Alexey Gaginsky

In this book, I examine three major topics: Being, the One and God. On the one hand, they might be considered independently, as they are of interest for the respective fields of philosophy; on the other, each chapter is a part of the whole, a step in realizing the book’s plan.
In the first chapter, I consider the concept of Being and the ontological vocabulary of Greek philosophy. The main aim of this chapter is to clarify the difference between Being (τὸ εἶναι) and beings (τὸ ὄν) so called ontological difference, to grasp elusive and unbearable lightness of Being. Historical and philosophical material, which was traditionally used in navigating in the area, though often lead to wrong results, is of a great help. Here I would like to note that the Being is anarithmical, or anarithmological (ἀν-άριθμος), i.e. beyond and without number. Although this does not yet bring us to the solution of the ontological problem, it allows us to see from a new point of view the Neoplatonic henology, which I discuss in the second chapter.
In fact, the doctrine of the One was developed in ancient philosophy in the context of a certain ontological model, which constituted a framework for analyzing Being in terms of ‘one-many’ (ἓν-πολλά), i.e. arithmologically. In the light of the first chapter, it becomes clear that this is an incorrect approach, since Being is neither one nor many. Therefore, I argue that the deconstruction of classical henology is needed. For this purpose, I analyze the relevant texts from Parmenides to Proclus. As a result, I conclude that the One of Neoplatonism is a conceptual idol, whereas a more correct understanding is to consider Being and the One not as two hierarchically different levels, but – as Aristotle did – as the same nature. This statement needs a refinement: Being is transcendent, but the One is immanent (i.e. the first appears as a condition of existence, and the second – as a condition of knowledge).
In the third chapter, I reconstruct the idea of God, which is interpreted in light of Neoplatonic henology and criticism of metaphysics as onto-theology. I believe that the idea of God was reduced to the realm of beings. For this reason, we make such ontological demands, which do not correspond to it. In other words, the idea of God was understood as a conditioned being (οὐσία), which depends on Being. However, as the texts of Christian authors show, the status of God is by no means reduced to the level of ‘one-many’, i. e. beings, but already in the
pre-secular epoch is interpreted as a superior to any statements and negations. This allows us to take seriously the thesis of God’s incomprehensibility and mystery, and helps to prepare the conditions for the experience of the presence of the Divine. Although the last point is the least you can be sure.                               
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Keywords: Being, beings, essence, the One, God, ontological difference, energy, ἐπέκεινα
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Table of contents. 0.1. Acknowledgements... p. 5; 0.2. Foreword... p. 6; 1. Being: Lexicon of ontology: 1.1. Introduction... p. 10; 1.2. Lexicon of Greek ontology... p.13; 1.3. Ontological difference... p. 37; 1.4. The univocity of Being and the many senses of beings... p. 44; 2. One: Deconstruction of henology: 2.1. Introduction... p. 51; 2.2. Pre-Platonism: Being and the One... p. 56; 2.3. Plato: the One and Being ... p. 63; 2.4. Neoplatonism: henology and ontology... p. 81; 3. God: Reconstruction of theology: 3.1. Introduction... p. 118; 3.2. The ontological status of God... p. 121; 3.3. Transformation of the idea of God... p. 142; 3.4. Onto-theology and metaphysics... p. 154; Conclusion... p. 166; Bibliography... p. 173.

