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... Wilfrid Hodges, Department of Mathematics, Queen Mary, University of London, w. hodges@ qmul. ... Sandu, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki; Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne, gabriel. ... author volume, that is, a... more
... Wilfrid Hodges, Department of Mathematics, Queen Mary, University of London, w. hodges@ qmul. ... Sandu, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki; Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne, gabriel. ... author volume, that is, a balanced whole without serious gaps or overlaps. ...
ion or precision ought to be carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in... more
ion or precision ought to be carefully distinguished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed discrimination and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the senses of terms, and only draws a distinction in meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of the association of images. It is the consciousness of one thing, without the necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other. (ibid.) Peirce's concept of precision, which supposes a greater separation than discrimination, but a less separation than dissociation, is a methodological concept. For example, we
In his classic work on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1960) Erik Stenius described Wittgenstein’s study as a critique of pure language, thus pointing to a connection between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Kant’s critique of pure reason. Besides... more
In his classic work on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1960) Erik Stenius described Wittgenstein’s study as a critique of pure language, thus pointing to a connection between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Kant’s critique of pure reason. Besides similarities, there also seems be important differences between the two philosophers. In Kant’s critique, one discerns a subject who does something, namely, constructs the world of experience, while Wittgenstein draws a picture in which neither an agent nor an act is visible. Like Kant and Wittgenstein, contemporary normative theories of assertion are also interested in limits, although in limits set to assertions. They appear to pay special attention to the one who asserts and to the act of asserting. This paper is an effort to search for the traces of normative theories of assertion in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus by focusing on the one who uses language and on the limits of that use. It is shown that both in Wittgenstein and in normative theories of...
There are several similarities between Robert B. Brandom's and the later Wittgenstein's views on linguistic meaning. Like Wittgenstein, Brandom rejects representationalism and takes linguistic practices to be the basis where all... more
There are several similarities between Robert B. Brandom's and the later Wittgenstein's views on linguistic meaning. Like Wittgenstein, Brandom rejects representationalism and takes linguistic practices to be the basis where all meaning rests. His inferentialism is a holistic view, already envisaged by Frege. The idea of a language game connects Brandom to Wittgenstein, although Wittgenstein's idea has also been developed in various other directions. However, unlike Wittgenstein, Brandom pays special attention to the game of giving and asking for reasons. This difference already suggests that Brandom has a strong ethical overtone in his philosophy of language. For Wittgenstein, normativity seems to be normativity of language, while for Brandom it is basically normativity of actions for which persons are responsible. Brandom's philosophy, which is loaded with deontic vocabulary, is a philosophy of human encounters. The present paper studies this very aspect of Brandom...
describes Euclid’s procedure in proving theorems. Euclid first presents his theorem in general terms and then translates it into singular terms. Peirce pays attention to the fact that the generality of the statement is not lost by that... more
describes Euclid’s procedure in proving theorems. Euclid first presents his theorem in general terms and then translates it into singular terms. Peirce pays attention to the fact that the generality of the statement is not lost by that move. The next step is construction, which is followed by demonstration. Finally the ergo-sentence repeats the original general proposition. Peirce lays much emphasis on the distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning in geometry. He takes an argument to be corollarial if no auxiliary construction is needed. For Peirce, construction is “the principal theoric step ” of the demonstration. Peirce also stresses that it is the observation of diagrams that is essential to all reasoning and that even if no auxiliary constructions are made, there is always the step from a general to a singular statement in deductive reasoning; that means introducing a kind of diagram to reasoning. This paper seeks to argue for two theses. One is that the way of ...
the origin of movement is also the origin of ruling and directing Herakleitos Feelings are nothing, nor are ideas, everything lies in motility from which, like the rest, humanity has taken
In his paper “Explanation of Curiosity the First” (1908) Charles Peirce describes Euclid’s procedure in proving theorems. Euclid first presents his theorem in general terms and then translates it into singular terms. Peirce pays attention... more
In his paper “Explanation of Curiosity the First” (1908) Charles Peirce describes Euclid’s procedure in proving theorems. Euclid first presents his theorem in general terms and then translates it into singular terms. Peirce pays attention to the fact that the generality of the statement is not lost by that move. The next step is construction, which is followed by demonstration. Finally the ergo-sentence repeats the original general proposition. Peirce lays much emphasis on the distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning in geometry. He takes an argument to be corollarial if no auxiliary construction is needed. For Peirce, construction is “the principal theoric step” of the demonstration. Peirce also stresses that it is the observation of diagrams that is essential to all reasoning and that even if no auxiliary constructions are made, there is always the step from a general to a singular statement in deductive reasoning; that means introducing a kind of diagram to reaso...
