FATIH CAGATAY CENGIZ

Demokrat Parti gelenegi ile baslatilabilecek olan merkez sag siyaset, Turk Sagi’nin temsil gucu acisindan en buyuk kanadini olusturmaktadir. Bu merkez sag siyasetin milliyetci ve Islâmci ideolojilerle olan rabitasi ‘devlet’ kavrami soz konusu oldugunda ontolojik bir ortaklasmanin nuvelerini gostermektedir. Devlet, kutsal bir varlik olarak milletin sadece koruyucusu olarak anlamlandirilmaz ayni zamanda pedagojik bir gorev de atfedilerek yuceltilir. Boylece, millet olmanin dogal bir sonucu olarak ortaya cikan devlet, milleti de etik degerlerle kodlar. Devletin ‘hikmet-i devlet’ olarak takdimi her ne kadar modern oncesi donemin kutsalligina atif yapsa da hizmet soylemi ve Makyavelist siyaset anlayisi merkez sagi, modern siyasetin gereklerini yerine getirmeye zorlamaktadir. Milletin koruyucusu olarak anlamlandirilan devletin burokratik ve ceberut yapisi merkez sag siyaset tarafindan modern/temsili demokrasi baglaminda elestirilir ancak bu elestiri de pragmatizmin ve cizdigi sinirlar cer...

2000’li yillarin baslarindaki soylemlerinde, neoliberal politikalara eklemlenmis sosyal devlet anlayisini benimsedigini, istikrarsiz ekonomik gidisata uluslararasi kurum ve kuruluslar ile kurdugu etkilesimle karsi koyacagini ve devlet merkezli yaklasimdan ziyade millet merkezli bir politik tercihte bulunagini aciklayan Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) zamanla izledigi siyasalar dogrultusunda hem kendini hem de “ulus tahayyulunu” donusturmustur. Soz konusu donusum, liberal/bireyci vatandas profiliyle kuresel bir nitelik kazanmaktayken, neoliberal populist siyasete eklemlenmis neoliberal milliyetciligi ile de “millet” olgusunu evrenselden yerele indirgemistir. Millet kavraminin algilanis seklini, neoliberal milliyetci yaklasimiyla politik ve ekonomik kararlarinda uygulayan AKP’nin bu tutumu, siyasal alana populist bir nitelik kazandirmis ve siyasal olanin soyut bir “halk” mefhumu ile olan baglantisini guclendirmistir. AKP’nin uzun yillardir siyasal iktidari elinde tutabilmesinin kayna...

wealth redistribution. Most importantly for Bayat, the NGO style of activism crystalizes not only the lack of intellectual anchor among the leaders but the absence of radicalism needed to match the challenges put forth by the neoliberal world structure. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brothers, with decades of underground activism behind them and with networks all over the country, took the laws of the market economy for granted. What Marx calls the poverty of philosophy has in the case of the Arab Spring fired back and decided the balance in favour of restorations of the pre-2011 orders. Bayat concludes with a note of hope highlighting how the logic of revolutions remains familiar with regressions before safely landing on solid egalitarian grounds. Readers, nevertheless, may still want to know how restorations can be reversed beyond the projection of the future via hope. Future research can investigate how curricula have been impoverished to the level that entire populations (including university graduates) have almost never heard of the kind of radicalism that can achieve a decisive break through. Militants can learn through reading circles the type of insurrectional literature and not staying overwhelmed from what is purposefully tagged as the daunting complexities of Hegel and Marx. Speaking of radicalism, the theoretical elaborations of these two must-read authors are disfigured in the academy today in order to maintain the neoliberal ethos in place. Despite his shrewd insights and meticulous distinctions, Bayat seems to internalize neoliberal ethos less as a historicism and more as a static given, fixating the present with little aspirations for ever overcoming such ethos. Is it not true that neoliberalism itself is witnessing a mortal struggle for survival? Bayat contrasts the 2011 revolutionaries against their counterparts in Iran 1979 or Cuba in 1959, overlooking that even when the restoration did not take place in these two situations, neoliberalism in the guise of state-capitalism soon took over. How long the shura committees in Iranian factories were tolerated and in what circumstances before they were banned? Capital always goes to great lengths not to tolerate an alternative. Its inherent contradictions, nevertheless, the ones that oblige it to compete against its own achievements will eventually usher in its ruin. Meanwhile, the embittered but unrelenting ‘wretched-of-the-earth’ of Tahrir and their analogues everywhere can still learn to be useful by abstaining from staying complicit in their own servitude.

