Closure, deduction and hinge commitments

Synthese, 2019

Duncan Pritchard’s Epistemic Angst promises a novel solution to the closure-based sceptical problem that, unlike more traditional solutions, does not entail revising our fundamental epistemological commitments. In order to do this, it appeals to a Wittgensteinian account of rational evaluation, the overarching theme of which is that it neither makes sense to doubt nor to believe in our anti-sceptical hinge commitments. The purpose of this paper is to show that the argument for the claim that there can be no rational basis to believe our anti-sceptical hinge commitments relies upon an implicit assumption about rational support that I label The Pritchensteinian Rational Grounds Principle. I argue that, insofar as this principle is intended to apply to closure-style inferences, it leads to irrational doxastic attitudes. I consider a seemingly plausible modification of the principle that would avoid this result but show that this modified principle faces serious problems of its own.

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, 2018

In his recent work, Duncan Pritchard defends a novel Wittgensteinian response to the problem of radical scepticism. The response makes essential use of a form of non-epistemicism about the nature of hinge-commitments. According to non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments cannot be known or grounded in rational considerations, such as reasons and evidence. On Pritchard's version of non-epistemicism, hinge-commitments express propositions but cannot be believed. This is the non-belief theory of hinge-commitments (NBT). One of the main reasons in favour of NBT over rival anti-sceptical Wittgensteinian views is that it has less theoretical costs and revisionary consequences than its rivals. In this paper, I argue that NBT fairs at least as bad as its rivals in terms of its theoretical costs and revisionism. In particular, I argue that NBT is inconsistent with certain kinds of philosophical disagreement; that it faces worries with mental-state scepticism; and that it faces difficulties in explaining how we can represent ourselves as committed to hinge-commitments.

Skepticism and Invariantism, C. Kyriachou & K. Wallbridge (eds.), Routledge, 2021

In this paper, I first present and discuss in some depth Wittgenstein's radical form of contextualism about knowledge ascriptions (§1). Accordingly, though superficially similar, uses of "I know" can serve three fundamentally different functions: an ordinary, genuinely epistemic one; a grammatical, non-epistemic one; and a 'philosophical', nonsensical one (§ §1.1-1.3). I then briefly present Wittgenstein's anti-skeptical strategies (§2), and compare my reading of On Certainty with therapeutic ones (§3.1), and with contextualist ones, such as Travis' and Williams' (§3.3-3.3). On reflection, the ordinary use of "I know" turns out to be the only common ground between Wittgenstein's position and contemporary contextualism regarding knowledge ascriptions. With respect to such a use, Wittgenstein was in fact an invariantist. I explore Wittgenstein's invariantism in (§4). In closing (§5), I consider the relationship between my own version of hinge epistemology, contemporary contextualism and skepticism. While I do not follow Wittgenstein in his claim that skeptical doubts are nonsensical, I don't think they pose a threat to our ordinary knowledge either. Yet, we do not have knowledge of hinges, since reasons for them would be circular. Hinges, rather, are rationally assumed, albeit without any justification, because they are constitutive of epistemic rationality. With that picture in hand, I then close by defusing the objection, raised by contextualists such as DeRose, that if we don't have knowledge of hinges, we would have to condone abominable conjunctions such as "I know there is a hand here, but I don't know

Extending Hinge Epistemology, Anthem Press, 2022

The aim of this paper is to evaluate a family of responses to Cartesian scepticism whose common point is to rely on the non-contextualist restriction of one or more epistemic principles; more precisely, principles asserting the closure of knowledge under various logical operations. I will attempt to show that one cannot respond to closure-based scepticism without considering other applications of closure principles than that which is usually the exclusive subject of discussion in the contemporary literature. Those other applications of closure principles give rise to different sceptical arguments, and I will argue that if one takes those other closure-based arguments into account (and understands the challenge raised by the sceptic in a minimally internalist and rational sense) then one is faced with serious difficulties, for it seems that no theoretical solution can be found unless one settles for some questionable dialectical misbehaviour, such as begging the question against the sceptic, most notably. In particular, I will defend the view that any solution relying on the Wittgensteinian idea of ‘hinge’ falls prey to those problems, if it is interpreted in such a way that it lends to a special kind of propositional attitude, distinct from ordinary belief.

Skepsis

Hinge epistemology is concerned with a particular approach to certain central epistemological questions that is inspired by Wittgenstein's remarks on knowledge, certainty, and related notions in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty. I here describe the version of hinge epistemology that I have articulated in recent work, along with its relevance to some fundamental epistemological topics. These topics include the problem of radical scepticism, the nature of epistemic vertigo and its relationship to Wittgensteinian quietism, epistemic relativism, and quasi-fideism regarding the epistemology of religious belief.

Skepsis

In this paper, I present and criticize three influential anti-skeptical proposals inspired by Wittgenstein´s On Certainty. I argue that these proposals are either ineffective anti-skeptical strategies or, more importantly, might lead us to another, subtle form of skepticism

2012

Hinge Epistemology is a special issue devoted to the relevance of Wittgenstein's conception of certainty in epistemology. This special issue, edited by A. Coliva & D. Moyal-Sharrock, is forthcoming (2015) in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. Contributions by Yves Bouchard, Annalisa Coliva, Pascal Engel, H.-J. Glock, John Greco, Allan Hazlett, Martin Kusch, Michael Lynch. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Luigi Perissinotto, Duncan Pritchard, Genia Schönbaumsfeld, and Claudine Tiercelin.

Sképsis, 2019

This is a critical commentary on Pritchard's book Epistemic Angst. In Section 2, I present the closure-based radical skeptical paradox. Then in Section 3, I sketch Pritchard’s undercutting response to this paradox. Finally, in Section 4, I put forward two concerns about Pritchard’s response and I also propose a reading of hinge commitments, the ability reading, that might put some pressure on Pritchard’s own reading of these commitments.