Political Islam in Turkey

Soğuk savaşın ürünü olarak ortaya çıkan internet, her şey hakkında bilgi sunan ve sayıları gün geçtikçe artan web sitelerine anında ulaşım sağlayan dünya çapındaki bilgisayar ağı olmakla beraber yirminci yüzyılın en önemli teknolojik gelişmeleri arasında yer almaktadır. Bu yeni gelişmenin etkisi her geçen gün artmaktadır. Bu etkinin nedeni internetin fonksiyonu ile ilişkilidir. İnternet sayesinde gündemden haberdar olma, bilgi alma ve görüş paylaşma, zamanın ve mekânın sınırlarını aşarak hızlı bir biçimde yapılmaktadır. Böylesi fonksiyonlara sahip olan internet, artık hayatımızın en önemli parçası olmuştur. Dahası internetin kaynaklık etmiş olduğu yeni iletişim sistemleri, insan yaşamının temel boyutlarını, zamanı ve mekânı kökten dönüştürmeye başlamıştır. Zaman ve mekân arasındaki sınır belirsizleşmiş, kültürel, tarihsel, coğrafi anlamlar değişmeye başlamış ve internet, değişimin ana manivelası haline gelmiştir.
İnternetin bir diğer özelliği de günümüzde dini veya seküler grupların kurumsal kimliklerini gözler önüne serdiği sanal mekân olmasıdır. İnternetin sunduğu tüm araçları bir araya getirme imkanıyla dini gruplar, ideoloji ve söylemlerini takipçilerine ve grubun dışındaki sempatizanlara tanıtmakta; dini grubun vizyonunu, misyonunu veya hedeflerini kamuoyu ile paylaşmaktadır. Ancak dijital ortamda varlık gösteren gruplar, bu mecraların sunduğu interaktif iletişimden ziyade geleneksel tek yönlü iletişim türünü sürdürmeyi tercih etmektedir. Son dönemde dini gruplar da interneti etkin bir biçimde kullanmaya başlamıştır. Dini gruplar; kendilerini tanıtmak, gruplarına katılımı arttırmak ve mensuplarının da kendi iç dinamiklerini pekiştirmek çerçevesinde bütün kitle iletişim araçlarını kullanmaktadırlar. Bu sayede dini grupların ideoloji ve eylemleri hem kamuoyu ile paylaşılmakta hem de dini grubun kendini konsolide etmesi sağlanmaktadır.

This article focuses on the populist strategy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party between the 2007 presidential election, when Turkish politics experienced an impasse, and the 2010 referendum over the constitutional amendments. As a means of analysing populism, the symptomatic approach is preferred over other theoretical perspectives, including empiricism and historicism. An analysis of the discourse articulated by Prime Minister Erdoğan leads us to the conclusion that he has continually appealed to the masses with an anti-institutional rhetoric that divides society into ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, thereby fulfilling the criteria of populism according to the symptomatic approach.

In this interview, Gülay Türkmen discusses the trajectory of political Islam in Turkey with Hayri Kırbaşoğlu, professor of theology at Ankara University's Divinity School. One of the main figures of the " Ankara school " in theology, known for their liberal interpretation of Islam, Kırbaşoğlu was among the founders of HAS Parti (The People's Voice Party), a religiously oriented party that was later coopted by the ruling Justice and Government Party (AKP). Coming from an Islamic background, he remains staunchly critical of the dominant interpretation and implementation of Islam in today's Turkey. In what follows, Kırbaşoğlu provides a detailed look at " Islam's crisis", both in Turkey and in the world, and offers ways out of it. (Pp. 93-106 in Authoritarianism and Resistance in Turkey: Conversations on Democratic and Social Challenges, edited by Esra Ozyurek, Emrah Altindis, Gaye Ozpinar. Switzerland: Springer International.)

This article suggests that the Gezi Park protests in general, and particularly the presence there of the Anti-Capitalist Muslims is a valuable example for studying the ambiguity and complexity of the secular/Islamic paradigm in Turkey. Conducting field research on the formation of the Anti-Capitalist Muslim identity, I argue that the secular/Islamic divide is politically produced, and potentially vulnerable to contestations and transformations, for it opens the socio-political landscape to the production of multiple secularisation projects beyond this divide.

