- Ghent University, Centre for Conflict and Development Studies, Post-DocThe University of Sheffield, Politics, Faculty MemberUniversity of Sussex, Department of International Relations, Faculty Memberadd
- Judith Verweijen is an Assistant Professor in Political Geography at the Department of Human Geography and Planning a... moreJudith Verweijen is an Assistant Professor in Political Geography at the Department of Human Geography and Planning at Utrecht University. Her work is situated at the intersection of conflict studies, political ecology, and political geography. She examines the socio-political and socio-spatial dimensions of processes of militarization, the interplay between armed and social mobilization, and the micro dynamics of violence in areas of protracted armed violence, zooming in on conflicts around natural resources. She focuses on eastern DRC, where she has conducted intermittent fieldwork since 2010.edit
Around the world, many conservation officials and park rangers work courageously and with significant personal risk to protect biodiversity. Despite this, we argue, there are considerable differences between rangers on the one hand and... more
Around the world, many conservation officials and park rangers work courageously and with significant personal risk to protect biodiversity. Despite this, we argue, there are considerable differences between rangers on the one hand and environmental and land defenders on the other, in terms of their occupational role, social embeddedness and position, and the nature of their work. Rangers’ occupational role as state officials, or employees of state-mandated organisations, and sometimes as arms-bearing law enforcement agents, sets them apart from environmental defenders. The latter are often indigenous peoples, community-based organisations and civil society groups, who in many contexts dispute the state, its policies and laws, and particular state officials. Their objects of contestation include laws and policies to protect biodiversity, which people living in and around protected areas may perceive to be at odds with their land and socio-economic rights. Furthermore, rangers’ mandated use of force, for instance, to carry out evictions, sits uneasy with the emphasis placed on “peaceful action” in mainstream definitions of environmental defenders. In addition, rangers are often locally perceived to have a different social position than environmental defenders. Finally, because of the distinct nature of their work and position, rangers and environmental defenders have different protection needs. We therefore suggest conceptualising rangers as a group apart from “environmental defenders''. This has important policy implications, as it allows for addressing the challenges faced by each group through distinct mechanisms and frameworks. Ultimately, this will enhance the protection of both rangers and environmental and land defenders.
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Geographers engaging with policy debates on armed conflict in the Global South are confronted with a set of difficult questions that have no satisfying answers. In this provocation, I discuss three risks that appear inherent to policy... more
Geographers engaging with policy debates on armed conflict in the Global South are confronted with a set of difficult questions that have no satisfying answers. In this provocation, I discuss three risks that appear inherent to policy engagement in this domain: the first is contributing to reproducing rather than upending a deeply unjust and unequal world order; the second is reinforcing colonial structures and epistemologies; and the third is facilitating the weaponization of one’s research. The discomforting confrontation with these dilemmas should not deter geographers of armed conflict from contributing to public policy, because non-engagement can be equally – if not more – problematic.
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This article uses the concept of the ‘infrastructural frontier’ to trace the linkages between externally financed road building projects and the constitution of eastern DR Congo as a liminal political space at the material edge of the... more
This article uses the concept of the ‘infrastructural frontier’ to trace the linkages between externally financed road building
projects and the constitution of eastern DR Congo as a liminal political space at the material edge of the state. This frontier
space has two core features: first, the patchy quality of its road infrastructure, which is perpetually rebuilt only to
disintegrate again. Second, the transient nature of configurations of authority and control, leading to ‘circulation struggles’
along roads that are never fully functional. These features contribute to the collapse of a clear-cut dichotomy between the
presence and the absence of transport infrastructure, but also between spaces of control and spaces of resistance. The
constitution of eastern Congo as an infrastructural frontier, we argue, is importantly related to its ‘subversive soils’,
whose clayish, sticky substance accelerates road degradation and compounds power projection. The resulting patchiness of
both durable road infrastructure and central state control generates a ‘frontier effect’: it invites perpetual external donor
interventions to build roads, but these projects never fundamentally upend the infrastructural and political state of
affairs. In fact, as we demonstrate, these projects have become crucial to its very constitution. These observations point to
the dual temporality of eastern Congo’s ‘perpetual’ infrastructural frontier, where the short-term volatility of circulation
struggles is both a product of and reproduces its frontier-ness over the longue dur´ee. Our contribution thus
demonstrates the intricate relations between the temporal, material and political qualities of frontier spaces.
