Religion and secularism

In his Autobiography of a Yogi, Paramahansa Yogananda, quoted Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s idea of nationalism in his own words thus:

”I call myself a nationalist but my nationalism is as wide as the universe; it embraces all nations. My nationalism includes the prosperity of all nations. I want a strong India able to transfuse its strength to other nations …. Let us look for something new; let us try the power of love and God which are the truth.”

Elsewhere, Gandhi had proclaimed that ‘loyalty to the country is always subordinate to loyalty to God’ and reemphasized that his nationalism was ‘not exclusive’ but is of ‘intense internationalism’.

His averment that ‘nationalism is as wide as the universe’, indeed, is the upanishadic concept of vasudhaiva kutumbakam but as it does not sync with the absolutist precepts of the Semitic faiths, obviously it is of no avail to further the cause of Indian nationalism. Be that as it may, it enabled Gandhi to ascend the throne on international moral high ground that is while leaving the Indian nationalism bereft of, so to say, any space.

The idea of State secularity—which needs to be distinguished from secularism—has never been easily accepted in Poland. The main reasons for that are the Polish experiences from the past, such as the traditionally strong position of the Roman Catholic Church and the episode of anti-religious oppression under communist rule, as well as the religious composition of the society, marked with the predominance of Roman Catholicism. This explains why the makers of the Polish Constitution of 1997, while adopting all the key features of the secular State, decided to avoid terms already known to the legal science; as a result, independence was mentioned instead of separation and impartiality instead of neutrality. However, using innovative terminology has its price, as it opens the Constitution to many conflicting interpretations, some of them being rather hostile to the idea of State secularity. Over the years, the constitutional practice has revealed a strong tendency to depart from that model by questioning the Polish secularity and/or adding more and more exceptions to it. The question remains open whether at some point the exceptions can annihilate the rule.

This article suggests that the Gezi Park protests in general, and particularly the presence there of the Anti-Capitalist Muslims is a valuable example for studying the ambiguity and complexity of the secular/Islamic paradigm in Turkey. Conducting field research on the formation of the Anti-Capitalist Muslim identity, I argue that the secular/Islamic divide is politically produced, and potentially vulnerable to contestations and transformations, for it opens the socio-political landscape to the production of multiple secularisation projects beyond this divide.

When considering the question of world peace, many of the political and intellectual responses of our age continue to operate within a well-defined prism that privileges secular, diplomatic, political, and economic solutions that have failed to adequately diagnose the root causes of this persistent global challenge. Further still, religion is frequently regarded as an exclusionary and divisive force, or worse still as an obstacle, that is to be channeled and contained. This paper seeks to address this imbalance. Part I seeks to provide a wider critique of the contemporary status quo and to proffer a diagnosis of the underlying root causes of our current global crises. In doing so, I build upon existing critical academic scholarship, with a special focus on Rajani Kanth’s forceful critique of ‘Euro-modernism’ and Steven D. Smith’s ‘cage’ of secular discourse. Here, I argue that the central malaise of our age relates to the shrinking landscapes of ‘meaning’ in our expanding global mon...

This essay’s scope is to demonstrate the dialogic relationship between reason and religion in Pasolini’s works from the 1960’s. This relationship culminates in Teorema, which concludes a series of works in which the author places at the base of his activity as an intellectual and as a poet reason’s openness to religiosità and to the mystery of reality. My analysis of Teorema will consider the character of the father, Paolo, as an example of religiosità in bourgeois society and as a witness of human existence understood as a search for the Other.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Maskilic journals increased their publication of anti-Hasidic satires. From the eighteen-sixties onward, this literature came primarily as a response to the revival in the publishing of Hasidic hagiography and to the spread of Hasidism into new territory. To this point, no complete review or even general survey has been performed on this extensive polemical literature, despite the fact that it has much to teach us about Hasidism and the Haskalah in those years. We are not speaking of an insignificant bibliographical lacuna, but of a disregard for an entire field of research which would shed light not only on a forgotten chapter of modern Hebrew and Yiddish literature but also on an important chapter in the relationships between Maskilim and Hasidim in that period and the genesis and development of the different streams of Hasidism. This Maskilic literature intended to do more than eradicate Hasidism; it aimed to strengthen the self-consciousness of the individual Maskilim who found themselves alone in Hasidic territory. Paradoxically, the literature documented the very movement it intended to eradicate from the world. The distorted reflection displayed in the anti-Hasidic literature does more than present a caricature of its subject -- it conceals hitherto unknown elements about the nature and development of the Hasidic movement. The present article deals with one such case, a satire on Bratslav Hasidism from 1863, which has at its core a Maskilic satirical text written by Yehiel Meller on pilgrimage to the grave of R. Nahman of Bratslav in Uman.