The prophet of Islam has prescribed these five things as the foundation of Islam and they are: Faith, prayer, fasting, Zakat and Hajj for the Sunnis and prayer, fasting, Zakat, Hajj and Imamate for Shia. These five things contain the totality of the religion of Islam as we shall see.

In the wake of the July 2016 putsch and the subsequent purge of followers of the outlawed Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen in every sphere of Turkish life under the ruling AKP government's state of emergency, the Gülen movement (GM) is in disarray and crisis. A fruitful way to bring some analytical order to this issue is through the frame of diaspora, which we contend provides some useful analytical purchase on understanding the movement historically and in transition. The GM as it stood prior to 2016 is, we contend, best conceived as a transnational parapolitical network-a 'diaspora by design'-dedicated principally to the service, not of humanity, but of power. Based on interviews with over 70 key members of the movement conducted between 2012 and 2018, we show how, from the late 1990s Gülen and his supporters crafted a complex transnational structure that has combined extensive financial operations with a distinctive organizational morphology. We map out the contours of this structure and show how it emerged over time via instrumentalization of Gülen's parapolitical ideology and the steady accretion of politically directed, corporate projects outside Turkey. Finally, drawing again on the notion of diaspora, we offer a framework for thinking about how the movement may evolve in future as it transitions to a fragmented community in transnational in political exile.

Is Ramadhan a Stupid Fasting or rather today's Muslims are Silly and thus the Fake Turkologist Nikos Chiladakis is Proven Ignorant?
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 3η Ιουνίου 2019.
First republished on 23rd August 2021 here:
https://profmegalommatistextsingreek.wordpress.com/2021/08/23/ηλίθια-νηστεία-το-ραμαζάνι-ή-ηλίθιοι-ο/

Ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης αναφέρεται σε online άρθρα μου δημοσιευμένα στα μισά της δεκαετίας του 2000, στα οποία είχα ζητήσει την κατάργηση του Ραμαζανίου δεδομένου ότι η ισλαμική νηστεία έχει καταντήσει ένα άθλιο διάλειμμα ανάμεσα σε νυκτερινές ευωχίες, αποκρουστική κραιπάλη, αργία και οκνηρία, εικονική τήρηση νηστείας (κατά την διάρκεια ημερήσιου ύπνου ‘για να περνάει η ώρα’) και, ακόμη χειρότερα, στις περισσότερες μουσουλμανικές χώρες έχει μεταβληθεί σε είδος κοινωνικής και κρατικής τυραννίας, διότι απαγορεύεται να δουν οι περαστικοί στον δρόμο κάποιον να μασάει.

Τα άρθρα μου εκείνα βρίσκονται αναδημοσιευμένα εδώ: https://www.academia.edu/25907214/Abolish_your_fake_Ramadhan_stupid_Text_by_Prof_M_S_Megalommatis_and_discussion
και https://www.academia.edu/26051016/Tyrannical_Ramadhan_as_part_of_Islamic_Terrorism_by_Prof_Muhammad_Shamsaddin_Megalommatis

Καθώς μας χωρίζουν 16 χρόνια από τις ημέρες κατά τις οποίες τα συνέγραψα, έχω δυστυχώς την αίσθηση ότι είπα ελάχιστα, είτε θεωρητικώς-ηθικώς, είτε ιστορικώς, είτε κοινωνικώς-ψυχολογικώς. Κατά το Ισλάμ και σε εκ διαμέτρου αντίθεση με το αίσχος των σημερινών ψευδο-μουσουλμάνων, η νηστεία είναι βασικά η μύηση του ανθρώπου στην αφαγία. Κάτι τέτοιο είναι ασύλληπτο για τους σημερινούς ψευδο-μουσουλμάνους των μεγαλουπόλεων οι οποίοι περιμένουν πως και πως την ώρα που θα αρχίσουν να καταβροχθίζουν ό,τι υπάρχει στον μπουφέ.

