ETH Library
Future Scenarios for the South
Caucasus
Journal Issue
Author(s):
Behrendt, Sven; Kempe, Iris; Secrieru, Stanislav; Iskandaryan, Alexander; Graalfs, Ulrike; Haindrava, Ivlian; Sharashenidze,
Tornike; Kremer, Martin
Publication date:
2010-08-13
Permanent link:
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006256275
Rights / license:
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
Originally published in:
Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) 19
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No. 19
Ab
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13 August 2010
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FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
■■South Caucasus 2025: Scenarios for an Uncertain Future
By Sven Behrendt, Beirut and Iris Kempe, Tbilisi
2
■■The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi: Implications for the Caucasus
By Stanislav Secrieru, Bucharest
4
■■Armenia–Turkey Relations: Options for 2025
By Alexander Iskandaryan, Yerevan
8
■■Georgia Post-2013: The Road to the Presidential Elections and Beyond
By Ulrike Graalfs, Ivlian Haindrava, and Tornike Sharashenidze, Berlin and Tbilisi
■■European Partnership and the South Caucasus:
Framework Condition for a Grand Bargain in 2025?
By Martin Kremer, Berlin
DGO
Resource
Security
Institute
Research Centre for East
European Studies, Bremen
Center for Security
Studies, ETH Zurich
11
15
HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG
SOUTH CAUCASUS
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South Caucasus 2025: Scenarios for an Uncertain Future
By Sven Behrendt, Beirut and Iris Kempe, Tbilisi
The South Caucasus is a geo-strategically important region, located between Europe and the wider Central Asian space, between Russia and the inherently volatile Middle Eastern. From a global perspective, the
South Caucasus is perceived as a single geopolitical and economic space, though its distinct political composition and ethnic fragmentation suggests that the South Caucasus is little more than a geographic concept.
R
ecent developments in the South Caucasus, most
notably the Russo–Georgian war of summer 2008,
reemphasized the relevance of the region and its constituent parts for broader geopolitical stability. The war was
yet another example of the extent to which great powers competed for influence in their immediate neighborhood, in the case of Russia, and more distant areas,
in the case of the U.S.
The Caucasus will remain in the center of the
global geopolitical space in the foreseeable future: its
geographic location attracts energy infrastructure projects safeguarding Europe’s energy security. Elections
in Georgia will also determine the fate of the regional
democracy agenda. The region has become a test case for
Turkey’s foreign policy, torn between its European aspirations and a more autonomous agenda, turning east. It
has also become a test for the strength of Europe’s “softpower”-based foreign policy approach, aiming at supporting a gradual transition towards more democratic
governance, based on liberal civil society and a prosperous, regionally integrated market economy.
The South Caucasus’ increasing geostrategic and geoeconomic relevance, paired with the uncertainties that
the future holds for the region, requires policy-makers to
base their policies on alternative scenarios. There is not
one single, most likely future for the region. To the contrary, any reasonable policy approach must be based on
the assumption that the future political, economic and
social dynamics of the region are very volatile indeed.
In other words, things can go wrong.
Accordingly, the Expert Group Caucasus 2025 has
identified four scenarios for the future of the South
Caucasus:
• A Stable and Prosperous South Caucasus
• The South Caucasus Implodes
• Backwater South Caucasus
• The South Caucasus Muddling Through
These scenarios have been developed taking into account
international, domestic, and regional political, economic,
and social dynamics.
• On the international level, the most important driver
is the influence that the most relevant global and
regional powers can exert, i.e. the U.S., Russia, the
EU, and Turkey, but also the specific relationships
and potential alliances that they are going to develop
amongst each other. Wild cards include developments in the Middle East and East Asia.
• On the domestic level, countries have the potential
to transition into fully fledged democracies, but also
risk falling back into political stagnation providing
the backdrop for hardening authoritarian structures.
• On the regional level, scenarios oscillate between
deep political and economic cooperation to regional
disintegration.
Assessing the interdependencies and overlapping dynamics between these three simple analytical categories, we
sketched out scenarios that are ideally mutually exclusive but in reality do overlap. These scenarios, however,
should to a high degree cover most plausible and likely
futures for the South Caucasus.
Scenario 1: A Stable and Prosperous South
Caucasus
The most positive scenario anticipates that the region
will turn into a prosperous, and partly democratic area
that increasingly benefits from regional integration. The
ability of Armenia and Georgia to establish robust democratic institutions, or at least head in that direction,
depends on the overall commitment of their leaders as
well as the development of healthy civil societies. Azerbaijan is somewhat lagging behind and is still governed
by an authoritarian regime. However, the leadership has
learned how to share power across various segments of
Azeri society. Power is transitioning smoothly from one
leader to the other. With time, the Azeri body politic
will develop a distinct political consciousness which
supports the development of democratic elements in
the political decision-making process.
All countries engage in ever more intensive regional
coordination mechanisms. Though short of substantial
integration, regional collaboration has increased the
collective bargaining power of the region. Local and
regional actors resist the temptation to develop bilateral patron–client relationships outmaneuvering their
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regional peers. A new sense of identity enables the region
to pursue more autonomous regional policy making.
The new sense of shared destiny is also reinforced by
economic considerations. All countries share an interest in developing the regional potential as a transport
hub between Europe and Central Asia. Their economies are increasingly diversified, providing a solid base
for increasing standards of living.
The positive developments in the region are supported by ever closer coordination between the EU
and its member states and Russia. Europe, Russia and
the U.S. develop tighter coordination mechanisms and
understand that the South Caucasus is a region of common interests but also joint values. Based on the concept of an overlapping integration space, external powers
contribute constructively to the positive development
of the region.
In particular, the strategic consequences of the
Russo–Georgian war of 2008 contributed to a heightened sense of dependency on Russia in Georgia, Russian–
Georgian relations improve post-Saakashvili (2013),
bearing the potential to replace open hostilities with
trends of cooperation.
A Turkish–Armenian border deal offers an additional positive dimension for the region. With the border with Turkey and thereby a new window to the West
opening, international investments in the region pick up
as a new crossroad for transport and trade comes into
being. As flag follows trade, national identities and cultures are constructed in a way that foster peaceful mutual
coexistence. Since Turkish influence is acceptable to all
interested outside powers including Russia, its presence
in the region grows and it develops into a cohesive factor for the region over time.
Scenario 2: The South Caucasus Implodes
Lack of political progress creates an ever accelerating
downward spiral of civil strife and violent conflict. Political entities disintegrate and economic development stalls.
The fragile democracy of Georgia gives way to a populist authoritarian regime that seeks internal legitimacy
by cultivating its external conflicts. Civil society and the
media are suppressed.
Azerbaijan, thanks to the economic mismanagement
of its natural resource base and the increasing alienation
between the regime and society, falls victim to the radical force of political Islam.
Minorities throughout the region seek to exploit a
situation of political disorientation, and radical political entrepreneurs benefit from institutional weaknesses.
The Middle Eastern theatre increasingly influences poli-
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tics in the region, with Shi’a and Sunni forces being supported by Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two competitors
for hegemony in the Gulf region, respectively.
Russia, most affected by possible spill-over and destabilizing effects and nearly unchecked, intervenes and
subsequently expands its influence in its “Near Abroad”.
Yet, Russia’s intervention is difficult to sustain over the
long term. A long “war of attrition” demands extensive
military resources and repeatedly tests the robustness
of its relationship with Europe and the U.S. The West,
focusing on the military hotspots of the broader Middle
East and East Asia fails to engage in a constructive way.
Conflict and discontent also have a devastating
demographic effect in the region. As confidence in a
prosperous future declines, marriages and birthrates
decrease substantially, while an ever growing part of the
respective populations seek refuge in exile. The South
Caucasus faces depopulation and subsequent national
catastrophes.
Scenario 3: Backwater South Caucasus
Lack of political progress and ambition let the South
Caucasus slide into a backwater of globalization. Azerbaijan and Armenia turn to a shaky form of authoritarianism. Georgia is increasingly disillusioned with its
democratic experiments. Regional economic growth is
sluggish. Commodity prices, a major driver of revenue
for the government of Azerbaijan linger at lower levels
than anticipated, and national diversification strategies
have not taken off.