Автор стремится показать, что теория трансценденталий имеет не только исторический интерес, но обладает и философским потенциалом. Так, известный логик Я. Воленкий говорит о том, что теория трансценденталий может пролить свет, например, на формальную онтологию. В статье предпринята попытка актуализации трансцендентальной метафизики, показывается ее значимость для современной интеллектуальной культуры, что достигается с помощью противопоставления «трансцендентального мышления» тенденциям нигилизма и филистерства, представленных Ф. Ницше и Л. Толстым. В частности, автор намечает основные контуры теории трансценденталий, после чего рассматривается позиция Ф. Ницше, который связывал наступление нигилизма именно с распадом трансцендентального единства, предполагающим антагонизм истины, добра и красоты. При этом отмечается, что сам Ницше отнюдь не занимается опровержением этого учения, он лишь констатирует окончательный распад трансценденталий. Эстетическое отвращение от хри-стианства — вот едва ли не главная причина появления феномена Фридрих Ницше. Далее показывается, что Л.Н. Толстой, в отличие от Ф. Ницше, принимал ценность добра и истины, однако резко выступал против красоты, как и вообще против единства трансцендентальных понятий, что сближает вели-кого писателя с филистерством. Имя великого писателя и такой едкий эпитет, несомненно, выглядят весьма странно рядом друг с другом, однако так уж сложилось, что Л. Толстой последовательно и осознанно воевал против красоты. Так, если Ницше отрицал все трансценденталии, кроме красоты, то Тол-стой наоборот — признавал истину, единство и особенно благо (добро), отрицая последнюю трансценденталию. Наконец, автор останавливается на фигуре Г.У. фон Бальтазара, который показал значимость красоты не только для этики и эстетики, но и для онтологии, поскольку «свидетельство бытия кажется невероятным тому, кто не воспринимает красоту». Автор полагает, что отсутствие красоты приводит к отказу от добра, отступлению от истины и забвению бытия: этика без красоты превращается в морализатрство, а добро перестает быть притягательным.

The article discusses the Trinitarian controversy of the 4th century, which led to the formation of two theoretical paradigms. The author shows how the views of Arius, Asterius, and the Homoians induced Phoebadius of Agen, Hilary of Poitiers and other Western theologians to posit an identity of essence and properties in God. On the contrary, the spread of the ideas of Aetius and Eunomius led to the fact that the Cappadocians rejected this identity and began to insist on the distinction between essence and properties, rethinking the concept of divine simplicity. A special role in this process was played by St. Athanasius the Great, who can be called an involuntary mediator in the transition from the identity paradigm to the difference paradigm. As the author shows, this transition not only reflects some important changes in Christian theology, but also reveals the specifics of two theoretical models that determine the structure and main elements of Western scholasticism and Byzantine metaphysics.

This paper deals with the project of meta-theodicy, which is offered as an alternative to the extreme points of view of (1) justifying evil to prove the existence of God or (2) re­fusing the very possibility of meaningful research of the relationship between suffering and God. The author summarizes the history and logic of theodicy briefly, and then ex­plains its modern alternative, called anti-theodicy. The author argues that, firstly, meta-theodicy can be viewed as an interdisciplinary project in which a large amount of differ­ent scholastic data can be ordered into a single whole; secondly, that meta-theodicy should clarify how the question of suffering and God’s silence can be raised; thirdly, that one methodological advantage of meta-theodicy is that a researcher does not take a cer­tain position, but tries to consider different approaches to the problem.

The article discusses the origins of the first philosophy, which was mentioned by Aristotle. In par ticular, using the material of the early Greek texts, the author shows how the difference between the language of gods and the language of people was transformed into the opposition of the philosophical and everyday levels of language, because of which myth becomes logos, poetic theology – the first philosophy. The author claims that by taking away the sacred function of poetry, philosophy inevitably rationalises and thus profanes its subject. If the language of gods was regarded as a perfect language, similar to that of Biblical Adam, for philosophers it is no longer something mysterious and inaccessible to the mind – it is reduced to the theoretical problem of the correctness of names. It appears that the appearance of philosophy, the rethinking of the status of language and the place of people in the world prepared the ground for the first philosophy, or theology. The development of this tradition can be found not only in philosophers (like Plotinus), but also in Augustine and other thinkers of the patristic age.

The article considers the concept of evil and its ambiguous status in the history of philosophy. It is shown that in the framework of the metaphysics of essence, or the metaphysics of good, which was common feature of ancient and medieval philosophy, evil was conceived as something devoid of essence, non-existent. The author considers the development of this concept and its understanding in this era. At the same time, it is noted that in modern times such an understanding of evil becomes unsatisfactory due to a change in the ontological paradigm, as well as an epistemological turn that occurred in this era. In conclusion, the author turns to modern methods of conceptualizing the phenomenon of evil.
Keywords: good, evil, essence, nonexistence, metaphysics, history of philosophy.