כתבי עת של משכילים לאורך המאה התשע עשרה הרבו לפרסם סאטירות בגנותה של החסידות. משנות הששים ואילך באה ספרות זו בעיקר כתגובה להתעוררות הדפסת ספרות השבחים החסידית ולהתפשטות החסידות במרחבים חדשים. לא קיימת עד עתה סקירה שלימה, ואף לא מיפוי כללי, של אותה ספרות פולמוסית ענפה, על אף שיש בה ללמד הרבה על דרכי החסידות וההשכלה באותן שנים.  לא מדובר רק בחסרון ביבליוגרפי שאין לו משמעות, אלא בהתעלמות משדה מחקר רב עניין שעשוי להאיר לא רק על פרק נשכח בספרות עברית ויידיש החדשה אלא גם על פרק חשוב ביחסים בין משכילים לחסידים באותה תקופה, ועל דרכי צמיחתם, פיצולם והתפתחותם של זרמים שונים בחסידות. הייתה זו ספרות שיותר מאשר נועדה לבער את החסידות נועדה לחזק את תודעתם העצמית של המשכילים הבודדים במרחבים החסידיים; ספרות שבאופן פרדוקסלי תיעדה תנועה אותה חפצו לבער מן העולם. הבבואה המעוותת בה התהדרה הסאטירה האנטי חסידית לא רק הציגה דימוי – אלא טומנת בחובה הצבעה על אלמנטים חדשים ועל התפתחויות בחסידות. במקרה אחד ממין זה הנוגע לחסידות ברסלב בשנות השישים של המאה התשע עשרה עוסק המאמר. שלפנינו - שעיקרו מהדורה של טקסט משכילי שכתב יחיאל מלר - בשנת 1863 - על העלייה לקבר ר' נחמן מברסלב באומן
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Chapter One
Introduction
1. Statement of the Problem
The invention of steam engine in 18th century, which is also known as the introductory point of “First Industrial Revolution”, was a major incident for the human civilization to be transformed into a modern society from a feudal, traditional one. Since then, transports could run through engine which cut the time and energy to move from one place to another significantly. The world became getting smaller and smaller and vehicles have been increasing exponentially in line with the growth of the world population. So invention of these engine-run vehicles was one of the greatest wonders of modern science. But like its parent, science, those wonders are not a one-edged sword. For each of the inventions, which were invented for whatever reasons, good or bad, there remains an opposite side of its goal. Most of those inventors were passionate and also determined enough to invent those no matter what the dire impediments were there, but probably most of them were not concerned enough about the probable opposite consequences of their inventions. For an example, Alfred Nobel did not invent dynamite for mass extinction rather probably for mass development for the human beings. Just think about internet. We all know how greatly it had transformed the entire world; how useful tool it has been for the development of the all the major sectors of this world. But still the cost of this development is not so low rather probably they are very high. In terms of wage and jobs, Internet helps those who are educated enough to use this in their favour, but it is failing to protect the jobs of those who fail to internalize those skills and education required. In a sentence, what I am trying to say is that it is not possible to control the practices and consequences of any invention particularly when the invention became “globalized”.
So what should the men do now? Should they avoid using those inventions? No. It’ll be like cutting the head from the throat because you have headache. Here the use of rational-choice model of decision-making plays its part. In these matters, the ‘benefit’ of these inventions (I am not talking about something like nuclear missile) always gets an upper hand against its counterpart ‘cost’. So the optimal decision is to admit the inevitability of negative impacts and take steps to reduce those.Likewise, Road-related accidents are inevitable. Men are prone to make error. It’s about human nature. Both the drivers and pedestrians could make mistake no matter how much you train and awaken them up. As the greatest creations of the Almighty make mistakes, man-made vehicles can also behave abnormally no matter how fit are of those engines, wheels, brakes, lights etc. Also the road environment could play a major part here since it is not realistically possible to make roads ensuring highest amount of safety all the time due to some unavoidable drawbacks. So admitting the inevitability of this errors, abnormality and lags, there are some existence of policies like strict punishment for reckless driving, speed limit, punishment for jaywalking, ensuring fit vehicles, compensation for the victims etc which are followed all over the world and more or less uniform in nature.
However, ensuring proper enforcement of these laws has been a major headache for the states especially for the countries of the Third world as the existence of corruption, indifference of state about protecting citizens’ safety, bureaucratic red tape, inactive nature of judiciary etc collectively strike in the heart of the proper implementation process of those relevant laws.
1.1 Scenario of Road Transport Sector in Bangladesh
The picture of our road transport sector in our country is unique. It is unique not because it has a systematic public transport sector that can provide necessary mechanisms to its citizens and can ensure reasonable amount of safety in roads. It is unique because apart from its failure in providing “minimum” amount of safety to its mass, the state has developed a framework where the officials or policy-makers whose job is to ensure or protect public’s interest, ridiculously, have become the main culprits who tend to work so hard to counter those interest.
1.2 Road Safety Movement, 2018
The Public or Road Transport Sector in Bangladesh is one of the most Corrupted sectors of this country. For a country aspiring to Middle Income Status, it is shocking how backward the state of road governance is and the types of impunity and misgovernance tolerated, no indeed, spawned by the system. The killing of two students that took place in July 29, was a tragic finale to a grisly chain of impunity and misgovernance that is blighting our roads and road transportation. After that students have written a new chapter for the annals of the democratic struggle of the country. They asserted their right to fix the all-encompassing rot that had set in the transport sector of the country. The insensitive and offensive comment by the president of Bangladesh Road Transport Workers Federation (BRTWF), who is also the Shipping Minister of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, and the low public confidence on the administration to dispense justice and address the concerns of the protestors resulted in quick spread of the protest like wildfire in other town and cities. School and College going boys and girls , in dozens, hundreds, and thousands, took to the streets demanding justice and effective measures to curb death and maiming on the roads . They also demanded enforcement of existing laws to ensure that only licensed persons become eligible to drive registered and roadworthy vehicles. The student’s frustration over inefficiency and corruption of the traffic police and the latter’s collusion with transport syndicates and their godfathers led them to take control of the traffic management in Dhaka City. These students, mostly teenagers, in school uniforms with bags on their back, braving hunger and thirst in summer heat and rains, have successfully brought about a semblance of order that this country had never experienced in the past. These young people ensure only licensed persons are in the driving seat of duly registered roadworthy vehicles, advice car passengers to put on seat belts, motorcyclists to wear helmets and pedestrians to use footpaths, zebra crossing intersections. For the first time since Independence, one lane in key arterial roads was made free for Emergency vehicles.
The self-appointed teenage enforcers of the law were polite but firm. With due respect they made a senior minister change direction and drive on the right side of the road, and another minister leave his vehicle as it did not carry proper registration of papers. Imbibed with the spirit of upholding the law, they stopped vehicles of a DIG, SC Judge and the Navy for not carrying proper documentation.
Spontaneous demonstrations by protesters at some intersections adversely affected the traffic flow and caused substantive hardships to the commuters. Despite this, the student protesters commander warm understanding from the city dwellers at large. Social media has witnessed an outpouring of compliments. People reassured them that they were prepared to put up with the inconvenience of traffic delays and detours as those were for the greater good. Some went on to suggest if citizens can withstand the agony of congestions and closures imposed by political party programmes that are of little interest to them, then why not endure this temporary discomfort for a worthy cause.
The protest is unique in many ways. It is not to put the government on the dock but to draw its attention to the urgent need for making the roads safe. It is not to claim political power, but to demonstrate how state agencies should function with efficiency. The protesters have that with good intentions and commitment, the tasks that public-funded professional forces could not perform for decades were indeed doable.
The students presented a 9-point charter of demands to the government. Their massive mobilisation, and the support it garnered from the masses, forced the government to concede within days. But it remains to be seen if or how the government embodies those verbal commitments into reality.

