History

Contrary to the wealth of evidence for some problems concerning the history of the ancient Macedonian state, the office of peliganes is barely mentioned in the ancient sources, and modern scholars rarely touch upon the problem. It is usually assumed that the name of the office is associated with the Greek word for “grey-haired”, “old”, so the peliganes are therefore translated as a “council of elders”, although, as we shall see, this interpretation is hardly based on solid ground. From all that has been written by the scholars – both foreign and domestic – one could conclude that the term peliganes signifies local officials, members of the city council, especially in the Macedonian cities in Asia. Yet, there are scholars who doubt that these officials had any real powers and, on the basis of the possible etymology of the part, a sign of recognition and honour that the community bestowed upon older citizens. These are the main points that this paper attempts to clarify.

Иако веродостојноста на легендата за епифанијата на Пан во битката кај Лисимахеја е побиенa во две научни студии во седумдесеттите години од минатиот век, во науката и натаму има мислења дека во античко време имало легенда, според која во текот на битката кај Лисимахеја се појавил богот Пан, кој создал паника во галскиот боен ред и со тоа му помогнал на Антигон Гоната да извојува победа.

Анализата на наративните, епиграфските и нумизматичките извори не говори во прилог на ваквото толкување, а ковањето монети со ликот на богот Пан треба да се набљудува во поширокиот контекст на воено-политичките состојби во Егејскиот басен. Според сè, мотивите поради кои Гоната го искористил ликот на Пан на монетите поскоро биле:
1) да им порача на Македонците дека новиот крал се оградува од непопуларната внатрешна политика на неговиот татко;
2) да покаже дека има намера да ги почитува, возобнови или продолжи конституционалните традиции на династијата Аргеади; и 3) да се доближи кон Македонците – особено од Пиерија и Ботиаја – со инсистирање на култот на едно традиционално почитувано божество во Македонија.

This paper deals with the status of Thrace and Macedonia within the royal administration of the Persian Empire.

The scholar views expressed so far are opposing and mutually exclusive, thus making it very difficult to attain a common ground between them. The complete corpus of information on the satrapies comes from the Persian administrative documents and from the extant Greek sources: however. the meaning of the word "satrapy" in the Greek sources is very vague, and moreover, this technical term is nowhere to be found in the Persian documents.

This calls for a re-thinking and re-examination of the term "satrapy" as a terminus technicus, as well as for a broader analysis of the mechanisms of satrapal actions and their place within the Persian administrative and fiscal framework.

As things stand, the term "satrap" should be analysed only in its first, basic meaning, "protector of the King/Empire" - a status that did not hinder the possibility of holding other local or foreign offices or honours.

The general impression on Memnon of Rhodes that is transmitted by our sources – and is more or less unanimously accepted in modern historiography – is that he may have been the only military commander able to bring the relentless Alexander III to a halt and disrupt his plans.

This opinion seems to be based on Memnon’s few successes, which could purportedly imperil the Asian expedition of Alexander: namely, Memnon’s achievements against Parmenio; his sensible proposal to avoid direct altercation with the Macedonians; the gallant defence of Halicarnassus; and particularly, his dangerous naval campaign in the Aegean Sea in 333 BC.

In this paper, we will consider whether Memnon’s actions, as well as their results, truly validate the impression and reputation he has acquired both in antiquity and today.

This article focuses on several problems concerning the advancement of the Persian army through Thessaly in 480 BC.: the ill-advised departure from Tempe and the role played by Alexander of Macedon; the paralel tradition recorded in Damastes of Sygeum and Diodorus; the political fracas between the Aleuadai and the rest of Thessaly; and finally, the nature of the alleged message that Alexander gave the Thessalians. A careful analysis of the events, as well as of the way they are presented in our extant sources, testify that Alexander did indeed play a role in the events in Thessaly, and that the Tempe episode ought to retain its place in the traditional narrative; however, the content of his message to the Hellenes remains elusive, un-doubtedly until the discovery of another source, different from those we have had up to now.

This paper aims to evaluate several episodes, scattered throughout our sources, which deal with the Persian crossing through Macedonian territory during the last Persian conquest in Europe; or, more precisely, to dissect the episodes which describe the construction of the Athos canal, the journey from Doriscus to Thermai, the passage through the Pierian forests, as well as the episodes that describe the return of the Persian army to Asia, with a special emphasis on the position and the relations of the Macedonian king, Alexander I, with the Persians.

