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Stephen Brown
  • School of Political Studies
    University of Ottawa
    120 University, 7th floor
    Ottawa, Ontario  K1N 6N5
    Canada
  • I am a professor at the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa, where I am also affiliated with the ... moreedit
This revised edition not only analyzes Canada’s past development assistance, it also highlights important new opportunities in the context of the recent change in government. Designed to reach a variety of audiences, contributions by... more
This revised edition not only analyzes Canada’s past development assistance, it also highlights important new opportunities in the context of the recent change in government. Designed to reach a variety of audiences, contributions by twenty scholars and experts in the field offer an incisive examination of Canada’s record and initiatives in Canadian foreign aid, including its relatively recent emphasis on maternal and child health and on the extractive sector, as well as the longer-term engagement with state fragility.
The equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines is one of the most important tests of global cooperation that the world has faced in recent decades. Collectively, global leaders failed that crucible abysmally, creating a 'vaccine... more
The equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines is one of the most important tests of global cooperation that the world has faced in recent decades. Collectively, global leaders failed that crucible abysmally, creating a 'vaccine apartheid' that divided the world according to income into countries with widespread access and those without. Why, given that leaders were fully aware of the risks and injustice of vaccine inequity, did governments of wealthy countries hoard doses, impede the expansion of vaccine manufacturing and otherwise prevent equitable access to vaccines? We argue that their decisions to act selfishly are best explained by governments' accountability to domestic constituencies, their lack of leadership and commitment to multilateralism and their adoption of short-term perspectives, as well as their unwillingness to curb the influence of profitoriented global pharmaceutical companies and, to a certain extent, of an additional private actor, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
Most struggles for LGBTQI+ rights play out at the national level. However, the question of sexual and gender minorities' rights periodically appears as a point of friction in international relations as well. This article analyses the... more
Most struggles for LGBTQI+ rights play out at the national level. However, the question of sexual and gender minorities' rights periodically appears as a point of friction in international relations as well. This article analyses the question of international efforts to defend LGBTQI+ rights in countries of the Global South, with a particular focus on Western countries' endeavours in Africa. Combining policy analysis, critique and recommendations, it asks how and when international actors should and should not intervene. It recognizes that motives for intervening can be problematic and the means often counterproductive, especially when exhibiting neo-imperialist tendencies and constituting ad hoc reactions to events in the media. Countering essentialist arguments about 'authentic' African culture and values, influenced by religious beliefs, is also a significant challenge. I argue that more fruitful efforts should instead be centred on local rights defenders' perspectives and supporting their priorities and initiatives, based on concerted, long-term, principled strategies. International actors, however, are reluctant to adopt such approaches because of a desire for short-term visible action, even if less effective or not effective at all. This conundrum is a fundamental problem in the area of foreign aid writ large, as greater impact often requires less visibility on the part of international actors, but donor countries want domestic and international recognition of their efforts. The article distils key lessons learnt and principles for action that have emerged over the past 15 to 20 years, brought together in one place for the first time. It aims to stimulate discussions among practitioners and academics. It should be of particular interest to human rights practitioners, especially those who are involved or contemplating getting involved in defending the rights of sexual and gender minorities internationally.
In the early 2010s, the Canadian government increasingly integrated commercial self-interest into its foreign aid program. This article analyzes the ostensible motives and impact of the rapid intensification of Canada’s support to the... more
In the early 2010s, the Canadian government increasingly integrated commercial self-interest into its foreign aid program. This article analyzes the ostensible motives and impact of the rapid intensification of Canada’s support to the extractive sector in Mongolia. It argues that, rather than a reflection of Mongolia’s needs, the decision was donor-driven and resulted in apparently poorly designed projects with limited potential to advance Canadian aid’s objective of reducing poverty, or even to meet the unofficial goal of benefitting Canadian mining companies. A potentially more productive approach would have been to help reduce, not reinforce, Mongolia’s extreme dependence on mining.