Otsikon sanoihin ”tiede”, ”totuus” ja ”viisaus” kiteytyy Ilkka Niiniluodon filosofian keskeisia teemoja. Niiniluoto on koko uransa ajan ollut kiinnostunut tieteesta ja tieteellisesta maailmankatsomuksesta. Hanelle tiede on paras tapa... more
Otsikon sanoihin ”tiede”, ”totuus” ja ”viisaus” kiteytyy Ilkka Niiniluodon filosofian keskeisia teemoja. Niiniluoto on koko uransa ajan ollut kiinnostunut tieteesta ja tieteellisesta maailmankatsomuksesta. Hanelle tiede on paras tapa muodostaa uskomuksia. Hanet tunnetaan myos loogikkona: han on seka kayttanyt etta kehittanyt formaaleja menetelmia ja myos puolustanut niiden kayttoa filosofiassa. Tassa kirjoituksessa tutkitaan Niiniluodon filosofiakasitysta. Siina tarkastellaan seka sita, mita Niiniluoto on kirjoittanut filosofian tehtavasta, etta sita, kuinka han kaytannossa harjoittaa filosofiaa. Artikkelissa pyritaan selvittamaan, millaisia menetelmia han suosii filosofiassa, mika on hanen suhteensa filosofian historiaan ja filosofian koulukuntiin ja kuinka han nakee filosofian ja erityistieteiden suhteet seka logiikan ja metafysiikan paikan filosofiassa. Niiniluodolle filosofia on myos elamantaitoa. Hanen filosofiakasityksensa ei ole muuttunut jyrkasti vuosien kuluessa, vaikka pie...
Introduction. Part I: Husserl and Frege: a Contribution to Elucidating the Origins of Phenomenological Philosophy D. Follesdal. Part II: The Criticism of Husserl's Argument against Psychologism in German Philosophy 1901--1920 M.... more
Introduction. Part I: Husserl and Frege: a Contribution to Elucidating the Origins of Phenomenological Philosophy D. Follesdal. Part II: The Criticism of Husserl's Argument against Psychologism in German Philosophy 1901--1920 M. Kusch. The Philosophy of Arithmetic: Frege and Husserl R. Tieszen. Husserl and Frege on Substitutivity C.O. Hill. Husserl's 'Logic of Truth' J.N. Mohanty. Part III: Husserl's Theory of Meaning and Reference B. Smith. Reference, Experience, and Intentionality D. Bell. Intentionality, Intuition and the Computational Theory of Mind L. Haaparanta. The Integrity of the Mental Act: Husserlian Reflections on a Fregian Problem D. Willard. Index of Names. Index of Subjects.
... He was known as a central representative of the phenomenological tradition in Finland. It is peculiar to Finnish phenomenol-ogy that it was precisely Krohn who was understood as an authoritative figure in phenomenology. ...
... BARBARA ABBOTT LEILA HAAPARANTA and JAAKKO HINTIKKA. General introduction. ... 31-45. Also in Selected essays, by Jean van Heijenoort, History of logic, no. 3, Bibliopolis, Naples 1985, pp. 85-97. HANS SLUGA. Semantic content and... more
... BARBARA ABBOTT LEILA HAAPARANTA and JAAKKO HINTIKKA. General introduction. ... 31-45. Also in Selected essays, by Jean van Heijenoort, History of logic, no. 3, Bibliopolis, Naples 1985, pp. 85-97. HANS SLUGA. Semantic content and cognitive sense. Ibid., pp. 47-64. ...
Ilkka Niiniluoto: Philosophy in Finland—the Cultural Setting 11 Edward Westermarck: Normative and Psychological Ethics 43 Eino Kaila: On Scientific and Metaphysical Explanation of Reality (1926) 49 Eino Kaila: On the Method of Philosophy.... more
Ilkka Niiniluoto: Philosophy in Finland—the Cultural Setting 11 Edward Westermarck: Normative and Psychological Ethics 43 Eino Kaila: On Scientific and Metaphysical Explanation of Reality (1926) 49 Eino Kaila: On the Method of Philosophy. Extracts from a ...
... Our original motive is also to be blamed according to the moral ¡deal of the moral ... out of the problem he sees in deontological theories, amounts to defining the concept of moral ... giving us new concepts of the good and the... more
... Our original motive is also to be blamed according to the moral ¡deal of the moral ... out of the problem he sees in deontological theories, amounts to defining the concept of moral ... giving us new concepts of the good and the evil.10 Nietzsche's superman (Übermensch) is precisely ...
This paper deals with two opposite metaphilosophical doctrines concerning the nature of philosophy. More specifically, it is a study of the naturalistic view that philosophical, hence also epistemological, knowledge cannot be... more
This paper deals with two opposite metaphilosophical doctrines concerning the nature of philosophy. More specifically, it is a study of the naturalistic view that philosophical, hence also epistemological, knowledge cannot be distinguished from empirical knowledge, and of the antinaturalistic view that philosophical, hence also epistemological, knowledge, is pure, that is, independent of empirical knowledge and particularly of the special sciences. The conditions of the possibility of naturalistic and of pure epistemology are studied in terms of phenomenological philosophy. It is concluded that pure epistemology is possible under relatively strong conditions but that the version of naturalistic epistemology which denies the pure basis leads to contradiction. That, however, does not shake the possibility of cognitive science. Following Husserl, we may argue that studies of human cognition are possible on the condition that a first basis is assumed which is not naturalized.
The concept of objectivity is becoming increasingly central to discussions of philosophical and social-scientific pragmatism. However, the notion has received widely divergent treatments from key figures in the pragmatist tradition as... more
The concept of objectivity is becoming increasingly central to discussions of philosophical and social-scientific pragmatism. However, the notion has received widely divergent treatments from key figures in the pragmatist tradition as well as from leading present-day pragmatists. Arguably, there is no single or well-defined pragmatist concept of objectivity employed in these debates.

