Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Mexico has undergone a peculiar transition to a democracy that in some aspects and places still exhibits traits of the authoritarian past. The com- bination of authoritarian shades and democratic glares, rich diversity in socioeconomic... more
Mexico has undergone a peculiar transition to a democracy that in some aspects and places still exhibits traits of the authoritarian past. The com- bination of authoritarian shades and democratic glares, rich diversity in socioeconomic conditions across the country, and the recent availabil- ity of a wealth of information and systematized data make for a great deal of research opportunities for sociolegal scholarship. This article reviews recent sociolegal studies on courts and judicial behavior, pub- lic security and the criminal justice system, and legal culture, pointing to several empirical puzzles and open questions that are crying out for explanations and systematic empirical analysis.
Research Interests:
This essay explores whether the design of justice system institutions helps control corruption. Applying the basic logic of checks and balances to intrabranch institutional design, the main argument is that any justice system where judges... more
This essay explores whether the design of justice system institutions helps control corruption. Applying the basic logic of checks and balances to intrabranch institutional design, the main argument is that any justice system where judges and prosecutors, of different ranks and lev- els, are unchecked actors generates incentives for them to abuse their positions. In other words, while generally judges and prosecutors are considered organs that oversee other branches of government, they may also constitute sources of corruption if left unchecked. The essay offers preliminary evidence on the specific hypotheses derived from the general argument from samples of eighteen Latin American countries and two case studies on Chile and Mexico.
Research Interests:
Legal reforms that make judges independent from political pressures and empower them with judicial review do not imply an effective judiciary. Something has to fill the gap between institutional design and effectiveness. When the... more
Legal reforms that make judges independent from political pressures and empower them with judicial review do not imply an effective judiciary. Something has to fill the gap between institutional design and effectiveness. When the executive and legislative powers are ready to react to an objectionable judicial decision, the judiciary may be weak and deferent towards those in power. But coordination difficulties in the elected organs of government make courts less constrained. I argue that the fragmentation of political power is a factor that accounts for an effective judiciary, a judiciary that is able to rule against power holders’ interests without being systematically challenged or ignored. I test this argument analyzing Mexican Supreme Court decisions against the PRI on constitutional cases from 1994 to 2002. I find that the probability for the Supreme Court of voting against the PRI increased from .07 to .44 to .52 as the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997 and the Presidency in 2000.
Research Interests: Mexico and Judicial Power
This article offers a comparative perspective on judicial involvement in policy change in Latin America during the last decade and a half. Drawing on the literature on new institutionalism and the judicialisation of politics, and on case... more
This article offers a comparative perspective on judicial involvement in policy change in Latin America during the last decade and a half. Drawing on the literature on new institutionalism and the judicialisation of politics, and on case studies from Latin America’s two largest countries, we propose a comparative framework for analysing the judicialisation of policy in the region. On the basis of this framework, we argue that institutional structure is a primary determinant of patterns of the judicialisation of policy. In particular, institutional characteristics of the legal system affect the way political actors fight to achieve their policy objectives and the kinds of public justifications used to defend policy reform.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
¿Qué explica el nivel de protección judicial de los derechos? En América Latina, por ejemplo, mientras la Corte Constitucional de Colombia o la Cuarta sala de la Corte de Costa Rica han sido altamente activas en términos de la protección... more
¿Qué explica el nivel de protección judicial de los derechos? En América Latina, por ejemplo, mientras la Corte Constitucional de Colombia o la Cuarta sala de la Corte de Costa Rica han sido altamente activas en términos de la protección de derechos, la Corte Suprema de México o el Tribunal Constitucional de Chile no lo han sido. ¿ Por qué, entonces, solo ciertas cortes constitucionales trabajan activamente en la garantía de derechos? En este trabajo se exploran posibles explicaciones del porqué algunas cortes constitucionales defienden más activamente los derechos establecidos en las constituciones que otras. Estas explicaciones se articulas en torno a tres dimensiones: socio- política, individual e institucional. Además, se discute y explora la relación que puede darse entre estas tres variable, presenta datos nacionales y sugiere varias hipótesis para futuras investigaciones dentro de este campo de estudio.