Nihal Atsiz ve Kemalizm uzerine yapilan akademik tartismalar genellikle Atsiz’in resmi ideoloji elestirileri uzerine yogunlasmaktadir. Bu elestirilere gore, Atsiz’in soy tetkikine dayanan irkciligi, sulhe ve tembellige karsi secaati ve savasmayi salik vermesi, Batililasma’yi bir tur yozlasma ve yabancilasma olarak goren tavri; Kemalizm’in Turk vatandasligi, muasirlasma ve bariscil dis politika anlayisiyla tezatlik olusturmaktadir. Millet, medeniyet ve siyaset tanimlari uzerindeki farklilik, iki dusunce sistemi arasinda uzlasmaz bir celiski gormektedir. Bu makale bu iddialarin aksine, Atsiz’in din algisinin Kemalizm’in dinsel pratikleriyle ortustugunu, milli ve sekuler bir din yaratma isteginin Turkculuk ile Kemalizm’i ortaklastirdigini iddia etmektedir. Nihal Atsiz’in milli bir Diyanet’i dini taassuba karsi mucadeleye cagirmasi ve tarikatlarin dini inhisarina karsi devletin inhisarinda etno-sekuler bir din arzusu, 1930’larin Kemalist din politikalariyla kosutluk gostermektedir. Kema...

While much has been written to explain the mutation of Islamic-oriented parties in Turkey from pursuing an Islamic ideological cause to embracing vote-seeking behavior and democratic processes, little effort has been made to explain why the far-right establishment – represented by the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) – still resists ideological change. This article argues that fortification of nationalism with Islam in the party, the party’s identification with Turkey’s national security issues, and the construction of personality cult around party founder Alparslan Türkeş restrict its ideological moderation. Nevertheless, the party benefits from this ideological immoderation to be a key player in Turkish politics. In other words, while ideological immoderation prevents the MHP from embracing a pluralistic political stance, it has also been functional to exert its nationalist ideology on the state without sharing governmental power.

Öz Demokrat Parti geleneği ile başlatılabilecek olan merkez sağ siyaset, Türk Sağı'nın temsil gücü açısından en büyük kanadını oluşturmaktadır. Bu merkez sağ siyasetin milliyetçi ve İslâmcı ideolojilerle olan rabıtası 'devlet' kavramı söz konusu olduğunda ontolojik bir ortaklaşmanın nüvelerini göstermektedir. Devlet, kutsal bir varlık olarak milletin sadece koruyucusu olarak anlamlandırılmaz aynı zamanda pedagojik bir görev de atfedilerek yüceltilir. Böylece, millet olmanın doğal bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan devlet, milleti de etik değerlerle kodlar. Devletin 'hikmet-i devlet' olarak takdimi her ne kadar modern öncesi dönemin kutsallığına atıf yapsa da hizmet söylemi ve Makyavelist siyaset anlayışı merkez sağı, modern siyasetin gereklerini yerine getirmeye zorlamaktadır. Milletin koruyucusu olarak anlamlandırılan devletin bürokratik ve ceberut yapısı merkez sağ siyaset tarafından modern/temsili demokrasi bağlamında eleştirilir ancak bu eleştiri de pragmatizmin ve çizdiği sınırlar çerçevesinde kalır. Öte yandan 'laf değil hizmet' üreten siyaset, her ne kadar merkez sağın kurucu unsuru olsa da Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ile bu siyaset, bir nümayiş siyasetine dönüşmüştür. Diğer bir anlatımla, hizmetin yapılması kadar onun gösterimi de merkez sağ siyasetin önemli bir unsuru haline gelmektedir. Hizmetin nümayişle buluşması son kertede siyaseti de teknik bir alana sıkıştırmaktadır. Bu makale, Türkiye' deki merkez sağ siyasetin pre-modern ve modern öncüllerini incelemeyi amaçladığı gibi bu ikili arasındaki çelişkileri de açığa çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir. Abstract The center-right politics that can be traced back to the legacy of the Democratic Party in Turkey constitutes a major part of the Turkish Right with respect to its representative power. The connection between the center-right politics with the nationalist and Islamist ideologies essentially demonstrates an ontological rapprochement when the term 'state' is taken into account. The state as a sacred entity is not only perceived as the protector of the nation but also canonized by attributing it to a pedagogical task. Therefore, the state as the natural outcome of nation codifies the nation with ethical values. Whereas the presentation of the state by the center-right politics as the embodiment of reason d' état refers to a sacred notion of the pre-modern era, the discourse on service and Machiavellian politics compels it to perform the exigencies of modern politics. Moreover, the bureaucratic and despotic structure of the state, which is interpreted as the protector of the nation, is criticized with respect to modern/ representative democracy, however, the criticism remains within the lines that pragmatism draws. On the other hand, although 'politics of service against politics of empty talk' has been the constitutive * Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi,