Στους 14 αιώνες ισλαμικής ιστορίας, γνωρίζουμε πολύ καλά ότι οι άνθρωποι εργάζονταν κανονικά κατά την διάρκεια της ημέρας ενόσω ενήστευαν. Σήμερα αυτό έχει καταργηθεί και η απλή πρόταση “νηστεύω” χρησιμεύει ως απαλλαγή από κάθε καθήκον εργασίας σε μία εταιρεία – εννοείται χωρίς καν να αφαιρείται ο μισθός μιας ημέρας, όπως θα απαιτείτο.

Τέλος, και ακόμη χειρότερα, η νηστεία τηρείται από τους σημερινούς μουσουλμάνους ως “απόδειξη” υπεροχής τους έναντι των Χριστιανών, των Ινδουϊστών, των Βουδιστών και άλλων. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι μία θεάρεστη πράξη όπως η νηστεία έχει καταλήξει σε πρόκληση αλαζονείας και απροσμέτρητου εγωϊσμού – κάτι το οποίο είναι παντού, πάντοτε και για τους πάντες εντελώς σατανικό.

Αν θα έγραφα σήμερα ένα τρίτο άρθρο περί Ραμαζανιού, θα εστίαζα στην διαμόρφωση ενός άρρωστου και αντι-ισλαμικού, απάνθρωπου χαρακτήρα τον οποίο διαμορφώνουν στους ψευδο-μουσουλμάνους η αντι-ισλαμική θεολογία και η πολιτική ιδεολογία, οι οποίες έχουν από καιρού αντικαταστήσει την θρησκεία ανάμεσα στις σύγχρονες ‘μουσουλμανικές’ κοινότητες. Αυθεντικό Ραμαζάνι μπορεί όντως κανείς να βρει σε πολύ απόμακρες και απομονωμένες περιοχές με ελάχιστη τεχνική-τεχνολογική υποδομή: από το Σουδάν και την Σομαλία μέχρι το Χαντραμάουντ της Νότιας Υεμένης, τα βουνά του Ιράν και της Κεντρικής Ασίας, και μερικά νησιά της Ινδονησίας.

Ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης χρησιμοποιεί το περιεχόμενο των άρθρων μου και στοιχεία από συζητήσεις μας, καθώς και την δική του εμπειρία από δεκάχρονη και πλέον ζωή ανάμεσα σε μουσουλμανικές κοινότητες, για να απορρίψει τα αστοιχείωτα λεγόμενα του δημοσιογράφου κ. Χειλαδάκη ο οποίος, όπως σωστά λέει ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης, δεν είναι ούτε τουρκολόγος ούτε ισλαμολόγος. Νομίζω ότι το θέμα είναι αλλού: ο κ. Χειλαδάκης δεν έχει ποτέ του καταλάβει, όπως όλοι στην Ελλάδα, ότι η ‘επιστήμη’ δεν είναι προϊδεασμένη προπαγάνδα και η παρουσίαση μιας οποιασδήποτε κατάστασης δεν γίνεται για να υποστηριχθεί το τι αρέσει στον λέγοντα ή στον γράφοντα αλλά για να αντικατοπτρισθεί η αλήθεια. Μισώντας το αντικείμενο της όποιας, έστω επιφανειακής, έρευνάς του, κανένας δεν είπε την αλήθεια.

Και ο κ. Χειλαδάκης, αντί ηλιθίως να χαρακτηρίζει το τι δεν έχει μάθει και συνεπώς καταλάβει, θα έπρεπε να απορρίψει την ψευδόχριστη και αντίχριστη Εκκλησία της Ελλάδας, δηλαδή τον σατανικό εσμό αποδοχής ομοφυλοφιλικών γάμων, εκτρώσεων και πλήθους άλλων ανομιών τυραννικώς επιβεβλημένων εν Ελλάδι από τους άνομους νόμους και την γενική σήψη που επικρατεί.

