AKP and democratization

On 20. January 2012, the Parliament of the Republic of Turkey passed a law
concerning new rules and procedure by which Turkey’s future head of state
would be elected. According to this law, Turkey’s next head of state was to be
elected by popular vote, in lieu of the Parliament, for the first time since
Republican Turkey was founded. Based on the official election results, the
former Prime Minister and head of the ruling party, the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
was elected in the first round as the 12th President of the Republic of Turkey
for a period of five years, wining more than 52% of the votes on 10. August
2014.1 The other two candidates were Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu and Selahattin
Demirtaş, who received 38.44% and 9.76% of the votes respectively

Dieser Sammelband bietet einen umfassenden Einblick in das Wesen der «Neuen Türkei». Die seit 2002 ununterbrochen regierende moderat-islam(ist)ische Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung und ihr damaliger Anführer und heutiger Staatspräsident Erdoğan haben den innen- und außenpolitischen Wandel der Türkei vorangetrieben und selbstbewusst die «Neue Türkei» proklamiert. Allerdings weicht die anfängliche Euphorie der Ernüchterung. Der EU-Beitrittsprozess steckt fest, während Vorwürfe über autoritäre Tendenzen, Korruption, Einmischung in die Privatsphäre, Reislamisierung der Innen- und Außenpolitik lauter werden. Experten aus Deutschland und der Türkei liefern in diesem Sammelband kritische Einblicke in die Innen- und Außenpolitik des sich im Umbau befindlichen Landes und erläutern sowohl Errungenschaften als auch Probleme der türkischen Transformationsgesellschaft.

İlkcan ALKURT, AKP Döneminde CHP Politikaları, Siyaset Bilimi Tezsiz Yüksek Lisans Bitirme Projesi, Ankara, 2019


Türk siyasi hayatımızın son 17 yılında AKP ve CHP odaklı bir siyaset yaklaşımı bulunmaktadır. Bu süreçteki tartışmalarda partiler arası boyutun yanı sıra lider odaklı da bir güç dengesi bulunmaktadır. Türkiye’de 2002 yılında iktidara gelen AKP’nin iktidarda kaldığı dönem boyunca CHP’nin nasıl ve ne şekilde politika ürettiğini CHP’nin logosu olan 6 ok simgesinden hareketle 6 ana başlıkta incelemekteyiz. Her başlık, kendi içerisinde konu ile ilgili diğer alanlarda da bilgi vermekte ve kronolojik süreçte ilerlemektedir. Bu başlıklar: Genel Hatlarıyla İç ve Dış Politika, Din, Eğitim, Kadın, Çevre ve Kentleşme, Temel Hak ve Özgürlükler şeklinde belirlenmiştir. Ancak çalışmadaki başlıklar içerisinde askeri, ekonomik, kültürel alanlara da göndermeler yapılmıştır. Aynı zamanda Türkiye’de uzun yıllardır devam eden lider odaklı siyasete vurgu yapılarak AKP özelinde Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, CHP özelinde ise Deniz Baykal ve Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu dönemleri birbirleriyle karşılaştırılmıştır. Çalışmada iktidar partisi AKP ve ana muhalefet partisi görevini yürüten CHP politikaları olumlu ve olumsuz yönleriyle eleştirilmiş, sonuç kısmında ise bu çatışmadan çıkarılan sonuca göre öneriler getirilmiştir.

Kitaptan başlıklar…


AKP Derin Tahribat Yapıyor
Sahipsiz Vatanın Batması Haktır
Tayyip Erdoğan Niye Sıkıntılı?
Yahudi’nin Türk Düşmanlığı ve Bunu Anayasallaştırma Hazırlığı
TSK’nın Hainlerden Kurtulması Bekleniyor
TSK’nın Yıpratılması ve Dağlıca’nın Perde Arkası
Ordu Düşmanlığı Gavur Uşaklığıdır
Sakın Aldanmayın, TSK Sağlamdır
Asıl Tehlike AKP mi, PKK mı?
İlim ve Akıl İman Etmeyi Gerektiriyor
İslâm Bayat Taklitçilik Değil, Hayat Disiplinidir
Kur’an’a Göre Patates Dini ve Tecelli Meselesi
Fetullahçı Zaman Gazetesinin İslamla Savaşı
İslâm ve Kur’an Nasıl Yozlaştırılıyor?
Kur’an Kıyamete kadar Gerekli ve Geçerli İlahi Kaynaktır
“İslâm Kapitalizmi” Sahtekarlık, “İslâm Sosyalizmi” Sapkınlıktır
AKP, Kapitalizm ve Protestanlık