Accordingly, the outward-spinning forces in the
region gain momentum. There is an increased awareness of the fractured nature of the region. National
distinctiveness increasingly drives policies of local and
regional actors. But small size matters and accordingly, their aspirations fail to be relevant and policies
meaningful.
Europe is concerned about its own internal affairs,
itself being threatened by political marginalization. The
USA increasingly feels the realities of its military overstretch, with too many strategic battlegrounds in the
Middle East and the Far East requiring its attention.
Central Asia is turning eastwards to satisfy China’s tremendous demand for natural resources, which lessens
the South Caucasus’ attractiveness as a significant transport hub. Russia has no intention to compromise its
increasingly stable relations with the U.S. and Europe
over the Sough Caucasus. Iran is preoccupied to fend off
regional challenges for hegemony. Turkey, after making
some overtures to the region, is reemphasizing its Western foreign policy outlook.
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There is an increasing awareness of the artificial
nature of the concept of the South Caucasus, grouping together three countries, which are indeed not to
be treated as one entity. Especially the countries of the
South Caucasus regard this concept with hesitation as
they see the danger that it neglects, at least conceptually, the individual development paths and characteristics of each country. Countries of the South Caucasus will not fulfill the external expectations of regional
integration, but fragment. Over time, individual countries might integrate with outside neighbours. It may
well be possible that in 2025 Armenia will have undergone advanced integrated with Turkey, Azerbaijan will
have become part of the Caspian region and Georgia
will have oriented West and become an integral part of
the Black Sea region.
Scenario 4: Muddling Through
The region continues to be based on balance of power
concepts. The survival strategies of regional players are
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based on opportunistic alliance building. Relationships between governments, outside forces, and domestic actors cease as quickly as they develop. Though giving an impression of political progress, the region as a
whole stagnates socially and economically and leaves
itself exposed to outside intervention. Peaceful coexistence and local escalation of conflict come and go.
While mild forms of authoritarianism assert themselves in the countries of the South Caucasus, the
region remains a contested space. As Europe becomes
less engaged, due to lack of progress and the political
developments on the ground, Russia and Turkey realize mutual benefits from cooperating economically and
politically in the region. Meanwhile, Russia is able to
create a space of “sovereign democracies” including Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. If this development coincides with the EU maintaining a closed door policy
toward Turkey, a new East–West divide will be consolidated and the countries of the South Caucasus will face
further isolation westward.
About the Authors
Sven Behrendt is a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center. Iris Kempe is the Director of the Heinrich
Boell Foundation South Caucasus.
The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi: Implications for the Caucasus
By Stanislav Secrieru, Bucharest
Abstract
Predicting what will happen next in international politics is never an easy task. When it comes to the Caucasus, anticipating the region’s alternative futures is even more complicated. However, a high degree of volatility makes such an effort worthwhile. The Sochi Olympics is among the factors which should not be underestimated in scenario building for the Caucasus. Intensive preparations for 2014 already serve as a catalyst
for economic development as well as a cause for environmental concerns. Looking beyond the immediate
effects, the Sochi factor is also likely to affect politics and security in the entire Caucasus.
Future Scenarios and the Sochi Factor
Regional scenario building traditionally revolves around
optimistic, hybrid (combining a mix of positive and negative trends) and skeptical projections. However, this
classic approach is far from perfect. To reduce uncertainty about the region’s possible futures as much as possible, the foresight exercise needs to address the impact
of local mega-events on regional developments too. As
far future scenarios for the Caucasus are concerned, the
Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, scheduled for 2014,
are a case in point. The Russian Black Sea resort city of
Sochi is located in the immediate vicinity of Georgia’s
breakaway region of Abkhazia (113 km separate Sochi
from Sukhumi) and the politically fragile republic of
Karachaevo-Cherkessia (part of Russia’s North Caucasus Federal District). The geographical location of
the 2014 Olympic Games venue, coupled with the economic opportunities it offers (the event’s budget is estimated at $30 billion) and a variety of ongoing political
and security challenges transforms Sochi, for the next
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four years, into one of the region’s focal points. Thus
any realistic scenario planning for the Caucasus should
consider the immediate and potential far-reaching consequences of this sporting event.
Intensive preparations for 2014 already serve as a
catalyst for positive as well as negative developments.
Sochi is a huge construction site which attracts workers from the economically depressed Northern Caucasus (in particular North Ossetia which is home to refugees from South Ossetia) and South Caucasus republics
badly battered by the global financial crisis. An influx
of Armenian workers into Sochi is already underway, a
process facilitated by the compact Armenian minority
which resides in the city. In this way, the Sochi Olympics provide job opportunities, alleviating to some extent
the social pressure across a region known for high unemployment rates. On the negative side, the massive construction campaign inflicts irreparable damage on local
ecosystems. Russian NGOs have identified grave irregularities during the construction projects, imperiling
the Sochi National Park and Caucasus State Nature
Biosphere Reserve, the latter of which is included on
the UNESCO World Heritage site list. Civil society in
tourist-dependent Abkhazia has quietly raised concerns
about the massive extraction of local sand and stone for
Sochi construction sites, worrying that this effort will
harm coastal river deltas and Black Sea beaches. Thus,
instead of improving living conditions, the “Sochi affair”
could significantly deteriorate the environment of the
local communities and damage the tourist industry.
Looking beyond the socio-economic and environmental impact, it is plausible to assume that the Sochi
factor will affect politics and security in the Caucasus.
As the Olympic Games approach, state, non-state and
anti-state regional actors are likely to either restrain their
behavior or engage in spoiler tactics. As the host of the
games, Russia will actively pursue its objectives in the
region. However, other regional players also see in the
Olympics a window of opportunity, and are determined
to push vigorously for agendas often running counter
to those professed by the Kremlin.
Sports and Politics Nexus
Russia traditionally has been strong in winter sports,
winning more medals than the average country. However, the national team’s poor performance at the 2010
Games in Vancouver proved to be a major disappointment. President Medvedev’s last minute decision to cancel his trip to Vancouver and the subsequent “purge” of
the country’s sports federations provide a good sense of
how Russia perceives its failures in international arenas
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and the importance it attaches to the Olympic Games in
Sochi. In Russia, international sports victories are associated with the performance of the political regime. Thus,
Moscow will work hard to prove in 2014 that Russia
is still an elite sports nation. Domestically, a successful
performance at the Olympic Games should uphold the
Kremlin’s slogan, promoted over the last decade, that
the country is “rising from its knees.” In terms of foreign policy, the extensive media exposure surrounding
the games (an estimated 4.7 billion viewers followed
the Beijing Games in 2008) provide Russia with a great
opportunity to boost its “soft power” potential by overhauling its image and portraying itself as a “civilized
great power”. The construction of Olympic venues from
scratch may help demonstrate that Russia has not lost
the ability to implement highly complex projects. As
President Medvedev put it “this is our chance to show
the world that we are a capable, hospitable and technologically-advanced country.”
Russian-Made Stability
In light of the Chinese experience in dealing with the
protests supporting Tibet along the Olympic flame route,
it is reasonable to assume that Russia will strive for stability (as this term is understood in Moscow) in the
South and North Caucasus. Moscow would not like
to see public opinion distracted by security and political problems in the North Caucasus, its illegal military
presence in Georgia, or the potential renewal of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the worst case
scenario, such developments could deliver a heavy blow
to the Sochi Olympics PR campaign, provoke a boycott
by an influential part of the international community,
or result in the non-participation of the belligerent sides.