projects and the constitution of eastern DR Congo as a liminal political space at the material edge of the state. This frontier
space has two core features: first, the patchy quality of its road infrastructure, which is perpetually rebuilt only to
disintegrate again. Second, the transient nature of configurations of authority and control, leading to ‘circulation struggles’
along roads that are never fully functional. These features contribute to the collapse of a clear-cut dichotomy between the
presence and the absence of transport infrastructure, but also between spaces of control and spaces of resistance. The
constitution of eastern Congo as an infrastructural frontier, we argue, is importantly related to its ‘subversive soils’,
whose clayish, sticky substance accelerates road degradation and compounds power projection. The resulting patchiness of
both durable road infrastructure and central state control generates a ‘frontier effect’: it invites perpetual external donor
interventions to build roads, but these projects never fundamentally upend the infrastructural and political state of
affairs. In fact, as we demonstrate, these projects have become crucial to its very constitution. These observations point to
the dual temporality of eastern Congo’s ‘perpetual’ infrastructural frontier, where the short-term volatility of circulation
struggles is both a product of and reproduces its frontier-ness over the longue dur´ee. Our contribution thus
demonstrates the intricate relations between the temporal, material and political qualities of frontier spaces.
Research Interests: Government, Political Ecology, Resistance (Social), Local Government and Local Development, Central Africa, and 8 morePolitical Ecology (Anthropology), Democratic Republic of Congo, Infrastructure, Colonial and Postcolonial History of Congo, Authority, Frontier, Road Construction, and Stabilization and Reconstruction
Within segments of the overlapping fields of political ecology and political geography, there is an emerging consensus that direct physical violence is over-studied, and that it cannot be analytically separated from other forms of... more
Within segments of the overlapping fields of political ecology and political geography, there is an emerging consensus that direct physical violence is over-studied, and that it cannot be analytically separated from other forms of violence. This article argues the opposite, namely, that direct physical violence remains understudied, and that analyzing it separately is warranted to grasp its specificities. To corroborate this argument, the article examines the study of green militarization and green violence. Whereas a substantial part of this literature discusses direct physical violence, most studies focus on broader conditions and discourses of violence, without empirically demonstrating how they feed into the production of direct physical violence. Consequently, these studies do not accurately map the entire "kill chain". A case study of violence in Virunga National Park, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, demonstrates the analytical merits of studying direct physical violence through a "microdynamics" approach, implying the detailed study of specific acts of violence and how they were committed. Far from distracting from broader conditions, structures and histories of violence, a microdynamics approach provides an entry point for understanding how these dimensions feed into the production of direct physical violence, and how this violence interacts with other forms of violence. In addition, it allows for a more accurate understanding of how the kill chain is constituted in time and space. The article concludes that acknowledging the particularities of different modalities of violence, instead of conflating them, will significantly advance the study of geographies of violence.
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The expansion of industrial mining in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has sparked social mobilization in gold mining concessions, most of which are important sites for artisanal mining. Congruent with observations on the... more
The expansion of industrial mining in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has sparked social mobilization in gold mining concessions, most of which are important sites for artisanal mining. Congruent with observations on the nature of social movements in Africa, such mobilization is hyper-fragmented and fluid. We ascribe this high degree of fluidity and fragmentation both to factors internal to the social mobilization effort, including limited organizational potential and the heterogeneity of attitudes and discourses, and the political and socioeconomic context, characterized by intense conflicts, patronage-based politics, poverty and repression. Additionally, we identify certain company practices as undermining the sustainability and coherence of social mobilization, in particular: the co-optation of intermediaries and protestors, acquiescence in practices of favoritism, fostering a repressive climate, and token commitment to community participation. We conclude that to understand social mobilization in mining concessions, it is important to study the interplay between political (re)actions 'from above' and 'from below', and to recognize the diversity of these (re)actions, which are located on a wide spectrum between resistance and repression on the one hand, and collaboration and co-optation on the other.
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This article looks at Mai-Mai armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and how their limited inclusion in the country’s peace processes has contributed to their fragmentation and ultimate proliferation. It provides a... more
This article looks at Mai-Mai armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and how their limited inclusion in the country’s peace processes has contributed to their fragmentation and ultimate proliferation. It provides a compelling example of how the disparate and diverse groups and individuals that comprise the Mai-Mai based in the east were included as an ‘umbrella category’ in a national peace process, and that this fostered both internal power competition within the Mai-Mai and ‘a sense of marginalisation’ from the central process, with profound consequences for the sustainability of the peace agreement. The article concludes that the difficult transition that followed reveals how the agreement failed to consolidate peace and has in fact led to remobilisation which continues to this day.
