Kérékou in Benin and Étienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo—established stable military governments. In order to end coup cycles, both leaders put in place coup-proofing measures that profoundly influenced the composition of the armed forces of their respective countries. In Benin, the Kérékou government implemented a series of measures to heighten divisions among the armed forces and to preclude the coordination of rivals. In Togo, the Eyadéma government filled the army with those from the leader’s ethnic group and pushed out any rivals.

While both strategies were effective, as no successful coups were staged in either country after the early 1970s, they also influenced each government’s ability to rely on their armed forces to defend the standing regime. In Benin, the Kérékou government fell, as it could not rely on the armed forces to quell a civic resistance campaign, while in Togo, the Eyadéma government could count on military personnel to crush a similar campaign. Consequently, the 2020 Togolese government is still ruled by the Eyadéma clan and relies on ethnically stacked armed forces to maintain its power. In Benin, a new civilian government has started the process of reprofessionalizing the armed forces.

This article examines the role of trust between military officers and opposition forces in fostering mass defections of military personnel during pro-democracy uprisings. The current literature on military defection emphasizes the role of either opposition characteristics, or government control policies. Combining the two, however, takes better account of defection as an interaction between officers and the opposition. Through an analysis of civil–military relations during mass uprisings in Benin (1989–1990) and Togo (1990–1993), this article finds that loyalist stacking creates a core of military personnel with a strong stake in regime preservation, while counterbalancing leaves open the possibility for a military-opposition alliance. Alliance also depends on civic resistance campaign characteristics (the unity of the movement, its nonviolent character, the presence of opposition leaders with social ties to military personnel) and promises to military personnel that acknowledge the latter groups’ interests. These findings provide a new theoretical framework for understanding military actions during regime crises.

This article seeks to analyse why mass protests during the Arab Spring of 2010 did not always result in the toppling of authoritarian leaders and why in some cases it actually led to the reinforcement of certain authoritarian regimes. In attempting to understand this puzzle, most scholars have concentrated on the impact of populist movements but have overlooked the importance of the incumbent regime’s divisions and the character of its relationship with opposition forces. Drawing on O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory on transitions “from above”, this research demonstrates that authoritarian responses to mass protests were conditioned by the existence of divisions within the ruling circle itself. We argue that the only transitions to culminate in the establishment of an electoral democracy were those in which mass protests succeeded in provoking rifts between softliners and hardliners within the authoritarian elites and in which pro-reform forces subsequently negotiated new rules of governance with opposition forces. We also distinguish between latent crisis, when tensions within the regime exist but are contained, and overt crisis, when the unity of the ruling bloc is broken. We demonstrate our hypothesis by comparing events in Bahrain and in Egypt, two cases that led to very different political patterns and outcomes following the emergence of popular protest movements. In the case of Egypt, soft-liners managed to get the upper hand and Mubarak’s National Democratic Party was toppled, while in Bahrain the monarchy could count on the support of a majority of the ruling class that was largely opposed to political liberalization and ready to quell the opposition coalition.

This article proposes to reintegrate dynamics within authoritarian elites into the analysis of the democratization dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa. This variable has been excluded from nearly all analysis on the subject. Based on a comparison of three cases, this article concludes that only in cases where popular mobilization accompanied by deep divisions within the ruling coalition did democratization ensue. The division of the authoritarian coalition in Benin and South Africa created a window of opportunity through which pro-democracy forces effectively pushed through democratic reforms. Furthermore, only when a majority of the authoritarian elite in South Africa favoured negotiations with the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid political organisations did the transition towards democracy in South Africa made any progress. In contrast, in the Togolese case, a united ruling coalition precluded any reform that would have challenged their political hegemony.

This paper seeks to elucidate why mass protests during the 2010/11 Arab Spring did not always result in the toppling of authoritarian leaders as it even led to the reinforcement of certain authoritarian regimes. In order to explain this puzzle, most scholars have concentrated on the impact of popular mobilization and social to the detriment of dynamics within authoritarian regimes. Drawing on O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory on transitions “from above”, this research aims at demonstrating that authoritarian responses to mass protests were conditioned by the existence of divisions within the ruling circle itself. Particularly, we argue that only those transitions in which mass protests have succeeded in provoking splits between softliners and hardliners within the authoritarian elites and in which pro-reform forces subsequently negotiated new rules of governance with opposition forces culminated in the instauration of an electoral democracy. We will demonstrate our hypothesis by comparing Bahrain, Egypt and Libya, three cases that followed different political patterns after the emergence of popular protest movements. Regime division will be identified by the presence or absence of credible reform propositions and by the appeal to outside support by certain members of the ruling.