As a result of the unexpectedly quick development of vaccines to prevent COVID-19, the Canadian government was pulled in two opposite directions. On the one hand, Canadians exerted extreme pressure on the government to purchase and roll... more
As a result of the unexpectedly quick development of vaccines to prevent COVID-19, the Canadian government was pulled in two opposite directions. On the one hand, Canadians exerted extreme pressure on the government to purchase and roll out vaccines as fast as possible for domestic immunization. On the other hand, it sought to promote global access to the vaccine, which would save more lives. This article examines how the Canadian government responded to this quandary, why it made those choices, to what effect and what a better approach would have been. I argue that, by adopting a resolute “Canada First” approach for electoral reasons, while also rhetorically espousing equitable global access, the government tried to satisfy both sides. However, by focusing overwhelmingly “doing good” for Canadians, the government is also indirectly “doing harm” to vulnerable people abroad and prolonging the pandemic globally and for Canadians too. Canadian “vaccine nationalism” is also harmful to Canadian economic interests and claims of global leadership, and will reduce Canada’s “soft power”. The solution, from both an ethical and a pragmatic standpoint, would be to share vaccines more equitably and support intellectual property waivers and other measures to accelerate global vaccine production and immunization.
This article analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on foreign aid. Using examples from Canadian foreign aid, it argues that, despite the terrible toll it is exacting, the crisis has accelerated some significant positive... more
This article analyzes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on foreign aid. Using examples from Canadian foreign aid, it argues that, despite the terrible toll it is exacting, the crisis has accelerated some significant positive pre-existing trends, both by destabilizing the perception of aid as flowing essentially from the Global North to Global South and by reinforcing awareness of the importance of joint efforts for global public goods and humanitarian assistance, as well as debt relief. However, it has also reinforced potentially harmful self-interested justifications for aid, which could align assistance more with donors' priorities than the needs of the poor. An important trend reversal is the renewed emphasis on well-being. Two other crucial trends remain unclear-the COVID-19 pan-demic's impact on multilateral approaches and on aid flows. How donors respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath over the next few years will depend on their political will, and will profoundly shape the future of development cooperation .
Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), launched in June 2017, marks the first time that sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) have been mentioned in an overarching Canadian aid policy. The inclusion of SOGI in... more
Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), launched in June 2017, marks the first time that sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) have been mentioned in an overarching Canadian aid policy. The inclusion of SOGI in the policy document sent an important signal to domestic and international development partners on the need to consider these sources of discrimination and marginalization. This article asks two basic research questions. First, what is the place of SOGI in Canada's "feminist" international assistance? Second, what additional steps does Canada's development program need to take to protect the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people in the Global South? Based on an analysis of official documents and secondary sources, we argue that FIAP itself sends only a weak signal about the importance of SOGI-related concerns, but Canadian foreign aid has expanded its understanding of LGBTI issues and has begun to commit dedicated resources to addressing them. Nonetheless, the initial programming (2017-2019) was channelled in an ad hoc manner and through one, major stand-alone commitment, rather than through a broader framework that would guide SOGI's integration into Canadian programs over the long term. If serious about addressing LGBTI rights more systematically, the Canadian government needs to expand its definition of what SOGI entails and move beyond niche programming to recognize the cross-cutting dimension of LGBTI rights in foreign aid, especially in the area of sexual and reproductive health and rights.
This article analyzes the rise and fall of the aid effectiveness norm, using the lens of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm 'life cycle'. I argue that, although donors and recipients endorsed the founding principles, the norm was only feebly... more
This article analyzes the rise and fall of the aid effectiveness norm, using the lens of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm 'life cycle'. I argue that, although donors and recipients endorsed the founding principles, the norm was only feebly internalized: they were unwilling to overcome their reluctance-and important disincentives-to substantially change their practices on the ground. After the norm cascaded, the donor-led process sought to gain legitimacy and diffuse the norm more broadly by trying to bring in a wider range of actors through norm substitution. These changes failed to convince emerging donors to engage and caused the norm to decay to the point where it ceased to constitute a norm. This case highlights the importance of refining the life cycle model to take into account weak internalization and the potential existence of a second phase in which norms decline and potentially die.
The “developmental state” has become a prominent alternative development model defended by contemporary Western aid donors, particularly in Africa. Purported “developmental states,” such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, are argued to possess... more
The “developmental state” has become a prominent alternative development model defended by contemporary Western aid donors, particularly in Africa. Purported “developmental states,” such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, are argued to possess strong-willed, visionary leaderships whose commitment to delivering on ambitious development plans renders them attractive donor partners. These leaderships are also, however, often authoritarian and unapologetic when criticized for democratic backsliding or human rights abuses. For many Western donors this represents a tolerable trade-off. The purpose of this article is to interrogate, critique and explain the assumptions and ideas underlying this trade-off. Using the case study of Ethiopia, we argue that donor officials’ understandings of “developmental state” are varied, vague and superficial, the main commonality being a “strong” regime with “political will” and a non-negotiable approach to domestic governance. We suggest that donors have too readily and uncritically accepted, internalized and deployed these notions, using the “developmental state” concept to justify their withdrawal from serious engagement on democratic reform. This derives from a systemic donor preference for depoliticized development models, as well as from Ethiopian officials’ own savvy political manoeuvrings. It has also, however, weakened donors’ position of influence at a time when the Ethiopian regime is debating major political reform.
