- University of Bath, Politics, Languages and International Studies (PoLIS), Graduate StudentIstituto Affari Internazionali, EU-Turkey, Department Member, and 2 moreadd
- Political Legitimacy, EU Foreign Policy, Conflcit Resolution, De Facto States, International Legitimacy, Peace and Conflict Studies, and 7 morePopulism, Cyprus conflict, Conflict Resolution, Authoritarianism, Democratization, Authoritarian Consolidation; Authoritarian Reproduction, and Political Islamedit
- Website: https://www.unive.it/data/persone/23423741/curriculum
Project website: https://pric.unive.it/projects/craft/homeedit
In this chapter, I examine how the societal and political conditions of competitive authoritarian regimes (CA)2 shape interest group ecologies.3 The chapter demonstrates that civil society and the mobilization of interest groups... more
In this chapter, I examine how the societal and political conditions of
competitive authoritarian regimes (CA)2 shape interest group ecologies.3
The chapter demonstrates that civil society and the mobilization of interest
groups therein is different in CA regimes compared to both consolidated
autocracies and liberal democracies. There is a unique set of conditions
affecting interest communities in these regimes. Pockets of civic
resistance, relative competitiveness of the oppositional groups, political
pressure in the form of cooptation and selective repression contour interest
groups’ organizational forms and entry and exit terms. I examine Turkey
under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(2002–present) as an illustrative case. Specifically, I focus on advocacy in
the area of gender politics by highlighting the role of women’s organizations
that legitimize or challenge the AKP’s authoritarian gender politics.
competitive authoritarian regimes (CA)2 shape interest group ecologies.3
The chapter demonstrates that civil society and the mobilization of interest
groups therein is different in CA regimes compared to both consolidated
autocracies and liberal democracies. There is a unique set of conditions
affecting interest communities in these regimes. Pockets of civic
resistance, relative competitiveness of the oppositional groups, political
pressure in the form of cooptation and selective repression contour interest
groups’ organizational forms and entry and exit terms. I examine Turkey
under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
(2002–present) as an illustrative case. Specifically, I focus on advocacy in
the area of gender politics by highlighting the role of women’s organizations
that legitimize or challenge the AKP’s authoritarian gender politics.
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This chapter reflects on the impact of Turkey’s authoritarian neoliberal governance on the transformation of civil society with a particular focus on latent counter-mobilisation. The first section focuses on how Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi... more
This chapter reflects on the impact of Turkey’s authoritarian neoliberal governance on the transformation of civil society with a particular focus on latent counter-mobilisation. The first section focuses on how Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) has transformed civic space through a selective approach that switches between repression and facilitation. The AKP represses autonomous and dissident organisations and activists through judicial harassment and new regulations while facilitating the growth of a government-oriented civil society sector (GONGOs). The GONGOs fulfil two aims: softening the immediate effects of the state’s withdrawal from social provision and generating bottom-up consent for authoritarian neoliberal governance. The second section analyses resistance against the AKP’s authoritarian neoliberalism by focusing on the case of a unique social movement, Müslüman Sol hareket (Muslim Left movement), which fuses class politics with Islamic soc...
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Popülist aktörler, son yıllarda inişli çıkışlı iktidar performanslarına rağmen, birbirinden çok farklı ülkelerde kendilerine sağlam bir yer edinerek siyasetin başat aktörlerinden olmuşlardır. Popülist sağ partilerin demokratik ilkeler ve... more
Popülist aktörler, son yıllarda inişli çıkışlı iktidar performanslarına rağmen, birbirinden çok farklı ülkelerde kendilerine sağlam bir yer edinerek siyasetin başat aktörlerinden olmuşlardır. Popülist sağ partilerin demokratik ilkeler ve anayasa karşıtı söylem ve politikalarına rağmen birçok ülkede gözlemlenen "önlenemez" yükselişi, literatürde birbiriyle ilişkili iki noktayla açıklanmaktadır. Birincisi, popülistler, ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi krizlerden mevcut kurumları ve hâkim siyasi aktörleri sorumlu tutarak, yerleşmiş pratiklere topyekûn savaş açmaktadırlar. 1 İkincisi, kendilerini siyaset dışı veya siyaset üstü olarak konumlandırarak, siyasetten ve yöneticilerden beklentisi kalmamış seçmen gruplarına, 'post-demokrasi' çağında yepyeni ve "kirlenmemiş" bir alternatif sundukları mesajını vermektedirler. 2 Ne var ki, popülistler kendilerine siyasi alan açmak için var olan krizleri kullanmak dışında, belli kişi ve grupları hedef göstererek yeni krizler de yaratmaktadırlar.