This research explores the factors determining the success of democratization processes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, this research challenges the consensus that dynamics within authoritarian elites play a marginal role in the success or failure of democratic transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using a most-similar cases methodology, this paper compares two countries, Benin and Togo, which did not follow similar political patterns in the 1990s despite their many similarities. Both states are former French colonies, which were characterized by a postcolonial history of successive military coups. Further, waves of popular protests in both states resulted in national conferences and multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Yet, despite these similarities, only Benin has succeeded in establishing a democratic state. The hypothesis of this research is that the armed forces’ decision to support or oppose the demands for political reforms largely influences the possibilities of a successful transition to democracy.

This research proposes an analysis of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy (TD). TD has been the subject of many researches, in particular since the end of the 1960s. This research attempted to identify the roots of those regime changes. Most researchers agree that TD is initiated by a conflict or crisis which affects the very legitimacy of the regime. These conflicts have been defined differently according to different authors: new versus old elites, civil society versus the authoritarian regime (RA), or between reformers and hardliners within the RA.
In this research, we criticize this consensus among Africanists. By applying the theoretical framework developed by Schmitter and O’Donnell in “Transition from Authoritarian rule” to the Benin, South African and Togo cases, this research will demonstrate the important how pro-reform forces within authoritarian regimes are a key feature of successful transition to democratic in Africa.

Les transitions démocratiques (TD) ont été le sujet de plusieurs recherches depuis la fin des années 1960. La position prédominante chez les spécialistes de la démocratisation consiste à voir la source de ces transitions dans des crises de légitimité des régimes autoritaires (RA). Cette position n’est cependant pas partagée par les africanistes se spécialisant sur l’étude des TD. Ces derniers estiment plutôt que les TD en Afrique seraient causés par des manques d’argent ou des crises du modèle néo patrimonial (marqué par des liens de loyautés tribaux et l’utilisation massive du clientélisme).
Dans cette recherche, nous offrons une analyse critique du consensus défendu par les africanistes. En appliquant le modèle de la transitologie tirée de Schmitter et O’Donnell « Transition from Authoritarian rule » au cas de l’Afrique du Sud, cette étude veut démontrer l’importance des forces réformatrices à l’intérieur du régime de l’apartheid au succès ultime de la TD sud-africaine et, conséquemment, remettre en question le consensus sur les TD africaines.

On a beaucoup parlé des diamants de la guerre en Afrique. Il est maintenant question du pétrole de la guerre. L'universitaire québécois, Julien Morency-Laflamme a fait des recherches à ce sujet, et a présenté ses résultats la semaine dernière, au congrès de l'Association francophone pour le Savoir- l'ACFAS.

Les transitions démocratiques (TD) ont été le sujet de plusieurs recherches depuis la fin des années 1960. La position prédominante chez les spécialistes de la démocratisation consiste à voir la source de ces transitions dans des crises de légitimité des régimes autoritaires (RA). Cette position n’est cependant pas partagée par les africanistes se spécialisant sur l’étude des TD. Ces derniers estiment plutôt que les TD en Afrique seraient causés par des manques d’argent ou des crises du modèle néo patrimonial (marqué par des liens de loyautés tribaux et l’utilisation massive du clientélisme).
Dans cette recherche, nous offrons une analyse critique du consensus défendu par les africanistes. À l’aide de deux études de cas portant sur le Bénin et le Togo, nous argumentons que les forces armées ont eu une influence déterminante sur les TD dans ces deux pays. Nous concluons, contrairement au consensus des africanistes, qu’il est possible dans ces deux cas précis de retracer la source des TD à une crise de légitimité du RA. Si notre argumentation est valide, notre recherche remet en question le besoin de disposer de thèse spécifique quand aux TD africaines.