Аннотация: В статье рассматривается проблематика этики веры, в рамках которой утверждается, что «всегда, везде и для каждого ошибочно верить чему-либо без достаточных сведений». Автор показывает, что строгий эвиденциализм, следующий из данного утверждения, не является логически обоснованным и оправданным прагматически, поскольку имеются сведения о том, что у нас недостаточно сведений в пользу эвиденциализма. В отношении эпистемологии религиозной веры эвиденциалистский принцип так-же нуждается в ограничениях, поскольку центральный предмет теологии имеет весьма специфический онтологический статус и, находясь за пределами мира, не может схватываться пропозициями, которые фиксируют только то, что имеет место в мире.
Ключевые слова: эвиденциализм, фидеизм, этика веры, мистический опыт, Бог, ре-лигия, эпистемология, теология.

Abstract: The article deals with the problem of ethics of belief, posed by William Clifford in his famous essay. According to his view, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”. The author shows that strict evidentialism, which follows from this statement, is not logically and pragmatically justified, since there
is evidence that we do not have enough evidence in favor of evidentialism. With respect to the epistemology of the religious belief, the main principle of evidentialism also needs some limitations, since the central subject of theology has a very specific ontological status and,
being outside the world, cannot be grasped by propositions that fix only what there is in the world.
Keywords: Evidentialism, Fideism, Ethics of Belief, Mystical Experience, God, Religion, Epistemology, Theology.

В статье рассматривается вопрос об онтологическом статусе Бога в контексте разных видов теологии. В частности, поскольку полемика между теистами и атеистами ведется рациональными методами, с помощью логической аргументации, постольку обе стороны должны признавать требования, которые предъявляются к такого рода полемике. Автор показывает, что имеет место не только «теистическая теология», которая использует какое-либо представление о Боге, но и «атеистическая теология», или атеология, которая возникает потому, что атеизм также оперирует определенной концепцией божественного. Отсюда следует, что можно выделить и проанализировать специфические черты идеи Бога в этих видах теологии. В статье предпринято сопоставление названных черт в плане онтологии, что позволяет определить наиболее важные аспекты идеи Бога. В связи с этим автор полагает, что стремление доказать/опровергнуть бытие того, что прежде бытия, — задача по меньшей мере сомнительная. Тем не менее для атеизма данный метафизический ход крайне важен, потому что доказательства превращают Бога в некое сущее, которое нуждается в бытии. И именно здесь атеизм обретает
рациональные основания, а без этого имеет место лишь «атеизм сердца», но не «атеизм разума».

The article deals with the question of the ontological status of God in the context of different types of theology. In particular, since polemics between theists and atheists has a form of logical, rational methods, both sides must recognize the demands necessary for the debates.
The author shows that for this reason not only “theistic theology” takes place, which uses a certain notion of God, but also “atheistic theology”, or atheology, which takes place because an atheist must also understand what he denies, i.e. must operate with some concept of the
divine. It follows that we can analyze the specific features of the idea of God in two kinds of theology. The article compares these theologies and identifies the most important aspect of the idea of God. In this regard, the author shows that the desire to prove or disprove the existence
of what is beyond Being is a questionable task, to say the least. Nevertheless, for atheism this metaphysical point is extremely important, because God turns into a being that needs Being. Here atheism acquires rational grounds, but without it we have only “atheism of heart”, not
“atheism of reason”.

This article analyses one more attempt to defend the onto-theological
interpretation of Christianity, in which God is understood as one of the beings amona number of others and must consequently be subject to requirements of logic and be available for rational cognition. The author of the article shows that this approach is connected with obsolete conceptions of ancient philosophy which is now outdated and
cannot be regarded as an adequate instrument for theology.