Background As foreign aid donors are increasingly open about seeking to obtain benefits from their development assistance, new forms of donor‐driven private‐sector partnerships have proliferated. This new trend is especially controversial... more
Background
As foreign aid donors are increasingly open about seeking to obtain benefits from their development assistance, new forms of donor‐driven private‐sector partnerships have proliferated. This new trend is especially controversial in the mining sector, to which Canada has become the largest aid donor among OECD/DAC countries.

Purpose
In order to better understand this phenomenon and its implications, this paper asks, first, how has aid to the mining sector evolved and what do the changes suggest about its underlying motives? Second, what are the implications regarding the ‘democratic ownership’ of the recipients’ development agenda?.

Approach and methods
The study analyses Canadian aid to the mining sector in Peru, its largest recipient of such aid, concentrating on the period since 2011, when Canadian aid took an ‘extractive turn’. It draws on 20 semi‐structured interviews with key players and observers in Lima and Cusco in Peru, as well as an in‐depth review of mainly secondary sources and some statistical data. Its analytical framework is based on the motives that must underpin aid, as stipulated by Canadian legislation, and the concept of ‘ownership’, the cornerstone of the international Aid Effectiveness Agenda.

Findings
The extractive turn in Canadian aid reflects an increase in commercial self‐interest, at the expense of altruistic poverty reduction and contradicting core elements of the legislated mandate of Canadian aid. Extractive‐related aid to Peru now almost exclusively supports: (a) strengthening the central government's role in promoting mining; (b) encouraging municipalities to negotiate mutually beneficial relations with Canadian mining companies; and (c) subsidizing Canadian companies’ efforts to obtain a ‘social licence to operate’ from local communities. Canada's assistance to the mining sector can be justified by a narrow interpretation of the concept of country ‘ownership’. However, its justification rests on a limited vision of ownership, based on what governments, who claim to speak on behalf of citizens, prioritize, rather than a more democratic conception that takes into account what poor people want, which may include or preclude mining activities.

Policy implications
Aid donors should focus on locally owned strategies that reflect poor people's priorities, independently of whether they include or exclude allowing mining companies to operate on their territories. Aid may thus contribute to a donor's commercial interests, but the latter should not be the underlying motive.
How do left- and right-leaning governments differ in their provision of foreign aid? As the case of Canada confirms, it is not clear that either type gives more aid or that they spend it significantly differently. This article examines... more
How do left- and right-leaning governments differ in their provision of foreign aid? As the case of Canada confirms, it is not clear that either type gives more aid or that they spend it significantly differently. This article examines the claim that Stephen Harper’s government played to its Conservative base and compares its record to that of Liberal governments. It finds that all governments over the past few decades have tried to brand their aid initiatives in ways that will appeal to their respective bases. These changes are based on domestic electoral considerations, rather than the needs and priorities of aid recipients, and are a distraction from and impediment to aid effectiveness considerations. In spite of their rhetorical differences, successive governments actually exhibit great continuity in their aid programs, regardless of which party is in power.
This article examines the principle of ownership, the keystone of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and its application to the cases of Mali and Ghana. It argues that both countries are characterized by a high level of... more
This article examines the principle of ownership, the keystone of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, and its application to the cases of Mali and Ghana. It argues that both countries are characterized by a high level of ownership in its formal sense, that is to say, both have developed their own development plans, rather than having them imposed from outside. However, substantively, ownership is severely hampered by the existence of multiple plans, with no clear hierarchy among them, and a similar lack of prioritization within plans, as well as serious deficiencies in translating those plans into action. These limitations to the concept of ownership are best understood, not due to a lack of capacity or a simple lack of will per se, but as a result of interests and incentives, notably to maximize donor funding. As a result, the impact of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda on ownership practices in Mali and Ghana has been far more in form than in substance.