Working in four scholarly teams focused on different global regions—North America, the European Union, the Middle East, and China—the contributors to Religion, Secularism, and Political Belonging examine how new political worlds intersect with locally specific articulations of religion and secularism. The chapters address many topics, including the changing relationship between Islam and politics in Tunisia after the 2010 revolution, the influence of religion on the sharp turn to the political right in Western Europe, understandings of Confucianism as a form of secularism, and the alliance between evangelical Christians and neoliberal business elites in the United States since the 1970s. This volume also provides a methodological template for how humanities scholars around the world can collaboratively engage with sweeping issues of global significance.

Contributors. Markus Balkenhol, Elizabeth Bentley, Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, David N. Gibbs, Ori Goldberg, Marcia Klotz, Zeynep Kurtulus Korkman, Leerom Medovoi, Eva Midden, Mohanad Mustafa, Mu-chou Poo, Shaul Setter, John Vignaux Smith, Pooyan Tamimi Arab, Ernst van den Hemel, Albert Welter, Francis Ching-Wah Yip, Raef Zreik

The pre-Islamic Middle East was mostly Christian. But with the advent of Islam, the demographic map of the Middle East was subject to major changes. Very quickly, Islam became the major religion. Despite the changes, the Christian presence remained heavy over a long period after the emergence of Islam. Throughout this period, Middle Eastern Christians, inspired by the teachings of their scripture were living on the intersection of two allegiances: allegiance to their Christian mission, and allegiance to their citizenship. Despite the difficulties, the Levantine Christianity had major contributions on all the spiritual, human and social levels. It was a major factor in the formation of the Arab Civilization and in the Arab Renaissance. it is still playing its ministerial role in the Middle East. In this paper, the author explores the positive contribution of Christians in the Middle East in times of pressure.