There are early signs that point to Russia’s intentions
to assure stability in a highly volatile region. The creation of the North Caucasus Federal District in January 2010 and the appointment of the former businessman Alexander Khloponin to lead it indicate that the
Kremlin is looking for a more balanced mix between
blunt power projection and a transformative approach in
the North Caucasus to address the structural problems
which breed violence and unrest. Khloponin’s demand
to appoint an ethnic Cherkess as a prime-minister of
Karachaevo-Cherkessia in accordance with the informal power distribution algorithm (the president of the
republic is an ethnic Karachai, the vice-president and
speaker of the republican legislative is an ethnic Russian) shows that Moscow keeps an eye on the potential flashpoints close to Sochi and is willing to contain
any manifestation of ethnic discord. In the South Cau-
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casus, Russian diplomacy played a positive role favoring, even if half-heartedly, the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Far from being decisive, the Sochi factor
is likely to influence Russian policy seeking to maintain
the power equilibrium between Armenia and Azerbaijan to minimize the chances of conflict unfreezing in
Nagorno-Karabakh ahead of the 2014 Games.
Georgian Politics and the Kremlin’s Game
With the Moscow Olympics of 1980 in mind, Russia
is likely to prefer avoiding another military confrontation with Georgia, at least until 2014. But this does not
mean that the Kremlin will stay aloof from Georgian
politics. Moscow perceives the current Georgian regime
as unpredictable, too unilaterally oriented towards the
West in its foreign policy, and thus predisposed to play
a spoiler game in the “Sochi affair” (for instance by supporting the campaign for the recognition of a “Circassian
genocide” or upholding the ecologists’ concerns about
the resource drain from Abkhazia). Therefore, Russia is
likely to work hard to ignite regime change in Tbilisi well
before the Olympic Games begin. To achieve this goal,
Russian top politicians will prefer to address directly
the citizens of Georgia, reiterating Moscow’s “peaceful
intentions” and portraying President Mikheil Saakashvili as a political outcast (this was the gist of President
Medvedev’s message to Georgian citizens on Victory
Day). In parallel, Russia will multiply its channels of
political influence in Georgia by cementing ties with
what it sees to be the moderate or pragmatic segments
of the opposition. Friendly NGOs and representatives
of the Georgian Diaspora in Russia might be co-opted
in this effort. Occasionally Russia will demonstrate the
advantages of a more “accommodationist” approach to
put additional pressure on the government in Tbilisi.
Former prime-minister Nogaideli’s visits to Russia followed by holiday flights between Moscow and Tbilisi,
as well as the liberation of Georgian citizens detained
by the South Ossetian militia, provides insights into the
tactics Russia will employ.
Since the results of the local elections in May suggest that the prospects that Saakashvili will be forced
to resign are bleak, Russia almost certainly will be indirectly involved in Georgia’s 2012–13 parliamentary and
presidential electoral cycle. Moscow will act to upset the
formation of a pro-presidential majority in the legislature and to weaken the domestic standing of President
Saakashvili so that he will not be able to stay in power
beyond 2013 or steer his heir through managed elections.
Russia will seek a similar “revenge” as in Ukraine’s 2010
presidential elections, looking to reassert its position in
the Black Sea region. However, Russian decision-mak-
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ers harbor no illusion about the chances of a pro-Russian candidate. The best case scenario for Russia would
be a succession to power in Georgia of a Timoshenkotype politician—one who is more sensitive to Kremlin
interests and who would engage Russia in a pragmatic
co-existence in the South Caucasus, pursuing a multivectoral foreign policy.
Given the tradition of turbulent power transitions,
elections in Georgia might get messy. It is difficult to
anticipate how Russia would act in the case of a prolonged power vacuum generated by a political struggle
which in a worse case scenario could degenerate into
small-scale armed clashes. Given its massive military
presence in South Ossetia and the short distance (40 km)
from there to the Georgian capital, Russia could relatively easily seize Tbilisi by mobilizing additional forces
from the North Caucasus. But such a move would heavily damage its plans for 2014, embroiling Moscow in a
risky enterprise and strengthening the Olympics boycott camp. Unwilling to pay the costs of such a move, as
an alternative, Russia could join the international community (EU, US, Turkey) or foster a regional “consortium” of security stakeholders with Turkey to facilitate
negotiations for a political solution to end the standoff.
International mediation would receive strong support
from Armenia and Azerbaijan since both heavily rely on
trade routes or energy transit through Georgia. A prolonged political instability and the potential disruption
of transit through Georgia might serve as an additional
incentive for Yerevan to make further steps towards the
normalization of relations with Turkey which might lead
to the opening of borders.
Russia–Georgia–Abkhazia Knot
The new Georgian leadership which will probably
emerge after exhausting political battles could adopt
a cautious and less emotionally-charged line on Russia. Opinion polls show that the overwhelming majority of the Georgian population (52 percent) disapproves
the government’s policy towards Russia. Thus, if public
opinion remains unchanged on this matter, the newly
elected president might prefer to refrain from combative rhetoric and could take cautious steps to improve
relations with Russia as much as possible in the post2008 war environment. If Georgia opts for this track,
then the Olympic Games in Sochi could provide a good
occasion to employ sports diplomacy, especially if Turkish–Armenian joint efforts to open the border prove successful by 2014.
Nevertheless, the opposite scenario, Georgia’s boycotting the games in Sochi, can not be ruled out either.
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The move could be motivated by Russia’s meddling in
the electoral campaign, its continuous illegal military
presence in Georgia, and the involvement of Abkhazia in
the Olympic Games preparations. But without dramatic
changes in the post-war status quo in relations between
Georgia, the separatist regions and Russia (including,
for example, the occupation of new territories in Georgia proper close to the breakaway republics or an escalation of violence resulting in civilian deaths), it would be
hard to “sell” the international community on a boycott
of the Olympic Games and would reduce the chance
to improve relations with Russia. Contemplated also
as a punishment of Abkhazia, a boycott would do little
to help Georgia’s cause by further alienating Sukhumi
from Tbilisi. More than that, such a decision could portray Georgia as a state unable to find a long term modus
vivendi between imperatives of domestic reform, normalizing relations with its important northern neighbor
and upholding its territorial integrity by more conciliatory and flexible means that might pay off in the future.
Preparations for the Sochi Olympics will facilitate
Russia’s economic expansion in Abkhazia, paving the
way for the de facto incorporation of this region into
Russia. The Russian government earmarked for the
period 2010–2012 around $100 million for the socialeconomic development of Abkhazia. The breakaway
region already serves as an important provider of natural resources (construction materials) and as a transportation hub (Russia gained control of the railway infrastructure for ten years) for Sochi. Furthermore, Moscow
expects Abkhazia to provide cheap accommodation to
100,000 workers from the Olympic construction sites.
Russia is also considering taking over the Sukhumi
airport (Babushera) and operating flights to Moscow.
The Kremlin actively promotes the idea of a Customs
Union between Russia and Abkhazia, which Sukhumi
has resisted so far. As Moscow solidified its military
footprint in Abkhazia, it was quick to suggest significant reductions in the Abkhaz armed forces. Thus, Russia’s overwhelming economic and military penetration in
the years to come could alter demographics, eliminate
the incipient political pluralism in Abkhazia and set the
stage for importing Russian-style “sovereign democracy.”
In contrast to Moscow, Sukhumi perceives the Sochi
Olympics as a unique time that maintains Abkhazia in
the spotlight and thereby opens a window for its “de-isolation” strategy. Turkey, home for a half million Abkhaz
Diaspora, is seen as a channel through which Sukhumi
hopes to break its isolation. In turn, Ankara, keen to
diffuse Russia’s growing clout in Abkhazia and boost its
influence in the South Caucasus, sent signals that it is
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ready to deepen economic ties with Sukhumi. Despite
frustrations over the EU’s decision not to recognize its
sovereignty, Abkhazia regards Europe also as a potential
source of investment and know-how transfer. There are
fears in Abkhazia that after the 2014 Olympics, international interest in the region’s fate will recede, leaving Sukhumi one-to-one with Moscow, which, while
upholding de jure Abkhazia’s independence will effectively hamper any efforts to assert de facto statehood
absorbing it (as Moscow did many times in relations
with its “client-entities”) into the “Russian world”.
