- Andrea Pozas-Loyo es investigadora titular de tiempo completo del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM. ... moreAndrea Pozas-Loyo es investigadora titular de tiempo completo del Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM. Es doctora y maestra en ciencia política por la Universidad de Nueva York, maestra en filosofía por la New School of Social Research, y licenciada en filosofía por la UNAM. Realizó una estancia postdoctoral en la Fundación Juan March en Madrid.
Sus áreas de investigación son la teoría constitucional y política, y los estudios empíricos del derecho. Sus temas de investigación son el cambio y la eficiencia constitucionales, la relación entre el derecho, las normas sociales y las prácticas organizacionales, y el poder judicial de México.
Actualmente es Distinguished Research Fellow in Constitutional Studies en la Escuela de Texas en Austin y co-presidenta del capítulo de México de la International Society of Public Law’s (ICON-s). Fue fundadora y coordinadora de la Línea de Estudios Empíricos del Derecho del IIJ (2018-2022) y encabezó la jefatura del Doctorado en Derecho de la misma institución. Fue visiting scholar del CASBS de Stanford (2917-8) y visiting researcher del CLAS de Georgetown (2022-23). Ha sido profesora de asignatura licenciatura y posgrado en derecho, en ciencias políticas y en ciencias sociales en la UNAM, la FLACSO México, el CIDE y la Universidad Iberoamericana.
Andrea Pozas-Loyo is a fulltime professor at the IIJ-UNAM (Institute of Legal Research). She holds a Ph.D. and a M.A. in Politics by New York University, a MA in Philosophy by the New School of Social Research, and a BA in Philosophy by the UNAM. She made a postdoctoral residence at the Juan March Foundation in Madrid.
Her research areas are constitutional and political theory and the empirical study of legal phenomena. Her research topics are constitutional change and efficacy, the relation between law, social norms and organizational practices, and the Judiciary in Mexico.
She currently is Distinguished Research Fellow in Constitutional Studies at UT Texas Law, and co-chair of The International Society of Public Law’s Mexican chapter (ICON-s Mexico). She co-founded and coordinated of the Seminar of Empirical Legal Studies at the IIJ-UNAM (2018-2022). She led the IIJ-UNAM’s JD (2018-2020). She was visiting scholar at Stanford University’s CASBS (2017-8) and visiting researcher at Georgetown University’s CLAS (2022-3). She taught graduate and undergraduate courses at UNAM, FLACSO-México, CIDE and Universidad Iberomericana.edit
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Our central question is: Under what circumstances can we expect a theoretically informed and reproducible measure of judicial independence de jure to be a good proxy for what we can expect to happen in reality? We argue that whether the... more
Our central question is: Under what circumstances can we expect a theoretically informed and reproducible measure of judicial independence de jure to be a good proxy for what we can expect to happen in reality? We argue that whether the de jure measure can be considered a good proxy for, to overestimate or to underestimate, judicial independence in reality depends
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Humanities
Page 1. NÚMERO 223 ANDREA POZAS AND JULIO RÍOS Constituted Powers in Constitution-Making Processes Supreme Court Judges, Constitutional Reform and the Design of Judicial Councils www.cide.edu ... Page 8. Andrea Pozas Loyo and Julio Ríos... more
Page 1. NÚMERO 223 ANDREA POZAS AND JULIO RÍOS Constituted Powers in Constitution-Making Processes Supreme Court Judges, Constitutional Reform and the Design of Judicial Councils www.cide.edu ... Page 8. Andrea Pozas Loyo and Julio Ríos Figueroa CIDE ...
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La reforma judicial del 2021 tuvo como uno de sus ejes la transformación del sistema de jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, emanada del juicio de amparo, para transitar del histórico sistema de integración por... more
La reforma judicial del 2021 tuvo como uno de sus ejes la transformación del sistema de jurisprudencia de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, emanada del juicio de amparo, para transitar del histórico sistema de integración por reiteración de criterios, hacia un nuevo sistema de precedentes judiciales. En este artículo argumentamos que la incompatibilidad entre esta reforma y las competencias profesionales que promueve el modelo preponderante de enseñanza de la jurisprudencia en México probablemente constituirán un desafío para la eficacia de este cambio constitucional sustantivo. Nuestro objetivo es realizar un estudio sobre el papel de la enseñanza jurídica en la operatividad de los sistemas jurisprudenciales basados en precedentes judiciales, haciendo un contraste con el modelo educativo en el que se ha fincado la enseñanza de la jurisprudencia en México, a efecto de proporcionar los insumos necesarios para evaluar la reciente reforma judicial, desde la identificación de l...