A brief scrutiny of the Persian preparations demonstrates that – even if one chooses to ignore the millions of Asians portrayed by Herodotus – a venture of such scale demanded careful logistics, meticulous planning and huge preparations. As things stand, it appears that Xerxes fully relied not only on the vast wealth and excessive human resources that he had at his disposal, but also on the expertise of his subjects. An excellent example of this is the Athos canal, probably the most impressive reminder of the brief Persian presence in Europe. Whether the construction really lasted two or three years, as stated by Herodotus, the canal was hardly excessive, unnecessary or vain; having in mind the Persian needs at the time, this waterway was more effective and more useful even than the Corinthian diolkos. Another point not to be bypassed was a careful inspection, maintenance and, where needed, establishment of a road network; and, certainly, all this work would be in vain, if not supported by reliable information from the field.

It did not take the Persians long to reach geographical Macedonia; and it is precisely here that the task of the historian becomes thorny. It is quite probable that Herodotus had almost no awareness of the ground, and was therefore unable to clearly describe the journey from Doriscus to Thermai. In principle, determining three topographically logical routes is hardly a problem: for example, on the section leading from Strymon to Thermai, one moira would advance towards the middle flow of Echedorus, the other would march to modern Lachana, while the third would pass through Mygdonia. Built upon а not entirely logical conjecture based on Justin, Hammond moves the northernmost of the three Persian moirai much farther north than necessary, seemingly for a reason that has nothing to do with topography – namely, his claim that Xerxes bestowed upon Alexander I control of a large part of Upper Macedonia. However, despite all attempts to see logic in the passage of Justin, it seems the Macedonian kings would need more time to establish control over Upper Macedonia and its basileis.

There were two Persian withdrawals that passed through Macedonia; of these two, the return of a part of the army after the defeat at Salamis is attested to sufficiently enough in the sources. The presentation of this withdrawal, given by the tragediographer Aeschylus, truly befits the nature of his work; however, it does not seem to correspond to reality. On the contrary, it appears that the Persian chain of supply was effective for the duration of the campaign, primarily due to prudent planning; as the army did not depend on supplies left by the fleet, it is safe to assume that the main roads, as well as the lines of communication, were regularly maintained. This was probably possible because the coastal tribes either sided with the Persians, or were prudent enough to never publicly declare allegiance to either side.

One would – and, indeed, should – expect to find more information on the events on the northern coast of the Aegean in the turbulent years of the last Persian conquest in Europe. These notes, scattered throughout the text of Herodotus, suggest why things are so. It is quite probable that our major – oftentimes our only – source on these events was neither concerned with nor interested in the peripheral logistics of the Persian army. The Macedonians were obviously counted on as auxiliary troops; they were to take care of the roads and supplies, or at most, to begin a battle with a challenge from distance, but they were never intended to present a main attacking force; that role was reserved for the troops that enjoyed the full confidence of the Great King, usually consisting of Iranians only. As to the war, Alexander's role as an ally or a Persian appears to be rather overestimated; geographical Macedonia was an important station and a kind of supply base during the advance and the retreat of the army of Xerxes, but not much more.

The question of the “Persian policies” of Philip II is still disputed; the data from our extant sources does not indicate that the Macedonian king had active plans to invade Persia before solving the question of hegemony in Greece proper. The approximating political positions of Athens and Persia, as well as the desire for security in the immediate surroundings of the extended Macedonian kingdom, undoubtedly had some bearing on his decision. There is a reasonable amount of evidence that Philip kept the developments in Asia under close scrutiny; however, not a single extant source shows much more than that. One can speculate that Persia caught the king’s eye, for no other venture would offer such prospects for financial gain; furthermore, there was a real danger that Persia would draw near to some of the stronger Greek poleis, which would complicate the intricate political situation in Greece even further. It is practically certain that Philip had these things in mind; however, one is unable to determine whether these designs were clearly defined by 340 BC. The answer to the question whether Philip had (or, to begin with, whether he was aware that he should have) a Persian policy, depends on the connotation and weight that one chooses to assign to Isocrates’ Philippos. What stems from the whole lot is that, at this time, there were certain circles in Greece who were willing to entertain the thought of waging war against Persia. However, this does not imply that every Greek man of politics wished for such a development of events – but only that Isocrates, and several other members of his circle, dealt with the validity of a theoretical idea. No matter whether it happened in 346 BC, 340 BC, or only after the outcome of Chaeronea, there came a moment when the war against Persia was no longer just a possibility, but a reality. Philip's death stopped the largest enterprise in the history of the kingdom up to that time; its final stage was not achieved during his lifetime. The small amount of extant data prevents us from venturing into speculations about Philip’s intentions and final aims; however, it is fairly obvious that his endeavours do not imply a complete conquest of the Persian kingdom. If one wishes to make assumptions, it could be said that our sources indicate two things: that, as long as the Persians did not interfere in his endeavours in Thrace, Philip did not have clearly objectified ambitions in Asia; and that in no case did he show interest and ambition for the events beyond the Western satrapies. The extant data does not provide basis for speculation that Philip seriously thought about territories beyond Cilicia and Taurus, not to mention the entire territory of the Achaemenid kingdom.