Terrorist Threat
Russian authorities intend to generate a spill-over effect
that could project development efforts from Sochi further into the neighboring North Caucasus. However,
chances for the opposite to happen are unfortunately
high. Russian official statistics for 2009 show a significant rise in the number of attacks by Islamic fighters and
their victims. Ahead of the Sochi Olympics, the Islamic
rebels will be tempted to spread the violence beyond the
North Caucasus. The May 2010 deadly terror attack
in Stavropol (240 km from Sochi) is a warning bell
for the Russian authorities. In 2013–2014 the world’s
attention will be attuned to Sochi, which makes it for
the Islamic insurgents a perfect location for a shocking
attack. If Russia intensifies its campaign to pacify the
North Caucasus by military means and fails to address
the roots of the violence, a new generation of radicals
will be extremely motivated to hit back.
Sochi is the summer residence of the Russian head
of state (Bocharov Ruchey) which means that there were
tight security measures even before the city’s successful
Olympic bid. Over the last decade, Russian security services have gained valuable experience in counter-terrorist tactics. Hence, these factors, coupled with the complex security plan to be implemented by the Russian
authorities, suggest that there will be enhanced safety for
participants and visitors during the winter competition.
However, global experience in fighting against terror
has made clear that despite draconic security measures,
terrorist attacks took place even in the most securitized
zones. Given the trend of suicide attacks in the North
Caucasus, terrorists might employ the same tactics in
Sochi. Such acts are difficult to prevent and, unfortunately, the March explosions in the Moscow Metro are
a grim reminder of what could happen in 2014.
Many construction sites in Sochi could serve as a perfect place to stock explosives in advance. Russian security services announced that in 2008 terror attempts
involving explosive materials were prevented in Sochi
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and Anapa. Islamic rebels could target the critical infrastructure, the destruction of which could lead to delay,
suspension or cancellation of the event. As the Olympic
Games will be organized in separate mountain (Krasnaya Polyana) and coastal (Sochi) clusters, railway links
will be important for transporting athletes, officials,
and tourists. A number of explosions on the gas pipelines and railways which connect Dagestan with Azerbaijan show the rebels’ interest to inflict damages to the
transportation infrastructure. If not prevented, terrorist
attacks could incite violence throughout the entire Caucasus. Encouraged by its ability to carry out attacks in
a highly securitized environment, the insurgents could
try to extend the “front,” for instance from Dagestan to
northern Azerbaijan (in 2008 Azerbaijan’s Special Forces
clashed in the Gusar district with Dagestani militants).
The Russian authorities might also try to camouflage
their failure by accusing Georgia of providing shelter
and support for Islamic fighters, fueling another spiral
of tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi.
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Conclusions
There is no doubt that the Sochi Olympics will have a
multidimensional impact on developments in the Caucasus. The interpretation of regional trends and patterns coupled with a bit of imagination presented above
revealed how the Sochi factor could influence politics,
economics and security in different parts of the Caucasus. Although the prestige calculations of hosting the
Olympics in Sochi will push Russia to seek stability in
the region, some instruments and means employed to
this end could generate contradictory effects. Other state
or non-state actors’ competitive agendas could breed tensions or, in a pessimistic scenario, create an explosive
mix affecting parts of the region or the whole area, ultimately jeopardizing the 2014 Olympics themselves. Nevertheless, there are fair chances that the Sochi factor will
play a positive role too by restraining states from openly
aggressive actions and diluting to some extent the patterns of enmity in a region with an acute deficit of trust.
About the Author
Stanislav Secrieru is an Associate Researcher at the Center for East-European and Asian Studies in Bucharest.
Armenia–Turkey Relations: Options for 2025
By Alexander Iskandaryan, Yerevan
Abstract
Armenia–Turkey relations are of extreme importance for the entire Caucasus region. How they look in 2025
will affect the entire region. An assessment is not very difficult as there are few options. Armenia–Turkey rapprochement began in 2008 and stalled by early 2010; however, following the political logic, normalization
will happen sooner or later. The timing will depend on political developments in Armenia and Turkey but
also on the regional context. Moreover, the situation in the South Caucasus will only have a limited instrumental effect on the rapprochement; it’s the geopolitical context in the wider region, from the Balkans to
the Larger Near East, which will define the place and role of Turkey by 2025.
Most Probably, By 2025 the Borders Will
Be Open
Where Turkey is concerned, the true question is “when”
not “if.” It is extremely unlikely that Turkey will give
up its engagement with the West in the coming years.
Even a dramatic development such as coup d’état or
change of rule in Turkey will not make it abandon its
Europeanization plans. Turkey’s choice is about civilization, not current politics. Something like the Iranian
revolution is not nearly feasible in Turkey. Irrespective
of whether or not the country will have joined the EU,
Turkey will remain part of European geopolitics also in
2025. Turkey’s relations with Armenia are part of Turkey’s European agenda and of the EU and US agenda
with regard to Turkey. With all the domestic problems
this involves, 15 years is a long time for Turkey to withstand European and US pressure with regard to normalizing ties with Armenia.
Turkey’s efforts to boost its role in Middle Eastern
politics (manifest as an estrangement from and even a
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confrontation with Israel) do not imply Turkey might
give up its European integration ambitions. Ankara’s
rise to prominence in the Middle East is not intended
to happen at the expense of its relations with the West
but in many ways, for their sake. In this context, unsettled Armenia–Turkey relations will pose an impediment
to Turkey’s new activism in regional politics, and will
keep negatively affecting its international image. The
only way Turkey can deal with this impediment is by
normalizing relations with Armenia and opening its
borders, by 2025 or sooner.
From Armenia’s perspective, there are no alternatives to normalization of ties with Turkey; all Armenian
governments have acknowledged this fact and expressed
readiness to unconditional normalization. Mistrust and
hostility to Turkey do exist in Armenia and especially in
the Diaspora, but they are insufficient to stop the ruling
elites from going ahead with normalization.
Moreover, there is a domestic process ongoing in
both countries, and it is moving rather fast. Despite
widespread protests and apprehensions, the psychological borders between Armenia and Turkey are already
down. Less than two years since the start of rapprochement, mutual relations have become part of domestic
politics. Issues are being debated at various levels and
new are ties established in various spheres.
Fifteen years should be long enough for the borders
to be unsealed. The question is when this happens: at
the start of the 15 years, in the middle or towards the
end. Exactly what Armenia–Turkey relations look like
by 2025 will depend on when normalization will have
happened. Therefore, three scenarios are possible.
Scenario 1: Quick & Optimistic
Turkey–Armenia borders open between 2011 and 2015
and relations are fully normalized. The geopolitical context remains favorable, external actors continue supporting reconciliation, and domestic developments in Turkey and Armenia (such as the 2011 election to Turkey’s
Parliament) are also conducive to mutual rapprochement.
Normalization is full-scale, and although political challenges remain, the two nations have the political will
needed to deal with them. Societal rapprochement will
also unfold, albeit cautiously, and historical reconciliation will gradually take shape. This scenario will lead
to an overall change of the regional context, fostering
integration between the societies and states of the South
Caucasus and Turkey.
The role of external players will also change. After the
opening of the Turkish–Armenian borders, Russia’s influence in the region will decline, if slowly. Some regional
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communication and transit projects will move to Armenia or involve it; Armenia will become another crossroads
in the region. The new projects and the diminished need
for Russia’s military and strategic umbrella will enable
Armenia to implement a more balanced foreign policy.
The opening of the railroad bridge over the Bosporus
and the opening of borders will make an Iran–Armenia railroad economically feasible as soon as the Armenia–Turkey stretch is already in place. As to an automobile road from Armenia to Iran—it is already under
construction.
As the two neighboring nations interact and do business, the impact will be mutual. On the one hand, Turkish businesses will be active in the Armenian market and
compete against Armenian companies. On the other
hand, Armenian business will become involved in Eastern Turkey, which is poor and counts on ties with Armenia for its economic development. Many Armenian businesspeople are very keen to get engaged; several owners
of Yerevan supermarket chains have already announced
they would open shops in Eastern Turkey as soon as the
opportunity arises. Of course, so far those are no more
than plans, but some of them may work. Eight to 10 million people live in the regions of Turkey directly bordering on Armenia, promising Armenians access to a market three times larger than the domestic one.
