Luca Vanzago

From Italy to Mexico, and all the way to Japan, then returning to the United States. By spanning the annus mirabilis which has witnessed the centenary of Merleau-Ponty's birth celebrated everywhere, Chiasmi International has captured some of its most important echoes in this issue which presents as well important news in the journal's structure. The relocation of its American seat and a change in direction accompany the contributions of Merleau-Ponty specialists who are the most representative of four different generations. Reviews and a new section of essays "around" Merleau-Ponty's thought complete this issue with which Chiasmi International caps off its tenth anniversary. Texts by: Suzi Adams, Emmanuel Alloa, Alia Al-Saji, Claudia Baracchi, Josep Maria Bech, Paride Broggi, Mauro Carbone, Paola Chiesa, Francoise Dastur, Daniela De Leo, Carmine Di Martino, Lester Embree, Veronique Foti, Simone Frangi, Giovanni Invitto, Stefan Kristensen, Mariana Larison, Feder...

The attention devoted by Merleau-Ponty to the problem of a definition of the phenomenological reduction is at the same time very restricted and yet very acute. We cannot hope to find, in Merleau-Ponty's writings, anything comparable to the extension and the meticulousness with which Husserl carefully distinguishes and compares, defines and undoes the various ways to perform the reduction, and progressively clarifies its purpose and value. Yet in a certain sense Merleau-Ponty's whole conception of phenomenology is ...

Merleau-Ponty’s notion of expression originates from his interests in the bodily subjectivity and is rooted in his phenomenology of perception, where he discusses language and speech in the light of his notion of embodiment. Yet this first achievement leaves some questions open. In his deepening of the problems of perception Merleau-Ponty is led to relate perception and expression in the light of a renovated investigation of the ontological implications of the former, which also leads to articulate more widely the latter. Merleau-Ponty encounters De Saussure’s diacritical and structural approach to language and integrates it within a processual understanding of Being. In this paper some aspects of the evolution of this themes are discussed and evaluated.

In this essay I propose to analyze two fundamental positions that have recently emerged in the philosophical debate in relation to the experience of pain: the reductionist one peculiar to the neurocognitive area, and the phenomenological one. The comparison is conducted in the light of the notion of representation, in order to show that the reductionist perspective fails to give a satisfactory account of the properly experiential aspect of pain, which instead the phenomenological approach is able to grasp more adequately.

In this paper the complex phenomenon of pain is discussed and analysed along different theoretical paths: cognitivism, hermeneutics, phenomenology. The neuro-cognitive approach is exemplified through Paul and Patricia Churchland's writings; then H.-G. Gadamer's hermeneutical approach is evaluated. While apparently opposite, they share a common assumption, namely that the body is basically to be conceived of as not really different from the Cartesian Res extensa. Some problems thus arise: in particular, the aspect of reflexivity implied in any experience of pain is overlooked. Accordingly, an adequate approach to feeling pain must take the phenomenological path. This means to discuss Husserl's but also Scheler's and Heidegger's contributions, in order to bring to the fore the complexity of the phenomenon of pain, which shows a particular and paradoxical structure: exposing the subject feeling pain to its own internal exteriority.

In this paper I address the problem of discussing if and to what extent could Whitehead's philosophy be compared to, and even derived from, Bergson's work. The aim of such an undertaking is however not so much to ascertain some similarities and differences between the two thinkers, but rather to address a specific theoretical question, related to Whitehead's metaphysics of process. Such question consists in evaluating Whitehead's philosophical perspective in the light of a general approach to reality in terms of the notions of process, event and time. In this perspective, Whitehead's philosophy is discussed according to a genetic framework, starting from his mathematical, logical and epistemological writings, then focusing on the two key-notions of his philosophy of nature, namely, events and objects, and finally articulated into five fundamental concepts belonging to his metaphysics, that is, actuality, potentiality, relationality, processuality, finitude. These...

In this paper I intend to demonstrate how Merleau- Ponty develops in his late thought an insightful account of reality. In opposition to the ontological primacy Husserl and Heidegger bestow to man, Merleau-Ponty's late perspective is based on a dynamic ontology, namely on a philosophical un- derstanding of the strict relation between nature and consciousness.With this respect, Merleau- Ponty approaches the problem of negativity, in order to explain the differences within reality without adopting an Hegelian account of dialectic and, on the other hand, avoiding a merely empirical view of contingency.