Der Mord an Samuel Paty im Oktober 2020 hatte die Welt schockiert. Obwhol die Tat von fast allen verurteilt wurde, scheiden sich die Geister über die Meinungsfreiheit, die den Mord verursacht hat. Dieser Artikel möchte die Konzepte der Meinungsfreiheit nachzeichnen, wie sie in Frankreich rezipiert wurden. Basierend auf Luthers Schrift »Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen « argumentiert der Artikel dann für die Relevanz von Luthers Freiheitskonzept, um die Suche nach wahrer Freiheit fruchtbar zu beantworten. Er entfaltet die Potenziale von Luthers Freiheitskonzept und zeigt, wie Luthers Denken eine sinnvollere Alternative bieten kann als der säkulare Freiheitsbegriff, wie er von der französischen Aufklärung rezipiert wurde.

Hassan Rachik, Symboliser la nation. Essai sur l’usage des identités collectives au Maroc, Ed le Fennec, Casablanca, 2003.
L’objet de la présente étude, n’est pas de savoir si la nation marocaine a depuis longtemps existé ou non, ni de considérer les bases sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain, mais d’examiner des processus politiques et culturels initiés, à partir de la deuxième décade du siècle passé, par des acteurs politiques dans le but de créer et de propager l’allégeance à un nouveau mode de groupement : la nation marocaine. L’accent est mis sur les usages politiques des symboles liés à la nation et sur les usages des identités dites tribales dans un contexte politique où l’allégeance suprême doit se faire à la nation.


Chapîtres

- IDENTITES COLLECTIVES, CULTURE ET POLITIQUE
- GENESE DES ORGANISATIONS NATIONALISTES
- SYMBOLISER LA NATION
- NATION ET TRIBU
- RITUALISATION DE LA NATION

With an ethical-centered philosophy, Taha Abdurrahman remains one of the most significant and sophisticated Arab philosophers of today. This review article seeks to elaborate on two of his recent books, which builds on and compliments his vision of philosophical independence,, particularly his 'Entrustment Ethics' (Al-ʾtimāniya). Throughout two volumes, he aims to construct an ethical philosophy on the foundation of faith, as an alternative to Western ethics. In Volume I Abdurrahman establishes his ethical philosophy that is grounded in what he conceives as three Quranic Covenants: Testimony, establishing man's responsibility before God, Entrustment, establishing man's duties and responsibilities on earth, and Transmission, introducing an ideal form of conduct through the role model of God's Prophets and Messengers. The second volume projects Abdurrahman's theory on Western established ethical theories and Western ethical and political thought in a broader sense, wherein he both illustrates and critiques theories proposed by thinkers, including, inter alia,

The discipline of modern economics has been categorized as based in mathematics and thus dealing only with facts. Religion, on the other hand, is considered one of the primary institutions in society that engenders different values. The stark separation between these two fields is typical of the modern fact-value distinction. The goal of this project is to provide, relying heavily upon Peter L. Berger, a detailed analysis of the value-laden social functions of religion and consider whether economics, specifically capitalism, also carries out these functions. The thesis blurs the lines between economics and religion by showing that capitalism engages in one of the primary social functions of religion, namely the promulgation of a theology. The research has revealed that capitalism, though it eschews any role in producing value-laden beliefs, actually manufactures its own unarticulated theology, establishing certain values through doctrine. This theology of capitalism is displayed by evaluating economic literature produced by three different schools of capitalism. Comparing this economic literature to three standard doctrines of Christian theology has uncovered pieces of capitalism’s own theology heavily involved in shaping specific values. By shedding light on capitalism’s theology, this thesis has revealed that economics carries out the same social functions as religion and consequently problematizes the modern fact-value distinction.

Αντικείμενο του βιβλίου είναι το ζήτημα των μεταρρυθμίσεων στο χώρο του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου και πιο συγκεκριμένα το πρόβλημα της ερμηνείας των Γενικών Κανονισμών , οι οποίοι επηρέασαν τη διαδικασία ανασυγκρότησης του ορθόδοξου μιλλέτ . Η μελέτη δεν περιορίζεται στην ανάλυση του κειμένου των Κανονισμών, αλλά διερευνά το πολιτικό πεδίο που συγκρότησε ο καταρτισμός τους. Οδηγεί έτσι, όχι μόνο σε πλούσιο πρωτογενές υλικό, αλλά και σε συμπεράσματα που φωτίζουν σημαντικές πλευρές της ζωής της ελληνορθόδοξης κοινότητας στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, οι στόχοι της εργασίας είναι:
- Να αναλύσει τι πολιτικές και κοινωνικές προϋποθέσεις της ανασυγκρότησης του ορθόδοξου μιλλέτ, ξεκινώντας από τα δίκτυα ισχύος και τις ομάδες συμφερόντων που συγκροτήθηκαν ήδη από τη δεκαετία του 1830.
- Να εξετάσει διεξοδικά το σχηματισμό των δύο πτερύγων , της κληρικαλικής και της μεταρρυθμιστικής και την αντιπαράθεσή τους κατά τις εργασίες του Εθνικού Προσωρινού Συμβουλίου.
- Να περιγράψει και να ερμηνεύσει το πεδίο πολιτικών ανταγωνισμών, όπως διαμορφώθηκε στο Πατριαρχείο, μετά τη ψήφιση των Γενικών Κανονισμών.
Σύμφωνα με την ερμηνεία που επιχειρείται εδώ, η ενδεχόμενη «λαϊκοποίηση» της Εκκλησίας δεν σημαίνει απαραίτητα και μια ώθηση στη διαδικασία εκκοσμίκευσης, δηλαδή, στη θεμελιακή διάκριση της θρησκευτικής από την πολιτική σφαίρα . Κι αυτό δεν οφείλεται τόσο στην αδυναμία του λαϊκού στοιχείου να επιβάλει την παρουσία του στον εκκλησιαστικό κόσμο, όσο στην ικανότητα του κλήρου να εγκολπώνεται τα «κοσμικά» ιδεολογικά σχήματα, συμμετέχοντας στη διαμόρφωση της δημόσιας σφαίρας που υπό κανονικές συνθήκες θα έπρεπε να τον περιθωριοποιήσει.