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UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations for a comprehensıve settlement of the Cyprus problem are going on for decades with breakdowns and under different leaderships from both sides. A new round of negotiations with the mediation of the... more
UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations for a comprehensıve settlement of the Cyprus problem are going on for decades with breakdowns and under different leaderships from both sides. A new round of negotiations with the mediation of the UN Good Offices is due to start soon. The leaders from both sides, the President of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) i Nicos Anastasiades and the President of Northern Cyprus Derviş Eroǧlu, started informal talks in November 2013, but they could not agree on the wording of a joint statement that has so far adjourned the start of formal negotiations ii. This article offers an analysis of current issues and long-standing complexities in the peace process that are crucial to understand the importance of the approaching negotiations in Cyprus.
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This chapter reflects on the impact of Turkey's authoritarian neoliberal governance on the transformation of civil society with a particular focus on latent counter-mobilisation. The first section focuses on how Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi... more
This chapter reflects on the impact of Turkey's authoritarian neoliberal governance on the transformation of civil society with a particular focus on latent counter-mobilisation. The first section focuses on how Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) has transformed civic space through a selective approach that switches between repression and facilitation. The AKP represses autonomous and dissident organisations and activists through judicial harassment and new regulations while facilitating the growth of a government-oriented civil society sector (GONGOs). The GONGOs fulfil two aims: softening the immediate effects of the state's withdrawal from social provision and generating bottom-up consent for authoritarian neoliberal governance. The second section analyses resistance against the AKP's authoritarian This study has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Project 'CRAFT' with Grant agreement ID 795117.
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This article investigates legitimacy of EU state building and conflict resolution as a continuous and collective process through which local stakeholders, as the direct bearers of EU policies, ascribe meaning and support for the EU actors... more
This article investigates legitimacy of EU state building and conflict resolution as a continuous and collective process through which local stakeholders, as the direct bearers of EU policies, ascribe meaning and support for the EU actors and actions on the ground. Contrary to the static and narrow understanding of legitimacy in the EU literature, the article offers a dynamic framework of legitimacy based on two main aspects: (i) sources of legitimacy (input and output) and (ii) objects of legitimacy (diffuse and specific support) in order to trace the complicated relationship between the EU and different local groups (the government, parliamentary opposition, local NGOs and public opinion) in Kosovo. The main argument is that the EU fails to generate local consent and faces a worsening erosion of support in Kosovo due to the limited participation of local stakeholders into the EU-promoted political decision-making structures and the contested ability of the EU to foster outcomes that have salience for local actors.
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This study examines the relationship between populism, nationalism and religion through evidence from Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. The literature on the populism’s rapport with nationalism has developed in isolation... more
This study examines the relationship between populism, nationalism and religion through evidence from Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule. The literature on the populism’s rapport with nationalism has developed in isolation from the burgeoning theorization of populism-religion nexus. This study has a two-fold contribution. Theoretically, it advances a historical approach to deepen our understanding of the widespread appeal of contemporary populism. It argues that populism can capitalize on unique contextual fusions of religion and ethnic (secular) nationalism that originate from historical legacies and ideas of modern nation-building to (re)construct the antagonistic discourse dividing the society into two camps of ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’. Empirically, by drawing upon discourse theory and empirical analysis of the AKP’s public discourse, the study offers a nuanced approach to the AKP’s much-debated stance on religion as an ideology versus instrument. Three areas are investigated to exemplify AKP’s construction of populist dichotomy: a) ethnic and religious minorities, b) women, and c) youth. The analysis reveals that the AKP has built three different, and at times, contradictory articulations of 'people as underdogs’, ‘people as nation’ and ‘people as the ummah’ against ‘the secular elites’, ‘the enemies within’ and ‘the West’, respectively.