Η σημασία της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου για το τουρκικό κράτος είναι διαχρονική. Ωστόσο είναι γεγονός ότι τα τελευταία χρόνια με αφορμή τις εξελίξεις γύρω από το θέμα της ενέργειας, καταγράφεται ένα ανανεωμένο ενδιαφέρον της Άγκυρας που εκφράζεται μέσα από διάφορες μορφές παρεμβατικής πολιτικής στην περιοχή. Το συγκεκριμένο άρθρο μελετά την αναδιαμόρφωση του γεωπολιτικού δόγματος της Τουρκίας και την διασύνδεση του με το πως αντιλαμβάνεται η Τουρκία την Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Εξετάζει τις επιπτώσεις της απόπειρας πραξικοπήματος του 2016 στο μπλοκ εξουσίας και τους αντικατοπτρισμούς της στο τουρκικό γεωπολιτικό δόγμα της χώρας. Στη συνέχεια μελετά την ταύτιση της Ανατολικής Μεσογείου με μια ευρύτερη «εχθρική περιοχή» και αναλύει την λειτουργία της έννοιας της «Γαλάζιας Πατρίδας» ως νομιμοποιητικού άξονα της πολιτικής της Τουρκίας. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο εξετάζεται επίσης η αναδιαμόρφωση της αντίληψης της Άγκυρας για την «ΤΔΒΚ» και την Τουρκοκυπριακή κοινότητα.

This paper asserts that Turkish secularism and Islamism represent two faces of one coincontemporary Turkish politicswhen one considers their goals and strategies. The two ideological movements have shaped one another and each now seeks to impose itself as superior. This article unpacks these differences and similarities in the following steps: (a) it defines the socio-historic modes of Turkish secularism and (b) examines its social and political origins; (c) it then explores Islam's return to the public domain as an oppositional Turkish identity; (d) and thereafter considers the diverse understandings of secularism resulting from neoliberal policies that relaxed state control over Islam, which then prompted socially-acceptable reinterpretations of Islam; and finally (e) describes how the AKP's has re-imagined secularism while (mis) using Islam as a political instrument. The comparison highlights such commonalties as a collectivist character, a desire for state control as a vehicle to realize an ideology, intolerance of diversity and criminalization of other perspectives, and the differentiation of religion as morality in the private sphere versus its cultural role in the public sphere. It concludes that, under the AKP government, Islam is used as a tool to consolidate the power of Erdoğan's kleptocratic regime.

Turkey has witnessed remarkable sociocultural change under the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), particularly regarding its religious communities. As individuals with pious identities have increasingly gained access to state power and accumulated economic influence, so religious appearances and practices have become more visible in Turkey's `secular' public spaces. More than this, consumption practices have changed and new Islamic and Islamist identities have emerged.
This book investigates three of the most widespread faith-inspired communities in Turkey: the Gulen, Suleymanli and the Menzil. Nazli Alimen compares these communities, looking at their diverse interpretations of Islamic rules related to the body and dress, and how these different groups compete for power and control in Turkey. In tracing what motivates consumption practices, the book adds to the growing interest in the commercial aspects of modest and Islamic fashion. It also highlights the importance of clothing and bodily rituals (such as veiling, grooming and food choices) for the formation of community identities. Based on ethnographic research, Alimen analyses the relationship between the marketplace and religion, and shows how different communities interact with each other and state institutions. Of particular note are the varied expressions of Islamic masculinities and femininities at play. Appealing to a cross-disciplinary readership, the book will be relevant for scholars within Turkish Studies, Gender Studies, Islamic Studies, Fashion, Consumption Studies, Sociology of Religion and Middle Eastern Studies.

An east-west axis of Azerbaijan and Turkey has grown into prominence within the broader structure of regional dynamics in Eurasia over the past two decades. Yet few, including among policy advisors and policy makers in either of the two states, have attempted to look deeper into the forces that lie behind the workings of this important regional nexus, a reality that resulted in a dual crisis in bilateral relations towards the end of the second decade of interaction.

This volume investigates the underlying causes that shaped the dynamics within the structure of the bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey. It features chapters by both scholars from the region and international experts in the field, and therefore provides both in-house and outside perspectives on developments within the complex structure of the relationship. With its analysis portfolio including historical, political, economic, socio-cultural, ideological, and international underpinnings of this regional alliance, the volume offers the most systematic and broad ranged analysis of the matter available to date.

The book will serve as an important resource for students and scholars of post-Soviet Studies, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the Middle East, while also being of interest to those of International Relations and political science disciplines.