In this paper I discuss the theme concerning the experience of pain by comparing three different theoretical perspectives: the cognitivist and reductionist approach most widely adopted at present within the neuro-sciences, as it is offered by P. and P. Churchland's works; the hermeneutical approach offered by H.-G. Gadamer's reflection; finally, a possible phenomenological conception grounded on E. Husserl's and M. Scheler's theses. The paper aims to show, through a discussion of the present-day evaluation and measurement methods of subjective experience of pain and its objectivation by means of questionnaires (McGill Pain Questionnaire), that in order to adequately understand, from a medical and philosophical standpoint, the complexity of painful experience, it is necessary to avoid a reductionist approach, and to open the investigation to the subjective structure, at the same time avoiding falling back into dualism derived by an opposition between physical explanat...

Les divers visages du mouvement. Questions phénoménologiques et ontologiques sur le rapport entre la perception, l'expression et le mouvement dans le cours de Merleau-Ponty Le monde sensible et le monde de l'expression Le cours professé par Merleau-Ponty dans l'année 1952-53 est encore inédit, mais grâce au travail de Emmanuel de Saint Aubert et Stefan Kristensen il est possible de le lire en transcription en vue de sa publication. Ce cours, inaugurant les leçons au Collège de France, contient des analyses détaillées ...

The attention devoted by Merleau-Ponty to the problem of a definition of the phenomenological reduction is at the same time very restricted and yet very acute. We cannot hope to find, in Merleau-Ponty's writings, anything comparable to the extension and the meticulousness with which Husserl carefully distinguishes and compares, defines and undoes the various ways to perform the reduction, and progressively clarifies its purpose and value. Yet in a certain sense Merleau-Ponty's whole conception of phenomenology is ...

The interpretive approach adopted in this paper is influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and in particular by his understanding of Nature, which in turn takes into consideration Whitehead’s work. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is seen by its author as the metaphysical generalization of problems found in his investigation of natural knowledge. Whitehead admits that a speculative approach is necessitated by the very questions arising from the mathematical concepts of the material world and the revolutions undergone in logic, mathematics and physics at the turn of the century.Whitehead’s understanding of nature is framed from the beginning in terms of a processual approach. However, this notion of process is not fully worked out in the epistemological works and requires a metaphysical deepening. This is due to the fact that the notion of duration adopted in the epistemological works is not sufficient to convey the notion of process. This lack of adequacy is coupled by Whitehead ...

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The attention devoted by Merleau-Ponty to the problem of a definition of the phenomenological reduction is at the same time very restricted and yet very acute. We cannot hope to find, in Merleau-Ponty's writings, anything comparable to the extension and the meticulousness with which Husserl carefully distinguishes and compares, defines and undoes the various ways to perform the reduction, and progressively clarifies its purpose and value. Yet in a certain sense Merleau-Ponty's whole conception of phenomenology is ...

The reflection on the notion of consciousness that Faustino Savoldi has carried out for many years, and whose greatest result is the work La coscienza, published in 2013, had continued after this publication. In personal conversations with him, we had come to the idea that the problem of consciousness and the question of the relationship between mind and body should be addressed in the light of a meditation on the concept of life. Unfortunately there was no time to complete this work. This essay tries to outline some theoretical assumptions to continue in any case along the direction glimpsed by Savoldi, and to bring forward his intellectual legacy.