This article examines the main trends in Canadian aid policies from the 2006 election of the Conservatives under Stephen Harper to their defeat in 2015. It finds that the Harper government increasingly instrumentalized Canadian foreign... more
This article examines the main trends in Canadian aid policies from the 2006 election of the Conservatives under Stephen Harper to their defeat in 2015. It finds that the Harper government increasingly instrumentalized Canadian foreign aid, reorienting it to benefit Canadian interests, to the detriment of poverty reduction abroad. This was part of a broader foreign policy that sabotaged Canada’s ability to use its soft power to influence the global order.
The term ‘aid orphan’ refers to a developing country forgotten or abandoned by the development community. This metaphor has featured prominently in the development assistance policy and research literature over the past decade.... more
The term ‘aid orphan’ refers to a developing country forgotten or abandoned by the development community. This metaphor has featured prominently in the development assistance policy and research literature over the past decade. Development practitioners, policy makers and researchers have defined aid orphans in manifold ways and often expressed concern over the potential fate or impact of such countries. In this paper we first examine the many definitions of aid orphans and then review the main concerns raised about them. Next we empirically examine more than 40 years of bilateral aid data to identify aid orphan countries and their common characteristics. Our findings suggest that very few countries meet the definition of aid orphan and fewer still raise the concerns collectively expressed about the orphan phenomenon. We conclude by suggesting researchers and practitioners abandon the orphan metaphor and instead focus on issues of equitable aid allocation.
This paper examines Western countries' pressure – or lack thereof – for peace, justice and democracy in Kenya. It analyzes the period since the 2008 National Accord, which defused the 2007–08 post-election crisis, focusing on the lead-up... more
This paper examines Western countries' pressure – or lack thereof – for peace, justice and democracy in Kenya. It analyzes the period since the 2008 National Accord, which defused the 2007–08 post-election crisis, focusing on the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2013 elections. The paper draws extensively on interviews conducted in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2013 with Western officials based in Nairobi, as well as informed Kenyans. It argues, first, that recent Western pressure is the latest iteration of a consistent pattern of donors not enforcing stated conditions for future support, causing diminishing returns. Second, donors not only have been reluctant to use potential leverage over the Kenyan government, but also have consistently underestimated it and erred by publicly threatening to use it only at the least strategic moment and not when it could have been most effective. Third, Western officials have continued to make short-term decisions favoring stability or peace that actually undermine basic principles of democracy and justice.
Since the late 1990s, a new norm has emerged among Western aid donors: recipient country concentration. The fragmentation of a donor’s foreign aid across too many recipient countries is widely believed to be detrimental to aid... more
Since the late 1990s, a new norm has emerged among Western aid donors: recipient country concentration. The fragmentation of a donor’s foreign aid across too many recipient countries is widely believed to be detrimental to aid effectiveness. This article explores the origins of the norm and assesses the extent to which country concentration can be expected to improve aid effectiveness. It also examines 23 donors’ actual record of country concentration, which does not reflect their rhetoric. Though the paper provides some potential explanations for donors’ behaviour, their collective failure to implement country concentration has very little consequence in theory or in practice. Attention would be better spent on identifying and putting into practice other ways of improving aid effectiveness.
This article examines the demand for criminal accountability for the atrocities committed after Kenya's contested December 2007 elections. It explains why, despite strong popular desire for accountability through prosecutions and the... more
This article examines the demand for criminal accountability for the atrocities committed after Kenya's contested December 2007 elections. It explains why, despite strong popular desire for accountability through prosecutions and the threat of and actual International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement, the government has failed to take concrete steps to try those believed primarily responsible. The article argues that the fundamental reason why the government has not initiated systematic prosecutions in regular domestic courts – or created, as promised, a hybrid national/international tribunal – is that those in charge of establishing these processes are, in many cases, those whom it would prosecute or their close allies. A hybrid tribunal now seems unlikely and credible national trials are an improbable alternative, though there are some reasons to be more optimistic following the new constitution of 2010. For the time being only international justice, which is beyond the government's reach, can achieve a breakthrough in criminal accountability, albeit in a very limited way.