Dindar-geleneksel kesimin yaşam tarzlarındaki dönüşümler doksanlı yıllardan bu yana akademinin başlıca araştırma ve tartışma konularından biri oldu. Fakat bu tartışmalar ağırlıkla, dindar-geleneksel eyleyicilerin piyasa ve modernite bağlamındaki sınıf içi pratiklerin değişimine odaklandı. Bu makaleye temel olan araştırma ise, dindar-geleneksel sınıfın dönüşümünü seküler pratiklerle ilişkisi üzerinden ele alıyor. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'nde, dindar-geleneksel ailelerden gelen erkekler, dindar-geleneksel ailelerden gelen kadınlarla arkadaşlık kurmakta ve onlarla sevgili olmakta zorlanıyor. Bu nedenle daha Bu makalede kör hakemlik süreci uygulanmıştır.

Özelde Türkiye toplumu ve genelde müslüman dünya, modernleşme ve Batı ile olan karşılaşmasını başından beri çok çeşitli nedenlerle sağlıksız bir şekilde yürüttü. Bu sorunlu karşılaşmanın pratik sonuçları siyaset, sosyoloji, felsefe ve ahlak alanlarının hepsinde rahatlıkla gözlemlenebiliyor.
En radikalinden en reformistine kadar geniş bir yelpazedeki İslami hareketlerin varlığı, başta felsefe olmak üzere sosyal bilimler ile olan mesafeli ilişkiler, Avrupa’daki müslümanların tecrübe ettiği sorunlar, bir muhafazakar parti olarak AKP’nin söylem ve pratikleri, ülkede çoğulculuğun bir türlü hazmedilememesi, Türkiye toplumunun en keskin kutuplaşmalarından biri olan laik-dindar çatışması ve daha birçok konu, söz konusu ‘sorunlu karşılaşma’dan bağımsız değerlendirilemez.
Bunun yanı sıra müslüman toplumlar, kentlileşmenin, sanayileşmenin ve sanayi sonrası toplumsal yapının getirdikleri karşısında geleneğin ve dinin nasıl konumlandırılıp yorumlanması gerektiği konusunda büyük bir düşünsel boşlukla karşı karşıyalar.
Bu boşluğun oluşturduğu kriz, müslümanlar arasında daha çok muhafazakar-dindarları etkiliyor; çünkü onlar dinî değer ve ilkelerin, üstelik hükümlerin muhafaza edilip hayata geçirilmesi konularında ayrıca gündemlere ve ideallere sahipler; ‘kriz’e karşı öyle ya da böyle tepkileri, cevapları ve pratikleri var. Üstelik şimdiye dek krizlerin bazen nedenleri, bazen de sonuçları olageldiler...
Kitap işte bu gerçeklerden hareketle, muhafazakar-dindar müslümanları özel bir mercek altına almakla birlikte, genel olarak Türkiye toplumunun ve devletinin bazı sorunlarını ele alıyor. Ele alırken de, hazırlanmış paket cevaplar sunmaktan ziyade, öncelikle doğru soruları sormayı ve ana sorunları ortaya çıkararak birlikte tartışmayı önemsiyor.
2013-2015 tarihleri arasındaki Türkiye ve dünya gündemine bir bakış, yorum ve tanıklık da içeren bu yazıları, Gezi Parkı protestolarının hemen sonrasında başlayıp, 2015 Haziran’ındaki genel seçimlere kadar devam eden bir zaman diliminde yazdım. Kitapta bu süre zarfındaki siyasi ve sosyal olaylarla ilgili doğrudan ve dolaylı yorumları görebileceğiniz gibi, aynı zamanda ve daha çok, öne çıkan belli bazı olaylardan yola çıkarak genel felsefi, toplumsal ve siyasi sorunlara işaret edip tartışan yazılarla karşılaşacaksınız.
Kitap beş bölümden oluşuyor. Birinci bölüm, genel olarak günümüz İslam düşüncesinde gördüğüm bazı aksaklıklara dönük tespitlerimi içeriyor; ikinci bölüm, Türkiye’nin muhafazakar-dindarlarına yönelik temel eleştirilerimi; üçüncü bölüm, devlet ile halk arasındaki sorunlu ilişkileri ve halkın muhalefet noktalarından birkaçını; dördüncü bölüm, Avrupa ile İslam ve müslümanlar arası ilişkide 2000’li yıllarda daha belirgin bir şekilde ortaya çıkan sorunların ipuçlarını; beşinci bölüm ise Türkiye toplumunun çoğulculuk konusundaki açmazlarını içeriyor.