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What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a meso-level approach to answer this question, and focuses on the... more
What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a meso-level approach to answer this question, and focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a case study. Lately, the diaspora governance literature has focused on official diaspora institutions and the policies of countries of origin. This study, alternatively, highlights “diasporic civic space” as an arena entrenching authoritarian practices “at home.” It investigates the conditions under which diasporic civic space can be co-opted by undemocratic countries of origin and the role of “home state oriented diaspora organizations” in this process of co-optation. The study shows that diasporic civic space can offer resources to undemocratic regimes to mobilize previously dormant diaspora communities and create a support base abroad that is driven by nationalism and partisanship. The empirical discussion unveils four factors behind the successful mobilization of diasporas by undemocratic countries of origin: (1) nationalist sentiments among the diaspora; (2) motivations to get a share from the perks that may be meted out by home country government; (3) feelings of insecurity, fear, and marginalization as immigrants; and (4) the desire to assert one’s identity and cultural ties vis-à-vis the majority in countries of settlement. The findings are based on the case of the Turkish diasporic civic space in Europe, which has recently been mobilized by a diaspora organization with political ties to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Original data are drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018–2019 with members and representatives of major pro-AKP diaspora organization known as the Union of International Democrats (UID), as well as Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamist/conservative diaspora organizations in Sweden, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany. The findings contribute to the understanding of undemocratic home states’ non-coercive and de-territorialized governance practices beyond their borders.
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Why do right-wing populist leaders routinely resort to religious appeals? How should the religious symbolism in populist politics be interpreted? To address these questions, this study shifts attention to symbolic, ritualistic and emotive... more
Why do right-wing populist leaders routinely resort to religious appeals? How should the religious symbolism in populist politics be interpreted? To address these questions, this study shifts attention to symbolic, ritualistic and emotive mobilization by populism through insights from cultural sociology and ‘sacralization of politics’. Populists in power sacralize the political arena by attributing nominally secular entities such as the nation, the state and the leader ‘religious’ traits as objects of loyalty and faith. By creating a syncretic amalgamation of the secular and religious domains, they perpetuate the dichotomy between the people and the powerful enemy, despite changing boundaries of both categories. Using the case of Turkey as illustration, the study examines three features of sacralized politics: (1) mission led by a sacrosanct leader, (2) consecration of elect community/the nation, and (3) performance politics that substitutes democratic participation. The findings suggest that beyond the instrumental use of religious tropes for political gain, right-wing populists rally support by selectively evoking the ‘cultural toolkit’ available to them. They also construct a specific group identity by evoking collective memory. Researchers should pay more attention to populists’ embeddedness in cultural structures in which religion remains a powerful pillar and resonate well with their audiences.
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Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, Turkey’s civil society has enlarged both in size and diversity of civic engagement. This development is puzzling since Turkey’s weak democratic credentials do not allow an enabling... more
Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, Turkey’s civil society has enlarged both in size and diversity of civic engagement. This development is puzzling since Turkey’s weak democratic credentials do not allow an enabling political and legal setting for civil society’s expansion. This study argues that the expansion can be explained through a particular dilemma of rulers in competitive-authoritarian (CA) regimes. The AKP is caught between the conflicting interests of appropriating and containing civil society. While the government needs to cherish civil society to sustain CA regime, it also needs to repress it, as civil society is the only arena where dissenting social forces can still carve pockets of resistance and challenge the dominant paradigms of the regime. Based on extensive fieldwork, this study discusses the patterns of containment and appropriation that have led to the steady expansion of civil society under pressure. The AKP’s dilemma has also rendered Turkey’s civil society ‘tamed’, namely politicized, disabled and segregated. The study broadens the understanding of relations between civil society and the state in CA regimes by offering essential insights into how these regimes are sustained, entrenched and also contested through and within civil society.