This book which has multidisciplinary studies from different areas of social sciences has been prepared in order to contribute to the growing and developing science world by getting closer to each other day by day. In this context the studies, which were from many different fields, especially in economics, business, political science and law, were dedicated to our valuable readers in a common platform. Studies in the book has been prepared, sampled and examined in accordance with current developments and problems. In this aspect we aimed to contributing the science world by bringing a multidisciplinary and different approach. If you share thought, that science should be considered as multidisciplinary, you are reading the correct book.

2000'li yılların başlarındaki söylemlerinde, neoliberal politikalara eklemlenmiş sosyal devlet anlayışını benimsediğini, istikrarsız ekonomik gidişata uluslararası kurum ve kuruluşlar ile kurduğu etkileşimle karşı koyacağını ve devlet merkezli yaklaşımdan ziyade millet merkezli bir politik tercihte bulunacağını açıklayan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) zamanla izlediği siyasalar doğrultusunda hem kendini hem de "ulus tahayyülünü" dönüştürmüştür. Söz konusu dönüşüm, liberal/bireyci vatandaş profiliyle küresel bir nitelik kazanmaktayken, neoliberal popülist siyasete eklemlenmiş neoliberal milliyetçiliği ile de "millet" olgusunu evrenselden yerele indirgemiştir. Millet kavramının algılanış şeklini, neoliberal milliyetçi yaklaşımıyla politik ve ekonomik kararlarında uygulayan AKP'nin bu tutumu, siyasal alana popülist bir nitelik kazandırmış ve siyasal olanın soyut bir "halk" mefhumu ile bağlantısını güçlendirmiştir. AKP'nin uzun yıllardır siyasal iktidarı elinde tutabilmesinin kaynağının anlamlandırılması açısından neoliberalizm, neoliberal popülizm ve neoliberal milliyetçilik arasındaki bağlantı önem taşımaktadır. İktidarının başından itibaren milliyetçilikle arasına mesafe koymuş olan AKP, sonrasında değişen uluslararası konjonktüre bağlı olarak, klasik milliyetçi anlayıştan farklı olduğuna inandığı milliyetçi kimlikleri bünyesine katmıştır. Türk siyasetinin kilit kavramlarından olan muhafazakârlık, milliyetçilik, İslâmcılık gibi düşünceleri, Neo-Osmanlıcılık ve neoliberalizm hattında yeniden revize eden AKP, bu yönüyle, Türk siyasal hayatında kendine özel bir yer edinmiştir. Bu çalışma; söz konusu dönüşümün kırılma noktalarını ve söz konusu kırılmaların ortaya çıkardığı "ulus tahayyülünü", Recep İvedik 4 ve Recep İvedik 5 filmleri üzerinden karşılaştırmalı olarak ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Böylece, çalışma, siyaset ve sinema arasındaki etkileşimi açığa çıkardığı gibi, Türk siyasal hayatının kırılma ve dönüşüm momentlerinin sinemada da kendisini gösterdiğini iddia etmektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Siyasal Hayatı, Neoliberalizm, Kamu Yararı, Milliyetçilik, Neo-Osmanlıcılık READING THE TURKISH POLITICAL LIFE OF THE 2000s VIA RECEP İVEDİK 4 AND RECEP İVEDİK 5 MOVIES ABSTRACT In the early 2000s, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) transformed both itself and its "imagination of the nation", while declaring that it adopted the welfare state that was articulated into neoliberal policies, that it would encounter the unstable economic development with its interaction with international institutions and organizations, and that it would make a nation-centered political choice rather than a state-centered approach. While this transformation has gained a global character with its liberal/individualist citizenship perspective, it has also reduced the phenomenon of the "nation" from its universal understanding to local one with regard to neoliberal nationalism, which has been incorporated into neoliberal populist politics. The policy of the AKP, which implements the concept of nation in its political and economic decisions through its neoliberal nationalist approach, has taken a populist character in the political field, while strengthening the connection of the political with an abstract notion of "people". The connection between neoliberalism, neoliberal populism and neoliberal nationalism is important in terms of making sense of the AKP's ability to hold political power for many years. Depending on the changing international conjuncture, the AKP, which had distanced itself from nationalism from the very beginning of its power, has incorporated nationalist identities throughout time. The AKP, which transformed the key concepts of Turkish politics such as conservatism, nationalism and Islamism along the lines of Neo