This dissertation began the day I saw the headline of the Turkish daily Hürriyet on its front page on 21 February 2004: ―SABIHA GÖKÇEN‘S 80-YEAR-OLD SECRET.‖ I was in the Giesel library of the UC San Diego casually surfing the Turkish news while trying to finish a seminar paper. Was Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk ‘s adopted daughter, the world‘s first combat war pilot, the only heroine of the Turkish Republic, an Armenian? Agos, Turkish-Armenian community‘s weekly newspaper, had reported so, according to Hürriyet. I was captivated. It was as if I had been looking for something in this world, and I had finally found it one rainy afternoon on Hürriyet ‘s internet page.

I had never heard about Hrant Dink until I saw Hürriyet that day. I came home and immediately sent emails to a few colleagues inquiring about how I could get in touch with Dink. I got his email on the very same day. I wrote to him and asked if he could send me a few copies of Agos that had the coverage on Gökçen. He never wrote me back. One week later, I found Agos issues folded in a nylon bag in my UCSD mailbox in the Department of Communication. When I touched that package, this dissertation became a ―matter of fate‖, as C.J. Jung mentioned it on writing.

Political and Legal System of Islam gives a broad and indepth view of Islamic governance and legal system on which further Islamic developments can be achieved. Secular society normalizes sins, making them acceptable in the mind. Zeal, eagerness to resist, fight sins are diminished. Evil is empowered as a result, with eventual decline and annihilation of society. Muslims become marginalized. Let's Islamize Muslim-majority counties.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

An introduction to anything should include principles, foundational concepts and significant information about that thing. This introduction has included such in a very wide range. This logically argumentative format has been used due to the fact that people may find the detailed works mentioned in the reference difficult in identifying rationale and arguments in the paragraphs. However, if you follow the reference you will get details, definitions, explanations, rules and further arguments.

ABSTRACT


This dissertation undertakes a critical scrutiny of Orhan Pamuk’s Snow (2004) and Other Colours (2007), texts that majorly grapple with contemporary Turkey’s socio-political issues. I have tried to demonstrate the modes in which Pamuk frames the competing political claims of secularism and Islam—key concepts in Turkey as well as our contemporary world—with a view to deciphering its implications for our times.

Literature, as is well-known by now, can no longer be regarded as an apolitical business without any stakes in the world. It is partisan—ideological and committed to power structures, with its particular agendas—and an active participant in hegemonic constructions. Literary and cultural representations are struggles for power and meaning, and texts are sites where these struggles are carried out. Pamuk’s writings are located on a site where Islam and secularism confront each other in particular ways. Moreover, Orhan Pamuk is a writer who addresses a global audience, a fact he himself is quite aware of. The award of the Nobel Prize for literature (2006) is not an insignificant factor in Pamuk’s receptivity throughout the global reading world as a voice of authority interpreting issues involving categories such as Islam, secularism, etc. Given these factors, it important to read his texts for their ideological underpinnings and to comprehend the importance of such understandings for contemporary resonances. I have read Snow and Other Colours in order to lay out the liberal-secular ideology the texts are premised on, especially with regard to Islam, even as they make claims to be dialogic and polyphonic. I largely drew upon some recent scholarship on secularism in order to problematize Pamuk’s valorization of liberal secularism and his take on Islam.

The “Introduction” of this dissertation entitled“Contexualizing Orhan Pamuk: Secularism, Islam, Global Geopolitics” begins by making a case for my contextualized, political reading of the texts in question. It sets the work of Pamuk against the larger secularism-Islam interface so as to pull into perspective the problem in question.

Chapter One, “Turkey: The Making Of A Socio-Political Arena” laid out the socio-political history of Turkey in the twentieth century so as to provide a window to the primary world Pamuk is engaging with. I elaborate on the contours of secularization that has been implemented in Turkey. The chapter dealt with the emergence of “political Islam”/ “Islamism” as an oppositional discourse to the hegemonic secularist discursive practices on Islam. It traced certain significant historical developments in terms of the Islamist-secularist confrontation in Turkey.