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Modern Turkey’s emergence was a nationalist struggle that aimed to cultivate youth as secular citizens. Almost a century later, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) attempts to re-model youth through a new ethno-religious... more
Modern Turkey’s emergence was a nationalist struggle that aimed to cultivate youth as secular citizens. Almost a century later, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) attempts to re-model youth through a new ethno-religious nationalist project. This study argues that different from the secular Kemalist social engineering that dominated the state’s youth policy for decades, the AKP relies on the intermediary agency of Islamist-conservative and government-oriented civil society to shape young generations and convey ethno-religious nationalism to youth. Seventeen government-oriented youth organizations illustrate the extent of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) quest for a new national identity and cultural hegemony within the broader context of Turkey’s steady decline into an authoritarian regime. The findings—based on original fieldwork conducted between October 2017–June 2019—demonstrate youth organizations’ country-wide grassroots engagement in four categories: indoctrination, extra-curricular training, service provision in the education sector, and street activism and humanitarian work. Their self-defined goals, ideological roots and grassroots reach inject a new disciplinary ethos and statist values in youth towards shaping them as Muslim and nationalist ‘ideal citizens’. The study offers insights on the societal aspects of authoritarian regime building and cautions that crafting ‘successful’ authoritarian regimes is not a one-way process that takes place only at the formal institutional level. A broad range of societal players and coalitions, including civil society, play a critical role in authoritarian regime building.
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Despite the remarkable scholarly attention to populism and populist parties, the relation between populism and religion remains understudied. Using evidence from two long-term ruling populist parties – Turkey’s Justice and Development... more
Despite the remarkable scholarly attention to populism and populist parties, the relation between populism and religion remains understudied. Using evidence from two long-term ruling populist parties – Turkey’s Justice and Development Party and Macedonia’s Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity – this study focuses on how and why religion can be an instrument for populist politics at three levels: (i) discursive, (ii) public policy and (iii) institutionalised alliances with religious authorities. The study highlights that religion comes into play at these three levels once populists attain comfortable electoral margins but encounter mounting political and economic challenges that can potentially weaken their grip on power. Ruling populists co-opt and monopolise the majority religion in the name of ‘the people’s will’ as they increasingly undermine democratic legitimacy but they need to justify their systematic crackdown on dissent, the system of checks and balances, the rule of law and minorities. The empirical findings of the study also demonstrate the dual function of religion for populists: its catch-all potential to create cross-class and cross-ethnicity popular support, and its instrumentality to discredit dissent as ‘religiously unfit’ while constructing an antagonism of ‘the people’ versus ‘the elites’.
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This FEUTURE Online Paper aims to offer a forward-looking analysis of EU-Turkey relations based on three scenarios: convergence, cooperation and conflict. It discusses current political and social developments in Turkey and takes stock of... more
This FEUTURE Online Paper aims to offer a forward-looking analysis of EU-Turkey relations based on three scenarios: convergence, cooperation and conflict. It discusses current political and social developments in Turkey and takes stock of the recent EU-level and regional developments under positive, negative and unfolding trends. The discussion shows that the future will be most likely driven by a push and pull between cooperation and conflict scenarios. On the one hand, mutual interests concerning trade, diversification of energy sources, migration and regional security concerns will continue to motivate both sides to engage with each other as partners in the future. On the other hand, Turkey’s domestic political developments marked by authoritarianisation since 2013 and violation of the freedom expression and the rule of law in the post-15 July period will strengthen the conflict scenario. It concludes with a discussion that the current EU apathy towards the social and political developments in Turkey undermines the EU’s normative influence and the credibility of the enlargement policy.
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Despite the continuously increasing research on conditionality, socialisation and compliance dynamics of the local political leaders in the Western Balkans, the fragmented local agency and its complex relations with the EU remains an... more
Despite the continuously increasing research on conditionality, socialisation and compliance dynamics of the local political leaders in the Western Balkans, the fragmented local agency and its complex relations with the EU remains an under-researched topic. This paper aims to fulfil this gap by offering a systematic analysis of ‘the local’ through the case of Kosovo. It aspires to complement the top-down Europeanisation/socialisation and rational adaptation perspectives with a critical perspective. The paper argues that a systematic analysis of the local agency and domestic dynamics would improve our understanding of some of the persistent problems of state-building and democratisation efforts in the Western Balkans by explaining why some norms and policies are resisted, and some others are supported under certain conditions. The investigation is based on the relevant literature, semi-structured interviews conducted in Kosovo and the analysis of policy documents, civil society reports and local newspaper archives. The findings show that the uneasy relations between the local groups and deeper problems of state weakness, such as lack of legitimacy, constantly pressurise the EU to redefine its state- and democracy building agenda in line with irreconcilable local priorities and expectations.