The body of preserved data on the first Persian incursion on the northern coast of the Aegean is rather small. A dissection of the information preserved in Herodotus, combined with a detailed analysis of the features of local geography, show that, in all probability, Persia managed to establish control over the majority of the Thraco-Macedonian coast.

However, there is little indication that the Persians attempted to administer this territory at such an early date. At the time, a major benefit for the Persians was establishing control over the road network leading to the west – a fact which indicates that Persian ventures were far from over and that this line of communication was of critical importance for further conquests. Most importantly, the road to the west led the Persians to the immediate vicinity of the kingdom of the Argeadae.

The story of the foundation of Rhaikelos presents a rather problematic piece of history, with a marginal narrative based on sources removed from the actual event by several centuries. The chronology of the tyrannies and exiles of Peisistratos, as well as the possible location of the city, are issues which have been much discussed in modern scholarship. It is now almost certain that Rhaikelos was founded at what is now Peraia near Thessaloniki in 556 BC; however, numerous problems persist. I am of the opinion that Peisistratos actually helped in establishing an Eretrian emporium on the western coast of Chalkidike, the only resource that Eretria could get from there – and for which it was worthwhile to set up a specialised emporium on the coast – being timber from close-by Mt. Kissos. In addition, I argue that king Alketas was not even close to Rhaikelos to be in a state to allow for, or even to facilitate the establishment of a settlement, so that it is entirely possible that the establishment of Rhaikelos took place without the help, approval, participation or collaboration, maybe even without the knowledge of Macedon.

Simultaneously with the siege of Thasos, ten thousand Athenian and allied colonists went on their way to establish a settlement at Ennea Hodoi, a crossing controlled by the Edonians. This attempt came to a grievous end, as – their alleged hostility notwithstanding – the Edonians and Alexander the Philhellene most probably had common interests in the area.

It would be very reasonable, in 479 BC, to keep an active military force and try to implement some sort of administrative overview over Edonia; fifteen years later, however, after all immediate external threats became a thing of the past, Alexander withdrew the formal border of the kingdom to the west in order to alleviate the cost of keeping soldiers and administrators that far from the capital at Aegae.

This, however, did not mean that Edonia left the Macedonian sphere of interest and/or influence. Ruled by a local basileus, they obviously remained ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὑπήκοοι (“allies and subjects”), following the pattern of certain tribes in western Upper Macedonia. Accordingly, in fighting the colonists sent by Athens, they seem to have acted in cooperation with the Argeadai – a fact that took the Athenians by surprise.

Philip of Amphaxitis, the brother of Perdiccas II, is usually said to be a pretender to the Macedonian throne. This alleged pretender, however, made absolutely no move against his brother until 432 BC, when Athens finally entered the fray. What is more, Philip neither struck coin, nor made an attempt to establish a legislative body or a state council of any sort. This, in addition to several other peculiarities of his arkhe in Amphaxitis, hints that he neither claimed the throne of the kingdom of the Argeadae, nor could he count on any level of support by the legislative bodies in Aegae. A thorough analysis of the events suggests that he simply chose to act independently and stop responding to the capital. Philip moved for the throne only after losing Amphaxitis and after securing the help and support of Derdas of Elymea and Athens: before that, he had neither power, nor a strong enough motive to fight for the royal regalia. After more than twenty years of independent rule in Amphaxitis, Philip was made a victim of Athenian political interests. In 432 BC, Athens succumbed to the needs of their Realpolitik, switched sides and gave nominal support to Perdiccas II.