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Drawing on postcolonial theory, this article queries into the ways in which the concepts of militarism/militarization and securitization are applied to 'African' contexts. We highlight the selective nature of such application and probe... more
Drawing on postcolonial theory, this article queries into the ways in which the concepts of militarism/militarization and securitization are applied to 'African' contexts. We highlight the selective nature of such application and probe into the potential reasons for and effects of this selectiveness, focusing on its signifying work. As we argue, the current selective uses of securitization and militarism/militarization in 'Africa' scholarship tend to recreate troublesome distinctions between 'developed' versus 'underdeveloped' spaces within theory and methodology. In particular, they contribute to the reproduction of familiar colonially scripted imagery of a passive and traditional 'Africa', ruled by crude force and somehow devoid of 'liberal' ideas and modes of governing. Yet we do not suggest simply discarding 'selectiveness' or believe that there are any other easy remedies to the tensions between universalism and particularism in theory application. Recognizing the ambivalent workings of colonial discourse, we rather contend that any attempts to trace the colonial into the present use of the concepts of securitization and militarism/militarization need to acknowledge the problematic nature of both discourses of 'African' Otherness and those of universalism and sameness.
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This article analyzes the effects of patronage networks on cohesion in the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It shows that while patronage networks provide support to individual military personnel, they undermine both... more
This article analyzes the effects of patronage networks on cohesion in the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It shows that while patronage networks provide support to individual military personnel, they undermine both peer and commander–subordinate bonding. They promote unequal service conditions and statuses and link these to extra-unit and extra-military forms of social identification, which are further reinforced by soldiers’ living and generating revenue among civilians. Furthermore, they impair meritocracy and frustrate the extent to which commanders live up to their subordinates’ expectations. As they fuel internal conflicts, often around revenue generation, and foster bad service conditions and distrust toward the political and military leadership, patronage networks also undermine institutional cohesion. The article concludes that cohesion formation in the FARDC follows different patterns than in well-institutionalized and well-resourced militaries. Given that cohesion impacts combat performance and norm enforcement, these findings are relevant for defense reform efforts and military cooperation.
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The expansion of industrial mining in the war-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has provoked resistance from those depending directly and indirectly on artisanal mining for their livelihood, and has been faced with violent... more
The expansion of industrial mining in the war-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has provoked resistance from those depending directly and indirectly on artisanal mining for their livelihood, and has been faced with violent actions from politico-military entrepreneurs. By analyzing the interplay between armed and social mobilization against industrial mining in the Fizi–Kabambare region, this paper sheds new light on the relations between industrial mining, resistance and militarization. It argues that the presence and practices of industrial mining companies reinforce the overall power position of politico-military entrepreneurs. This occurs both directly, by efforts to co-opt them, and indirectly, by fuelling dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection that crucially underpin these entrepreneurs' dominance. At the same time, due to the eastern Congo's convoluted political opportunity structure for contentious action, politico-military entrepreneurs enlarge the scope for social mobilization against industrial mining. They offer a potential counterweight to repressive authorities and provide collective action frames that inspire contentious politics. Yet they also harness popular resistance for personal or particularistic purposes, while extorting the very people they claim to defend. These complexities reflect the ambiguous nature and versatility of both armed and social mobilization in the eastern Congo, which transcend socially constructed boundaries like the rural/urban, state/non-state and military/civilian divides.
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This paper analyses the role of cattle in the entwined dynamics of conflict and violence in the Fizi and Itombwe region of South Kivu province, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the one hand, agropastoral conflict... more
This paper analyses the role of cattle in the entwined dynamics of conflict and violence in the Fizi and Itombwe region of South Kivu province, in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the one hand, agropastoral conflict intensifies armed mobilisation, allowing armed groups to draw upon particular conflict narratives that generate popular and elite support. It also creates incentives for armed actors to engage in cattle-looting, or the defense against it, for both symbolic and material reasons. On the other hand, the presence of armed forces and the use of violence profoundly shape agropastoral conflicts. Importantly, they change the perceived stakes of these conflicts, and hamper their resolution. By showing that the relations between cattle-related conflict and armed activity are indirect, complex and mutual, the paper refines both theories on agropastoral conflict and those highlighting the role of local conflicts in fuelling violence in the eastern Congo.