Following contested elections in late 2007, Kenya experienced brief but significant violence. International pressure and diplomacy led to a coalition government, and a commission of inquiry recommended the creation of an internationalized... more
Following contested elections in late 2007, Kenya experienced brief but significant violence. International pressure and diplomacy led to a coalition government, and a commission of inquiry recommended the creation of an internationalized criminal tribunal or International Criminal Court (ICC) involvement, should a tribunal not be created. The government of Kenya both promised to create a hybrid tribunal and to cooperate with the ICC, yet has arguably done neither, engaging in delaying tactics for about a year before the prosecutor requested approval to open an investigation. The specific situation presented by Kenya requires careful analysis of two key principles of admissibility in the Rome Statute, gravity and complementarity. This article, based on fieldwork and interviews in Kenya and in The Hague and on judicial decisions and prosecutorial policy documents, examines the treatment of these to date, emphasizing the use and abuse of the concept of positive complementarity.
La Cour pénale internationale (CPI) a autorisé, en 2010, l’ouverture d’une enquête officielle sur les violences qui ont ravagé le Kenya à la suite des élections présidentielles de 2007. C’est la première fois dans le pays que les... more
La Cour pénale internationale (CPI) a autorisé, en 2010, l’ouverture d’une enquête officielle sur les violences qui ont ravagé le Kenya à la suite des élections présidentielles de 2007. C’est la première fois dans le pays que les principaux responsables de violences électorales qui sévissent depuis 1990 sont poursuivis de manière crédible par une instance judiciaire. La CPI apparaît pour le Kenya comme le seul espoir de rompre avec la complète impunité qui caractérise le pays, ce qui constituerait une contribution sans précédent. Néanmoins, au-delà de la condamnation d’un nombre restreint d’individus, un grand nombre d’attentes se révèlent irréalistes.
Most sub-Saharan African countries are neither liberal democracies, nor fully authoritarian. Officials from Western governments that provide assistance to these 'hybrid regimes' often become apologists for their lack of democracy. Rather... more
Most sub-Saharan African countries are neither liberal democracies, nor fully authoritarian. Officials from Western governments that provide assistance to these 'hybrid regimes' often become apologists for their lack of democracy. Rather than cogently arguing why democracy promotion activities should not be a priority, such donor officials frequently claim either that their host country is more democratic than it actually is, or that it could not be any more democratic for the time being.
Abstract This contribution analyses Western governments' responses to the 2008 Kenyan crisis. It argues that while donors' reactions to the crisis were a vast improvement over their responses to previous elections and eruptions of... more
Abstract This contribution analyses Western governments' responses to the 2008 Kenyan crisis. It argues that while donors' reactions to the crisis were a vast improvement over their responses to previous elections and eruptions of political violence, they failed to learn some important lessons from the past and take a more proactive role in preventing violence, notably because they disregarded key governance problems that made violence easily imaginable, if not utterly predictable.
This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the ‘credible commitment’... more
This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the ‘credible commitment’ problem. By examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it demonstrates how ‘soft’ guarantees — in these cases, on the integration of armed forces and access to financial and material resources for rebel leaders — can help end civil wars. The non-binding nature of these pledges, however, also facilitated the ruling parties’ progressive withdrawal from them, which has set back the democratisation process in both countries. This in turn may put at risk future peace and development.
This article focuses on four sub-Saharan countries that offer different insights into postcolonial democratic experiences on the continent. Botswana has enjoyed decades of uninterrupted multiparty politics (but single-party rule) under a... more
This article focuses on four sub-Saharan countries that offer different insights into postcolonial democratic experiences on the continent. Botswana has enjoyed decades of uninterrupted multiparty politics (but single-party rule) under a political system that mixes Western-style liberal democracy with traditional top-down structures. Benin has democratised rapidly and relatively successfully after a long period of dictatorial rule, providing a transition model for several other African countries.
Analysis of Canada's International Policy Statement as a blueprint for radically improving the work of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The overarching objective and motivation of the Statement's chapter on... more
Analysis of Canada's International Policy Statement as a blueprint for radically improving the work of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The overarching objective and motivation of the Statement's chapter on development—improving aid delivery, not only to combat poverty abroad, but also to serve Canadian interests, including the provision for Canada of a more prominent role in international affairs—is examined.
The disappointing results of international democratisation efforts are often attributed to domestic conditions that make it difficult for democracy to be established or survive. This paper recognises that the process is largely an... more
The disappointing results of international democratisation efforts are often attributed to domestic conditions that make it difficult for democracy to be established or survive. This paper recognises that the process is largely an endogenous one and that significant structural impediments exist. It argues that international actors, though for the most part absent from current theories of democratisation, can nonetheless play a very important role in promoting (or preventing) democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa.