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Mexico's 1917 Constitution has gone through 737 reforms; no other codified constitution has been subjected to such a constant pattern of renewal through amendment. We argue that the study of Mexican patterns offers important theoretical... more
Mexico's 1917 Constitution has gone through 737 reforms; no other codified constitution has been subjected to such a constant pattern of renewal through amendment. We argue that the study of Mexican patterns offers important theoretical insights for the study of constitutional change by calling into question the generalizability of the thesisarticulated by Donald Lutz and currently endorsed by most specialists in the fieldaccording to which amendment and interpretation are substitute means of constitutional updating. Based on two original data sets containing all constitutional amendments and all Supreme Court precedents on constitutional matters from 1917 to 2020, we find that in Mexico hyper-reformism is correlated to a steep increase in the number and diversity of binding constitutional precedents. Quantitative and qualitative analysis shows that these precedents not only apply the Constitution, but substantively revise it, suggesting that, in Mexico, amendment and interpretation are not alternative but complementary channels of constitutional change. Our account suggests that, in Mexico, hyper-reformism has actually led to innovative constitutional interpretation as a mechanism to cope with its effects. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and comparative insights this case offers for better understanding the nature, causes, and effects of the different modalities of constitutional change.
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One of the most po lemic char ac ter is tics of con tem po rary con sti tu tional de moc ra cies is the limit they place on ma jor ity rule. Jean Jacques Rous seau is one of the most im por tant ad vo cates of pop u lar sov er eignty. The... more
One of the most po lemic char ac ter is tics of con tem po rary con sti tu tional de moc ra cies is the limit they place on ma jor ity rule. Jean Jacques Rous seau is one of the most im por tant ad vo cates of pop u lar sov er eignty. The pas sages where he seems to give full sup port to ma jor ity rule are well known. I ar gue that for Rous seau the le git i macy of ma jor ity rule for or di nary law mak ing rests on its lim ited char ac ter. Un like pre vi ous in ter pre ta tions (e.g. Waldron 1990, Weirich 1986, and Grofman and Scott L. 1988) my in ter pre ta tion gives a com pre hen sive and co her ent ac count of Rous seau’s pre scrip tions for dif fer ent kinds of law-mak ing, and of the re la tion among them. I pres ent a crit i cism of Waldron’s in flu en tial in ter pre ta tion of Rous seau, and dis cuss the way Rous seau’s thoughts can fur ther our un der stand ing on this im por tant is sue.
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Page 1. NÚMERO 223 ANDREA POZAS AND JULIO RÍOS Constituted Powers in Constitution-Making Processes Supreme Court Judges, Constitutional Reform and the Design of Judicial Councils www.cide.edu ... Page 8. Andrea Pozas Loyo and Julio Ríos... more
Page 1. NÚMERO 223 ANDREA POZAS AND JULIO RÍOS Constituted Powers in Constitution-Making Processes Supreme Court Judges, Constitutional Reform and the Design of Judicial Councils www.cide.edu ... Page 8. Andrea Pozas Loyo and Julio Ríos Figueroa CIDE ...
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This paper focuses on amendment processes, their characteristics and their influence in constitutional development. The paper analyzes amendment processes that adopt or reform judicial councils. The central hypothesis is that the... more
This paper focuses on amendment processes, their characteristics and their influence in constitutional development. The paper analyzes amendment processes that adopt or reform judicial councils. The central hypothesis is that the constitutional decision regarding the degree of independence and powers delegated to Supreme Court Judges affect the design of judicial councils in future reforms. In particular, the more independent and powerful Supreme Court Judges are the more likely they will successfully influence future amendments that shape the composition and functions of judicial councils in such a way that serves the judges’ interests. Preliminary empirical analysis on all cases of amendments that create or reform judicial councils in Latin America suggests that there is evidence in line with the main hypothesis of the paper.
One of the most polemic characteristics of contemporary constitutional democracies is the limit they place on majority rule. Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of the most important advocates of popular sovereignty. The passages where he seems... more
One of the most polemic characteristics of contemporary constitutional democracies is the limit they place on majority rule. Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of the most important advocates of popular sovereignty. The passages where he seems to give full support to majority rule are well known. I argue that for Rousseau the legitimacy of majority rule for ordinary law-making rests on its limited character. Unlike previous interpretations (e.g. Waldron 1990, Weirich 1986, and Grofman and Scott L. 1988) my interpre- tation gives a comprehensive and coherent account of Rousseau’s prescriptions for different kinds of law-making, and of the relation among them. I present a criticism of Waldron’s influential interpretation of Rousseau, and discuss the way Rousseau’s thoughts can further our understanding on this important issue.