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The literature on peacekeeping has paid scant attention to the interaction between peacekeeping troops and host country military. Addressing this gap in scholarly knowledge, this paper conceptualizes such interaction as ‘diagonal... more
The literature on peacekeeping has paid scant attention to the interaction between peacekeeping troops and host country military. Addressing this gap in scholarly knowledge, this paper conceptualizes such interaction as ‘diagonal interoperability’. The latter is situated in-between ‘horizontal interoperability’ on the one hand, relating to interaction between different components of a peacekeeping mission, and ‘vertical interoperability’ on the other, referring to the relations between international peacekeepers and ‘peace-kept’ populations. The paper focuses on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where UN forces and the Congolese army are engaged in joint military operations and army reform is part of the peacekeeping mission’s mandate. Studying both mutual representations and joint practices, the paper explores the organizational, political, discursive, and security-related factors that shape diagonal interoperability. It concludes that diagonal interoperability between the two forces is weak, as reflected in mutual distrust and ‘not-so joint’ joint operations. Perhaps surprisingly, it finds that shared military identities do not seem to facilitate collaboration. Rather, mutual perceptions of the ‘military Other’ are infused with discourses of cultural and political difference, therefore accentuating the power asymmetries that undermine diagonal interoperability.
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This article explores the links between autochthony discourses and physical violence through a case study of a Mai-Mai group in the eastern DR Congo. While this group garners support by employing such discourses and related tropes of... more
This article explores the links between autochthony discourses and physical violence through a case study of a Mai-Mai group in the eastern DR Congo. While this group garners support by employing such discourses and related tropes of autodéfense (self-defense), there are clear limits to the capacity of these narratives to mobilize for and legitimize violent action. Furthermore, much of the violence committed by the Mai-Mai is not informed directly by notions of autochthony, but is rather geared toward the consolidation of power. This observation should act as a caution against the a priori coding of violence according to the ways it is discursively framed by its protagonists.
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This article analyses the disconcerting phenomenon of 'popular in/justice' , or killings of citizens enacted by other citizens 'in the name of justice'. It studies these practices in the Fizi/Uvira region in the conflict-ridden eastern... more
This article analyses the disconcerting phenomenon of 'popular in/justice' , or killings of citizens enacted by other citizens 'in the name of justice'. It studies these practices in the Fizi/Uvira region in the conflict-ridden eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where they target either suspected criminals or presumed sorcerers. The article locates the causes for this phenomenon in certain transformations of socio-political space, notably the unsettling of customary and politico-administrative authority, dys-functional state-led justice and security services, and the militarisation of local gover-nance. These developments have compounded dispute processing and handling the occult, leading these processes to often turn violent. They also incentivise and enable politically and socioeconomically marginalised yet demographically numerous groups to assert socio-political agency and engage in order-making. The article concludes by arguing that popular in/justice should be seen as an expression of such aspirations to exercise efficacious socio-political agency, thereby constituting a perverse form of democratisation.
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Contrary to dominant approaches that locate the causes for military entrepreneurialism in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo predominantly in criminal military elites, this article highlights the importance of the Congolese... more
Contrary to dominant approaches that locate the causes for military entrepreneurialism in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo predominantly in criminal military elites, this article highlights the importance of the Congolese military's (FARDC) civilian context for understanding military revenue-generation. It analyses how the latter is shaped by structures of domination, signification and legitimisation that drive and are driven by the FARDC's governance, private protection and security practices. It argues that these practices contribute to bestowing a degree of legitimacy on both the FARDC's position of power and some of its revenue-generation activities. Furthermore, by emphasising that the FARDC's regulatory and protection practices are partly the product of popular demands and the routine actions of civilians, the article contends that the causes of military revenue-generation are co-located in the military's civilian environment. In this manner, it offers a more nuanced conceptualisation of military entrepreneurialism, thus opening up new perspectives on policy interventions in this area.
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By unearthing a range of punitive and restorative practices enacted outside the military justice system, this article problematizes dominant representations of “near total impunity” in the Congolese armed forces. It explores the... more
By unearthing a range of punitive and restorative practices enacted outside the military justice system, this article problematizes dominant representations of “near total impunity” in the Congolese armed forces. It explores the mechanisms and logics underlying both “formal” and “informal” justice practices, as well as how these practices are “read” and experienced both by the military and civilians. In particular, it focuses on readings of levels of in/formality and the extent to which practices are seen to “bring justice” and how. This leads to the conclusion that the differences between “formal” and “informal” justice are in many respects more a matter of degree than of nature.
