Religion in Turkey

This article focuses on the populist strategy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party between the 2007 presidential election, when Turkish politics experienced an impasse, and the 2010 referendum over the constitutional amendments. As a means of analysing populism, the symptomatic approach is preferred over other theoretical perspectives, including empiricism and historicism. An analysis of the discourse articulated by Prime Minister Erdoğan leads us to the conclusion that he has continually appealed to the masses with an anti-institutional rhetoric that divides society into ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, thereby fulfilling the criteria of populism according to the symptomatic approach.

Turkey is fast becoming one of the largest markets for the trafficking of women from nearby former Soviet states who are brought into the country and forced into prostitution, an international agency said in a report released this week. Profits from the illicit sex trade in Turkey were estimated to be about $3.6 billion (€3 billion) last year and growing, the report said. About 5,000 women, more than half from Moldova and Ukraine, are believed to be working as sex slaves across Turkey, said an agency official. The prostitution networks made about $150 (€124) from each customer, with each woman serving as many as 15 clients a day.

Introduction by Maria Couroucli 1. Identification and Identity Formation around Shared Shrines in West Bank Palestine and Western Macedonia / Glenn Bowman 2. The Vakef: Sharing Religious Space in Albania / Gilles de Rapper 3. Kom iluk and Taking Care of the Neighbour's Shrine in Bosnia-Herzegovina / Bojan Baskar 4. The Mount of the Cross: Sharing and Contesting Barriers on a Balkan Pilgrimage Site / Galia Valtchinova 5. Muslim Devotional Practices in Christian Shrines: the Case of Istanbul / Dionigi Albera and Benoit Fliche 6. Saint George the Anatolian: Master of Frontiers / Maria Couroucli 7. A Jewish-Muslim Shrine in North Morocco: Echoes of an Ambiguous Past / Henk Driessen 8. What Do Egypt's Copts and Muslims Share? The Issue of Shrines / Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen 9. Apparitions of the Virgin in Egypt: Improving Relations between Copts and Muslims? / Sandrine Keriakos 10. Sharing the Baraka of Saints: Pluridenominational Visits to the Christian Monasteries in Syria / Anna...

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908-1909 was a turning point that opened up new prospects for Ottoman society and politics. It created a milieu in which new ideas could be shared in a relatively open manner. The case of the Baha’is in Palestine, even though they were seemingly a quantité négligeable among the religious communities, is a good example for the dissemination of reformist thoughts in that period. Based on unpublished letters of the Baha’i leader ‘Abdu’l-Baha (‘Abbas Effendi, 1844-1921) in Palestine written in Ottoman Turkish, this chapter deals with the post-Revolutionary relations between him and the Young Turk elite. The chapter discusses the significance of Palestine to the development of the Baha’i community, the contributions of ‘Abdu’l-Baha to the reform discourse in the Ottoman Empire, the tense relationship between ‘Abdu’l-Baha and Sultan Abdülhamid II, ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s previously unknown connections with some leading Young Turks, and the Baha’i leader’s attempt to infuse Baha’i thoughts into the CUP. The chapter is rounded up with an overview of the declining relationship between the CUP and ‘Abdu’l-Baha during World War I.

Fuad Köprülü'nün Anadolu’da İslamiyet adlı eseri birçok bakımdan
onun Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar başlıklı
çalışmasını tamamlamaktadır. Köprülü’nün bu metinde
yürüttüğü çeşitli tartışmalar, aradan geçen yüzyıl
boyunca Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı’dan Ahmet Yaşar Ocak’a,
Suraiya Faroqhi’den Ahmet Karamustafa’ya dek takip edilip
tekrar tekrar yorumlanmış ve günümüze dek zenginleşerek
gelen literatürü şekillendirmiştir.