The article deals with philosophical theology of Boethius, which I characterize as a “paradigm of identity”. It is shown, in particular, that this paradigm goes back to Aristotle’s theory of simplicity of the Unmoved-mover, which presupposes the identity of essence and action in God. Through Plotinus, Marius Victorinus and St. Augustine this concept had a great influence on Boethius, but if St. Augustine develops the paradigm
of identity within the framework of theology, Boethius returns to it ontological significance. On the one hand, development of the paradigm of identity allows Boethius to solve a set of theological and philosophical questions, among which the substantiation of monotheism with the assumption of the hypostatic non-identity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. In the context of the Arian crisis, this philosophical justification was very significant. On the other hand, this paradigm arise some theoretical differences between the western and eastern branches of Christianity, since the latter adheres to the directly opposite
conceptual model, which can be called a “paradigm of difference”.

In this paper I try to analyze the “Hume’s guillotine” in the context of medieval doctrine of the transcendentals. In order to accomplish this, I consider the original positions of the doctrine of transcendentals. I show, in particular, that this doctrine is based on a statement of the inner connection between Being and Good, which are convertible (ens et bonum convertuntur). In this context the “guillotine” has a different perspective – not so devastating for the ethical systems, but at the same time preserving the theoretical importance of the Hume’s law. I indicate the internal difficulties of the traditional understanding of is-ought problem and propose a new interpretation of it.

In this article, the author attempts to highlight some of the premises of rational theology which normally tend to be taken for granted. The most important precondition of scientific rationality is the assumption that the object of inquiry does exist. When it comes to theology, however, this assumption becomes ambiguous because it makes God dependent on
the existence. As a result, it can be shown that divinity becomes ‘inferior’ to the existence. If one, namely, is to prove the existence of God,one is forced to acknowledge, at least in theory, that there may happen to be no God at all. Once this mode of thinking is deemed logically acceptable, doubts as to the existence of God become psychologically admissible as well. Postmodern theology, on the contrary, suggests thinking about God’s freedom from the existence, but this kind of reasoning is problematic since it accepts the absence of God as an axiom. The author outlines a possible solution by recurring to the doctrine of divine energies. If the concept of existence in theology is a homonym, then nothing about God can be known, it cannot even be said He exists. This notwithstanding, such conclusion is not something impossible if one is prepared to take the thesis of the incomprehensibility of God seriously.

This article deals with the ontological background of the discussion about divine energies in the 14th century. Specifi cally, since the concept of being was reduced to the essence, the status of energy became unclear, for the anousios energeia cannot be regarded as existing. The article shows that the existential dimension of the concept of energy, developed by Aristotle, in the era of Christological controversies recedes to the background, and the conceptual apparatus of ontology becomes so narrow that it seeks to eliminate everything that does not fi t into the framework of the opposition “essence vs. accidents” (ousia vs. sumbebekos). The article also demonstrates that this circumstance is a philosophical base of the Palamitic disputes and their most important theoretical prerequisite. In the relevant scientifi c literature, these disputes are viewed from the theological point of view; the motivation of anti-Palamites therefore remains unclear. Presumably, it might have happened that for their personal reasons, they did not accept, for example, hesychastic practices, whereas they were urged to deny the concept of energies by their own “mental ontology”.

The A. examines the issue of the distinction of the possessor and the possessed in God, which was raised in the discussion of 1355 between St. Gregory Palamas and Nicephorus Grigoras. The A. shows that the theologians of the IV century, being very cautious in their choice of philosophical concepts, used the opposition of “essence” and “inherentness” in God, which subsequently found continuation in the doctrine of divine energies. In the meantime, Western thinkers, beginning with blessed Augustine, did not accept this opposition, which ultimately led to a clash between the Byzantine Thomists and the Palamites. The article shows, in particular, that St. Gregory Palamas, along with the categories of “essence” and “attribution”, also uses the categories of “action” and “possession”, which allow him to speak about the difference
between possessor and the possessed in God. His opponents, on the contrary, considered such a distinction inadmissible, which for the most part is due to the influence of ancient metaphysics, primarily Neoplatonism, and is very problematic from the philosophical point of view.

