Frank Fanselow

After a brief overview of the evolution of the Brunei sultanate from a pre-colonial patrimonial state to a colonial protectorate under Indirect Rule, the chapter analyses its economic transformation into an oil-producing rentier state and its political reinvention as a nation state whose official ideology paradoxically defines it as a traditional Malay sultanate. The realisation of the long-term unsustainability of the welfare (“Shellfare”) state that relies on oil rents is beginning to expose ideological contradictions and societal fault lines. Attempts to diversify the economy have not made a major impact and the state increasingly uses normative religion to legitimise the monarchy.

Durant près d'un demi-siècle, la modernisation du Brunei a accompagné la consolidation de l'institution monarchique traditionnelle. L'articulation de l'État-providence à une riche économie pétrolière et à un ensemble de sanctions pénales autorisant les châtiments corporels – quoique rarement mis en oeuvre – a permis d'asseoir l'autorité autocratique du souverain et d'emporter l'adhésion du peuple. La fin de son règne approchant, le sultan charismatique Hassanal Bolkiah, âgé de 70 ans et dont la succession s'annonce incertaine, a engagé une série de mesures pour assurer la survie de son régime. Celles-ci se sont, en particulier, accélérées à partir de 2014, quand le sultanat de Brunei a dû faire face à une sérieuse crise financière suite à la chute du prix des hydrocarbures. En 2016, la Chine a alors massivement investi dans son économie, pour contrer, ce faisant, les rapports de force régionaux contestant son expansion en mer de Chine méridionale. L'islamisation du pays, et particulièrement la mise en place d'un nouvel appareil d'État islamique, a dans ce contexte permis de maintenir la monarchie. Mais tandis que la rente pétrolière diminue et que la religion prend de l'importance, des rééquilibrages s'opèrent entre les principales forces représentatives de la société brunéienne – dont le Sultan et son proche entourage de ministres, la classe des fonctionnaires du service public, et celle des commerçants et des nouveaux entrepreneurs.

This paper provides a detailed account of the process of invention of a nationalist tradition for Brunei, the most tradition-conscious nation in Southeast Asia. It shows how its nationalist tradition emerged at the interface of colonial records, indigenous oral and written sources, ethnographic fieldwork and anthropological theories. For this purpose the paper traces the history of anthropological research in northern Borneo from its colonial beginnings to its post-colonial role in nation-building and shows how anthropology and anthropologists have — sometimes unknowingly, sometimes deliberately — played an active role in the shaping of Negara Brunei Darussalam.

This paper analyses indigenous and anthropological attempts to understand several outbreaksof ethnic violence that occurred around the time of the 1998 Indonesian Reform in Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of Borneo. Violence between immigrant Madurese and indigenous Dayaks hadoccurred regularly in the western and central provinces of Kalimantan since the intensification of thetransmigration policy in the 1970s but it increased dramatically with the collapse of Suharto’s NewOrder. Between 1997 and 2001 there were three major outbreaks of communal violence that attracteda great deal of sensationalist media reporting in part because they involved archaic forms of violencesuch as headhunting and cannibalism. This paper is concerned primarily with the different theoriesthat have been put forward to explain the violence, rather than with the ‘facts’ of the conflict aboutThis paper analyses indigenous and anthropological attempts to understand several outbreaksof ethnic violence that occurred around the time of the 1998 Indonesian Reform in Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of Borneo. Violence between immigrant Madurese and indigenous Dayaks hadoccurred regularly in the western and central provinces of Kalimantan since the intensification of thetransmigration policy in the 1970s but it increased dramatically with the collapse of Suharto’s NewOrder. Between 1997 and 2001 there were three major outbreaks of communal violence that attracteda great deal of sensationalist media reporting in part because they involved archaic forms of violencesuch as headhunting and cannibalism. This paper is concerned primarily with the different theoriesthat have been put forward to explain the violence, rather than with the ‘facts’ of the conflict aboutwhich a number of reports have already been written. Social scientists who have worked in the areagenerally reduce the ethnic conflict to economic competition over resources between two marginalisedgroups. This interpretation of the conflict has been ‘fed back’ into the society by the media and isvehemently rejected by the Dayaks themselves, who have not only developed an alternative theoryof the conflict but also a critique of anthropological interpretations. They interpret the conflict as a‘clash of cultures’ between Madurese and Dayak traditions (adat) and dismiss the reduction of culturaldifferences to economic factors as yet another form of cultural imperialism in a long history of misrepresentationof Dayak society in which outsiders have imposed their categories of understandingon Dayak culture. They argue that the conflict can only be resolved if it is understood through thecategories of Dayak culture itself and managed within the framework of conflict resolution methodsavailable in Dayak culture.which a number of reports have already been written. Social scientists who have worked in the areagenerally reduce the ethnic conflict to economic competition over resources between two marginalisedgroups. This interpretation of the conflict has been ‘fed back’ into the society by the media and isvehemently rejected by the Dayaks themselves, who have not only developed an alternative theoryof the conflict but also a critique of anthropological interpretations. They interpret the conflict as a‘clash of cultures’ between Madurese and Dayak traditions (adat) and dismiss the reduction of culturaldifferences to economic factors as yet another form of cultural imperialism in a long history of misrepresentationof Dayak society in which outsiders have imposed their categories of understandingon Dayak culture. They argue that the conflict can only be resolved if it is understood through the categories of Dayak culture itself and managed within the framework of conflict resolution methods available in Dayak culture.

This paper examines the political, economic and religious context of the Covid-19 pandemic in Saudi Arabia. Although outsiders sometimes see the kingdom is sometimes seen as inward-looking, it is deeply enmeshed in global contexts: economically, as a rentier state dependent on external revenue flows, and religiously as an Islamic state that derives its legitimacy, not just domestically but in the wider Muslim World, from its assumed role as protector of religion. Covid-19 impacted these foundations of the state in two ways: it further weakened the state through low from oil exports, and it challenged the state’s politically because public health measures contradicted religious duties. Compared to some larger and less authoritarian Muslim states, where opposition and even resistance to public health measures have flared up, the Saudi state has so far been able to navigate the problematic area between religious sentiments and public health concerns without much turbulence. However, its solutions are probably not sustainable in the longer term. Minimising the economic impact of Covid-19 for citizens with a long-nurtured sense of entitlement, while letting the foreign labor force bear the brunt of the crisis, is costly in the face of declining state revenues. It is also uncertain how effectively the state will be able to keep control over the religious establishment and non-establishment Islamist voices, some of which have already challenged its religious legitimacy from outside the country.