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Drawing on extensive ethnographic field research, this dissertation explores the interaction between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and civilians in the eastern DR Congo’s conflict-ridden Kivu provinces. It uncovers the... more
Drawing on extensive ethnographic field research, this dissertation explores the interaction between the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and civilians in the eastern DR Congo’s conflict-ridden Kivu provinces. It uncovers the multidimensionality, reciprocity and complexities of this interaction, which arise from and give rise to its fundamentally ambiguous character. This ambiguity is both an outcome and an engine of processes of militarization, which entail structural transformations that generate a dominant position for armed actors and lead to the normalization of their involvement in non-military spheres of social life. Militarization has profoundly blurred the social roles and forms of identification surrounding armed actors in the Kivus, causing the boundaries between categories like military/civilian, coercion/persuasion, victim/perpetrator, public authority/private protector, licit/illicit to be porous and constantly shifting.
The study concludes that the continuing dominance of the FARDC in the Kivus is the cumulative result of both civilians’ and the military’s everyday practices, which reproduce the militarized structures of domination, legitimation and signification that underpin the FARDC’s position of power. An important engine of this reproduction are the dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection both within the military and within the Kivus’ social order as a whole. These dynamics lead to a short-term focus that causes civilians and soldiers to engage in practices that sustain the military’s dominance in the long term. Another important element in the reproduction of militarization is the routinization of certain forms of civilian-military interaction. As routine actions draw upon ‘practical consciousness’, routinization hampers the development of awareness among civilians of the effects of their individual practices on the social order as a whole. This shows that militarization is a process that is driven by practices that make sense to individual social agents, but that have outcomes that are disadvantageous at the collective level.
The study concludes that the continuing dominance of the FARDC in the Kivus is the cumulative result of both civilians’ and the military’s everyday practices, which reproduce the militarized structures of domination, legitimation and signification that underpin the FARDC’s position of power. An important engine of this reproduction are the dynamics of conflict, insecurity and protection both within the military and within the Kivus’ social order as a whole. These dynamics lead to a short-term focus that causes civilians and soldiers to engage in practices that sustain the military’s dominance in the long term. Another important element in the reproduction of militarization is the routinization of certain forms of civilian-military interaction. As routine actions draw upon ‘practical consciousness’, routinization hampers the development of awareness among civilians of the effects of their individual practices on the social order as a whole. This shows that militarization is a process that is driven by practices that make sense to individual social agents, but that have outcomes that are disadvantageous at the collective level.
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The Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu Province has been the theatre of ongoing conflicts and violence for over two decades. Patterns and dynamics of conflicts and violence have significantly evolved over time. Historically, conflict dynamics... more
The Ruzizi Plain in South Kivu Province has been the theatre of ongoing
conflicts and violence for over two decades. Patterns and dynamics of conflicts and violence have significantly evolved over time. Historically, conflict dynamics have largely centred on disputed customary authority – often framed in terms of intercommunity conflict. Violence was connected to these conflicts, which generated local security dilemmas. Consequently, armed groups mobilized to defend their community, albeit often at the behest of political and military entrepreneurs with more self-interested motives. At present, however, violence is mostly related to armed groups’ revenue-generation strategies, which involve armed burglary, robbery, assassinations, kidnappings for ransom and cattle-looting. Violence is also significantly nourished by interpersonal conflicts involving debt, family matters, and rivalries. In recent years, regional tensions and the activities of foreign armed groups and forces have become an additional factor of instability. Unfortunately, stabilization interventions have largely overlooked or been unable to address these changing drivers of violence. They have mostly focused on local conflict resolution, with less effort directed at addressing supra-local factors, such as the behaviour of political elites and the national army, and geopolitical tensions between countries in the Great Lakes Region. Future stabilization efforts will need to take these dimensions better into account.
conflicts and violence for over two decades. Patterns and dynamics of conflicts and violence have significantly evolved over time. Historically, conflict dynamics have largely centred on disputed customary authority – often framed in terms of intercommunity conflict. Violence was connected to these conflicts, which generated local security dilemmas. Consequently, armed groups mobilized to defend their community, albeit often at the behest of political and military entrepreneurs with more self-interested motives. At present, however, violence is mostly related to armed groups’ revenue-generation strategies, which involve armed burglary, robbery, assassinations, kidnappings for ransom and cattle-looting. Violence is also significantly nourished by interpersonal conflicts involving debt, family matters, and rivalries. In recent years, regional tensions and the activities of foreign armed groups and forces have become an additional factor of instability. Unfortunately, stabilization interventions have largely overlooked or been unable to address these changing drivers of violence. They have mostly focused on local conflict resolution, with less effort directed at addressing supra-local factors, such as the behaviour of political elites and the national army, and geopolitical tensions between countries in the Great Lakes Region. Future stabilization efforts will need to take these dimensions better into account.