In this article, the author discusses the influence of Origen’s exegesis on
the position of Arius, who had known the Commentary on the Gospel of John, in which Origen rejects the idea of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son. However, Arius went further, proposing the doctrine of the non-existence of the Son before the begetting, though many theologians in Alexandria had not accepted his interpretation. At the same time the author notes that the views of Arius had a significant impact of ancient philosophical theology, with its stringent requirement
to think of the first principle as absolutely simple and one. Subordinative theology corresponds with the Zeitgeist of that time, and was influenced not by the biblical text, but by ancient philosophy. Therefore, we can say that the Orthodox teaching of the Holy Trinity did not arise under the influence of ancient philosophy, but in spite of it.

Keywords: Origen, Arius, subordinationism, simplicity, ancient theology,
consubstantiality, trinitarian theology.

Теоретическая задача данной статьи заключается в том, чтобы поставить некоторые решения постметафизической теологии под вопрос; методологическая – в том, чтобы показать логику этого явления, поместив его в контекст истории онтологии. Исходя из такой установки, автор кратко намечает основные вехи европейской онтологии, на фоне которых рассматривается постметафизическая теология, представленная феноменологией данности. В частности, в статье показывается, что с трудов Иоанна Дунса Скота начинается процесс натурализации бытия, после чего сферы онтологии и теологии принципиально разделяются и онтология оказывается чем-то внешним по отношению к теологии. И. Кант делает первый шаг на пути выведения онтологии за рамки теологического дискурса, однако последовательное выражение это находит только в философии М. Хайдеггера. Опираясь на труды последнего, в частности, понимая метафизику как онто-тео-логию, которая препятствует доступу к божественному, Ж.-Л. Марион разрабатывает феноменологию данности, обосновывающую его теологический проект, представленный в книге «Бог без бытия». Тем не менее философия Ж.-Л. Мариона, по мнению автора, оказывается версией онтологического релятивизма, что ставит под сомнение пригодность данного проекта для теологии.

The article deals with patristic philosophy, which includes two fundamental paradigms underlying the eastern and western branches of Christianity. According to the paradigm of identity (Western tradition), essence and properties are identical in God. This leads to the concept of absolute divine simplicity. According to the paradigm of difference (Eastern tradition), the essence is fundamentally different from any kind of predication. This leaves the essence in situation of the complete
ontological uncertainty. The paper presents the historical and philosophical foundations of these paradigms, as well as their role in the modern philosophical theology. In particular, the article shows that criticism of A. Plantinga relates only to the paradigm of identity and does not apply to the paradigm of difference.

This article aims to show Aristotle as the forerunner of the medieval doctrine of the reversibility of Being, the One, the Good, and Truth. Hence, the name of the article refers not to the Modern reinterpretation of this concept as a condition of the possibility of experience but to the understanding of the ontological sense of this concept, which is historically more correct. The article reveals the meaning of transcendental ontology and helps to describe medieval and partly antique and modern European philosophy. Since the doctrine of transcendentals expresses the essential features of European metaphysics, it can be called the transcendental ontology. Much attention is paid to the study of the heritage of Aristotle, who laid the foundation of the doctrine of transcendentals, which emerges only in the XIII century.