Chapter Two, “Secularism(S): Critiques, Disjunctions, And Utopias in Orhan Pamuk,” unpacks Pamuk’s take on secularisms. Drawing on some recent scholarship on secularism, the chapter critiques liberal secularism as a political principle as well as  hegemonic discourse / ideology / worldview which permeates multiple discourses and circumscribes understandings of the very category of “the human.” It makes the case that advocacy of pluralism through a championing of liberal secularism defeats its very objective.

Chapter Three, “Muslim Women’s Headscarf, Islamism and the Islamic Other” explores the issues attending liberal-secular readings of politics under the banner of Islam and the polemical question of the Muslim women’s headscarf / hijab in the light of Pamuk’s self-avowed wish to know and engage the Islamic Other.

The “Conclusion” pulls together the various threads explored in the chapters. It examines the implications of the critical analyses done in the chapters for our times, where liberal secularism is a hegemonic ideology / discourse/world view. My close reading of Orhan Pamuk’s select texts underscores the need for a critical distance from and a vigilance against the effects of the naturalization of the liberal-secular in all aspects of being in the world, something which our embattled times cry out for.

Researched by Frank Dougan 02/04/2022
Jesus Christ denouncing Turkish devil ERDOGAN for desecrating and turning one of the greatest Christian Churches in the world the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople into the House of Satanic  for the worshippers of the Satanic Verses “By Salman Rushdie”.

Jesus of Nazareth - Hypocrisy of the Scribes and Pharisees (Matthew 23) https://youtu.be/mD--lHALcm0 via @YouTube
https://youtu.be/mD--lHALcm0

The victory in the November 2002 elections of the Islamic rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been a strong challenge for Turkey's democracy with its strong secular state tradition. Fifteen years of uninterrupted governance later AKP has re-form its agenda to an extent
that barely reminds its 2002 self. The EU membership from number 1 priority became a possible option, while the Kurdish Issue has been through fire and iron. In these fifteen years Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan has seen his allies change drastically, from West to East and from closest ally to worst enemy. Throughout the ups and downs Erdoğan served Turkey as Prime Minister from 2003 to
2014 and they made history as the first elected President of Turkey. Six electoral wins and one referendum victory later Tayyip Erdoğan is the most influencial man in Turkey. However he was not alone in this journey, President Erdoğan had the unconditional support of Ahmet Davutoğlu who became the architect of Tayyip Erdoğan's dream, the “New Republic of Turkey” influenced by islamist ideology and neo-ottomanism.

Turkey has witnessed a proliferation of Islamic television channels since the liberalization of broadcasting in the 1990s. The programming of these TV channels was initially distinctly theological in character, with shows focusing on the doctrinal, scriptural, and ritualistic aspects of Islam. More recently, however, they have started producing family-friendly entertainment programs as well as shows aimed at “strengthening the family.” Islamic broadcasters intend their family-focused programming as civil initiatives against what they see as the increasing corrosion of the “moral fabric of the family” and devaluation of “family values” in contemporary Turkish society. In these TV shows, audiences are provided with guidance and techniques that would help them cultivate ethical dispositions, knowledge, and skills so that they could assume autonomy and responsibility for administering their families more effectively. Islamic broadcasters explicitly identify their role as assisting the state in  fighting social problems through their programming. Moreover, the discourses and sensibilities promoted on television articulate with the biopolitical concerns of the nation-state and the emerging rationalities of governance. While Islamic television professionals’ self-ascribed mission to “strengthen the family” emerges from a religiously inspired moral imperative to provide service, it simultaneously indicates their internalization of neoliberal rationalities of governance that promote the responsibilization of non-governmental actors for providing social services as well as that of individuals for supporting and caring for their family members. [Keywords: Islam, television, media, family, family values, secularism, neoliberalism, Turkey]

You can download the paper at: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/670934

Doğumundan itibaren Bülent Ecevit'in yetiştiği ortam, gazetecilik hayatı, fikir dünyasının oluşumu, gelişimi ve birtakım düşünceleri, siyasete girişi, ortanın solu fikri, siyasi mücadelesi esnasında parti içinde yaşanan kavgalar ve bölünmeler, CHP Genel Başkanlığı'na yükselişi, kendisinin aşırı sol ile olan fikrî ve fiili yakınlığı, şairliği, MSP ile kurduğu hükümet, Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı, muhalefete düştüğü dönem ve ardından 5 Haziran 1977 seçimleriyle birlikte hayatının zirve noktasına çıkıp peşi sıra 12 Eylül 1980'e kadar yaşadıkları ele alınmıştır. Bilhassa zirveye hızlıca çıkıp düştüğü bu dönemde, hafta hafta dönem içi neşriyat takip edilerek gerilemesi ve CHP'deki son devrinin neden sıkıntılı bittiği izaha çalışılmıştır.