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Over the past two decades, urban violence in the eastern Congo has reached alarming levels. However, it has rarely made it to the forefront of international policy and media attention. Violent cities, Violent Societies analyzes urban... more
Over the past two decades, urban violence in the eastern Congo has reached alarming levels. However, it has rarely made it to the forefront of international policy and media attention. Violent cities, Violent Societies analyzes urban violence through the lens of the acceptability of using violence and the accessibility of violence, or the ease with which violence can be mobilized. The report argues that similar to rural zones, much violence in urban areas is driven by personalized conflict and revenue generation linked to aspirations for social mobility and status. The report shows the analytical inadequacy of deeply ingrained distinctions between political, criminal and personal violence, which importantly shape international interventions in the domains of stabilization, peacebuilding and peacekeeping.
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After more than two decades of ongoing violent conflict, armed groups—however fleeting their existence—have become an integral feature of the eastern Congo’s social-political order. They are not a temporary aberration in what is otherwise... more
After more than two decades of ongoing violent conflict, armed groups—however fleeting their existence—have become an integral feature of the eastern Congo’s social-political order. They are not a temporary aberration in what is otherwise a normal society. They are at the heart of the way power is exercised and experienced. Moreover, armed groups do not stand apart from either society or the state apparatus. They are deeply embedded in social networks that regroup state and non-state actors and that stretch from the very local to the national and sometimes the sub-regional (Great Lakes area) and international levels.
This report analyses the stability, inclusivity and levels of violence of both the political settlement of the Congo as a whole and of political settlements in the conflict-ridden east. It shows that in each of these political arenas, armed groups and violence play a different role, and examines how these arenas mutually influence each other. The relative importance of armed groups as either resources or threats to the power of the presidential patronage network shapes its policies towards the east, such as initiatives for military operations or negotiations. These policies influence the role that armed groups play locally. This role, in turn, shapes to what extent and how national politicians engage with armed groups; for instance, whether they support their mobilization or demobilization.
This report analyses the stability, inclusivity and levels of violence of both the political settlement of the Congo as a whole and of political settlements in the conflict-ridden east. It shows that in each of these political arenas, armed groups and violence play a different role, and examines how these arenas mutually influence each other. The relative importance of armed groups as either resources or threats to the power of the presidential patronage network shapes its policies towards the east, such as initiatives for military operations or negotiations. These policies influence the role that armed groups play locally. This role, in turn, shapes to what extent and how national politicians engage with armed groups; for instance, whether they support their mobilization or demobilization.
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This Usalama Report analyses militarization in Uvira and how it shapes the interplay between local conflicts, governance and armed mobilization. Focussing on the Bafuliiru Chiefdom and the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom, the report examines how... more
This Usalama Report analyses militarization in Uvira and how it shapes the interplay between local conflicts, governance and armed mobilization. Focussing on the Bafuliiru Chiefdom and the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom, the report examines how armed forces influence and are influenced by conflicts related to customary power, security governance and local economic regulation. The presence of so many armed groups in Uvira affects local governance profoundly, in particular because of their links with local authorities. The report argues that in order to sustainably demilitarize Uvira, it is necessary to defuse conflicts related to customary authority, weaken armed groups and their civilian support networks, and improve security management and regulation of local defence forces.
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Scholars conducting ethnographic research in zones with ongoing violent conflict are inevitably faced with the continuous challenge of finding, processing and assessing “security knowledge”. They are confronted with questions such as: who... more
Scholars conducting ethnographic research in zones with ongoing violent conflict are inevitably faced with the continuous challenge of finding, processing and assessing “security knowledge”. They are confronted with questions such as: who do they consider to be “security experts”? How do these “experts” produce knowledge on “the security situation”? And how to cope with contradictory or incredible risk assessments? During the first stages of field research on the microdynamics of civilian- military interaction in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, I frequently consulted foreign security personnel, including UN peacekeepers and other military. This allowed me to discover that those we are socialized into seeing as “security experts” had superficial and at times erroneous readings of security dynamics. Consequently, my understanding of who was a “security expert” and what counts as “security expertise” started to shift. Although initially unsettling, these shifts ultimately enhanced my awareness of how one’s positionality and related biases shape readings of “the security situation”, and how these readings feed into the construction of “security knowledge”.
