Christopher Badura
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institut für Philosophie I, Graduate Student
- Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institut für Philosophie II, Graduate StudentUniversity of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), Graduate Studentadd
- I did my PhD student in Philosophy (Logic) at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany, supervised by Heinrich Wansing and Francesco Berto (ILLC/St Andrews). My dissertation is titled "Logic(s) for Imagination".
In 2016, I obtained an M.Sc. in Logic from the University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.
In 2013, I graduated in Philosophy at the University of Hamburg, Germany, under the supervision of Benjamin Schnieder.
My interests are non-classical logics, modal logics, semantics of (expressions of) intentional states.edit
In Berto’s logic for aboutness in imagination, the output content of an imaginative episode must be part of the initial content of the episode (Berto, Philos Stud 175:1871–1886, 2018). This condition predicts expressions of perfectly... more
In Berto’s logic for aboutness in imagination, the output content of an imaginative episode must be part of the initial content of the episode (Berto, Philos Stud 175:1871–1886, 2018). This condition predicts expressions of perfectly legitimate imaginative episodes to be false. Thus, this condition is too strict. Relaxing the condition to correctly model these cases requires to consider a language with predicates and constants. The paper extends Berto’s semantics for aboutness in imagination to a semantics for such a language. The new semantics models contents of formulas along the lines of Hawke’s issue-based theory of topics (Hawke, Australas J Philos 96:697–723, 2017), while remaining faithful to the (in)validities discussed by Berto. Several relations between issues and topics are defined, which allow to overcome shortcomings of Hawke’s initial framework. These relations are then discussed with respect to their usefulness in the truth condition for the imagination operator.
We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis’s [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis’s possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as... more
We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis’s [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis’s possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis’s original view and show that our theory overcomes them.