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This article investigates legitimacy of EU state building and conflict resolution as a continuous and collective process through which local stakeholders, as the direct bearers of EU policies, ascribe meaning and support for the EU actors... more
This article investigates legitimacy of EU state building and conflict resolution as a continuous and collective process through which local stakeholders, as the direct bearers of EU policies, ascribe meaning and support for the EU actors and actions on the ground. Contrary to the static and narrow understanding of legitimacy in the EU literature, the article offers a dynamic framework of legitimacy based on two main aspects: (i) sources of legitimacy (input and output) and (ii) objects of legitimacy (diffuse and specific support) in order to trace the complicated relationship between the EU and different local groups (the government, parliamentary opposition, local NGOs and public opinion) in Kosovo. The main argument is that the EU fails to generate local consent and faces a worsening erosion of support in Kosovo due to the limited participation of local stakeholders into the EU-promoted political decision-making structures and the contested ability of the EU to foster outcomes that have salience for local actors.
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This article seeks to explain the endurance of populist parties in power by focusing on the case of Turkey and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The existing scholarly research on the AKP’s populism either focuses on the discourse... more
This article seeks to explain the endurance of populist parties in power by focusing on the case of Turkey and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The existing scholarly research on the AKP’s populism either focuses on the discourse and mediagenic performance of Erdoğan constructing an antagonism between ‘the people’ and ‘elites’ or equates populism to patronage politics. This study argues that in order to understand the AKP’s long term appeal, populism should be theoretically decoupled from narrow approaches related to economic governance and treated as an essentially anti-pluralist set of ideas in problematic relationship to democracy. Empirically, the article examines the government-dependent trade unions and women’s organisations in Turkey to understand how ruling populists shape extra-legislative fields. The findings show that the AKP expands the reach of populist antagonism between the people versus the elites through these organisations. Dependent organisations serve to reassert the AKP’s continuing relevance as the only genuine representative of ‘the people’, while transforming the labour and women’s struggle in line with the government’s agenda. They also keep newly arising social demands in check under a democratic disguise while denying pluralism to civil society and entrenching undemocratic governance.
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Few studies have systematically examined the rising political and social unrest in the Balkans. This paper investigates the local dynamics and consequences of widespread discontent in Kosovo through the analytical framework of populism as... more
Few studies have systematically examined the rising political and social unrest in the Balkans. This paper investigates the local dynamics and consequences of widespread discontent in Kosovo through the analytical framework of populism as an essentially anti-establishment political style. By focusing on the case of Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (LVV), the paper sets out to consider two related questions: the unique populist style of LVV and the complex reasons behind its electoral breakthrough and continuing support among various groups. Based on a qualitative documentary analysis of the party programme, manifesto, party publications, speeches of the leadership and interviews, the paper finds that LVV successfully melds a populist political style, leftist/social democratic agenda and contentious politics as a means to disperse its message. The second part of the article offers three arguments to explain its appeal: structural factors (electoral availability and party system), societal dynamics (political and economic dissatisfaction) and the agency of LVV (internal organisation, cohesion and leadership). The article contributes to the thriving literature on populism through a novel empirical scope, and to the literature on Southeast Europe through a focus on local agency, voter preferences and the party system.