Bu makale, sekülerleşme kavramına eleştirel bir değerlendirme getirmeyi amaçladığı gibi, kavramı Batı dışı modernleşmenin uğrağı olan Türkiye üzerinden de incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Makale ilk olarak, klasik kuramcıların din olgusuna nasıl yaklaştıklarını ele almakta ve bu kuramcıların dinsellik ile toplumsallık arasındaki bağı modernleşme düşüncesi üzerinden kurduklarını iddia etmektedir. Klasik kuramcıların çağdaş kuramcılara bıraktığı bu miras, modernleşmenin zorunlu olarak sekülerleşmeye yol açtığını öne sürmektedir. Ancak, bu makalenin iddia ettiği gibi sekülerleşme, doğrusal ve evrensel bir süreç olmayıp, Batı Avrupa'da devlet ve Kilise arasındaki iktidar mücadelesinin ve Aydınlanma geleneğinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Kavramın içinde doğduğu sosyo-politik formasyonun göz ardı edilmesi, sekülerleşme kavramını apolitikleştirmekte ve modernleşen her toplumda "olması gereken" bir süreç olarak imlemektedir. Türkiye özelinde bakıldığında ise, "zorunlu sekülerleşmenin" ekonomi, siyaset ve eğitim gibi alt sistemlerdeki "yeniden kutsallaşma" momentlerini görmediği iddia edilebilir. Bu makale, sekülerleşme kavramının Türkiye özelinde doğrusal bir süreç izlemediğini, modernleşme krizlerinin birçok alt sistemde deseküler bir yapı ortaya çıkardığını göstermektedir.

Drawing on the theory of sub-imperialism, this article focuses on the roles of race and religion in the construction of South Africa and Turkey’s regional expansions. It argues that while ‘black control of politics and white control of economy’ was a constitutive element of South African sub-imperialism after the fall of the apartheid regime in 1994, religion has been instrumental to Turkey’s sub-imperialist expansion since the 1980 military intervention. Thus, the South African state uses claims of representing and protecting African interests as its instrument of a sub-imperialist agenda, while the Turkish state’s guarding of Islam in the Middle East facilitates its sub-imperialist expansion. While ‘white’ bourgeoisie and late-comer ‘black’ bourgeoisie decisively marked the post-apartheid period in the South African context, the political interests of ‘devout bourgeoisie’ and the economic interests of big finance capitalists marked Turkey’s sub-imperialist direction. The article concludes that race and religion are the unifying ideologies of South African and Turkish sub-imperialism respectively, as both manufacture consent among popular masses.

Literature on Turkey’s post-2011 authoritarian turn – especially after the eruption of the 2013 nationwide Gezi Protests – adopts modern concepts such as ‘dictatorship’, ‘authoritarianism’, ‘totalitarianism’, ‘one-party government’, ‘party-state fusion’, and even ‘fascism’ mainly in order to pin down the nature of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Turkish acronym) or depict the current character of Turkey’s regime. Through engaging the pre-modern concept of neopatrimonialism, which is derived from Max Weber’s concept of patrimonialism, this paper argues that Turkey’s encounter with authoritarianism is deeply associated with the proliferation of neopatrimonial domination, into which the legacy of patronage politics, fracture of security power, and the metastasis of crony capitalism have been conflated. This article argues that neopatrimonial features have always, to a degree, marked state-society relations in Turkey. Furthermore, this article suggests neopatrimonial characteristics started to dominate Turkey’s modern legal structure under the AKP, which led to a state crisis culminating in the 2016 attempted coup. However, despite the fact that neopatrimonialism cannot be argued as a pathological deviation from modern-legal domination, this paper concludes that tension exists between the crony capitalism-based economic model of neopatrimonalism and Turkey’s decades-long market-based capitalism.