This article revisits the causes of Malawi’s “model” transition to multipartyism (1992-94) and examines how the process subsequently influenced the country’s political life. It argues that foreign aid donors played a crucial role in the... more
This article revisits the causes of Malawi’s “model” transition to multipartyism (1992-94) and examines how the process subsequently influenced the country’s political life. It argues that foreign aid donors played a crucial role in the timing and relative smoothness of the transition, but that their centrality at that key moment undermined the subsequent ability of domestic actors to defend the gains made, let alone press for further democratisation. Democratic governance visibly deteriorated between 1994 and 2004. The presidency remained overly powerful and insufficiently accountable and no other actors — other branches of government, opposition political parties, or civil society organisations — were able to check the executive’s abuses, other than in rare instances of church-led political mobilisation. Though external donors were reluctant to assume that role, they are essential players to defend and promote democratisation in Malawi.
In their seminal text Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986: 6) define a transition as “the interval between one political system and another”. According to the authors, the beginning and... more
In their seminal text Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986: 6) define a transition as “the interval between one political system and another”. According to the authors, the beginning and end of this process are relatively easy to trace. The transition begins with a split in the authoritarian regime, after which regime elites who believe in the necessity of electoral legitimation become dominant.
This article argues that prior accounts of Moi and KANU's re-election in Kenya's 1992 and 1997 polls overemphasise divisions within the opposition and underestimate the role of international actors. Drawing on interviews with central... more
This article argues that prior accounts of Moi and KANU's re-election in Kenya's 1992 and 1997 polls overemphasise divisions within the opposition and underestimate the role of international actors. Drawing on interviews with central players and internal donor documents, the author demonstrates that aid donors played a central part not only in initially advancing the cause of multipartyism but subsequently also, on several occasions, actively impeding further democratisation.
For 30 years,“Life President” Hastings Kamuzu Banda held an iron grip on Malawi. No one could have predicted that within a short period of time, between 1992 and 1994, the brutal dictatorship would peacefully transfer power to a... more
For 30 years,“Life President” Hastings Kamuzu Banda held an iron grip on Malawi. No one could have predicted that within a short period of time, between 1992 and 1994, the brutal dictatorship would peacefully transfer power to a democratically elected opposition party in a process often hailed as a model democratic transition. Yet despite the remarkable initial success, there has been very little progress since President Bakili Muluzi and the United Democratic Front (UDF) assumed power.
Edited by Katherine A.H. Graham and Allan M. Maslove. Ottawa: Carleton University.
The link between elections and violence in Kenya is quite different from most other countries examined in this book. In most cases, from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, post-conflict elections are an integral... more
The link between elections and violence in Kenya is quite different from most other countries examined in this book. In most cases, from Afghanistan to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, post-conflict elections are an integral part of a peace process that is meant to end conflict and usher in an era of stability.
The new millennium brought significant changes to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). After almost a decade of decline, Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) rapidly rose from C $2.6 billion in 2000-01 to C $4.1... more
The new millennium brought significant changes to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). After almost a decade of decline, Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) rapidly rose from C $2.6 billion in 2000-01 to C $4.1 billion in 2004-05 (Canada 2006b, 1). 1 This dramatic budget increase, not seen since the early 1980s, provided CIDA with the financial means to improve not only quantitatively but qualitatively.
Since 1990, Kenya has experienced a marked decay in human security, from ballooning petty crime to the advent of ethnic cleansing. The local and international press often mentions the phenomenon of 'rising… crime and insecurity'(Africa... more
Since 1990, Kenya has experienced a marked decay in human security, from ballooning petty crime to the advent of ethnic cleansing. The local and international press often mentions the phenomenon of 'rising… crime and insecurity'(Africa Confidential, 11 January 2002). This chapter seeks to explain this unfortunate trend through the lens of the new regionalism/regionalisms approach (NRA) under consideration in this volume.
Since 1991, approximately 2,000 Kenyans have been killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes in a series of violent incidents. While the commonly used term “ethnic clashes” suggests reciprocal conflict based on “tribal”... more
Since 1991, approximately 2,000 Kenyans have been killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes in a series of violent incidents. While the commonly used term “ethnic clashes” suggests reciprocal conflict based on “tribal” animosity, it belies the overall one-sided source of the violence.