The current article delineates the qualified nature of citizenship in the Turkish Republic. Its primary argument is that the content of citizenship in Turkey was shaped and reshaped since its establishment and until the present by a struggle between the hegemony of strict liberal and pluralist ideas. Throughout Turkish history the incumbent regimes, Kemalist, populist and Islamist, subjected the full range of citizenship rights to conceived-internal and external, real and imagined-security threats, which further legitimized restrictions on the already constrained implementation of Turkish citizenship. The recent downturn in Turkish citizenship, which started in 2011 and peaked following the failed coup attempt in summer 2016, should be understood in relation to the contemporary turmoil in the Middle East which confronted the Turkish state with a plethora of security challenges that further exacerbated the infringement of citizenship rights in Turkish society.

This thesis investigated the reactions to the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) recent lift of the ban against the Islamic headscarf in the Turkish Parliament. The reactions by the oppositional party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), were analysed through Norman Fairclough’s understanding of critical discourse analysis, which aims to illuminate unequal power relations created or recreated by the production of discursive practises, which is believed to ultimately affect social practises. The method of critical discourse analysis was accompanied by the feminist critique of orientalism, intended to assess how headscarved women are stereotyped and homogenised through orientalist ideas. The analysis resulted in an understanding of the complex power relations between the ruling party and the main oppositional party, as well as the effect of using orientalist ideas in discourse, possibility contributing to an increasingly extensive polarisation and, thus, the risk of increased conflicts between the secular groups and the more religiously observant groups in the Turkish society.

In countries like Turkey, issues such as minority rights/freedoms and
religious rights/freedoms are generally considered painful topics of domestic
and foreign policy mainly because there is usually a general belief that such
issues are “imposed” by external actors like the EU and the United States.
The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul and Heybeliada
Theological School (Halki Seminary), have been targets of the nationalist and/or
conservative religious media for a long time. Additionally, the traditional
widespread acceptance of these institutions as Turkish by the successive Turkish
governments, and the perception of the issue within the framework of
“reciprocity” between Turkey and Greece, made these issues “chronic” topics of
Turkish domestic and foreign policy. However, it is difficult to say that Turkish
public opinion as a whole share the same view on this issue. Especially since
2002, the Justice and Development Party government, created hopes and
expectations that actual steps would be taken towards the problematic title of
“ecumenical” of the Patriarchate and the reopening of Heybeliada Theological
School. Yet, the JDP government like its predecessors, does not recognize the
ecumenicity of the Patriarchate and continues to point out the reciprocity
understanding regarding the opening of the Theological School.

Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have historically excluded Islamist parties from the political process, making it difficult to assess assumptions about how they would behave in power, let alone about their potential to stimulate and steward a democratic transition. Until Tunisia’s Ennahda party won elections in 2011, no Islamist party in (or beyond) the MENA region had managed to lead an elected government, with a single exception: Turkey’s Justice and Development party (AKP). While scholars have tended to focus on the regional impact of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the original Arab Islamist movement, in many ways the Ennahda - AKP comparison is tighter, and therefore more illuminating, than the Ennahda - Muslim Brotherhood comparison. Comparing the AKP and Ennahda, therefore, can help scholars identify how different Islamist parties’ impact on democratization may diverge. Based on interviews in Arabic and Turkish with leaders, activists, and base-level members of Ennahda and AKP, this article examines what-- if anything-- AKP and Ennahda are learning from one another's experiences in power and why.

ข้อสรุปขั้นเบื้องต้นว่า ประเด็นหนึ่งที่ยังไม่ล้าสมัยในการทำความเข้าใจการเมืองตุรกีคือข้อถกเถียงเรื่องกระบวนการทำให้เป็นประชาธิปไตย

ดังนั้นในแง่ของการศึกษาเชิงวิชาการตุรกีสามารถเป็นได้ทั้งตัวแบบและบทเรียนให้กับประเทศมุสลิมและประเทศโลกที่สามที่ประสบปัญหาการพัฒนาประชาธิปไตย และหนึ่งในประเทศเหล่านั้นคือประเทศไทย