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De term “Mai Mai” wordt gebruikt als etiket voor een bonte verzameling van kleinschalige, vaak langs etnische lijnen gevormde gewapende groepen in oost Congo. Doorgaans roept de naam associaties op met hekserij, barbarij en... more
De term “Mai Mai” wordt gebruikt als etiket voor een bonte verzameling van kleinschalige, vaak langs etnische lijnen gevormde gewapende groepen in oost Congo. Doorgaans roept de naam associaties op met hekserij, barbarij en irrationaliteit. Mai Mai groepen staan immers bekend om het gebruik van amuletten, tatoeages en spirituele rituelen met water die hen immuun zouden maken tegen kogels. Zulke simplistische voorstellingen vertroebelen ons begrip van Mai Mai milities. Want als de Mai Mai inderdaad zo’n beestachtig en bloeddorstig zooitje zijn, hoe verklaren we dan dat deze groepen op grote schaal in hedendaags oost Congo voorkomen? Hoe komt het dan dat delen van de bevolking toch enige sympathie voor hen hebben? Deze bijdrage poogt Mai Mai milities te demystificeren door middel van een historische en sociologische benadering. Ze legt uit wat Mai Mai groepen eigenlijk precies zijn en geeft een overzicht van hun historische wortels en ontwikkeling. Ook verklaart zij waarom er van de dag nog steeds Mai Mai milities actief zijn. Daar blijkt geen eenduidig antwoord op te zijn, gezien een veelvoud aan historische, sociale en economische factoren een rol spelen.
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More than ten years after the official conclusion of the peace process, more armed groups are operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo than during the two Congo Wars (1996–1997, 1998–2003), their numbers showing a steady increase... more
More than ten years after the official conclusion of the peace process, more armed groups are operating in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo than during the two Congo Wars (1996–1997, 1998–2003), their numbers showing a steady increase over the past few years. However, the nature of armed mobilization is changing. Currently emerging groups (which exist alongside longer-standing insurgencies) are no longer large-scale, foreign-supported rebel movements or broad coalitions of rural-based nationalist self-defense groups, even if their commanders often started their military career in these predecessor armed movements. Rather, they represent a
multitude of locally rooted and small-scale armed groups, some of which count no more than ten to twenty fighters. The strong local rootedness of these smaller- scale armed groups, and the ongoing conflicts and competition between the civilian networks of which they are a part, have created both the incentives and the possibilities for local authorities and other local elites to draw upon armed actors to reinforce their power position. Consequently, as we argue in this chapter, militarized politics has become accessible to a broadening range of actors. Hence, it has become “democratized” in the sense of drawing in more, but lower-level politico-military entrepreneurs, reflecting how violence as a strategy has become more accessible.
multitude of locally rooted and small-scale armed groups, some of which count no more than ten to twenty fighters. The strong local rootedness of these smaller- scale armed groups, and the ongoing conflicts and competition between the civilian networks of which they are a part, have created both the incentives and the possibilities for local authorities and other local elites to draw upon armed actors to reinforce their power position. Consequently, as we argue in this chapter, militarized politics has become accessible to a broadening range of actors. Hence, it has become “democratized” in the sense of drawing in more, but lower-level politico-military entrepreneurs, reflecting how violence as a strategy has become more accessible.
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This chapter analyzes how the electoral and wider political inclusion of ex-belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has contributed to the militarization of its political order in the east. By exploring the post-settlement... more
This chapter analyzes how the electoral and wider political inclusion of ex-belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has contributed to the militarization of its political order in the east. By exploring the post-settlement trajectory of one particular politico-military entrepreneur, Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi, it shows how this inclusion has contributed to ongoing violence. Furthermore, it argues that in comparison to the pre-war order, politico-military entrepreneurs have become more numerous, more independent of the political center, and more active also at lower levels of the power pyramid. As such, the post-settlement order seems to be characterized by a type of “democratization” of the strategy of the pompier-pyromane. This democratization unleashes a dynamic that often acquires a momentum of its own, due to the multiplicity of the involved factions and their complex and ever-changing alliances. As a result, not everyone who divides is still able to rule, and not everyone who ignites is still able to extinguish.