Analisi e riflessioni sul complesso fenomeno chiamato dolore sono antiche quanto l'uomo e certamente presenti fin dall'inizio della storia del pensiero filosofico. Tuttavia, recentemente, si può dire che questo tema stia tornando alla ribalta dell'attenzione degli studiosi, non soltanto dei filosofi ma, anche e forse soprattutto, degli scienziati cognitivi, dei biologi, degli psicologi, dei medici, e dunque di ricercatori che operano in ambiti solitamente meno direttamente coinvolti in questioni che si potrebbero, almeno provvisoriamente, chiamare soggettive o, per altro verso, qualitative. In realtà il problema di come comprendere il dolore è da tempo presente anche nella riflessione epistemologica sulla medicina, e anzi forse il ritorno di interesse per questo aspetto universale ma certo poco piacevole dell'esistenza umana può essere motivato innanzi tutto dalla crescente preoccupazione dei medici per un aspetto della sofferenza che, da appendice inevitabile della malattia, si sta progressivamente trasformando in patologia autonoma, soprattutto in connessione con l'invecchiamento della popolazione. L'International Association for the Study of Pain, che pubblica l'importante rivista internazionale Pain, è stata fondata nel 1973 e ora vede al proprio interno più di 7000 membri provenienti da 133 nazioni, ha 90 sedi nazionali, e 20 gruppi di interesse speciale, dedicati ad altrettanti temi rilevanti connessi alla ricerca generale sul dolore. È chiaro dunque che la questione della comprensione del dolore riapre un capitolo del più generale dibattito su cosa sia l'esperienza, e in particolare se la coscienza abbia un ruolo oppure no. Ma, come si diceva, va tenuto in conto anche l'aspetto della comunicazione, non necessariamente linguistica, dell'esperienza dolorosa. In effetti molti questionari di valutazione dell'esperienza personale del dolore propongono una valutazione delle espressioni facciali o dei comportamenti gestuali, quando non sia ad es. possibile ottenere uno scambio verbale significativo con la persona sofferente. In questo senso il corpo "parla" anche se non utilizza il linguaggio. Questi due problemi sono chiaramente interconnessi e aprono a un dibattito epistemologico che chiama in causa la più generale problematica relativa a cosa sia l'esperienza e in particolare come si debba comprendere l'aspetto fenomenico, in questo caso connesso alla sofferenza, rispetto a un più o meno chiaramente concepito sostrato corporeo o materiale. In definitiva, l'esperienza del dolore riapre il vaso di pandora del contrasto tra dualismo e monismo e dunque la grande questione del rapporto tra mente e corpo. Forse però l'indagine sul dolore può offrire uno sguardo diverso su questi temi tradizionali. Per esaminare l'ampia e complessa problematica relativa all'esperienza del dolore, questo numero di Discipline filosofiche vuole proporre alcuni approcci, tra loro a volte anche profondamente differenti, che permettano innanzitutto di apprezzare la varietà delle forme della sofferenza, e inoltre di sondarne la valenza filosofica alla luce della comune convinzione che il dolore rappresenti un tema di indagine molto significativo per le sue valenze epistemologiche e ontologiche. Per contribuire a questo numero si possono proporre testi che ricadano in uno dei seguenti campi, sebbene altre proposte possano essere prese in considerazione: 1) Questioni epistemologiche relative alla valutazione qualitativa e/o quantitativa dell'esperienza del dolore; 2) Questioni relative allo statuto della corporeità come base esperienziale del dolore; 3) Questioni concernenti il rapporto tra coscienza fenomenica e substrato inconscio (cognitivo e/o psicoanalitico) nell'esperienza del dolore; 4) Aspetti relativi ai rapporti tra filosofia e scienze naturali (in particolare biologia e medicina) connessi alla cura del dolore; 5) Tematiche concernenti la dimensione narrativa dell'esperienza del dolore nelle sue connessioni con lo statuto epistemologico delle scienze biomediche.

Reflection on the complex phenomenon called pain goes back to the beginnings of humanity and has certainly been alive since the inception of philosophical thought. But this theme is now gaining new attention from scholars-not only from philosophers, but perhaps especially from cognitive scientists, biologists, psychologists and physicians, who are usually less directly concerned with 'subjective' or 'qualitative' issues. To be sure, epistemological reflection on medicine has long been addressing the problem of how to understand pain, and indeed this renewed interest in this universal but certainly unpleasant aspect of human existence may well be motivated to a large extent by the growing concern of doctors for the fact that suffering is turning from being an inevitable fallout of the disease to being an autonomous pathology, especially in connection with the aging of the population. The International Association for the Study of Pain, which publishes the leading international journal Pain, was founded in 1973 and now has more than 7,000 members from 133 nations, 90 national offices, and 20 special interest groups dedicated to as many topics related to general research on pain. It is clear that the question of understanding pain reopens a chapter in the more general debate on what experience is, and in particular on whether consciousness plays a role in it or not. But the communication of pain experience, which is not necessarily linguistic, is another aspect that should be considered. Many questionnaires for the assessment of personal pain experience involve an evaluation of facial expressions or gestural behaviour, for instance when a meaningful verbal exchange with the suffering person is precluded. In this sense the body 'speaks' even if it does not use language. These two issues are clearly interconnected, leading to an epistemological debate on the more general problem of what experience is, and in particular of how its phenomenal aspect, in this case connected to suffering, should be understood in relation to a more or less clearly conceived bodily or material substrate. In the end, the experience of pain reopens the Pandora's box of the contrast between dualism and monism and therefore the big question of the relationship between mind and body. Perhaps, however, the investigation of pain can offer a different perspective on these traditional issues. This issue of Discipline filosofiche aims to address the wide and complex issues relating to the experience of pain by bringing to it multiple, and sometimes very different, approaches, in order to bring out the variety of the forms of suffering, as well as to probe the philosophical significance of pain, in the light of the common belief that it represents a crucial subject of investigation for its epistemological and ontological value. Suitable topics for submission of manuscripts include but are not limited to: 1) Epistemological issues relating to the qualitative and/or quantitative assessment of the pain experience; 2) Issues relating to the status of corporeality as the experiential basis of pain; 3) Issues concerning the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and its unconscious (cognitive and/or psychoanalytic) substrate in the experience of pain; 4) Issues concerning the relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences (in particular biology and medicine) with respect to the treatment of pain; 5) Topics concerning the narrative dimension of the experience of pain in its connections with the epistemological status of biomedical sciences.