The Reina nightclub attack, which occurred in the early hours of New Year’s Day 2017 in Istanbul, Turkey, and the counterterrorism operations after the attack provide valuable security lessons. The attacker, Abdulkadir Masharipov, spent a year in a sleeper cell in Konya, Turkey, before receiving orders from his emir in Raqqa, Syria, using the Telegram app. He not only carried out an attack in the name of ISIS, killing 39 people and wounding many others, but also dodged police scrutiny at the scene by pretending to be one of the victims. ISIS has a heavy presence in Turkey, with several established cells and safe havens, and it has been openly threatening Turkey since the al-Bab military campaign in Syria. Turkey is a bridge between the East and West, and the danger of Turkey becoming the gateway for European terrorist activity cannot be ignored. With ISIS starting to lose vast territories in Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s capacity to counter terrorist threats and stem terrorist activity within its borders is critical for global security.

http://perconcordiam.com/isis-in-turkey/

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) has been in power in Turkey since 2002, consolidating
its electoral support among an array of social groups ranging from broad appeal among the popular
classes to business leaders and a growing middle class. The success of the AKP is a consequence of the
manner in which the party has inserted itself into certain economic and social sectors. While the party
has internalized the principles of reducing the public sphere and outsourcing to the private sector, it
has not restricted the reach of government intervention. On the contrary, it has become increasingly
involved in certain sectors, including social policy and housing. It has managed this through an indirect
approach that relies on intermediaries and private allies such as the businesses and associations that is has
encouraged. In this way, the AKP has developed and systematized modes of redistribution that involve
the participation of conservative businessmen who benefit from their proximity to decision-makers,
charitable organizations, and underprivileged social groups. These public policies have reconfigured
different social sectors in a way that has strengthened the Party’s influence

This article questions the assumption that the increase in visibility of religion in mass-mediated content is indicative of greater impact of religion in the public and state sphere and of a process of de-secularization. It argues that expressions of Hinduism and Islam have become inseparable from secularist histories in the respective countries. The analysis emphasizes a necessary distinction between piety, public popular culture and political activism in the name of a national religious majority, and shows that in its appropriation and redefinition of secularism and employment of religious symbolism, Hindu nationalist mobilization and governance in India are related more closely to sacralization of secularism in historical Turkish nationalism than to the Islamic movement. In both countries, we can observe a retreat rather than a greater media presence of the pious and sacred in the face of neonationalism and commercialization, which in each case produces a democratically precarious public popular culture.

Serdar M. Değirmencioğlu (Der.) İletişim Yayınları, 1. baskı - Haziran 2014. (407 sayfa)

Bu derleme, sosyal bilimlerin bu önemli ve tabu konu karşısındaki sessizliğini bozarak, şehitlik mitolojisinin türevlerini ve yansımalarını inceleme amacı güdüyor. Kitapta, şehitlik kavramının farklı dönemlerdeki ve farklı bağlamlardaki kullanımları ele alınıyor: Çanakkale Savaşı, 27 Mayıs…

Şehitlik söylemi nasıl yeniden üretiliyor... Şehitlik mitolojisi kamusal alanı nasıl çatışma belleğinin hâkimiyetine sokuyor?

ABSTRACT
The “Alevi Issue” is one of the most complicated and, at the same time, largely misunderstood problems in Turkey. Conflicts, resentments, grievances, and perpetual fears about Alevis that have existed for centuries have been publicly voiced through different mechanisms; yet, the message had never been understood thoroughly by the interlocutors of the Alevis. The discussions on the issue in various social and political contexts have often revolved around a rather limited list of Alevi identity-based claims.
The JDP government has undertaken a series of steps to understand and respond to Alevi identity-based claims. Popularly known as the “Alevi opening” (Alevi açılımı), the initiative is a turning point in terms of the Turkish governments’ approach to problems of Alevi citizens in Turkey. The Alevi Opening is the first systematic effort to address Alevis’ identity-based contentions. This step is also part of the broader policy of “Democratic Opening,” which addresses the burning problems of various ethnic and religious groups (Kurds, Alevis, religious minorities, and the Romani people) in Turkey. The objective of “Democratic Opening” is to reconcile the Turkish state and the marginalized segments of Turkish society.
This brief provides an analytic background for understanding the governing JDP’s “Alevi opening” initiative, which was launched in the summer of 2007. The issues mentioned in the list of Alevi identity-based claims, obstacles to the fulfillment of these issues, and the methods and the processes of the ongoing Alevi Opening are elaborated. This analysis argues that only a holistic intervention can bring about a sustainable reconciliation process between the Alevis and the Turkish state establishment as well as between the Alevi and Sunni citizens. In order to provide a holistic analysis, political, legal, psychological, cultural dynamics of the Alevi issue are emphasized here. Intervention insights and policy recommendations are formulated, consistent with the analytic perspective.