This study analyzes the political reasons that allowed the Islamic State to expand successfully in Syria and Iraq, by enabling to ‘franchise’ worldwide, and the role of the regional governments in this issue. The essay provides a different explanation from the classic approach of the “clash of civilizations” theorized by Samuel P. Huntington, ascribing responsibility for the growth and expansion of the Islamic State to the complex framework of geopolitical alliances within the Muslim civilization and the Arab world. The paper highlights the attempt by Turkey to establish itself as a regional power and guidance of the Islamic world, by resurrecting the Caliphate, and, based on this, explains the contrast with the Islamic State, which goal is the foundation of a globalized Caliphate. The plans of the Turkish President Erdoğan for a Great Turkey, allied with Egypt, have foundered with the coup that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood from power. The study relates the connection of Ankara with the Kurds, regarding the management of the crisis in Syria and Iraq, and the Turkish liaison with regional powers (Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and other powers (Russia, Cina and USA).

Alevi Diasporası ve 'resmi din' olarak Alevilikte çoklu kimlik Zeynep Arslan  Özet Mevcut çalışma, Anadolu Alevilerinin önemli ölçüde dışarıdan gelen tanımlamalara maruz kalmalarına ve Türkiye siyaset konjonktüründe daima " Şeriat tehlikesini " dengeleme amaçlı araçsallaştırılmalarını ele alıyor. Aleviliğin Türkiye toplumunda büyük toplum kesimlerince egemen olan ve devlet erkanında kurumsal olarak işlerliğini sürdüren Sünni-Ortodoks İslam ile kıyaslanma üzerinden tanımlanması durumu, Avrupa Diasporası'nda ve Aleviliğin Avrupa devletleri tarafından tanınma süreçlerinde etkinliğini sürdürmektedir. 1 Özellikle Avusturya örneğinde 2008/2009 yıllarından itibaren Alevi kurumlarınca başlayan Aleviliğin resmi din olarak tanınma (Almanca: Anerkennung als Religionsgesellschaft) çabaları, devlet çıkarları doğrultusunda (1912 İslam yasasını reform etme amaçlı) yeniden araçsallaştırılabileceğine tanık olundu. Bu çalışma, Avusturya'da Alevi kurumlarının tanınma süreçlerinde izledikleri yolu ve sonuç iti-bariyle Avusturya-Alevi toplumunun kurumsal olarak iki kanada bölünme sürecinin nedenlerini incelemektedir. Konunun içeriğini güncel siyasi ve hukuki süreci belgeleyen kaynaklar ile kritik söylem çözümlemesi yöntemiyle devletin kimlik belirleme hususu, hakimiyet ve egemenlik çerçevesinde iç ve dış etkenlerin karşılıklı ilişkilendirmeleriyle, kimliklerin kategorize edilerek oluşumu konusunu 'kesişimsellik' (İngilizce: Intersectional approach) teorik altyapısıyla destekleyeceğim.

Researched by Frank Dougan 02/04/2022
Jesus Christ denouncing Turkish devil ERDOGAN for desecrating and turning one of the greatest Christian Churches in the world the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople into the House of Satanic  for the worshippers of the Satanic Verses “By Salman Rushdie”.

Jesus of Nazareth - Hypocrisy of the Scribes and Pharisees (Matthew 23) https://youtu.be/mD--lHALcm0 via @YouTube
https://youtu.be/mD--lHALcm0

Armenian ethnic identity in the Middle East is formulated around language, religion, descent, and the concept of a diaspora–homeland relationship. The historical leadership of the Armenians, who have experienced diaspora and lack of self-rule for the better part of a millennium, has been concentrated in the Armenian Apostolic Church, a non-Chalcedonic Orthodox denomination. A synonymous relationship exists between Armenians and Christianity, which until recently (accurate at the time of writing) remained largely uncontested in the Middle East and elsewhere. Historically, Armenians who converted to another religion were outcast and no longer considered Armenian.
However, in recent decades, the “rediscovery” of Armenian Muslims has
raised a central question for Armenians in Armenia and the diaspora: can a Muslim truly be Armenian? This is further complicated by another related but more sensitive question: can an Armenian also be a Turk?