Scenario 2: Complex & Scattered
In this scenario, normalization is partial and inconsistent. The regional context creates obstacles to bilateral
dialogue between Turkey and Armenia. Some external
players lose their onetime interest in the rapprochement;
others try to interfere with it. The societies of Armenia
and Turkey suffer from growing mutual mistrust and
hostility, resulting, on the one hand, from more profound Islamic and radical trends in Turkey, and, on the
other, Armenians’ growing feeling of isolation and vulnerability combined with the disappointment of Armenian society and Diaspora with the failed Football Diplomacy effort in 2008–2010.
In such a setting, Armenia will toughen its stand
on Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s negativism and pessimism where the settlement of this conflict are concerned, and its rejection of the potential involvement
of Turkey, will also be projected onto Turkey, causing
Armenian society to perceive it as a hostile nation openly
supporting Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Both Armenia and Turkey will have to face the 2015
hundredth anniversary of the Genocide, which will also
affect the results and options of rapprochement. As this
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date approaches, by 2013–2014, nervousness and tensions will increase. Turkey will be concerned by the prospect of leading Western powers recognizing the Genocide; it may consider rapprochement with Armenia as
a possible deterrent.
Aware that final settlement of the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh is not realistic, Turkey will slacken
its efforts to tie rapprochement with Armenia to this
conflict; however, nationalistic trends in Turkish
society will affect its policy with regard to Armenia.
As a result, the mutual borders may be opened partially, or opened and then quickly closed again. Pragmatic motives will induce the two countries to sustain some degree of normalization, but mistrust and
hostility will keep the bilateral relations very tense by
2025. New problems will arise alongside successes in
normalization.
The opening of borders will cause some problems
to escalate. Many Armenians will be eager to visit
adjacent regions of Turkey which are part of Armenian history and the homeland of their ancestors. Visitors from Armenia will be appalled by the sad state of
Armenian historical heritage in those regions whereas
some local residents will resent the Armenian pilgrimages and the memories they evoke. A surge of intolerance and nationalism on both sides will be inevitable.
With the border crossable, nationalist ideologies will
no longer rely solely on historical memories but also on
everyday problems that did not happen as long the two
nations did not interact. The already existing and rather
neurotic discourse about Turkish “crypto-Armenian”
citizens will intensify in both countries. Descended
from Armenians who survived the Genocide as a result
of adopting or being forced to adopt Turkish identity and faith, the “crypto-Armenians” preserve some
form of Armenian identity. They are seen as a threat
to national identity by Turkish nationalists, and to
ethnic and religious identity, by Armenian nationalists. Moreover, according to some data, up to a third
of the population of the Turkish regions that border
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on Armenia are Azeri, i.e. people having some aspects
of Azerbaijani identity.
Scenario 3: Long & Pessimistic
The border opens by 2025 as a result of slow, bit-bybit normalization. Following the 2010 suspension of
Football Diplomacy, bilateral relations relapse into the
pre-2008 stagnation phase, both in terms of interstate
relations and the perceptions of elites and expert communities. The two countries continue their quest for
normalization, without, however, making any efforts
to compromise, but rather trying to induce one another
to make concessions.
The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh may become a
deterrent to Armenia–Turkey rapprochement. Mounting militaristic rhetoric, renewed warfare in the conflict
zone (regardless of its results) or any other force majeuredevelopments in the South Caucasus may slow down
Armenia–Turkey normalization.
However, given the regional trends towards integration with Europe, and Turkey’s ambitions to boost its
role in regional and world politics, to which unsettled
relations with Armenia will continue creating obstacles,
normalization will still unfold, albeit slowly, unevenly
and painstakingly. The international community will
play a relatively low-profile but still positive role in rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. Domestic perceptions of mutual relations will remain overall negative.
Conclusion
At which stage this process will be in 2025—the very
beginning of mutual ties, the most acute stage of trying
to come to grips with each other, or already the stage of
mutual adaptation—will depend on exactly when the
border opens. Any risks to this process are external; they
do not stem from Armenia–Turkey relations but from
Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. A profound crisis in the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh can have repercussions
for the Armenia–Turkey relationship.
About the Author
Alexander Iskandaryan is Director of the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan, Armenia.
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Georgia Post-2013: The Road to the Presidential Elections and Beyond
By Ulrike Graalfs, Ivlian Haindrava, and Tornike Sharashenidze, Berlin and Tbilisi
Abstract
It is hard to believe that by 2013, President Mikheil Saakashvili, then aged 46, will withdraw from politics
when his second term in office ends. This young president has shown himself too ambitious to simply put
down the pen and vacate the presidential palace for an early retirement. In order to understand what lies on
the road ahead for Georgia before and after the 2013 presidential elections, it is essential to look at the current political trends and developments in a country that still sees its western course challenged by its powerful Russian neighbor in a geopolitically contested region.
The Political Future of Mikheil Saakashvili
While it can be excluded that President Saakashvili
will run for a third presidential term in 2013, it cannot be ruled out that he will follow some variant of a
Putin–Medvedev model in order to maintain a powerful political position after 2013. To this end, he may
transform the Georgian political system from a presidential to a semi-presidential or (in a far less likely scenario) to a parliamentary system, creating a new post
for himself via amendments to the constitution before
his term in office ends. But Georgia is not Russia, and
even if the president pushes for a candidate loyal to
him to rise to power in 2013, or even if he manages
to create a meaningful post for himself, it remains
unclear whether this strategy would bear fruit in the
long-run or would simply prepare the way for proper
transition of power.
Nevertheless, the legal basis for such changes may
be put into place sooner rather than later, possibly even
before the parliamentary elections in 2012, as a commission to review the Constitution is already in place.
Although this process, which has been endorsed by the
Venice Commission, seems to be a participatory one at
first glance, Saakashvili holds the necessary power to
modify a new draft Constitution to his advantage at
any point convenient for him.
Whereas it is no secret that the reform efforts of
President Saakashvili have somehow lost momentum
in recent years and that some domestic as well as international observers have been quite critical of his policies, his hold on power remains almost unchallenged,
due to the fact that he has devised a system of tight control which rests on four pillars, namely control over the
distribution of wealth, excessive role of the state security forces, politicization of other state institutions, and
management of information.1
1
The authors conscientiously do not use the phrase information
control, paying tribute to the fact that TV channels and newspapers echoing the views of the opposition exist in Georgia.
The Government’s Grip on Wealth and
Media
In Georgia, the accumulation and distribution of wealth
is still largely dependent on the consent of the government. The “state fund bubble”, which has been inflated
by recent foreign development assistance, is often selectively distributed via an elite-dominated network of corruption combining state actors with Georgian economic
players. Protest regarding the government’s approach
is rather ineffective, as the Ministry of the Interior,
headed by Vano Merabishvili, and the Ministry of Justice, headed by Zurab Adeishvili, stand firmly behind
government policies, preventing any changes to current
practices. Thus, the state appears as an oppressive force
which sees its policies through despite criticism voiced
by civil society actors questioning the official government views.
An important means the government uses to suppress
its public critics is its influence over the media. Transparency International provided a very telling summary
of the situation in November 2009, noting that “Today,
Georgia’s media is less free and pluralistic than it was
before the Rose Revolution in 2003 and the ousting of
President Eduard Shevardnadze.” Another case in point
is the March 2010 broadcast by Imedi TV of a mockdocumentary about a new Russian invasion, which was
meant to draw attention to a persistent Russian threat.
The way it was presented, however, caused a severe outcry
among the Georgian population and drew a worrisome
picture of the extent the state is willing to permit information directed at the public to be manipulated in order
to serve its purpose. Since then, the opening of Channel 2 with a declared aim to accord equal airtime to all
parties may signal attempts to steer a different course.