Quand il est à Rome, le pape François déjeune chaque jour au milieu de bonnes soeurs dont il partage le modeste repas. Signe de la vie simple qu’il s’est choisie en référence à François d’Assise, dont il fut le premier pape à adopter le patronyme comme pour inaugurer une ère nouvelle. Mais aussi, dit-on, façon de conjurer le risque d’un empoisonnement, tant sa volonté de réforme heurterait les puissants du Vatican… Pour autant, en faire un pape révolutionnaire reviendrait à ne pas saisir à quel point son action est limitée par la doctrine, le fonctionnement des structures de l’Église et les difficultés contemporaines du catholicisme. Si François, professionnel de la communication et habile jésuite, tient tant à un aggiornamento, c’est avant tout pour tenter d'enrayer le recul, aussi rapide que profond, de la foi romaine partout en Occident.

Religion has been a definition to most of the human beings existing in this world, religious practices have given meaning to most of the lives. A handful of religions are governing the world and its worldly affairs. The article describes the inception of all the religious practices which have developed the history of India and the influences which have played a major role in shaping out the history of the country. An international probe shall follow later.

Now, to better understand the Oligarchy or the 1% (actually, those who are really in control of our world are of much less than 1%, but it is easier to just say, "the 1%"), we need to not only ask questions, but to answer them as well. It just so happens that I had already been researching the Oligarchy for more than 20 years before people like Jimmy Carter, Jesse Ventura and Bernie Sanders started talking about it.

Thus, I am perhaps the one main person who not only knows the most about them, but who will also tell you about what I now know. Others who know, may not know as much, and they may not want to tell you what they know. The fact of the matter is that you most likely will not find out anything about the Oligarchy or the 1% via an education from within present day academia. In fact, what you "learn" or are told from within academia today, most likely will steer you away from what you would need to know about the subject.

‘A Tale of Two Speeches: Secularism and Primacy in Contemporary Roman Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy’ ed. John Chryssavgis, Primacy in the Church: The Office of Primate and the Authority of the Councils, Volume 2: Contemporary and Contextual Perspectives (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2016), pp.807-837.

I have tried to outline the theory of post-secularism by first examining the historical and philosophical framework in which secularism initially emerged and asserted its claims. We have seen that the philosophical, political and societal constituents of the secularism thesis were perceived as intrinsically interrelated components of a single universal epistemological process of human development. This holistic imagination has been subject to a serious review and reconsideration in the last few decades. However, the idea of post-secular neither implies a rejection of the secular, nor a teleological failure of secularism per se. It rather tries to include religious voices, terminologies into the hitherto secular public sphere, and it reconceptualises, modifies both the secular and the religious, re-evaluates and abstracts its own presumptions and finally recognises its own limitations, while still sticking insistently to its inevitable secular epistemic framework, by recognising ‘the religious’ and encouraging and facilitating its way to gaining a secular episteme. Post-secularism is the process from a polemical, thoroughly ideological distaste for religion, to a more including, embracing, self-critical and respectful attitude towards religion.