In the last days of the Ottoman Empire during the armistice period (1919–1922), Abdullah Cevdet, one of the original members of the Young Turk Osmanî Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress), caused a considerable public upset in 1922 by publishing an article on the Baha’i religion in his journal Ictihâd. The religious authorities and the Turkish press quickly responded, accusing him of attacking the Prophet Mohammad and Islam, and praising the Baha’i religion. Consequently, Cevdet was sentenced to two years in prison, although he never served his sentence.
This paper aims to analyse this case in the context of the Weltanschauung
of Abdullah Cevdet. Was he really the irreligious materialist historians usually
depict? Did he regard religion solely as a tool to effect change in society? And, in this fashion, was ‘Baha’ism’ just an appropriate catalyst and an intermediary step to convert Muslims to Positivism? Or was Cevdet a committed man who wished for the well-being of humankind and thus proposed the Baha’i religion as a world-embracing movement of peace? By quoting at length from Cevdet’s Baha’i article and portraying his trial, I will try to show that he did not see the Baha’i religion simply as an instrument or an intermediary step between Islam and Positivism, but that he identified himself with it. This is also attested in the statements of his adversaries.

Turkey’s journey towards one-man rule and a new political system without checks and balances turned a new corner with the disputed national referendum on 16 April 2017. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won new powers from voters, which confirmed his consistent efforts over years to transform Turkey from a secular Western democratic country into a political Islamist and authoritarian police state. Erdogan once said that democracy, for him, is not the objective but rather a tool, comparing it to a bus within a journey. “Once I get to my stop, I will get off.” Apparently, after highly controversial elections, Erdogan has arrived at his stop, and he has gotten off the democracy bus. Many scholars agree that the secular Republic of Turkey as it has been known does not exist anymore, and it is not coming back under the Erdogan dicta.

As a consequence, the West now has to deal with a political Islamist police state with a large portion of radicalised citizens. The priorities should be set to assist and help the people suffering in Turkey at the hands of Erdogan’s regime, many guilty of nothing more than not supporting the status quo. The West, when dealing with Erdogan, should seriously consider extending their support to the people suffering inside Turkey. Europe has ample leverage against Erdogan, including travel sanctions against individual members of the Turkish government, economic sanctions, refusal to sell arms, and politically pressuring the Erdogan regime. All these tools should be considered to assist the suffering Turks in the name of humanity and for the future bilateral and peaceful relationship between Turkey and Europe after Erdogan’s departure. European countries should also consider taking the allegations against the Turkish president listed in this article to the International Criminal Court at The Hague for the crimes against humanity. Europe must prioritise a sincere approach in order to neutralise threats coming from the Erdogan regime and his supporters and extend their hands to the brave citizens who did not accept becoming part of Erdogan’s dicta. While many Turkish citizens have found refuge in Europe, thousands are still being tortured, raped and even killed in Turkey. The world must find a way to stop this misery before it becomes a tragic loss of life reminiscent of the worst crimes in world history.

http://www.orient-online.com/

http://www.orient-online.com/issues/ORIENT-III/2017

The so-called Islamic State and the (slow but steady) Radicalisation of Turkey. Available from:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318066367_The_so-called_Islamic_State_and_the_slow_but_steady_Radicalisation_of_Turkey [accessed Jul 5, 2017].

In this article, I discuss the emergence and transformation of Islamic television broadcasting in Turkey. In the 1990s, Islamic channels were launched as a challenge to the so-called moral degeneracy of infotainment channels and claimed to represent an alternative form and content. However, far from presenting an alternative broadcasting style, Islamic channels rapidly succumbed to the logic of capital and the imperatives of commercial broadcasting. I argue that the transformation of Islamic broadcasting is related to the overall transformation of Islamism in Turkey.