Nevertheless, voluntary censorship on the one hand,
and disproportionate representation of opposition channels and misinformation (spread not only by the government-controlled channels, but also by channels close to
the opposition), on the other hand, are still contribut-
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ing to the lack of thoughtful commentary about politics
and policies in the public sphere. At the same time, constructive criticism and disagreement with the administration’s policies from within its own structures remain
absent. This phenomenon results from a concentration
of power in the hands of the president who demands
absolute loyalty from the people serving in government
institutions and the presidential bureaucracy.
Room for Political Change
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the government has
constructed a system that does not leave much room for
new challengers to rise or political changes, the possibility of change before or during 2013 still exists. It is especially likely if the current ruling circle—including the
president and his closest confidants (all of whom have
not yet demonstrated any presidential ambitions) Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria, and Minister of Justice Zurab Adeishvili—fails to agree on a future model for Georgia.2
Any erosion of the current unity among the ruling elite
may lead to unexpected changes, possibly including public unrest. It must be kept in mind, however, that even
in the case of unanticipated changes, most potential
future political leaders visible in the Georgian political
landscape today represent a certain continuity, as they
can be regarded as products of either this or the previous administration. Nonetheless, the domestic political landscape in Georgia is currently undergoing some
transformations.
Most notably, the recent municipal elections—
administered in a better way than previous ones
although still far from flawless3 —are remarkable in two
ways: First, the results passed unchallenged and without people taking to the streets. Second, the mayor of
Tbilisi, Gigi Ugulava, has been directly elected for the
first time. The vote lent credence to his ability to govern
and made him more confident, which may enable him
to challenge the current establishment and its course
from within. Given his presidential ambitions, Ugulava represents another strong, charismatic leader in the
ruling party, whom Saakashvili may need to accom2
3
The current mayor of Tbilisi, Giorgi Ugulava, used to belong
to President Saakashvili’s inner ruling circle, but due to some
unspecified developments, it is speculated that he is no longer
part of it. The reason may be presidential ambitions or disagreement with the future political model to be imposed on Georgia.
For a full assessment of the May 30, 2010 Elections see: International Election Observation Mission: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, www.osce.org/documents/
odihr/2010/05/44179_en.pdf.
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modate in the run-up to 2013 so as not to risk internal
party divisions.
Meanwhile, opposition leaders such as Irakli Alasania, Davit Usupashvili or Salome Zourabishvili essentially propose to continue the reform efforts and western
orientation Saakashvili has attempted during his presidency, promising improvements and corrections of the
administration’s domestic and foreign policy mistakes.
At the same time a new political force has begun to take
shape in recent months. Promising a different course
based on closer relations with Russia, it may come to
represent a challenge to the existing political direction
of the country, if it manages to consolidate the current
nascent trends and to be embraced by a sufficient number of the Georgian electorate.
The Russia Factor in Domestic Politics
Amidst a rising sense of dependency on Russia after the
August War and a perception that the West is taking
an increasingly hesitant attitude toward Georgia, former Speaker of the Parliament Nino Burjanadze and
former Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli have emerged
as examples of political figures catering to the possibility of restoring ties to Russia. Burjanadze is eager for to
return to political power while Nogaideli is a technocrat,
who some claim may be able to run the country. The
two highlight the benefits of a closer alliance with Russia for a discontented part of the population negatively
affected by the deteriorated situation regarding South
Ossetia and Abkhazia,4 the unilateral Russian embargo
on Georgian goods, the post-war economic decline and
the effects of the global financial and economic crisis.
In addition, the closure of the Russo–Georgian border has put great strain on the large Georgian Diaspora
living and working in Russia in terms of supporting and
communicating with relatives and friends on their native
soil. These circumstances underline the vulnerability of
Georgia vis-à-vis its powerful northern neighbor and
in the absence of a closer and improved relationship
with western allies5 that provides a solid sense of secu4
5
The authors acknowledge that the Abkhaz and South Ossetian issues need to be dealt with more constructively in order to
achieve sustained progress in Georgia. The problem is far reaching and cannot be addressed within the limits of this analysis.
Strong political will and a change in discourse would be needed
to start tackling the issues at hand. Among other things, the
respective societies would have to be prepared for and engaged
in a long-term process aiming at normalization without quick
payoffs or misguided hopes for a resolution or reintegration of
the territories in the short-term.
Two developments are noteworthy in this regard: 1) Saakashvili was denied any official visit with Western leaders for almost
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rity, underscore the importance of normalization with
Russia to an increasing number of Georgians—even if
it comes at a cost. Russia has supported this new political force and even facilitated its rise through a series of
meetings with high-ranking Russian officials in Moscow.
Despite the fact that Russia restrained itself from conquering Georgia in 2008, it has not given up its hopes
for home-grown regime change, which it actively supports in order to help a more convenient administration
rise to power in Georgia.
While weakening the opposition, Burjanadze and
Nogaideli’s moves seem to have been welcomed by Saakashvili, who uses their pronouncements to polarize
the domestic debate and sell himself once again as a
pro-western hero against pro-Russian villains—a theme
not entirely new to Georgian politics—meanwhile distracting from domestic problems and polishing his own
image as the defender of western values in the eyes of
Europe and the US. The president’s effort represents
an indistinct picture of his rule aimed at distorting the
actual situation and also underlines his strategy to discredit all opposition figures based on their real proRussian aspirations or a construct thereof. Despite this
political game, it cannot be ignored that the pressure
Georgia is facing from Russia remains real. A pro-Russian course led by a new Georgian administration after
2013, although currently no more than a theoretical
construct, would severely limit the country’s sovereign
foreign and domestic policy conduct and push against
western influence in the entire region.
The Geopolitical Environment:
Turkey and Russia
Nevertheless, what will happen until 2013, thus paving the road for post-2013 Georgia, does not entirely
depend on internal developments, but may also be
heavily influenced by external factors. In a nutshell, if
Georgia remains a focal point of western interest and if
the West manages to provide a credible sense of security to Georgia and to find a way to motivate and hold
the administration accountable for a process of democratic reforms, it may be possible to refocus the current
domestic development path on sustainable modernization efforts. However, if the West decreases its involvement and loses interest in the country, the possibility
for a political turn towards Russia and subsequent Russian influence permeating social and political structures
two years after the war and 2) Turkish, Kazakh, and Arab/Eastern foreign direct investments increase as western ones decline.
This is also mirrored as increasing official rhetorical adherence
towards these states.
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in Georgia may no longer be excluded. These developments would pose a threat, not only to Georgia, but
also to the West.
While Russia’s desire to dominate the region does
present a necessary condition to threaten western influence, it alone will not be sufficient to achieve this aim
without an important ally by its side, namely Turkey.
If the West continues to alienate Turkey, the country
may well strengthen its eastern foreign policy vector
by enhancing its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asian region, whereby also seeking closer ties with
Russia. This Realpolitik-approach, combined with established economic and military interdependencies in the
region, would be sufficient for Russia to strangle Georgia whenever it desired and thereby divide the region
into a Turkish and Russian sphere of influence, while
the unconsolidated western powers would be pushed
into the position of mere bystanders.
Although these remain distant threats for the time
being, civil society actors in Georgia are taking note of
the fact that a creeping change is taking place in the
domestic political arena. Unease about the government’s
increasingly sophisticated methods to lever out democratic processes and the greater likelihood of renewed
Russian influence in Georgia and its negative consequences for the country’s development path is spreading. This is perceived not only as a short-term danger to
the country, but one that could have detrimental longterm effects, as it would put one of the greatest hopes
for Georgia’s future in jeopardy, namely true change
administered by those who not only pay lip service to,
but embrace western and European values and are willing to put them into practice.
Georgia Divided
The struggle permeating Georgian society today is one
between future-oriented segments and those who have
settled for a way of doing business as usual and who are
geared to the past. The growing fragmentation within
Georgia needs to be addressed in order for the “Europeanization project” not to fail. Consensus building and
increasing compatibility between liberal and traditional
values through domestic political and social processes
would be a valuable first step. Realizing the potential
for domestic consensus that a reform of the political system and a new constitution may yield, understanding
and mobilizing overlapping interests of different parties,
as well as reinvigorating the stalled reform process and
strengthening—instead of weakening—the pro-western
force that civil society represents, would be logical steps
to follow. For now, however, these remain pipe dreams.