Once having grasped the distinction between Being and beings (Sein und Seiendes), it is no longer possible to study the history of ontology without understanding the forgetfulness of Being. The purpose of the present paper is to clarify the 'ontological difference' by inquiring into specific cases from the history of philosophy and, on the other hand, to outline the limit beyond which one cannot go back in time when speaking of Being. It can be argued that there is nothing methodologically incorrect about such an attempt, since the distinction of Being and beings appears to have been known long before Heidegger and started to take shape already in ancient Platonism. There is ample evidence for this in the lexicon of Greek ontology, focused as it was on the study of beings, or things. By introducing the concept of essence, Plato established for ontology a new and specific perspective which had a determining influence on European metaphysics. This work was continued by Aristotle who distinguishes between the different meanings of beings but fails to clarify the underlying unity behind them. It was only Heidegger who gave the question of Being an unambiguious formulation by making 'ontological difference' the foundation and starting point of his philosophy. With this difference in mind, one is able to discern the core of the debate between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, which sheds light on how Being was conceptualized during the Middle Ages. From the above it becomes clear that Being has only one meaning, whereas beings are said in many ways. Being is predicated of all things but is identical with none of the things of which it is predicated, because Being excludes multiplicity. Despite this, Being is not the one, since by its nature it is in no way related to number.

Keywords: Being, existence, beings, essence, quiddity, 'ontological difference', history of ontology

My main thesis looks as follows. Two fundamental paradigms were developed in Christian culture in the 4th с. AC. and largely determine philosophical and theological thought in East and West: 1) the identity paradigm, which became widespread in the West after Augustine, involves the identifi cation of essence and predicates in God; 2) the paradigm of diff erence, which became widespread in the East thanks to Cappadocian Fathers, involves fundamental diff erence between essence and predicates in God. These approaches are not only private theological opinions, but lie at the beginning of the two branches of the Christian metaphysics. I argue that identity paradigm is imperfect from theological and philosophical points of view, while the paradigm of diff erence has a rich philosophical and theological potential, however, it has not been studied suffi ciently.
Keywords: difference, identity, patristic philosophy, Arianism, Cappadocian Fathers, Augustine, East, West.

В статье рассматривается вопрос о компетенциях рациональности в тео-логии на примере блаж. Августина (354-430) — мыслителя, определившего ход развития всего последующего богословия на Западе. Согласно Ав-густину, истины, которые душа воспринимает perse ipsum, несомненны и неопровержимы, ручательством чему служит аргумент против скепти-цизма; язык мышления подобен совершенной речи Адама, адекватно вы-ражающей свой предмет, на этом праязыке разумная душа «совещается» (consulit) с вечной премудростью Божией; идеи Платона есть мысли Бога, идеи постижимы, следовательно, мысли Бога тоже. Все это в совокупности поднимает статус мышления на уникальный, почти сверхчеловеческий уровень, весьма контрастирующий с компетенциями разума в греческой патристике.

The paper shows that the medieval doctrine of the transcendentals appeared under the influence of ancient philosophy. The concepts of Being, Truth and Goodness play special role in Presocratic' (Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea, Heraclitus, Gorgias), Socratic' (Euclid of Megara) and especially in Plato’s philosophy. At the same time it is noted that at this stage we can not speak about the transcendental paradigm in the strict sense (this paradigm was appeared only in the XIII century). Nevertheless, author shows that some elements of this doctrine were thought namely in ancient philosophy.

The article considers concept of onto-theology, off ered by Martin Heidegger, as well as its reception in postmetaphysical theology, in particular, in Jean-Luc Marion. (1) Onto-theology is an understanding of Being, which is reduced to beings and is founded in the top of hierarchy of beings (Ex 3. 14: He who is). This is «fate of Being» — it came to oblivion in metaphysics, which structure is the onto-theo-logic, i. e. «cross base» between the top being and the totality of beings. The consequence of the oblivion, says Heidegger, is loss of sacred and divine — nihilism. The desire to think truth of Being and open up access to the Divine leads to the need to overcome metaphysics, go to postmetaphysical thinking, which can reveal «the last God». (2) Author maintains that such ideas attract attention of philosophers and theologians in secular age. Vague hints at «the last God» are grasped like modern Christian philosophy, and the concept of onto-theology is seen as an opportunity to overcome atheism simply by removing it to a metaphysical problem. This is the starting point for the development of so-called post-metaphysical theology, i. e. theology after metaphysics. For example, philosophy of J.-L. Marion is based on the concept of onto-theology. However, he constricts the concept. As a result, onto-theology becomes more vulnerable to criticism.