Jön Türk devrimi (1908–1909), Osmanlılar için toplumsal ve siyasi açından yeni beklentilere yol açan bir dönüm noktasıydı. Bu hareket, yeni fikirlerin, göreceli de olsa, serbestçe paylaşılabildiği bir ortam yaratmıştır. Dini cemaatler arasında sayısal olarak göz ardı edilebilecek bir seviyede olsalar da Filistin’deki Bahailer, bu dönemde reformist düşüncelerin nasıl yayıldığına iyi bir örnek teşkil ediyor. Bu makale Jön Türk Devrimi sürecinde Bahailerin önderi Abdülbaha (Abbas Efendi) ve önde gelen Jön Türkler arasındaki ilişkilerle ilgilidir ve içeriği büyük oranda Abdülbaha’nın daha önce yayımlanmamış olan Türkçe mektuplarına dayanmaktadır. Bu mektuplar bize Abdülbaha’nın Akka’daki elli yıllık sürgün hayatından kurtulmasına kimlerin yardımcı olduğu ve kendisinin İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (İTC) ile ilgili fikirleri ve yaklaşımları hakkında bilgi edinme fırsatı vermektedir. Makalenin ilk bölümde, Bahailik’in kurucusu Bahaullah’ın ve oğlu ve halefi olan Abdülbaha’nın “dünyanın ıslahı” ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve İran’daki reform tartışmalarına katkılarını ele alırken, takip eden bölümlerde Abdülbaha’nın Sultan II. Abdülhamid ve rejimi ile olan sorunlu ilişkisine ışık tutmaya çalışıyorum. Araştırmamın odak noktaları, 31 Mart Vakası’nın mimarı olarak görülen Derviş Vahdeti’nin Abdülbaha’dan nasıl bir destek aradığı; Abdülbaha’nın bazı önde gelen Jön Türkler ile ilişkilerinin bilinmeyen yönleri ve Bahai düşüncelerini İTC’ye telkin çabalarıdır. Makalenin son bölümünde ise Bahai önderinin İTC’yle Birinci Dünya Savaşı esnasında kötüye giden ilişkilerine değindim.

After reviewing the emergence of Turkish Euroscepticism in the context of the evolution of Turkey–European-Union relations between 1963 and 1999, the paper analyses party and popular Euroscepticism after 1999. The Turkish case appears to confirm the Taggart– Sitter thesis concerning the strategic Euroscepticism of opposition parties. The exception of the Kurdish nationalists suggests that strategic Euroscepticism does not apply to ethnic minority parties. In Turkey there is both ‘soft’ Euroscepticism (centre-left parties) and ‘hard’ Euroscepticism (nationalist and Islamist parties), the latter usually based on identity. At the popular level, identity Euroscepticism revolves around four key issues: national sovereignty; morality; negative discrimination; and Europe’s alleged hidden agenda to divide and rule Turkey (the so-called ‘Sevres Syndrome’).

Based on research about the infertility experiences of women and demand for in vitro fertilisation treatment in Turkey, I observe in this paper the rhetorical strategies employed by childless women to bring meaning to their infertility experience as well as to attain adult gender identity. I also briefly touch on men’s experiences of infertility. I argue that the prevalent references to the almightiness of God do not only indicate religious beliefs. Through the instrumental use of religious discourse, these references can be considered the rhetoric of religious belief.

Large-scale population transfers are immensely disruptive. Interestingly, though, their legal status has shifted considerably over time. In this book, Umut Özsu situates population transfer within the broader history of international law by examining its emergence as a legally formalized mechanism of nation-building in the early twentieth century. The book's principal focus is the 1922-34 compulsory exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey, a crucially important endeavour whose legal dimensions remain under-scrutinized. Drawing upon historical sociology and economic history in addition to positive international law, the book interrogates received assumptions about international law's history by exploring the "semi-peripheral" context within which legally formalized population transfers came to arise.