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But the years 2012–2013 are important precisely
due to the fact that—at least in theory—there exists
the possibility of a new pro-European reformist coalition (including some of the best among those now in
power) coming to power. Nevertheless, if the present
administration fails to take the necessary steps to modify the current course, it may divide society even further
amidst a polarized political environment and create the
conditions that will make radical changes to the system
seem necessary. Russia would be the likely benefactor
of a fragmented Georgian society confronted with continuous political strife. It could easily foster and take
advantage of this domestic divide in order to strengthen
its own position, not only in Georgia, but possibly in
the entire region.
Three Scenarios
The First Scenario that follows from the text envisions a
Georgia that sees its internal and external developments
strengthened by sustained western support, including
a partnership where problems can be openly addressed,
while consensual solutions and accountability are properly monitored. Pro-western forces and civil society are
tactically embraced, improving Georgia’s image abroad.
A culture of constructive criticism conditions a new
openness that lends room to freedom of expression. The
process of reviewing the constitution gains participatory
character and helps to assess Georgia’s recent political
past and build consensus for a more inclusive future. A
reassured public can fend off destructive attempts by outside powers to interfere with Georgian internal affairs
and the attempts to support opposition forces within the
country only further a pluralist political environment.
As the political landscape transforms following the positive trend demonstrated by the recent municipal elections and after procedures are improved and substance
follows suit, the likelihood of moving towards free and
fair elections in 2013 increases, preparing the way for
a new pro-western coalition with a moderate attitude
towards Russia to take over and govern the country. The
positive and democratic developments in Georgia give
new impetus to conflict transformation efforts, which
gradually develop in a more constructive direction.
The Second Scenario suggests that western support for
Georgia continues in the established frameworks, but is
not perceived as a serious commitment or as sufficiently
strong to ensure the adherence to the Europeanization
project by the government. While the administration
mostly focuses on and rhetorically defends its achieve-
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ments, a laissez faire attitude among the western allies
relieves the government of pressure for a more critical
assessment and much needed accountability. Uncontested set-backs in democratic developments peak in
the institutionalization of light authoritarianism. President Saakashvili manages to find an effective method to
promote a successor that grants him sustained influence
extending beyond 2013. Relations with Russia remain
hard to improve thereafter and are marked by occasional
Russian attempts to meddle in Georgia’s internal affairs
by various means. Unable to resist the temptations of
polarized and personalized politics, political processes
with the semblance of democracy are nevertheless proposed occasionally. Filling them with substance can
only be achieved in the long-term and in accordance
with political will, which in turn depends on external
and internal pressures. As a growing part of the public
returns to doing business as usual; the future-oriented
segments devoted to European values are experiencing
the pressure of marginalization. Due to strong convictions, they nevertheless continue their work under difficult conditions, pushing for change. Progress and meaningful changes are slowed down. Meanwhile, internal
cohesion remains, due to a strong sense of tradition,
culture, and nationalism, supported by the religious
establishment. Georgia is unable to develop its immense
potential, which also impacts any efforts to transform
the territorial conflicts in a productive fashion.
The Third Scenario that can be inferred from the discussion above is that the West turns its back on Georgia due to unsatisfactory progress which is perceived as
a mockery to its western allies. Russian support within
the country gains momentum, particularly as Russia
exploits internal weaknesses until a friendly regime
comes to power in Georgia. External manipulation in
the form of mobilizing discontented segments of society and toying with ethnic grievances creates a constant
threat of disintegration, in an atmosphere of divide and
rule. Polarized politics and a regime of tight state control
are the only means to induce a certain level of stability,
while the potential for internal strife as well as renewed
conflicts increases. Over time, Georgia grows increasingly dependent on Russia and Turkey, which tighten
their control over the region, marginalizing western
influence. Georgia’s change of course has detrimental
effects for regional developments, especially as civil society actors throughout the region have long looked to it
as an inspiration for democratic and free development.
(please see overleaf for information about the authors)
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About the Authors
Ulrike Graalfs is currently on leave from her position as Director of the Public and Economic Policy Program at The
American Academy in Berlin. Ivlian Haindrava is Director of the South Caucasus Studies programme at the Republican Institute in Tbilisi. Tornike Sharashenidze is Founder and Head of the International Affairs Programme at the
Georgian Institute of Public Affairs in Tbilisi.
European Partnership and the South Caucasus: Framework Condition for a
Grand Bargain in 2025?
By Martin Kremer, Berlin
Abstract
The future of the South Caucasus will depend to a large extent on overcoming geopolitical rivalry in the
region and establishing working relations among the key external actors with influence in the region. A
peaceful transformation of the region requires the successful management of the common neighborhoods
between Russia and the EU. In fact, in the future, the EU, much more than the US, will emerge as the main
player in region, as its interests are driven not only by immediate strategic, but also by far sighted economic
and social considerations. In order to create the conditions which facilitate first and foremost the stability
of this troubled region, the EU will need to work towards drawing Russia and the US into a larger European security framework which will necessitate close cooperation with other external players and international organizations.
Main Players in the Region
Good framework conditions between Russia and the West
remain essential to addressing many of the more difficult
challenges to regional and international peace and security. The tentative debate on a new security order for a
wider Europe, which began in the wake of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s reaffirmed policy of modernization and the “resetting” of US–Russia relations, highlights the value of a comprehensive partnership between
the West and Russia. Both sides share far more than just
common history and geography. At the same time since
the beginning of the 21st century, mutual estrangement,
misunderstandings, and divergent perceptions and narratives have created a framework within which crises have
divided Russia from the West and have divided the West
over the question of how to deal with Russia.
The South Caucasus remains a focal point in that
respect as the region is situated at the interface of the
EU’s Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy Initiative, and is in the remit of the greater Middle East
and new energy supply projects from Central Eurasia to
Europe. The Georgia crisis—as well as the unresolved
conflict in Nagorno Karabakh and the explosive situation in the Northern Caucasus—have demonstrated
amply the large potential for conflict in the South Cau-
casus region. The fundamental question to both Russia and the West is whether the two sides will find ways
to create conditions which are conducive to successfully manage conflict. In the years to come, the bulk of
responsibility for managing substantive relations with
Russia as well as the neighboring countries of the postSoviet space, will clearly lie with the European Union
and its members states, as their interests in this region
are driven not only by strategic consideration (as is the
case with the US), but also by cooperative economic ones.
The EU and its member states, but also Turkey as an
emerging regional power, will need to find a re-politicized strategic approach to developments in the European neighborhood—not only by supporting bilaterally
a challenging political, social and economic reform process within the South Caucasus countries, but also by
engaging with new economic and mobility incentives
with the region and regional powers as a whole. The big
test for the EU’s Eastern Partnership and strategic relations will be to unlock the region’s potential for intraregional cooperation by a comprehensive and transformative Eastern Policy which uses a sectorial approach
to bring Russia closer to the EU.
The challenge will, however, by far exceed the necessity of cooperation in economics, societal transformation,
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trade and energy. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will have to contribute decisively in the near term, drawing on the already
existing EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia. To put it
in different terms: soft security cannot replace hard security; this is all the more true in the face of the looming
ethno-territorial conflicts which feature so prominently
in the South Caucasus.
Three Scenarios
In an optimistic—ideal world—scenario (which could
be dubbed “shared responsibilities”) the EU, Russia,
NATO and OSCE all live up to their high potential.
The EU is making best use of its new external action
opportunities under the Lisbon Treaty. Under this winwin scenario, sectoral cooperation will deliver the greatest impact of European Eastern policy, with neighboring states step-by-step becoming elements of European
integration. According to the well proven formula that
security in wider Europe is not possible against but only
with Russia, NATO and OSCE rise to their challenges
and put into place the European security architecture
which was envisaged in the Charter of Paris in 1990.