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The Mexican Constitution of 1917 granted the Supreme Court the power to handpick lower court judges and oversee their careers. For almost eight decades this capacity was not regulated. To fill this void, the justices began to take turns... more
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 granted the Supreme Court the power to handpick lower court judges and oversee their careers. For almost eight decades this capacity was not regulated. To fill this void, the justices began to take turns filling vacancies which developed into an informal institution – the so-called 'Gentlemen's Pact'. Using original archival data, we document and describe the birth and development of this practice and argue that it consolidated into an informal institution as the judiciary increased in size. We uncover the workings of this social norm that established a patronage model of judicial selection. Our analysis period ends in 1994, when a constitutional reform created a judicial council with the explicit aim of ending patronage and corruption within the judiciary.
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This Article studies amendment processes, their specific characteristics, and how these characteristics shape institutional design outcomes. Amendment processes are in between the extraordinary creation of new constitutions and the... more
This Article studies amendment processes, their specific characteristics, and how these characteristics shape institutional design outcomes. Amendment processes are in between the extraordinary creation of new constitutions and the ordinary process of lawmaking. Our central claim is that the design of institutions through amendments is influenced by variables that do not regularly figure in the analysis of constitution making because of their bias toward new constitutions and the “politics of the extraordinary.” In particular, we argue that the design of the existing institutions and the political leverage of actors that do not participate directly in constitutional reform may exert an important influence in the design of institutions created by amendments. In other words, the more institutional power and political leverage actors have, the more likely the amendment will reflect their interests, even if they do not partake of the constituent body. To explore this hypothesis, we analyze the leverage that supreme courts have to shape the amendment processes that adopt or reform judicial councils. We claim that the more powerful supreme court judges are, the more likely they will successfully influence amendments that shape the composition and functions of judicial councils in a way that serves their interests. We offer empirical evidence from all the cases of amendments that created or reformed judicial councils in Latin America.
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When and why can constitution-making processes be expected to produce an institutional framework that formally serves constitutionalism? Based on a simple and general typology of constituent processes that captures their legal/political... more
When and why can constitution-making processes be expected to produce an institutional framework that formally serves constitutionalism? Based on a simple and general typology of constituent processes that captures their legal/political character and dynamic nature, constitution-making processes controlled by one cohesive and organized political group (unilateral) can be distinguished from processes controlled by at least two different political groups (multilateral). A sample of eighteen Latin American countries from 1945 to 2005 shows that multilateral constitution making tends to establish institutional frameworks consistent with constitutionalism.
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A diferencia de lo que ocurre con otros escritos considerados
Mexico has one of the world's oldest and most amended constitutions: its 99-year old constitution has been amended 642 times. De jure, Mexico's constitution is pretty rigid: amendments require three-quarters of the present members of... more
Mexico has one of the world's oldest and most amended constitutions: its 99-year old constitution has been amended 642 times. De jure, Mexico's constitution is pretty rigid: amendments require three-quarters of the present members of congress and approval of the majority of the states' legislatures. During the hegemonic-party period, the PRI had unilateral control over all the institutions whose votes are required to amend the Constitution. Interestingly, and contrary to all expectations, the rate of constitutional reform increased with political pluralism, and it skyrocketed with transition to democracy. Just in the last two presidential terms (2006-2015), the constitution has been amended 200 times. This extreme pattern of constitutional change, known as hyper-reformism, is widely recognized as problematic by the Mexican legal community.
Conocimiento, democracia y constitucionalismo: en torno a la autonomía de las instituciones generadoras de conocimiento... more
Conocimiento, democracia y constitucionalismo: en torno a la autonomía de las instituciones generadoras de conocimiento ibericonnect.blog/2021/11/conocimiento-democracia-y-constitucionalismo-en-torno-a-la-autonomia-de-lasinstituciones-generadoras-de-conocimiento/
De acuerdo con Paulina García-Corral, en 1970 las mujeres constituían sólo el 25% de cédulas profesionales emitidas para licenciadas y licenciados en derecho en México. Pero 45 años después, en 2015, se alcanzó la paridad en este... more
De acuerdo con Paulina García-Corral, en 1970 las mujeres constituían sólo el 25% de cédulas profesionales emitidas para licenciadas y licenciados en derecho en México. Pero 45 años después, en 2015, se alcanzó la paridad en este indicador. Este aumento se ha visto reflejado en mayor o menor medida en los distintos ámbitos profesionales. El Poder Judicial de la Federación (PJF), es probablemente el espacio jurídico en el que este cambio ha sido más claro. En 2020 alcanzó prácticamente la paridad con un personal compuesto por el 50.5% de hombres y 49.5% de mujeres. Este cambio es un cambio importante en sí mismo, y que tendrá implicaciones sustanciales para el derecho en México. Sin embargo, es un fenómeno que ha recibido relativamente poca atención académica.