Since 1947, Baloch have resisted inclusion into the Pakistan and have waged several waves of ethno-nationalist
insurgency against the state. Scholars and Baloch nationalist leaders alike generally assert that Baloch are more
secular than other Pakistanis, more opposed to the political Islamist policies pursued by the state, and less
supportive of Islamist militancy in the country. However, these claims lack empirical support. We employ data
derived from a large national survey of Pakistanis from 2012 to evaluate these conventional wisdoms.
Contrary to claims in the literature, we find that Baloch resemble Pakistanis generally with few important
exceptions

Turkey has witnessed a proliferation of Islamic television channels since the liberalization of broadcasting in the 1990s. The programming of these TV channels was initially distinctly theological in character, with shows focusing on the doctrinal, scriptural, and ritualistic aspects of Islam. More recently, however, they have started producing family-friendly entertainment programs as well as shows aimed at “strengthening the family.” Islamic broadcasters intend their family-focused programming as civil initiatives against what they see as the increasing corrosion of the “moral fabric of the family” and devaluation of “family values” in contemporary Turkish society. In these TV shows, audiences are provided with guidance and techniques that would help them cultivate ethical dispositions, knowledge, and skills so that they could assume autonomy and responsibility for administering their families more effectively. Islamic broadcasters explicitly identify their role as assisting the state in  fighting social problems through their programming. Moreover, the discourses and sensibilities promoted on television articulate with the biopolitical concerns of the nation-state and the emerging rationalities of governance. While Islamic television professionals’ self-ascribed mission to “strengthen the family” emerges from a religiously inspired moral imperative to provide service, it simultaneously indicates their internalization of neoliberal rationalities of governance that promote the responsibilization of non-governmental actors for providing social services as well as that of individuals for supporting and caring for their family members. [Keywords: Islam, television, media, family, family values, secularism, neoliberalism, Turkey]

You can download the paper at: https://muse.jhu.edu/article/670934

While the contemporary world has been heralded as being “post-racial”, we can look all-around to see evidence that this assertion is not only flawed but false. Religion is generally blamed as the key culprit for the escalating conflicts igniting the world over which threatens peace. Yet, rarely is secularism and the void created in its midst carefully analyzed in this context. The historical roots of this problem are more remote than postmodernism and modernism. However, secularism has fractured the way that human identity has been understood throughout time which eclipses the integral relationship between human diversity and religious pluralism.

Das Thema Salafismus wird in Deutschland nunmehr seit Jahren in den Medien diskutiert. Grund hierfür ist die Tatsache, dass der Salafismus auch in Deutschland angekommen ist und Fuß gefasst hat.  Insbesondere seit der Ausrufung des Kalifats der Terrororganisation „Islamischer Staat“ wächst die Angst vor salafistischer Bedrohung und seit hunderte deutscher Staatsbürger auswanderten, um sich jener Terrororganisation anzuschließen, sich an Kampfhandlungen beteiligten und teilweise gar als Selbstmordattentäter für ihre Ideologie und Überzeugungen in die Luft sprengten, wirkt die Gesamtproblematik bedrohlicher und greifbarer denn je. 
Lange Zeit glaubte man, dass in einer säkularisierten aufgeklärten Welt ein Widererstarken und eine Rückkehr der Religionen nicht möglich sei, da der Modernisierungsmythos lehrte, eine fortschreitende Säkularisierung und Privatisierung der Religion zu erwarten.  Laut Olivier Roy besteht jedoch „ein enges Band zwischen Säkularisierung und religiösem Wiedererweckungsglauben; Letzterer ist nicht Abwehr der Säkularisierung, sondern ihr Produkt. Die Säkularisierung bringt das Religiöse hervor. Es gibt keine ‚Rückkehr‘ des Religiösen, sondern eine Veränderung.“
Die Entstehung des Salafismus lässt sich wie die Entstehung aller großen religiösen evangelikalen Erweckungsbewegungen ins 18. Jahrhundert zurückdatieren und ist ebenfalls keine schlichte „Rückkehr“ des Religiösen, sondern eine Erweckungsbewegung, welche den muslimischen Glauben an Gott und die Glaubenspraxis tiefgreifend veränderte. Da er wie alle Erweckungsbewegungen der Moderne besonderen Wert auf Purismus legt, ist sein Konzept der religiösen Neuerung, Bidʿa, sowie der Umgang mit jener ein zentraler Bestandteil des innersalafistischen Diskurses und ideologischer Marker. Daher beschäftigt sich vorliegende Arbeit mit dem Begriff Bidʿah, dem Begriff der religiösen Neuerung, seiner Definition im salafistischen Diskurs sowie den hieraus erwachsenden Folgen, und stellt dem auch knapp den sunnitisch-orthodoxen  Standpunkt gegenüber, um jene ideologische Veränderung deutlich zu machen. Dabei beschränkt sich der Autor auf neo-salafistische, konservative Strömungen des Salafismus, obgleich sich der modernistische Salafismus in vielen Punkten ideologisch nicht von erstgenannten Strömungen unterscheidet.
Diese Arbeit setzt sich zum Ziel, den Begriff Bidʿa und weitere Begrifflichkeiten zunächst zu definieren, sodann einen kurzen historischen Überblick zum Thema Salafismus und seiner Hauptströmungen zu bieten, um hiernach auf Methoden und die Lehre des Salafismus in diesem Bezug einzugehen. Im Kapitel über die Lehre bezüglich dem Begriff Bidʿa im Salafismus wird das salafistische Verständnis der Primärquellen aufgezeigt, da vor allem im innerislamischen Diskurs dem Salafismus als religiöse Ideologie nur auf theologischer Ebene beigekommen werden kann, weshalb ein tiefgreifendes Verständnis dieser Lehre und auch Kenntnis um die sunnitisch-orthodoxe Gegenposition, unabdingbar sind, um Differenzieren zu können. Die sunnitisch-orthodoxe Lehrmeinung wird teils im Fließtext, teils als eigener Unterpunkt knapp zusammengefasst dargestellt, um dem Leser einen direkten Vergleich zu ermöglichen. Hiernach wird auf den Gebrauch des Begriffs Bidʿa als ideologischen Marker zur gezielten Abgrenzung eingegangen, sowie auf die salafistische Legitimation jener Abgrenzung und einige ihrer theologischen Folgen. Anschließend wird die Frage erörtert, ob das salafistische Verständnis von Bidʿa allein der Grund für die puristische Haltung des Salafismus ist, oder sie bereits im salafistischen Gottes- und Glaubensverständnis wurzelt. Nachdem der Begriff Bidʿa theologisch aus salafistischer und sunnitisch-orthodoxer Sicht erläutert und seine Verwendung dargestellt wurde, wird auf einige direkte und indirekte praktische Folgen jenes Verständnisses eingegangen und schlussendlich ein Blick auf Prävention und Deradikalisierung geworfen.