In Turkey: The Pendulum between Military Rule and Civilian Authoritarianism, Fatih Çağatay Cengiz explains Turkey’s trajectory of military and civilian authoritarianism while offering an alternative framework for understanding the Kemalist state and state-society relations. This book clearly captures the zeitgeist of the moment Turkey has passed/has been passing through: democratisation, authoritarianism, and the coup cycle. Moreover, the book not only focuses on Turkish domestic politics with regards to procedural democratisation and waves of authoritarianism under the Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), it also engages with Turkey’s recent foreign policy; policy that pushes Turkey to take an active role in the Syrian conflict through the concept of ‘Neo-Ottomanism’.

While much has been written to explain the mutation of Islamic-oriented parties in Turkey from pursuing an Islamic ideological cause to embracing vote-seeking behavior and democratic processes, little effort has been made to explain why the far-right establishment – represented by the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) – still resists ideological change. This article argues that fortification of nationalism with Islam in the party, the party’s identification with Turkey’s national security issues, and the construction of personality cult around party founder Alparslan Türkeş restrict its ideological moderation. Nevertheless, the party benefits from this ideological immoderation to be a key player in Turkish politics. In other words, while ideological immoderation prevents the MHP from embracing a pluralistic political stance, it has also been functional to exert its nationalist ideology on the state without sharing governmental power.

Marksist ekonomi politiğin izlediği yörüngenin, başarıları ile zayıf yönlerinin ve de gelecekle ilgili öngörülerinin bir envanteri olan bu Kılavuz, Marx'ın geniş bir konu ve perspektif yelpazesi içerisinde geliştirdiği metot, kuram ve kavramları bir arada sunmakta, Marksist ekonomi politiğin geçmişten bugüne geçerliliğini koruyan amacı ve canlılığına tanıklık etmektedir.

Marksizmin eleştirel/açıklayıcı/değiştirici potansiyelini en etkili biçimde kullanma gayretinde olan yazarların, yani Marksistlerin elinden çıkma bu benzersiz çalışma, bir bütün olarak, Marksist ekonomi politiği üç kategori içerisinde analiz etmektedir: ana akım iktisadın bütün versiyonlarıyla eleştirisi; Marksist ekonomi politiğin sosyal bilim disiplinlerinin her biri üzerindeki etkisi; ve salt belli bir disiplinle sınırlanamayacak konuların analizi. Kılavuz'da yer alan maddelerden bazıları Marx'ın özgün katkısını, bu katkının önemini ve Marksist ekonomi politik içerisinde daha sonraları geliştirilen pozisyonlar ile yaşanan tartışmaları belirtik kılmakta, bu arada temel kavramları da genel okurun anlayabileceği bir dille serimlemektedir. Yazarlar, ayrıca, kapitalizmin tarihsel gelişimine ve geçen zaman içerisinde ortaya çıkan yeni maddi, tarihsel ve düşünsel gelişmelerle zorluklara ilişkin değerlendirmelerde de bulunmaktadırlar.

Since the economic crisis hit European markets in 2007-2008, Turkey has increasingly attracted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s 2016 World Investment Report, Turkey became the fifth largest West Asian FDI recipient in 2015, receiving $16.5 billion that year. While Qatari investors have shown interest in Turkish retail and pay-TV companies (Boyner Perakende and Digiturk, respectively), Saudi companies have increasingly invested in the state-owned telecommunication company Turk Telekom. It appears that decreasing trade with and investment from European markets since the financial crisis of 2008 has been offset by an increase from Middle Eastern markets, particularly those of the Gulf region. On the other hand, Turkish FDI outflows to GCC countries – primarily in the construction and real estate sectors – remain active, which in turn counterbalance the fiscal deficit these countries have faced due to the precipitous decline in oil prices. However, despite political efforts to advance Turkey’s relations with the GCC since 2011, economic exchange between Turkey and the GCC remains low as compared to European countries. This paper argues that the increasing political interdependence between Turkey and GCC countries stems from the foreign policy model Turkey has adopted, which requires Gulf countries to support the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. In return, Turkey provides the defence and security these tiny kingdoms require. Nevertheless, political interdependence between Turkey and the GCC is risky considering their divergent foreign policies with respect to the Arab Spring. This paper employs a political economy approach in order to understand the increasing political relations between Turkey and the Gulf region.