Supported by the League of Nations, the 1922-34 population exchange reconfigured the demographic composition of Greece and Turkey with the aim of stabilizing a region that was regarded neither as European nor as non-European. The scope and ambition of the undertaking was staggering: over one million were expelled from Turkey, and over a quarter of a million were expelled from Greece. The book begins by assessing minority protection's development into an instrument of intra-European governance during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It then shows how population transfer emerged in the 1910s and 1920s as a radical alternative to minority protection in Anatolia and the Balkans, focusing in particular on the 1922-3 Conference of Lausanne, at which a peace settlement formalizing the compulsory Greek-Turkish exchange was concluded. Finally, it analyses the Permanent Court of International Justice's 1925 advisory opinion in Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, contextualizing it in the wide-ranging debates concerning humanitarianism and internationalism that pervaded much of the exchange process.

This monograph of the religious life of the late Ottoman Empire covers several significant features of the Turkish religious landscape. Beginning with the westernizing reforms at the turn of the nineteenth century, Alkan notes the role of the ulema in this reform before considering Sultan Abdülmecid and the Tanzimat Period. He then traces the early growth of the Babis from the rule of Necib Pasha in Iraq and the opposition to the Babis. The role of Iran in the growth of the Babi faith, focusing on the activities of Baha’u’llah characterizes the Ottoman Reform Elite. The development of Baha’i in the context of the Young Ottomans and other “fathers” of Ottoman constitutionalism is explored and Alkan considers the Iranian reformers as well as the Young Turks in relation to the Babis in nineteenth-century Istanbul. ‘Abdu’l-Baha in the Ottoman context of the turn of the century and the Kemalist reform round out the discussion. Indispensable for historians of Islamic breakaway religions, Alkan’s monograph fills a gap in many accounts of emergent religions.

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS (page 9)
Illustrations (page 11)
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (page 13)
FORWARD (page 17)
INTRODUCTION (page 19)
1 REFORMS IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (page 27)
2 EARLY BABIS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (page 37)
3 THE BABIS, IRAN AND THE OTTOMAN REFORM ELITE (page 59)
4 THE BAHA'IS AND THE 'FATHERS' OF OTTOMAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (page 99)
5 IRANIAN REFORMERS, YOUNG TURKS AND THE 'BABIS' IN 19TH CENTURY ISTANBUL (page 117)
6 'ABDU' L-BAHA AND THE OTTOMANS, 1890S -1910S (page 145)
7 FROM EMPIRE TO REPUBLIC: STATE AND RELIGION IN THE ERA OF KEMALIST REFORM (page 183)
CONCLUSION (page 219)
APPENDICES (page 227)
BIBLIOGRAPHY (page 247)
INDEX (page 267)

Yaklaşık iki yüzyıllık Türk modernleşmesinin en önemli aktörlerinden birisi hiç şüphesiz din olgusudur. Bu olgu, günümüze kadar gelen modernleşme süreci içerisinde kimi zaman karşıt bir kavram olarak sürecin karşısına çıkabildiği gibi, sanılanın aksine kimi zaman da destekleyici-ilerletici bir katalizör görevi görmüştür. Bu durumlar, modernleşme sürecinin karakteristiğini belirleyen önemli bir unsurdur. Yenileşme hareketleri ve süreci, topluma kimi zaman jakoben bir tarzda tepeden inme-dayatma şekliyle kabul ettirilmek istenmiş, kimi zamansa sınırlı da olsa toplumla birlikte gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. İşte bu noktada din, çift ve kısmen çelişkili anlam içeren bir kavram hüviyetine büründürülmüştür. Hem aşılması gereken bir olgu olarak görülürken, hem de dine, yenileşme hareketlerini topluma benimsetmede araçsal bir fonksiyon yüklenmiştir.