The article deals with the relation between Being and the One/the Good in Plato's philosiphy. From traditional point of view the One/the Good is 'beyond Being'. The author aims to show that this is problematic for ontology of Plato, both in relation to the Good and in relation to the first hypotesis of 'Parmenides'.

The article deals with analysis of the key concepts of epistemology as criterion, knowledge and truth. The author aims to make a distinction between mentioned terms, which would help to solve some difficulties in understanding what the truth is, and shed light on the nature of knowledge. We show that the correspondence theory replaces the truth by many criteria that are necessary for the process of knowledge, but are unable to give an accurate idea of truth itself. Furthermore this theory leads to the contamination of the concepts of truth and knowledge, which in turn brings insoluble problems to the disclosing of their meanings.

"В статье исследуется понимание свт. Григорием Богословом онтологического статуса Бога. Выявляются три основных подхода: онтический, онтологический и гиперохический, которые представляют собой разные способы описания Божественного. Автор показывает, что на основании Библейских положений (Исх 3.14) Григорий отдает предпочтение онтологическому подходу, используя вместе с тем и два других.

Ключевые слова: Бог, Сущий, бытие, тождество, собственный признак, ономатология, катафатика, апофатика.

The article examines the understanding of St. Gregory of Nazianzenus of the ontological status of God. There are three basic approaches in Gregory thought (ontical, ontological and transcendent) which represent different ways of describing the divine. Based on Exodus 3.14, Gregory prefers ontological approach but at the same time using the other two.

Keywords: God, He who is, being, identity, transcendence, cataphatic and apophatic theology."

Статья посвящена рассмотрению знаменитого текста из книги «Исход» (3: 14), где Яхве открывает свое имя Моисею. Это основополагающий текст, от которого отталкиваются как древние, так и современные авторы при осмыслении онтологического статуса библейского Бога. На примере таких мыслителей, как Филон Александрийский и Иустин Философ, автор рассматривает, как древние авторы осмысляли соотношение понятия бытия и идеи Бога.

Ключевые слова: Бог, Сущий, бытие, сущность, непостижимость, иносказание, энергии, божественные
имена.

The paper deals with the famous text passage from Exodus 3: 14, where Yahweh reveals His name to Moses. This foundational text, which serves for ancient as well as for modern authors as a basis for thinking over the ontological status of the scriptural God. The paper takes Philo of Alexandria and Saint Justin Martyr as ancient examples of considering the relation of the concept of being and the idea of God.

В статье рассматривается вопрос о понимании Василием Великим сущности Бога: отождествлял ли святитель сущность Бога и бытие, или последовательно придерживался учения о ее непостижимости? Автор анализирует релевантные высказывания святителя по этому поводу, а также сопоставляет его взгляды с доктриной Евномия, в полемике с которым Василий высказывает ряд основополагающих тезисов.


Ключевые слова: Бог, бытие, сущность, тождество, божественные энергии, Сущий, онто-теология, Василий Великий, Евномий.

The article deals with the problem of understanding the God's essence by Basil of Caesarea: whether he identifies essence of God with being or he argues consistently for its incomprehensibility? Author analyzes the relevant Basil's propositions concerning this matter and compares his views with the doctrine Eunomius as in controversy with Eunomius Basil makes a number of his fundamental theses.

The author discusses a number of questions about the theory
of John Greco, who distinguishes two types of testimonial
knowledge: testimony as transmission of knowledge and as
distributing of information. The author expresses doubts that this
difference is consistent and, therefore, useful for epistemology. He
argues that John Greco’s theory needs some refinements without
which it will be either trivial or erroneous.

Scholars participating in the discussion attempted to answer the following questions: Does the philosophy investigate something new? What should we expect from reading the philosophical text? What is the goal of the philosophy: new unexpected questions or subtle witty answers? Will the philosopher tell us something new and unprecedented, or, conversely, will it say the same thing and repeat old “philosophical” questions?