Cette recherche s'est penchée sur le lien entre les guerres civiles et la présence de réserves pétrolières dans les pays en développement. L'hypothèse de travail est que le pétrole augmente la valeur relative d'une région donnée, ce qui encourage à la fois les mouvements armés et les gouvernements de tenter d'établir une hégémonie sur les revenus issus de son exploitation. Cette recherche propose une application des principaux facteurs identifiés par la littérature théorique sur le sujet aux trois grands états pétroliers de l'Afrique subsaharienne (l'Angola, le Nigéria et le Soudan) afin d'explorer l'implication de ces théories sur les différents cas. Cette recherche a, ainsi, identifié quatre facteurs distincts reliant les réserves pétrolières à l'intensification des guerres civiles: la découverte de réserve pétrolière encore inexploitée, le recrutement par les mouvements rebelles, le financement de l'appareil de sécurité et, finalement, la concentration des réserves pétrolières dans une région donnée et la recrudescence du sécessionnisme dans la même région. Ces facteurs démontrent que le pétrole a réellement une influence sur l'intensification (donc un effet catalyseur) des guerres civiles.

Dans cette présentation, nous argumentons que la méthode inductive (bottom-up) est plus favorable que la méthode hypothético-déductive (top-down) en sciences sociales. À la suite d’une revue de littérature sur le sujet, nous expliquons comment la méthode inductive permet d’obtenir des conclusions fiables et comment cette méthode permet d’éviter certains problèmes importants de la méthode hypothético-déductive. En appliquant la théorie explicative manipulationniste de Woodward (2003) et une analyse en termes de robustesse (Wimsatt 2007) à cette méthode, nous concluons qu’elle permet de favoriser le développement d’explications satisfaisantes et de résultats robuste.

Afin d’illustrer le fonctionnement de cette méthode ainsi que le type d’erreur qu’elle permet d’éviter, nous présentons une étude utilisant cette méthode provenant de la science politique. Cette étude est une analyse du lien entre le système électoral et le comportement des électeurs. Pour plusieurs analystes, la représentation proportionnelle (RP) amène un plus grand fractionnement des parlements que le mode scrutin uninominal majoritaire à un tour (majoritaire), utilisé en ce moment au Canada (Hoag & Hallet, 1969). Afin de vérifier la véracité de cette théorie, les résultats électoraux de quatre pays, l’Allemagne, le Canada, l’Espagne et la Nouvelle-Zélande, deux avec un système RP et deux avec système majoritaire, furent analysés afin de vérifier si le système électoral a un effet sur la prépondérance des deux principaux partis. Nos résultats semblent proposer que le système électoral n’ait pas d’effet significatif sur la prépondérance des deux principaux partis.

En conclusion, nous suggérons que nos résultats sont utiles pour les sciences sociales, mais aussi exportables dans des domaines académiques plus normatifs tels l’éthique et la philosophie politique.

Benin and Togo have much in common: both countries are former French colonies; throughout the 20th century, both have achieved a comparable level of economic development; both are characterized by a postcolonial history marked by coups d’états and waves of protestations in favour of democracy in the 1980s. Moreover, in both cases, these waves of protestations resulted in National Conferences and multiparty elections in the early 1990s. Yet, in spite of these similarities, only Benin has succeeded in establishing a democratic state. This thesis attempts to determine why this is the cases. By examining the influence of the opposition parties’ strategies in the overall transition process of Benin and Togo, one concludes that the degree of unity among opposition groups and the various compromises made with the government exerts a critical influence on the success or failure of democratic transitions.

Book chapter: “Successes and Breakdowns: Democratization Stories from Sub-Saharan Africa” Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou et Timothy D. Sisk (eds) Rebooting Transitology: Democratic Transitions in the 21st century (forthcoming –September 2016- with Routledge)

In 1989, as Namibia held its first multiparty election since the country’s independence, a wave of democratisation was ignited all over Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Until then, the sub-continent’s regimes had, for the most part, been authoritarian.  Afterwards, the evolution of SSA’s regimes has taken a variety of directions: electoral democracies flourished in a number of cases, hegemonic authoritarian regimes maintained themselves in power and, in most cases, hybrid regimes, also called anocracies, took shape. While the initial period of regime changes in the early 1990s eventually came to an end, SSA’s regimes continued to evolve, sometimes quite drastically, over the following twenty years. Autocrats who had managed to hold on to power through the end of the twentieth century lost their power monopoly and had to leave office. Inversely, in certain states, democratic processes were derailed.