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The lower ranks of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the poorer segments of Congolese society. Small radios and mobile phones, allowing them to listen to music, figure among their most important personal... more
The lower ranks of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the poorer segments of Congolese society. Small radios and mobile phones, allowing them to listen to music, figure among their most important personal belongings. What songs do these troops listen to? What lyrics of the rumba most resonate among them and why? Exploring both soldiers’ narratives on music and the lyrics of their favored songs, this contribution shows that music does not only figure as a fleeting opportunity to hold on to humanity/humanities amidst the dehumanizing conditions of Congolese army life, but also provides a stock of tropes to think about notions of good and bad, success and failure, in a morally convoluted universe. Music at the frontlines is at once a palliative for and a painful reminder of permanent loss, which both alleviates and incites, seduces and cures. As such, its effects on soldiering are as ambiguous as soldiering itself.
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This chapter investigates how dominant framings of the African armed actor as barbaric shaped ethnographic research on the everyday interaction between the military and civilians in the eastern DR Congo’s Kivu provinces. It describes how... more
This chapter investigates how dominant framings of the African armed actor as barbaric shaped ethnographic research on the everyday interaction between the military and civilians in the eastern DR Congo’s Kivu provinces. It describes how these framings impacted on the modalities of research and the collection and interpretation of data. Subsequently, it reflects on how the researcher coped with this “barbarian syndrome”, and how the new media revolution impacted on this process, concluding that only long-term fieldwork and the time-consuming process of learning local languages seem to bear the potential for a more ethical encounter with the Other.
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Semi-industrial mining in and near protected areas in eastern DRC exacerbates violent conflict in three ways: 1) it fosters competition between political-military networks; 2) it creates new, and exacerbates existing, conflicts; and 3) it... more
Semi-industrial mining in and near protected areas in eastern DRC exacerbates violent conflict in three ways: 1) it fosters competition between political-military networks; 2) it creates new, and exacerbates existing, conflicts; and 3) it intensifies popular grievances because of negative social and environmental impacts. In a militarized environment, conflict and competition can spark violence and foster popular support for armed groups. Measures to curb mining in protected areas need to take these different effects on conflict dynamics into consideration. Policymakers and donors need to ensure that such measures do not exacerbate conflict, competition and grievances by 1) fostering broad support for them among different (civilian and military) state agencies and at different administrative levels; 2) anticipating displacement effects; and 3) carefully assessing the impact on local livelihoods.
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After the military defeat of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23, March 23 Movement) rebellion in November 2013, armed mobilization in the eastern DRC has continued at a frightening pace. An initial, much-advertized wave of surrenders did not... more
After the military defeat of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23, March 23 Movement) rebellion in November 2013, armed mobilization in the eastern DRC has continued at a frightening pace. An initial, much-advertized wave of surrenders did not persist, and consisted mostly of individual combatants rather than armed groups as a whole. During the course of 2014, the armed group landscape underwent further fragmentation, as existing groups split and new ones emerged. A recent count identifies more than seventy groups in the Kivu provinces alone. Most of these groups—such as the various Raia Mutomboki and Nyatura factions—are not larger-scale rebel movements. They have a limited, although variable, number of fighters, often less than 300. What explains this proliferation of smaller-scale armed groups in the eastern Congo? What policies have been adopted to address this situation? And finally, what are the implications for efforts towards stabilization and peacebuilding?
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This policy brief looks into the causes of extra-legal ‘popular’ violence, whereby citizens kill other citizens ‘in the name of justice’ in the eastern DR Congo. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, what is commonly called justice... more
This policy brief looks into the causes of extra-legal ‘popular’ violence, whereby citizens kill other citizens ‘in the name of justice’ in the eastern DR Congo. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, what is commonly called justice populaire cannot only be ascribed to the malfunctioning state-led justice and security apparatus. Rather, it relates to a wider crisis of authority resulting in part from the eroding role of customary chiefs, spiritual leaders and elders. Other causes are the high level of social conflicts and the militarisation of society, which render violent responses seemingly adequate solutions to conflicts and other social problems. Additionally, justice populaire provides a way in which groups with limited access to official political channels, in particular the youth, try to assert socio-political agency.