According to the 2014 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, Turkey was 2013’s most ‘generous’ country in terms of international humanitarian assistance: its foreign aid spreads from the Middle East to Central Asia to the Balkans. This paper aims to decipher and understand the material factors underlying the Turkish state’s generosity and magnanimity in the context of both pragmatic domestic policy-making processes and the escalation of the refugee crisis in Europe. In other words, while a massive influx of refugees from peripheral zones provides cheap and informal labour for Turkey’s industrial base, the EU can also securitise its borders. 
In this multi-dimensional context, this paper argues that Turkey’s foreign aid policy, which entails the ‘good governance’ component of the post-Washington Consensus, is one of the political linchpins of the country’s proactive foreign policy. Turkey’s foreign aid policy is motivated by its strategic calculations and aims to enhance the country’s presence and sphere of influence. In addition to Turkish faith-based humanitarian organisations, the state-run agency TİKA has been a key institutional tool of Turkish foreign policy ever since its establishment in 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initially, TİKA aimed to provide assistance to the ‘Turkic’ republics only, but it has since expanded its sphere of influence greatly and increased its Programme Coordination Offices in neighbouring countries.
This paper employs the world-systems theory and concept of sub-imperialism when referencing the asymmetric power relations of the global order, in which dependence is maintained by a trichotomy of actors: the imperialist centre, subimperialist agents and the periphery. According to the world-systems theory developed by American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, a subimperialist country functions as a mediator between the imperialist centre and the periphery to the advantage of the former. Within this theoretical context, foreign aid becomes a tool for a subimperialist county to reach new zones of influence and ease the burden of imperialist centres. In line with the data and theoretical debates, this paper concludes that foreign aid under the Justice and Development Party is used as an instrument of Turkish foreign policy; an instrument that advances Turkey’s soft power, especially in the Middle East, and increases its bargaining power vis-à-vis central powers.

This paper looks at the phenomenon of religion, its practice, and how the Turkish right uses these as reference points to transit among different ideological positions. With reference to Ibn Khaldun’s concept of assabiyyah, which is used to understand change itself, the moments of the birth and the downfall of civilisations, this paper argues that the Turkish right – i.e. political parties spanning the centre-right to the Islamic – uses religion as a tool to legitimise the construction of its identity against ‘the other’. Asabiyyah is a manner of thought and behaviour that can also mobilise the masses by taking a defensive position against the other in society. While religion as a source of manner of thought and behaviour has been used by centre-right political parties as a vessel where reaction against Kemalist modernisation flows, Islamic parties have fixed religion as the irrevocable essence of the nation. Unlike centre-right political parties, the Islamically-minded National Outlook parties aim to establish a religious order to rule society, going beyond the instrumentalisation of religion. The state, on the other hand, sees religion as the harbinger of social and political unity within the dichotomy of partial rejection and inevitable acceptance. The centre-right’s attachment to Islamic orders continued intensively after the transition to a multi-party system. As this paper aims to elucidate the Turkish right’s conflicting takes on secularism and religion from a historical perspective, it is important to also highlight the fault line in Turkish society. As a result, this paper suggests that religion undertakes a constituent role in the construction of the Turkish right, and this constituent role cannot be understood without taking into account the construction and reconstruction of the nation-state in and of itself.

This study aims at transcending the essentialist accounts and homogenous constructions of the Gezi Park protests. It attempts to locate the context of the mass popular mobilisation into its sociological foundations by alluding to the concept of “anomie” developed by Émile Durkheim. The main argument of the study is that the explosion of the Gezi Protests and people’s frustration and disillusionment are rooted in Turkey’s anomic growth and discontinuation of democratisation process under the AKP decade. Relying on Durkheimian concept of anomie to understand this sociological development, it is argued that economic growth and formal democratisation under the AKP decade in the 2000s have raised people’s social expectations beyond their social limits. However, satisfactorily fulfilment of people’s expectations and aspirations are bound to fail under capitalist system. It is therefore emphasised that while the AKP implemented formal democratic reforms to control the military power and achieved high economic growth in a decade—which was unusual for Turkey—a dual process was on the track. While the political reforms and economic growth raised the expectations of society, frustrations of unfulfilled expectations and aspirations accumulated given that the AKP halted democratisation process after 2011 and started to play the role of a regulatory and authoritarian moral order.