In a pragmatic—probably more realistic—scenario
(which could be called “enhanced mosaic cooperation”)
concrete projects replace suspicion with an atmosphere of
cooperation—having also an immediate positive impact
on the South Caucasus region. Short of providing revolutionary change, the EU, Russia and the participants
in the Eastern Partnership (including the three South
Caucasus countries) make the best use of their partnership for modernization. NATO and OSCE manage “to
get Russia right” and to negotiate a reinvigorated European security order—altogether resulting in the respect
of existing geopolitical constraints but also allowing for
as much Europeanization as possible.
In a negative—unfortunately not entirely to be
excluded—scenario (tantamount to “turbulent or even
imploding neighborhoods”) tensions in the shared
neighborhood rise, with a “geopolitical race to the bottom” looming. Likewise a scenario of “negative neglect”
for the region could even materialize. The EU’s relations
with Russia neither pass a test of cooperation on global
issues nor on neighborhood, energy, rule of law and
democracy concerns. In spite of all efforts, the Eastern
Partnership does not develop any transformative power
or any lasting avenues for interregional cooperation. The
window of opportunity for achieving a sustainable European security architecture is irrevocably closing.
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Toward a New Security Framework
The likelihood of achieving favorable framework conditions, reinforcing the EU’s numerous post-conflict activities in the South Caucasus region, will decisively depend
on how the issue of a genuine European security order
will be addressed. Only if the EU and the West manage
to get Russia right will a sustainable European security
architecture emerge. Dangers posed by an “expanded
West” and a “shrunken East” in which each side too
often continues to view the other as a rival have been
exposed starkly by the August 2008 conflict in Georgia. Nor is Georgia the only flashpoint along the unstable frontier between Russia and Europe. Frozen conflicts similar to the ones in Georgia exist in a number
of other European states including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Moldova, and potentially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ukraine. The possibility of escalation, along
with the absence of a mechanism for regulating these
conflicts, raises the specter of further instability in the
future, a prospect all the more perilous should external
powers compete for influence.
No satisfactory institutional mechanism currently
exists which would allow aligning Russian and Western interests in case the two sides disagree. A reinvigorated security framework dedicated to achieving practical solutions to major problems in relations between
Russia and the West could help both sides to overcome
a resurgent East–West polarization. In the long run, it
could also help reaffirm Russia’s European orientation
and potentially lay the foundation for deeper integration if Russia’s politics and civil society begin evolving
with the arrival in power of a younger generation. Likewise it could help to manage Russia’s dwindling economic and political influence in the post-Soviet space.
The problem remains to find a mechanism that
allows Russia to play a constructive role; that reinforces
the security of vulnerable states along Europe’s periphery, which continue to view Moscow as their greatest
threat; and that allows Europe, Russia, and the United
States to work jointly against common threats, all without paralyzing existing institutions. Instead of focusing
on Russia’s assimilation into Western dominated institutions, Europe and the United States should be pursuing a more restricted kind of security engagement with
Russia, based on a set of shared interests. The basic logic
underlying the Russian proposal for a new security structure is therefore sound, even if specific suggestions put
forward by Medvedev have been disappointing.
A new security framework that takes the principles of
nonintervention and sovereign equality seriously while
focusing on common threats like interstate conflict, ter-
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rorism, and drug trafficking would give Russia an incentive to contribute positively to Europe’s security while
separating these issues from more contentious questions
related to Russia’s domestic governance. By building
institutional linkages, it would promote mutual trust,
build the habit of cooperation among skeptical bureaucracies and security services, and at least keep the door
open to more substantive security integration in the
future. There are promising opportunities where a more
collaborative approach would be in the interest of both
Russia and the Europeans. Next to military security/
arms control issues, the two sides share a common interest in the stability of the post-Soviet states not formally
aligned to either Russia or the EU and NATO.
Avenues to Reduce Geopolitics in the
Region
On the issue of military balance it will be critical to prevent any further erosion in the system of agreements that
has already worked towards establishing a predictable and
stable relationship between Russia and Western powers. That means moving quickly to shore up the existing
arms control regime, including obtaining ratification of
the successor agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty and reviving the process of applying the adapted
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
The continued impasse over the adapted CFE agreement in particular is a major obstacle. In essence, the
West will not ratify the adapted agreement, which Russia badly wants (because it would relax limitations on
the deployment of Russian forces inside Russian territory and would ensure that ceilings on NATO deployments cover new members of the alliances) until Russia
follows through on the “Istanbul commitments,” under
which Russia is supposed to withdraw all forces from
Georgian and Moldovan territory—including the disputed region of Abkhazia. Despite the intractability of
this issue, Moscow and Washington have been exploring ways of bringing the treaty into force, and the prospect of a broader discussion of European security can
serve as an inducement for making progress.
The most prominent reason for Western skepticism
of the proposal for a new Euro-Atlantic security treaty
is fear that any new agreement will be used to hamstring NATO’s ability to carry out its collective security
responsibilities, or to admit new members. Indeed, the
very act of negotiating is possibly highlighting differ-
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ences among Europeans—unless the US and its European allies are providing sufficient leadership to make it
impossible for Russia to apply a “divide and rule” policy. Using the OSCE as a cornerstone for a new security
architecture, as currently in the so-called “Corfu process”, is certainly challenging, in large part because of
the dispute over the organization’s human dimension.
Strengthening the OSCE’s security role (the “politicalmilitary dimension”) in parallel with its commitment
to the human dimension, however, could address this
concern. Why not for example re-animate the classic
contact group format—the foreign ministers of the US,
Russia, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, plus
the EU and NATO (as recently floated by the chairman
of the Munich Security Conference Ischinger)? If the
shortcomings of the peripheral North Atlantic Council
are addressed, NATO could also be used as one of the
building blocks for a new security arrangement. Why
not also consider the proposal of a joint development of
a missile defense system (as proposed by NATO Secretary Rasmussen) and organize in addition a more effective security dialogue between Russia and the EU (as
suggested by German Chancellor Merkel and Russian
President Medvedev)?
Any agreement to give Russia a larger role in European security arrangements will of course be politically
challenging, given the background of the Georgian–
Russian war, the repeated quarrels over energy between
Russia and its neighbors, and the continued presence of
Russian troops in both Georgia and Moldova’s breakaway Transnistria region. Russia will have to give the
European and Americans further evidence of good will
on some of these issues before any concrete progress can
be made on a new security framework. Recent Russian
foreign policy achievements with regard to Ukraine,
Norway and Poland may finally allow President Medvedev to come forward with such evidence. .
Having said that, both sides have much to gain from
possible arrangements, all the more so if progress would
occur against the backdrop of an intensifying EU Eastern policy—thus helping to make an optimistic or at
least pragmatic framework scenario gradually become
reality. The result could then very well be a process—
even in the challenging conditions of the South Caucasus region—that by itself already creates an incentive
for some alleviation and—lastly—step-by-step resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus.
About the Author
Martin Kremer, M.C.L., is Senior Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, the German Institute for International and Security Analysis, in Berlin. This article reflects solely the author’s views.
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About the Caucasus Analytical Digest
Editors: Iris Kempe, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Lili Di Puppo
The Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) is a monthly internet publication jointly produced by the Heinrich Böll
Foundation in Tbilisi (www.boell.ge), the Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
(www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Resource Security Institute in Washington, DC (resourcesecurityinstitute.org/)
and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich (www.css.ethz.ch) with support from the German Association
for East European Studies (DGO). The Caucasus Analytical Digest analyzes the political, economic, and social situation in the three South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia within the context of international and
security dimensions of this region’s development. CAD is supported by a grant from the Heinrich Boell Foundation.
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The Heinrich Böll Foundation, affiliated with the Green Party of Germany, is a legally independent political foundation. The regional office for the South Caucasus was opened in 2003. Its main objective is to contribute to the forming of free, fair and tolerant societies in the region. The Foundation supports and facilitates cooperation of individuals and organizations throughout the region who, based on the principle values of human rights, search for the change
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