Pour analyser la situation actuelle en Turquie, et notamment pour caractériser le régime politico- juridique, le professeur Kaboğlu propose deux concepts : la déconstitutionnalisation et la délégalisation. Cet entretien cherche à décrypter ces deux concepts et à analyser l’évolution de la dégénérescence du régime juridique à des fins politiques. L’entretien révèle aussi comment la période actuelle se différencie d’un passé où les dérives et pratiques antidémocratiques ont toujours existé. Le débat s’ouvre sur les moyens d’une reconstitutionnalisation du régime juridique en Turquie.

This publication is also available in german and has been published in Berliner Debatte Initial 4 - 2014 - Jugend und Revolte im "Arabischen Frühling":


Gözde Böcü betrachtet die Protestbewegung in der Türkei und die Rolle der „Gezi-Generation“. Die Türkei ist als Teil des südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraums direkt von den Entwicklungen in den arabischen Nachbarstaaten betroffen, wie der aktuelle Syrien-Irak-IS-Konflikt zeigt. Die politischen Konstellationen in der Türkei unterscheiden sich von denen der arabischen Umbruchländer; in den Protestformen, -slogans und -zielen der jungen Generation sind jedoch gewisse Parallelen zu erkennen. Die Proteste der Gezi-Generation sind Teil einer breiteren transnationalen Protestwelle, die 2011 in Tunesien ihren Anfang nahm und an verschiedenen Orten im gesamten Mittelmeerraum aufflammte.

From 2001 to 2018, the AKP has delivered a new wave of political Islamism to the Turkish political landscape. I analyze the ideological foundations, political justifications, and social perspectives that gave rise to the AKP in the early 2000's--and articulate the party's political trajectory to present-day.

What motivates diasporas to support undemocratic rule in their countries of origin while enjoying democratic freedoms in their countries of settlement? This study adopts a meso-level approach to answer this question, and focuses on the Turkish diaspora in Europe as a case study. Lately, the diaspora governance literature has focused on official diaspora institutions and the policies of countries of origin. This study, alternatively, highlights “diasporic civic space” as an arena entrenching authoritarian practices “at home.” It investigates the conditions under which diasporic civic space can be co-opted by undemocratic countries of origin and the role of “home state oriented diaspora organizations” in this process of co-optation. The study shows that diasporic civic space can offer resources to undemocratic regimes to mobilize previously dormant diaspora communities and create a support base abroad that is driven by nationalism and partisanship. The empirical discussion unveils four factors behind the successful mobilization of diasporas by undemocratic countries of origin: (1) nationalist sentiments among the diaspora; (2) motivations to get a share from the perks that may be meted out by home country government; (3) feelings of insecurity, fear, and marginalization as immigrants; and (4) the desire to assert one’s identity and cultural ties vis-à-vis the majority in countries of settlement. The findings are based on the case of the Turkish diasporic civic space in Europe, which has recently been mobilized by a diaspora organization with political ties to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Original data are drawn from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018–2019 with members and representatives of major pro-AKP diaspora organization known as the Union of International Democrats (UID), as well as Alevi, Kurdish, and Islamist/conservative diaspora organizations in Sweden, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Germany. The findings contribute to the understanding of undemocratic home states’ non-coercive and de-territorialized governance practices beyond their borders.

How does Turkey's presidential system look after two and a half years of its implementation? Through a thorough analysis of changes in institutions and politics under the new governance system, this research paper sheds light on how likely a democratic repair is in the short run.

Freedom of religion has been a delicate issue since the founding of the Turkish Republic despite the principle of secularism stated in its constitution. After decades marked by assaults towards non-Muslims in Turkey and confiscation of their properties, several reform packages were adopted by the Turkish government in order better to secure their religious freedoms. This essay focuses on the motives behind and the limitations of the transformation of religious freedoms in Turkey over the last decade. The author argues that the incumbent AKP party’s religious friendly approach, while flexible, is ultimately grounded in Islamic superiority, and therefore remains limiting.