The long-standing contest over a 1500 square yard plot of land, situated in the city of Ayodhya, located in the district of Faizabad in the state of Uttar Pradesh in north India, has become a site where religious groups, pilgrims, lawyers, and even gods are battling to establish their claims of rightful ownership. The issue has been simmering in independent India since its birth in 1947 and arose well before that time. The courts have been called upon time and again to adjudicate on this fraught issue, where their decisions are not only defining the parameters of the right to freedom of religion, but are implicated in the very construction of faith and belief. In this article, I examine how the right to freedom of religion has emerged in law, focusing on the 125-year-old property dispute in Ayodhya. I discuss how the reasoning of the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgement partly resulted in reproducing and reinforcing Hindu majoritarianism through its interpretation of the right to freedom of religion and the broader implications of the decision on the meaning and definition of secularism in Indian constitutional discourse. I also underscore how the law and judicial discourse has played a central role in enabling the Hindu Right, a right wing political and ideological movement intent on establishing India as a Hindu State and a key player in the Ayodhya dispute, to successfully pursue its agenda through the right to freedom of religion.

U ovom radu bavimo se odnosom, odnosno sukobom Tradicije i modernizma u djelima Seyyeda Hosseina Nasra. Spomenuto nesuglasje bit će prikazano kroz Nasrove kritike modernizma s tradicionalne tačke gledišta, uz osvrt na ono što Nasr podrazumijeva pod tradicionalnim islamom, koji je neodvojiv od konteksta ovog diskursa. Prvo navodimo značenje Tradicije i modernizma, a onda odgovor, odnosno reakciju islama i muslimana na njegov juriš. U tom pogledu neozaobilazan je govor o moderniziranim muslimanima. Potom se govori o modernoj zapadnoj nauci i sekularizmu te obavezi religijskih mislilaca spram toga. U posljednjem dijelu ovoga rada analiziramo ono što se naziva tradicionalnim islamom. Na kraju navodimo savjete Seyyeda Hosseina Nasra koje je uputio bosanskim muslimanima.

This paper examines the experience of disaffiliation from religious tradition as a phenomenon linked with deconversion, secularisation, and postmodernity, in a Western context. By utilising the work of a variety of authors across several disciplines including, philosophy, theology, and sociology, this paper explores the themes of secularisation, religious belief and deconversion, and questions how much we can say about any of these concepts. This paper uses an autoethnographic and a phenomenological method in addition to examining case studies to explore and give language to the experience of losing one’s religion. The author proposes the concept of spiritual homelessness as a term to encompass the multifaceted experience of leaving behind one’s spiritual home, dwelling in uncertainty, and the loss of a secure knowledge of God which is argued as being symptomatic of the postmodern age. The language of spiritual homelessness tries to provide a relatable description of what many individuals in the Western world live as a spiritual reality today. However, ultimately, questions remain regarding how much we can say about this experience and whether we can truly capture in words something we can never fully comprehend.