Turkey’s journey towards one-man rule and a new political system without checks and balances turned a new corner with the disputed national referendum on 16 April 2017. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won new powers from voters, which confirmed his consistent efforts over years to transform Turkey from a secular Western democratic country into a political Islamist and authoritarian police state. Erdogan once said that democracy, for him, is not the objective but rather a tool, comparing it to a bus within a journey. “Once I get to my stop, I will get off.” Apparently, after highly controversial elections, Erdogan has arrived at his stop, and he has gotten off the democracy bus. Many scholars agree that the secular Republic of Turkey as it has been known does not exist anymore, and it is not coming back under the Erdogan dicta.

As a consequence, the West now has to deal with a political Islamist police state with a large portion of radicalised citizens. The priorities should be set to assist and help the people suffering in Turkey at the hands of Erdogan’s regime, many guilty of nothing more than not supporting the status quo. The West, when dealing with Erdogan, should seriously consider extending their support to the people suffering inside Turkey. Europe has ample leverage against Erdogan, including travel sanctions against individual members of the Turkish government, economic sanctions, refusal to sell arms, and politically pressuring the Erdogan regime. All these tools should be considered to assist the suffering Turks in the name of humanity and for the future bilateral and peaceful relationship between Turkey and Europe after Erdogan’s departure. European countries should also consider taking the allegations against the Turkish president listed in this article to the International Criminal Court at The Hague for the crimes against humanity. Europe must prioritise a sincere approach in order to neutralise threats coming from the Erdogan regime and his supporters and extend their hands to the brave citizens who did not accept becoming part of Erdogan’s dicta. While many Turkish citizens have found refuge in Europe, thousands are still being tortured, raped and even killed in Turkey. The world must find a way to stop this misery before it becomes a tragic loss of life reminiscent of the worst crimes in world history.

http://www.orient-online.com/

http://www.orient-online.com/issues/ORIENT-III/2017

The so-called Islamic State and the (slow but steady) Radicalisation of Turkey. Available from:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318066367_The_so-called_Islamic_State_and_the_slow_but_steady_Radicalisation_of_Turkey [accessed Jul 5, 2017].

Islamic revival is not a bed of roses but requires revolutionary acts of Jihad. We can make revolutionary decisions to prepare also for the arrival of Imam Mahdi. However complete political Islamic revival will be achieved by advent of Imam Mahdi. Only we can control the extent of the effect and consequences of our adversaries' hostilities as God is on the side of the Mujahedeen. As we are not doing nothing now rather emboldening our adversaries, we are thus facing the full force of their hostilities, because we Muslims are our greatest enemies.

Alevis, Bektashis and Qizilbashes in today's Turkey
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 4η Σεπτεμβρίου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης συνεχίζει την παρουσίαση στοιχείων από διάλεξη την οποία είχα δώσει τον Ιανουάριο του 2019 στην Νουρσουλτάν (πρώην Αστανά) αναφορικά με τα ισλαμικά κινήματα με τα οποία οι δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες δεν επεχείρησαν ποτέ να επικοινωνήσουν επειδή τα θεωρούσαν δεδομένα ως εχθρικά.
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First republished on 25th October 2021 here:
https://medium.com/@megalommatis/αλεβίδες-μπεκτασήδες-κιζιλμπάσηδες-κι-η-τουρκία-σήμερα-αναδημοσιευση-16f9e5653a57

This paper examines the short-lived rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the Arab Spring and argues that the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned Islamist values without embracing democratic ideals. It identifies a pathway to reform for the Brotherhood  if it is serious about democratization. The paper insists that the failure of democracy in Egypt is not a judgement on the compatibility of Islam and democracy.