The Reina nightclub attack, which occurred in the early hours of New Year’s Day 2017 in Istanbul, Turkey, and the counterterrorism operations after the attack provide valuable security lessons. The attacker, Abdulkadir Masharipov, spent a year in a sleeper cell in Konya, Turkey, before receiving orders from his emir in Raqqa, Syria, using the Telegram app. He not only carried out an attack in the name of ISIS, killing 39 people and wounding many others, but also dodged police scrutiny at the scene by pretending to be one of the victims. ISIS has a heavy presence in Turkey, with several established cells and safe havens, and it has been openly threatening Turkey since the al-Bab military campaign in Syria. Turkey is a bridge between the East and West, and the danger of Turkey becoming the gateway for European terrorist activity cannot be ignored. With ISIS starting to lose vast territories in Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s capacity to counter terrorist threats and stem terrorist activity within its borders is critical for global security.

http://perconcordiam.com/isis-in-turkey/

The Mevlevis are one of the best known Turkish Sufi orders on an international scale. This thesis offers a historical reconstruction of Kemalist political attitudes towards religion and investigates how the laicity-oriented ban forced some mystical orders to disappear while others transformed their rules and rituals in order to survive in an atmosphere of clandestineness. Mevlevis reshaped their structure by reducing their rituals to the essential and, especially after the new liberal climate of the 50s, they earned global attention becoming a folkloric group. After a partial reconstruction of a Mevlevi ritual and a review of some articles produced during the last decades by ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ scholars, the thesis focuses on the contemporary composition of such groups. It therefore analyses both the multimedia shapes that the Mevlevi embraced through their public placement on the market, and the recent touristic arrangements of their dances in the cities of Istanbul and Konya.

Emre Erdogan ile birlikte yazdığımız "Bizi Yanlış Tanıyorlar! Avrupalıların Türkiye ve Türkler Hakkındaki Algıları" adlı kitabımız İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları'ndan çıktı.

Avrupa kamuoylarının Avrupa kimliği hakkındaki görüşlerini; Türkiye hakkındaki bilgilerini, algılarını, imgelerini; Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği karşısındaki tutumlarını; bütün bu algı ve tutumların gerek ülkelere, gerekse de gelir, yaş, parti, din gibi sosyoekonomik, politik, demografik alt gruplara göre nasıl farklılaştığını merak edenlere hararetle tavsiye olunur!

Kitapta, 2009 sonbaharında Almanya, Fransa, İngiltere, İspanya ve Polonya'da toplam 5000 kişi ile görüşerek yürüttüğümüz, ve bu alanda tek olan, kapsamlı ve derinlikli saha araştırmamızın bulgularını kimlik, genişleme, derinleşme, bütünleşme kuramları çerçevesinde analiz ediyoruz.

The paper discusses the Gülen-Movement (hizmet) within a transnational context and determines influencing factors and links which change the movement. To demonstrate the case a comparison between Turkey and Germany will be taken as example.

Presented at: Conference on West and Central Asia and their Diasporas: The Transnational and Transgenerational (Monash University Melbourne, March 2015)

The debut of Turkish-language translations of the Qurʾan in the newly founded Republic of Turkey sparked lively debates over whether Qurʾan translation was possible or desirable, who should engage in interpretation of the text, and what characteristics a Turkish-language rendering of the Qurʾan should have. Whereas the abolition of the Islamic caliphate, closure of the medreses, and prohibition of the Sufi orders have received considerable attention in histories of early republican Turkey, the state-sponsored translation of the Qurʾan into Turkish remains both neglected and misunderstood. Muhammad Rashid Rida, who was highly influential in shaping opinion in the Muslim world, portrayed the state-sponsored project as a long-term plot to displace the Arabic Qurʾan. Other accounts misrepresent the involvement of President Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in the promotion of Qurʾan translation by anachronistically suggesting that he sparked the initiative and led a “campaign” in support of it. Mustafa Kemal had no hand in the composition of Turkish Qurʾan translations published in 1924, other than helping create the political context in which they could be published. Their composition began well before the foundation of the Turkish republic, and their inspiration emerged from the intellectual milieu of the late Ottoman public sphere.