Pragmatists have both criticised and defended the ideal of objectivity. Following Donald Davidson’s lead, Richard Rorty controversially argued that objective truth amounts to an unfathomable ideal, which consequently cannot be the aim of our inquiries, and suggested that the ideal of objectivity should be replaced with ‘solidarity’ and ‘consensus’.

In contrast, Hilary Putnam has defended the view that value statements can achieve objectivity, understood in opposition to the merely subjective (or merely idiosyncratic). Others, such as contemporary Peirceans, have attempted to formulate views of objectivity that would escape the threats of relativism while still defending a notion of truth that evades the difficulties of the traditional correspondence account.

Pragmatists have actively explored new ways of conceptualising objectivity. Several contemporary pragmatists have defended an understanding of objectivity that is inherently connected to our practices of communication and judgment.

For example, Huw Price has argued that in many of our assertoric practices, the function of ‘truth’ is to point towards a standard of opinion beyond one’s current stance, inviting disagreement from others. In a broadly similar vein, Robert Brandom’s ambitious inferentialist semantics strives to make the connection between objectivity and communicative commitments explicit.

Some current pragmatists, such as Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, have argued that the pragmatist perspective on truth and the objectivity of inquiry has tangible implications for social decision- making and public practices. Interpreted along such lines, the pragmatic approach to objectivity is intrinsically linked to fundamental questions in the philosophy of the social sciences.

This one-day workshop explores different dimensions of the concept of objectivity from the point of view of the pragmatist tradition and present-day pragmatism. Key questions to be discussed include:

How have central figures of the history of pragmatist philosophy conceptualised objectivity?
What notions of objectivity are available to contemporary pragmatists? What criteria should we use in evaluating them?
Can we formulate a conception of pragmatic objectivity which escapes objectivism without lapsing into relativism?
What is the connection between objectivity, consensus and convergence? Can a pragmatist approach to objectivity accommodate pluralism?
Is objectivity inherently connected to our communicative practices?
What role, if any, can a distinctly pragmatist concept of objectivity play in the social sciences?
Would the adoption of a pragmatic approach to objectivity make a genuine difference in our public life, such as our media practices and the procedures of political decision-making?
Venue

The workshop is organized at department of social research at the University of Helsinki, 23 May 2013. The workshop sessions take place at Unioninkatu 37, lecture room 4.

The organizers of the conference are the project Pragmatic Objectivity, with funding from the Helsingin Sanomat Foundation, the University of Helsinki, and the Nordic Pragmatism Network with funding from NordForsk.

Workshop participants include Chiara Ambrosio (UCL), Mats Bergman (Helsinki), Leila Haaparanta (Tampere), David Hildebrand (Denver), Brendan Hogan (NYU), Christopher Hookway (Sheffield), Erkki Kilpinen (Helsinki), Aki Petteri Lehtinen (Helsinki), Sami Pihlström (Helsinki) and Henrik Rydenfelt (Helsinki).
Research Interests:
This paper focuses on the connection between inferentialist philosophy and inferentialism in the epistemology of testimony. In contemporary epistemology there is a debate between inferentialists and anti-inferentialists; inferentialists... more
This paper focuses on the connection between inferentialist philosophy and inferentialism in the epistemology of testimony. In contemporary epistemology there is a debate between inferentialists and anti-inferentialists; inferentialists argue that the adoption of a testimonial belief is the result of an inferential process in which the premises include beliefs about the testifier's trustworthiness. This paper defends the view that if assertions are testimonies, the best candidate for a theory of assertion is a normative theory, particularly a theory held by inferentialist philosophers in which assertions come with certain commitments. A Brandomian inferentialist need not be an inferentialist in the epistemology of testimony, who has a skeptical attitude and who searches for inferential justification for the testifier's competence or sincerity in order to believe what the speaker claims. However, this paper argues that the normative attitude emphasized by Robert Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin and the evaluative attitude towards the testifier are related. By utilizing Gottlob Frege's and W.V. Quine's semantic views, it elaborates the idea that the adoption of a testimonial belief involves the recipient's seeing the testifier as a certain kind of person; still, the evaluative attitude towards the testifier need not generate an explicit premise into the inferential chain.