This article reviews Keith Spicer’s 1966 book on Canada’s foreign aid program, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada’s Foreign Policy. Spicer’s essentially realist perspective on the reasons why Canada did and should provide... more
This article reviews Keith Spicer’s 1966 book on Canada’s foreign aid program, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada’s Foreign Policy. Spicer’s essentially realist perspective on the reasons why Canada did and should provide development assistance is not only inconsistent with more recent views that justify aid at least in part on humanitarian grounds; it is also difficult to support even from the evidence he presents. The article concludes by comparing Spicer’s views with recent developments in Canadian foreign aid policy, suggesting that Spicer might well approve of the self-interested nature of current policy—but that he would be unlikely to embrace the narrow, short-term perspectives that underpin it, which could hurt Canada’s standing internationally.
On June 17 and 18, 2008, The North-South Institute1 held a conference in Ottawa entitled Does aid work? Can it work better? Crucial questions on the road to Accra and Doha. Participants from around the globe analyzed how to improve the... more
On June 17 and 18, 2008, The North-South Institute1 held a conference in Ottawa entitled Does aid work? Can it work better? Crucial questions on the road to Accra and Doha. Participants from around the globe analyzed how to improve the impact and effectiveness of foreign aid, within the broader context of development cooperation and financing.

These issues are particularly timely in the lead up to two international meetings that are expected to have a major policy impact: the Accra High-Level Forum on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (to be held in Ghana in September 2008) and the Doha Review Conference on Financing for Development (Qatar, November 2008).

This policy note draws on key findings from the conference to analyze some of the challenges associated with improving aid effectiveness and impact. It makes a number of policy recommendations, directed particularly at donors.
Research Interests:
Reposted on the blog of the Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, September 5, 2018, https://www.cips-cepi.ca/2018/09/05/the-oda-accountability-act-at-ten-time-for-an-update/.
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For this final entry, we consider the edited book experience from a contributing author’s point of view… What follows is advice from Stephen Brown, a professor of political science at the University of Ottawa.
The Canadian government has been lauded for its efforts to increase the transparency of its foreign aid. Still, questions remain about the depth of transparency on Canadian aid and about the accessibility of the information on offer.
Research Interests:
In 2013, when Canada abolished CIDA, its stand-alone aid agency, and integrated the agency’s work into the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD, now Global Affairs Canada), the government argued that the... more
In 2013, when Canada abolished CIDA, its stand-alone aid agency, and integrated the agency’s work into the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD, now Global Affairs Canada), the government argued that the expanded mandate would “improve foreign policy coherence and boost the impact that foreign aid and development work can have on less-developed countries”. That sounded promising. In fact, though, there has been very little evidence of policy coherence for development over these past three years.
Research Interests:
Expectations were low, but the federal budget released on March 22 provides little concrete encouragement in the area of international development.
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Blog entry, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, March 16, 2016 • Published in French as « La migration, une menace à l’aide au développement ? ». Blogue Un seul monde, Huffington Post Québec, March 14, 2016.
Research Interests:
How commercial gain came to replace poverty reduction as the primary goal of Canadian foreign aid.
Blog, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, January 11, 2015
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Blogue Un seul monde, Huffington Post Québec, 8 janvier 2015
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This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the 'credible commitment'... more
This article analyses how alternative power-sharing mechanisms can be used to secure peace in countries where warring parties fail to reach a traditional power-sharing agreement, the most common method of solving the 'credible commitment' problem. By examining the cases of Angola and Mozambique, it demonstrates how 'soft' guarantees — in these cases, on the integration of armed forces and access to financial and material resources for rebel leaders — can help end civil wars. The non-binding nature of these pledges, however, also facilitated the ruling parties' progressive withdrawal from them, which has set back the democratisation process in both countries. This in turn may put at risk future peace and development.
Abstract: The International Criminal Court (ICC) provides the most promising, and potentially only, venue for accountability for those most responsible for serious post-election violence in Kenya.• International scrutiny, specifically the... more
Abstract: The International Criminal Court (ICC) provides the most promising, and potentially only, venue for accountability for those most responsible for serious post-election violence in Kenya.• International scrutiny, specifically the involvement of Kofi Annan and diplomatic pressure, sought to promote a resolution to violence and gave weight to the recommendations of a domestic commission of inquiry, but were unable to ensure domestic or hybrid accountability proceedings.• The ICC is expected by many in Kenya and beyond ...