First published in American Chronicle, Buzzle and AfroArticles on 30th December 2010
...............................................
Here, I would like to merely ask the following question:

When Islam's worst enemies, namely the Zionist - fake Freemasonic regimes of England and France, permeate and penetrate an Islamic country from border to border and determine every aspect of its daily life and international position, does it really matter whether the local people pray five times per day, fast in Ramadan, and abstain from alcohol, pork and premarital sex?

In fact, it is ridiculous to think that Islam exists after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In reality, there is no Islam anymore. There is only a fabricated ghost - a spiritual elementary useful for the Satanic needs of the Zionist & Freemasonic gangsters who use printed pages of the Quran to clean their ass or to perform sexual rituals on them.

Without a cultural, educational, scientific, military, socioeconomic, and imperial rule effectuated under total control by the indigenous Muslim population and elite, there is no Islam.

To believe that Islam can possibly exist in a fake country whereby the criminal Freemasonic gangsters of England, France and America, disguised as diplomats, academia, and cultural advisors, move free, contact anyone, bribe and corrupt whomever they like, plot along with their local lackeys, and promote their agenda for total control of the former Ottoman province, is not simply idiotic; it is a crime against the interests of all the indigenous peoples irrespective of their religion, origin, language and culture.

What Kemal Ataturk understood and all the filthy Satanic sheikhs of Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, Jerusalem, Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, etc. cannot understand is the conclusion about the gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the key role played by the Anglo-French Freemasons and Zionists in this ominous process, which spread terror and death throughout the Ottoman territories that the Satanic Western Zionist and Freemasonic mass media mendaciously and ludicrously call "Middle East".

Durch die gesellschaftspolitischen Entwicklungen treten die inneren Widersprüche der Türkei offener zu Tage. Angeregt von dem Kampf der Kurden nach Anerkennung und Selbstbestimmung, organisiert sich auch die größte nicht-sunnitische Gruppe, die Aleviten und stellt Forderungen nach rechtlicher Anerkennung und dem Ende der staatlichen Assimilationspolitik. Da die Aleviten eine sehr heterogene Gruppe sind, treten sie dementsprechend vielstimmig auf. Eine Strömung beteiligt sich an der sog. alevitischen Initiative der Regierung, andere Gruppen fordern ein radikales Umdenken der Beziehung von Staat und Religion. Politisch sind sie aber weitgehend machtlos.

Ce travail sera basé sur la perception de la religion et plus particulièrement du prophète Mohammed à l’ère de la naissance de la nouvelle République turque.  Dans ce travail, ma tendance générale est de montrer à quel point l'instrumentalisation et de l'utilisation de la religion dans la jeune république turque est efficace. Une recherche sur la position de l’idéologie laïque kémaliste découvrit aussi que dans le période des reformes laïques et occidentaux la religion et l’image de Prophète a toujours un même rôle importante. En effaçant la visibilité de l’islam dans l’atmosphère sociopolitique de cette jeune république, les autorités se servent aussi de certaines notions religieuses comme de leurs caractères holistiques et de leur communauté pour créer une nouvelle identité turque. C'est-à-dire qu'en dépit de sa structure laïque, l'identité turque a (parfois implicite et parfois explicite) toujours une relationnalisation ambivalente avec la religion. Dans laquelle l'image de Prophète est un domaine vaste et profond de cette problématique turque. Son rationalisme et ses idées progressistes selon son propre temps sont toujours loués  et donnés comme un modèle pour la religion souhaitée par les nouvelles élites politiques. Malgré leur caractère laïc, les cadres kémalistes s’abstiennent de porter atteinte à l’image du prophète (et même de l’islam) mais les contrôlent. À ce stade, ce travail tentera de montrer ces mécanismes de contrôle et leur fonctionnement.