According to Polity IV, there were two periods of democratic rise: first from 1988 to 1995 and then from 2000 to 2010.  These two sub-waves are at the core of this chapter’s analysis of common trends among SSA’s regime transitions. While the multiple regime trajectories of SSA states do highlight that regime transitions do not have fixed outcomes, they point to the importance of actors in the transition stories.  In their key work on the 1989-1994 African democratic wave, Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle claim that popular protests were the main igniter of regime change in Africa.  They also draw attention to the critical role played by the armed forces, which often ‘determined’ the fate of democratisation processes.  Other works examining the same period also highlight the critical role played by actors in African democratisation processes, indicating that the outcome of regime crisis was anything but fixed and that the decisions of domestic and international actors could be seen as the strongest explanatory factors.

This chapter assesses the actions of four critical actors: the incumbent regime, the opposition forces, the armed forces and the international community. It then outlines the transitional paths that can be identified in Africa. Finally, it assesses the modes of transition taken by SSA states in order to find common characteristics among successful transition cases. While the transition processes varied greatly, from transition through ruptures to foreign-backed transitions, all successful transitions established political limitations on actions of the various political forces; in a large number of successful democratisation cases, this political limitation was put in place through formal or informal agreements among the main actors. These constraints also came from other factors, namely the weakness of incumbent elites, demands by foreign actors or even fear that political alternatives could result in major civil strife and/or coups. Furthermore, with a few exceptions, successful democratisation was accompanied by the creation of relatively strong opposition parties to prevent the incumbent from monopolising power.

This article integrates the dynamics within authoritarian elites into analysis of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. This variable has been excluded from nearly all analysis on the subject. Based on a comparison of three cases, this article concludes that only in cases where popular mobilization was accompanied by deep divisions within the ruling coalition did democratization ensue. The division of the authoritarian coalition in Benin and South Africa created a window of opportunity which enabled pro-democracy forces to push through democratic reforms. Furthermore, only when a majority of the authoritarian elite in South Africa favoured negotiations with the African National Congress and other anti-apartheid political organizations did the transition towards democracy in South Africa make any progress. In contrast, in the Togolese case, a united ruling coalition precluded any reform that would have challenged its political hegemony.

Cette recherche s'est penchée sur le lien entre les guerres civiles et la présence de réserves pétrolières dans les pays en développement. L'hypothèse de travail est que le pétrole augmente la valeur relative d'une région donnée, ce qui encourage à la fois les mouvements armés et les gouvernements de tenter d'établir une hégémonie sur les revenus issus de son exploitation. Cette recherche propose une application des principaux facteurs identifiés par la littérature théorique sur le sujet aux trois grands états pétroliers de l'Afrique subsaharienne (l'Angola, le Nigéria et le Soudan) afin d'explorer l'implication de ces théories sur les différents cas. Cette recherche a, ainsi, identifié quatre facteurs distincts reliant les réserves pétrolières à l'intensification des guerres civiles: la découverte de réserve pétrolière encore inexploitée, le recrutement par les mouvements rebelles, le financement de l'appareil de sécurité et, finalement, la concentration des réserves pétrolières dans une région donnée et la recrudescence du sécessionnisme dans la même région. Ces facteurs démontrent que le pétrole a réellement une influence sur l'intensification (donc un effet catalyseur) des guerres civiles.

This Ph.D. dissertation analyzes the factors that influence armed forces’ decisions to tolerate or suppress opposition movements demanding political reforms which could lead to regime change. This dissertation helps to fill a large gap in the literature as only a few scholars have attempted to explain military behaviour during regime crisis. It does so
through an analysis of how anti-coup policies and opposition forces’ characteristics lead to the formation of marginalized military cliques and their potential support for regime change. It theorizes that the head of state’s survival strategy, specifically coup-proofing measures, influences military factions’ willingness to preserve the status quo. Reliance on
loyalists leads to armed forces with a powerful core loyal to the incumbent regime and willing to use repression, while the strategy of counterbalancing leads to armed forces largely unattached to the maintenance of the regime. Under these circumstances, opposition
forces can foster regime defection when they offer a viable alternative to the incumbent government, if the opposition can unify around a moderate platform that provides realist demands vis-à-vis regime forces.

The main argument, on the influence of divergent coup-proofing policies on military actions, is assessed through a comparison of Benin and Togo. In each state, authoritarian regimes responded to the challenge of opposition mobilization by initiating negotiation processes. Divergences in coup-prevention techniques and credible commitment capacity of the opposition explain why the opposition campaign in the beginning of the 1990s was successful in Benin but failed in Togo. This research is based
on two methods: process-tracing and the comparative method.