In this chapter, I offer a preliminary ethnographic and media examination of the ways, and the extent to which, the BJP has been able to (and still is) negotiating its status in the region. I want to suggest that this status has been accomplished by honing a self-sufficient and dynamically structured political machine and by the adoption of an agenda that transcends religious, social and cultural boundaries. But an analysis of their momentary success must be tempered by realities on the ground that highlight complexities with regard to the national-regional dynamic. In order to understand these developments, I present an analysis of two aspects of the BJP’s approach: its utilisation of key alliances that have emerged in reaction to the failures of regional and central governments, and its projection of itself as a secular party that encompasses but also moves beyond exclusively ‘Hindu’ sentiments. This paper higlights this double-think – the situational/regional differences in political self-presentation that demonstrate the malleability of their ideology while at the same time managing the BJP’s complex relationship with the RSS.

This thesis analyzes the Communist experiment of the separation of Church & state and secularization policies, alongside an ethnic accommodation of Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims in multi-confessional Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Communist period. How did the ethnic and the confessional categories relate to each other, and to the concept of territoriality? And more importantly, how did the process of secularization complicate the ascriptive categories of Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Muslims, as well as the concomitant process of nation building in Socialist Bosnia-Herzegovina? This research conveys a particularistic narrative of the dilemmas of secularization in Socialist Yugoslavia and its particular implications for Bosnian Muslims, whilst seeking to contextualize the violence of the 1990s. At the same time, it also raises a broader question of the place of religion within society and politics, modernity as well as of confessional categories amidst national politics. The complexity of separating the religious from the ethnic or cultural in this particular context illuminates the importance of determining the role of religion in a society, as an institution, a lifestyle and as a political category, before examining the question of secularization in a heterogeneous society.

This extensive review explores the nature of human individuality through a broad spectrum of themes which all relate in an unwavering manner back to the fundamental question of “Who Am I?” The paradox of being fully human is that it depends on transcending the human condition itself. Integral individuality exists at the intersection between the horizontal and the vertical or the human and the Divine. Modern psychology, especially humanistic and transpersonal psychology has, much to its credit, done a great deal to facilitate the rightful place of the human within the spiritual dimension; yet, to date, it has been unable to situate what human individuality is. In fact, modern psychology has grossly overlooked that each of the spiritual traditions of the world has its own corresponding and complete psychology or rather pneumatology (“science of the Spirit”). It is by turning to the integral psychology of the perennial philosophy that human identity can be recovered.

As debate intensified over Fiji's future as either a secular or a Christian state during the 2012 Constitution Commission drafting-process, a more fundamental point arose: had Fiji ever been a secular state? For Bainimarama's military government, a secular state was a novel and crucial innovation. For their principal opponents, the SDL Party and the Methodist Church, it was an unprecedented threat. Yet for Professor Yash Ghai's Commission, a secular state was simply a continuation of the status quo. If supposedly simple facts about the secularism of Fiji's past constitutions could not be agreed, what chance was there generating consensus on secularism for Fiji's future? This paper sets out to provide some clarity on this debate. Where do we find secularism in Fiji's past constitutions? How has it changed through it history of constitutional reform? Why have these changes taken place? And lastly, why was there such disagreement on this issue?

After a brief introduction, the article focuses on the unique challenges associated with reinterpreting the supernaturalism of the Lotus Sūtra for compatibility with a secular worldview. Next is a segment on scholarly opinions that cast doubt on a supernatural reading of the sutra’s ultimate revelation and hinder belief today in Nichiren’s eternalization of this reading in the thirteenth century. With the above topics addressed and hermeneutic integrity in mind, a phrase is introduced for converting the revelation into a comprehendible insight from immanence. Thereafter and until close, the phrase is contextualized with traditional Buddhist and contemporary socio-philosophical principles to show compatibility and readiness to replace faith in a transcendent understanding of the text’s long-venerated core.

In engaging with heterogeneous societies, states have oscillated between three modes of dealing with social diversity: accommodation, segregation and eradication. Accordingly, this article cross-examines three typologies of secularism: Consociational secularism (Lebanon), communal partition (India and Pakistan) and coercive secularization (China and Turkey). The article argues that while each state shared the challenge of establishing state sovereignty in pluralistic societies, the central authorities’ attempt to impose homogenization varied according to the strength of state institutions, the hold of communal ideologies and the degree of disparate socio-economic interests. The legitimacy of regimes hinged on the perceived impartiality of the state in meeting the demands of diverse socio-economic and ethno-religious constituencies. The article argues that the potential for fragmentation was particularly high when socio-economic fault-lines overlapped with, and reinforced ethno-religious fissures. When sectarian solidarity trumped loyalty to the state, partition along communal lines unfolded within the caldron of civil war, as was the case in Lebanon in 1975 and the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 and 1971. By contrast, the authoritarian states of Maoist China and Kemalist Turkey could enforce, albeit violently and at great human cost, a rigidly secular, cultural homogenization in part because they were perceived to be lessening socio-economic inequalities despite their assault on traditional identities. In all cases, and regardless of whether or not a dominant majority existed or not, sovereignty and state legitimacy was ultimately predicated not so much on the absence or presence of democracy or diversity, but on the provision of a critical measure of justice for all citizens irrespective of origin or identity.