Im Jahre 2002 gewann in der Türkei mit der AKP (Adalet v Kalkιnma Partisi, Gerech­tig­keits- und Entwick­lung­s­partei) eine Partei die Parla­ments­wahlen, die erst ein Jahr zuvor gegründet worden war. Von ihren Anhän­gern und großen Teilen der west­li­chen Presse wurde sie als Trägerin des demo­k­ra­ti­schen Aufbruchs und Garantin des Siegs des Volkes über poli­ti­sche Eliten gefeiert. Andere Stimmen hingegen sahen die AKP als Prota­go­nistin der Isla­mi­sie­rung des Landes und der Einfüh­rung der shari‘a.
Die vorlie­gende Arbeit stellt sich die Aufgabe, die AKP von ihrer Selbst­be­sch­rei­bung ausge­hend zu unter­su­chen. Hierfür wurden grund­le­gende Texte zu ihrem poli­ti­schen Konzept Muha­faz­akar Demo­krasi (Konser­va­tive Demo­k­ratie) aus dem Türki­schen über­setzt und ana­­ly­siert. Dabei wird der Frage nach­ge­gangen, wo ›Konser­va­tive Demo­k­ratie‹ im türki­schen bzw. inter­na­tio­nalen Konser­va­tis­mus­dis­kurs verortet werden kann bzw. wie zutref­fend diese Selb­st­­be­zeich­nung ist.
In einem zweiten Schritt wird die Umset­zung ›Konser­va­tiver Demo­k­ratie‹ in die Regie­rungs­praxis anhand der Beispiele Menschen­­rechte, reli­giöse und ethni­sche Minder­heiten, Gender und Demo­k­ra­ti­sie­rung beleuchtet. Es wird geklärt, welche externen und internen Faktoren zu Prob­lemen bei der Umset­zung führten.
Um dem Vorwurf der Isla­mi­sie­rung der Türkei durch die AKP nach­zu­gehen, werden die gemein­same Geschichte der AKP mit den isla­mis­ti­schen Milli Görüş-Parteien betrachtet sowie die von ihr verfolgte Reli­gi­ons­po­litik und ihre Vor­­stel­lungen über das Verhältnis von Staat und Reli­gion detail­liert unter­sucht. Popu­läre Zusch­rei­bungen wie »die AKP als Modell für die isla­mi­sche Welt« oder »die AKP als türki­sche Christ­de­mo­k­raten« werden kritisch auf ihren prospek­tiven Gehalt hinter­fragt.
Ihre Studie hilft, die Motive hinter dem poli­ti­schen Taktieren der AKP, deren häufig vage Programm­for­mu­lie­rungen nicht nur im Ausland bisweilen für Verwir­rung sorgen, besser zu verstehen. (Joseph Croi­toru, FAZ)

This paper sketches out the historical emergence and progress of political Islam in modern Turkey by emphasizing its statist and clientelistic aspects emanating from the authoritarian basis of Turkish political modernization. The paper contends that there has always been an authoritarian and autocratic tendency in modern Turkish politics that depends on a peculiar and modernist articulation of both Islamism and secularism, which eventually stand on the same ground. This very ground is formed upon a sacred understanding of the state that can be defined as an all-encompassing and absolute perfection of political power, which manifests itself differently in content for secular nationalists and Islamists, and yet produces the same authoritarian tendency. Both the secular nationalism and Islamism appear to be state oriented movements in the sense that they both have emanated from the state, and envisage to control the state in an absolute sense.

KEYWORDS: Turkey, Islam, authoritarianism, clientelism

At the end of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire noticed the importance of the changes in ottoman political system. To sustain the empire, the aim was the westernisation movement. The changes in the military could not avoid the secessionist movements.  The multinationality came into play of the dissolution of the empire as well as the emergence of an opposition against the empire. The sum and the substance of the multinationality and of the modernism which was pioneered by ottoman military officers, brought disintegration of Ottoman Empire and the first opponents creations. The Ottoman intellectuals and the Young Turks established the first political parties and brought the first constitutional attempts. The modernisation, which was started on the ottoman military, was the reason of political modernisation which had been started by the military. However, these attempts influence the next one hundred years of Turkish political parties.

This paper examines the role of tradition for the political performance of Turkey's governing Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party). It is argued that a political program relying on traditional values as well as a political strategy relying on traditional interaction patterns is responsible for the party's exceptional success. To prove this hypothesis in a first step the party's foundation and political program are presented. In a second step the general rise of conservative beliefs in Turkish society are related to the values the party pursues. Decisive influences on the party's political concept " Muhafazakar Demokrasi " (Conservative Democracy) like former Islamist parties, the development of an alternative elite consisting of pious businessmen (Anatolian Bourgeoisie) or the opposition of secular-kemalist forces are discussed. A third step focuses on the AKP`s local politics as they are believed to be decisive for its national success and offer ideal possibilities to observe the interaction between party and population. In this part the dominant interaction patterns used by the AKP and its predecessor the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) are described. It is shown how the parties apply " himaye " and " imece " and how these became an important tool of political mobilization. It is also explained how perceptions of a " just society " underlying these interaction patterns got integrated into the party's national politics.