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Research Interests: Turkey and Referendum
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This is the first in a three-part series on democracy, human rights and the refugee crisis on the EU’s borders. In part one of this series, Bilge Yabanci questions the morality of EU incentive deals with quasi-authoritarian regimes,... more
This is the first in a three-part series on democracy, human rights and the refugee crisis on the EU’s borders. In part one of this series, Bilge Yabanci questions the morality of EU incentive deals with quasi-authoritarian regimes, asking: ‘When will the EU start taking the authoritarian practices in candidate countries seriously and what can
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Conflict resolution constitutes a crucial aspect of the European Union’s foreign policy objectives and external actions. Despite its centrality, there is a profound mismatch between the academic level discussions about the EU’s role and... more
Conflict resolution constitutes a crucial aspect of the European Union’s foreign policy objectives and external actions. Despite its centrality, there is a profound mismatch between the academic level discussions about the EU’s role and impact on various conflicts of ethno-political nature and what actually takes place in practice, as the EU conflict resolution agenda unfolds within different local settings. Adopting an analytical perspective of legitimation based on local support, the thesis seeks to understand how and when local agency impacts EU conflict resolution. Subsequently, the framework is applied to analyse the complex interaction between fragmented local groups (political elites, non-state organisations and public) and the EU (as a framework and as a policy-actor) in two grand conflict resolution projects of the EU: Kosovo and North Cyprus. The thesis finds that local groups have a distinctive ability to confer or withdraw support to certain EU policies, to push the EU to introduce or alter mechanisms for local participation into policy-setting process and to counter and disqualify the EU’s normative arguments and policy choices with alternative normative arguments. Diverse local agents actively select norms and reinterpret them in order to match them with their extant ideas with an aim to push the Union to pursue a local vision of conflict resolution. This process of re-interpretation or localisation has behavioural implications on local groups as well. It approximates the conflict resolution process to local priorities and expectations; otherwise, the EU starts to lose its appeal to local groups to maintain its decisive role in the conflict resolution process. These findings help us complement the EU literature which analyse conflict resolution through Europeanisation/socialisation and conditionality perspectives. Local groups are not merely passive recipients of EU benefits. Nor do they go through a linear process of socialisation and natural acceptance of the EU agenda in the long-term. By analysing the reasons and implications of increasing local resistance in Kosovo and North Cyprus, the thesis also bridges the theoretical gap between the EU literature and broad conflict resolution studies which promotes a genuine focus to the ‘everyday concerns’ of local groups.
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The landslide victory of the main opposition party (the Republican People's Party, CHP) in Turkey's 2019 municipal elections marks a surprising moment in Turkish politics and the end of an intense decade. Although tacit and contested, a... more
The landslide victory of the main opposition party (the Republican People's Party, CHP) in Turkey's 2019 municipal elections marks a surprising moment in Turkish politics and the end of an intense decade. Although tacit and contested, a cooperation between the CHP, its nationalist allies (Iyi Parti), and the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (HDP) made possible a political reshuffle on the local level of politics, which many would not have thought was still possible after a decade of authoritarian centralization. Although the government continues to criminalize and persecute the opposition, particularly the HDP by suspending the democratically elected mayors, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged deeply rattled and insecure. However, what is considered to be 'the electoral success' of the opposition parties in Turkey could not be possible without a sustained civic and social opposition that kept the grassroots organized, and developed alternative channels of participation and production of democratic demands. The purpose of this workshop is to initiate a debate on the opposition in Turkey and contribute to the theorization of the role, transformation, mobilization strategies and different forms of the opposition in undemocratic regimes. The growing scholarly interest in de-democratization and the emergence of several forms of hybrid regimes has created an extensive literature on the institutional erosion and 'liquid regimes', the monopolization and constellations of the executive power and the political economy of hybridization across the world. However, the role and the changing forms of the opposition(s) under the process of autocratization remains undertheorized. In academic debates, 'the opposition' is mostly utilized in reference to political parties and categorized as 'successful' or 'failed' based on their electoral performance. While the political opposition is crucial in undemocratic regimes without doubt, the lack of an in-depth theorization on the forms, agency and transformation of the opposition(s) is highly problematic. As Schedler (2013) argues, despite the political violence and high odds against 'their success' in the traditional sense, the oppositions persist in many different forms, incentivize ways of alternative participation, demand democratic rights and protest. In this sense, it might be more useful to consider 'many' oppositions (political/civic/social, local/national, formal/informal) and investigate several ways in which they articulate their demands and counter the challenges they face. What does it mean to be an opposition in autocratizing regimes? How do the oppositional actors organize in and outside the political party arena? What are their activities and strategies under the autocratic limitations on the basic freedoms? How do institutionalized political opposition and organized civic and social opposition in Turkey cooperate? In which areas does a lack of communication between the two pose challenges for oppositional activity? How do the oppositional forces enhance forms of cooperation which go beyond the electoral campaigns and voting? How do 'the oppositions' in Turkey compare with oppositions in similar contexts? Relying on the literature on party politics, political contention, social movements and infrapolitics, the workshop invites original contributions on topics covering but not strictly limited to: