PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
on findings of monitoring the 11 April 2018 early Presidential Election in Azerbaijan
Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre
I.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre (EMDS) is a non-partisan and nonprofit organization promoting free and fair elections, human rights and democracy in
Azerbaijan.EMDS conducted long- and short-term observation of all stages of the 11 April 2018
Presidential Election, including nomination and registration of candidates, election campaign,
voting and vote counting on the Election Day. The organization also issued a statement 1
following the scheduling of the early election.
EMDS cooperated with 22 long-term (LTOs) and 166 short-term observers (STOs) during the
monitoring effort. STOs observed the Election Day at a random, representative sample of 125
polling stations in all election constituencies of the country in accordance with the sample-based
observation methodology.
The 11 April 2018 Presidential Election took place in an environment of increasing restrictions
on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association. Political repression has increased since
the 2013 Presidential Election, and the number of political prisoners has doubled, reaching 138
people. Independent media and civil society have faced severe restrictions to the point where
there is virtually no space in which to operate.
Amendments to the 2003 Election Code created legal obstacles to a number of electoral activities
and did not address the recommendations of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
Failure to address recommendations on ensuring the independence of election commissions and
preventing unauthorized interference with the electoral process is of particularly concern.
The campaign was characterized by a low level of political activities, discussions, and overall
public attention in comparison with the previous presidential election. There was no genuine
competition, and some candidates openly campaigned for the incumbent president Ilham Aliyev.
This limited alternative options for voters.
EMDS observed several shortcomings in the electoral administration. The Central Election
Commission (CEC) did not demonstrate an effort to prevent undue interference on the electoral
1
Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre STATEMENT on the scheduling of the early Presidential Election in Azerbaijan on 11
April 2018 - https://smdtaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/EMDS-_Statement.pdf
1
process, illegal campaigning in favour of the incumbent president, and pressure on observers and
voters. Abuse of administrative resources during the signature collection process and failure to
disclose information about candidates' incomeswere noted during the nomination and registration
of candidates.
On Election Day, EMDS recorded widespread, serious election violations that undermined
voting and counting processes. This included voting without registration in 47% of polling
stations, ballot-box stuffing in 53% of polling stations, and multiple voting in 53% of polling
stations. Only 8% of polling stations were free of major violations. The organization also
received reports of pressure and harassment towards observers and journalists who were raising
concerns about violations or attempting to monitor the counting process.
The turnout recorded by observers cooperating with EMDS was significantly lower than the
officially reported turnout at an overwhelming majority of polling stations. Through detailed
analysis, EMDS also found several other anomalies in the officially reported turnout figures.
These findings, combined with observation of ballot staffing in more than half of polling
stations, point to the likelihood that turnout was artificially inflated, raising doubts about the
credibility of results.
EMDS’s overall assessment is that the 11 April 2018 early Presidential Election was marred by
the widespread restrictions of political freedoms, limitations to conditions necessary for equal
and real competition, including for alternative choice, and violations of national legislation and
international standards on electoral integrity. Thus, the 2018 Presidential Election cannot be
considered free or fair.
II.
EMDS BACKGROUND
Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Centre (EMDS) is a non-partisan, independent, and
non-profit organization working towards holding free and fair elections and promoting human
rights and democracy in Azerbaijan.
EMDS is a predecessor of Election Monitoring Centre (EMC), which was established on 24 July
2001 and was illegally deprived of its registration by the Khatai District Court of Baku on 14
May 2008 following the illegal claims of the Ministry of Justice. EMDS applied for a state
registration to the Ministry of Justice in 2009, but the application was denied without proper
grounds. The organization challenged the decision of the Ministry and filed a complaint with the
court on a violation of the right to freedom of association. Domestic courts did not support
EMDS'sclaims, and the organization appealed to the European Court of Human Rights.
EMDS (also as EMC) has monitored 15 elections held in Azerbaijan since 2001. The
organization has conducted more than 600 trainings for approximately 14,000 people and
provided them with legal/technical support in their accreditation as observers.
Two weeks after the 2013 Presidential Election on 27 October, the Prosecutor General of
Azerbaijan launched a criminal investigation against the organization. As a result of the
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investigation, the chair of the organization Anar Mammadli and its executive director Bashir
Suleymanli were imprisoned for 2 years and 3 months, and 10 months respectively. EMDS
regards the criminal investigation as political persecution for monitoring of the Presidential
Election.
EMDS is a member of the European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO),
a platform of NGOs operating in the OSCE countries, Eastern Partnership Civil Society
Platform, the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE),and the Global Network of
Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM).
The organization's activities are based on the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, as well as the Declaration of Global Principles for
Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations.2
During the 11 April 2018 Presidential Election, EMDS assisted citizens, who wanted to be
observers on their own personal initiative, including getting accreditation at the Central and
Constituency Election Commissions as observers, and learning electoral regulations, observers'
rights and duties, as well as the code of conduct. Some of the accredited observers cooperated
with EMDS based on the principles of nonpartisan election monitoring and on a long-term basis.
EMDS carried out long-term observation with the support of 22 volunteer observers across the
country and monitored the preparations to the election, nomination, and registration of
candidates, election campaign, activities of election commissions, and media coverage of the
election. 166 short-term observers deployed to monitor Election Day based on a statistically
representative and randomly selected sample of polling stations across the country.
The combination of long-term and short-term observation allowed EMDS to have a
comprehensive assessment of the 11 April 2018 Presidential Election.
III.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The presidential decree to move the presidential election date six months earlier was issued
without clear rationale, without debate, and using powers obtained through an undemocratic
referendum. Azerbaijan’s electoral legal framework has been amended several times since its
2003 adoption. These series of amendments have ignored recommendations from credible
election observers and the Venice Commission, and instead have further restricted democratic
space in which electoral stakeholders can operate.
a) The legal basis for scheduling an early election
The President of Azerbaijan IlhamAliyev signed a decree on 5 February 2018 bringing the date
of the Presidential Election from October 2018 six months earlier on 11 April. Although the
decree was adopted in accordance with Article 101 of the Constitution and Article 179 of the
2
Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations
http://www.gndem.org/declaration-of-global-principles
3
Election Code, it violated the principles of democratic constitutionalism and periodicity of
elections.
The President obtained exclusive and unconditional power to declare early elections as a result of
the Constitutional amendments adopted in the September 2016 Referendum, which was
conducted in an undemocratic manner. Before the Referendum, early presidential elections could
be declared only in three cases: (i) resignation of the president; (ii) if the president lost his/her
capacity to work due to a medical condition; (iii) removal of the president from his/her post. The
Referendum granted the president with the right to call for early elections at his/her discretion.
The power to declare an early presidential election was introduced to the national legislation with
the non-democratic 2016 Referendum. 3The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe
criticised the proposed amendments to the Constitution for not having a clear rationale, not
involving the Parliament in the discussions, and lacking provisions specifying rules for the
amendments to take into effect.4
The presidential decree forscheduling early presidential election did not provide reasonable
justification and did not involve open public discussions in the parliament. Therefore, the
decision hindered the preparation of electoral participants, including the potential candidates,
domestic and international observers, for the presidential election. This also violated the
requirements regarding the reasonable frequency and timeframe stipulated in the international
documents5 that Azerbaijan is party to.
b) Election Code
The Election Code was adopted in 2003 and has been amended several times since. However,
most of the joint recommendations 6 of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission remain
unaddressed. On the contrary, the adopted amendments further restricted space for democratic
participation. In 2008, the election period was shortened from 120 days to 75 days, and the
alternative option for candidate registration registration deposit was eliminated.7 The 2010
amendments to the Election Code further reduced the election period to 60 days and shortened
the official campaign period to 22 days. The allocation of funding from the state budget to
registered candidates for financing their campaigns was also eliminated. All of these restrictive
amendments were adopted without consultation with political forces across the political
spectrum, civil society, Azerbaijani public, or the Venice Commission.
Numerous recommendations for improving the Election Code, including holding persons who
commit electoral violations accountable, extending the timeframe for submitting election
3
http://www.msk.gov.az/az/referendum/927/
Azerbaijan - Opinion on the draft modifications to the Constitution submitted to the Referendum of 26 September 2016, endorsed by the Veni ce
Commission at its 108th Plenary Session (Venice, 14-15 October 2016) http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDLAD(2016)029-e
5International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 25) and Protocol No 3 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms
6 Joint Recommendations on the Electoral Law and the Electoral Administration in Azerbaijan by the Venice Commission and the OSC E/ODIHR
adopted at the 8th meeting of the Council for Democratic Elections and endorsed by the Venice Commission at its 58th Plenary Session (Venice,
12-13 March 2004). http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2004)016-e
7 EMDS Assessment Report on Implementation status of recommendations on Improvement of electoral process in Azerbaijan
https://smdtaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/EMDS-AR-100917.pdf
4
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complaints, ensuring independence of the election commission by forming their composition on
the basis of equal representation of political forces, and introducing online registration of
domestic observers, were not addressed prior to the 11 April Presidential Election.
IV.
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT PRIOR TO THE ELECTION
The election took place in the context of more than 130 political prisoners, severe restrictions on
political freedoms, and widespread political repressions. In contradiction to the country’s
Constitutional requirements and international commitments, the government has not
demonstrated the political will to guarantee political freedoms during the election period.
a) Media and civil society
Freedom of expression was further restricted in the last year and prior to the election. In March
2017, the Parliament granted the Ministry of Communication and the courts with virtually
unlimited powers to block access to any website from Azerbaijan. A month later, the Ministry
used its new powers to block access to the country’s main independent news websites
Azerbaijani Bureau of the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Berlin-based Meydan TV, and
opposition newspaper Azadliq – on a questionable basis. Internet TV channels Turan TV and
"Azerbaijani Hour" were also blocked by the same court decision.
Defamation remains criminal despite the long-standing calls from the Council of Europe and
other international organizations. Instead, the parliament extended it to the Internet in November
2016. Several people, including bloggers and journalists, were recently jailed on defamation
charges. Prominent blogger and journalist MehmanHuseynov was sentenced to 2 years in prison
for defaming entire police in March 2017. Huseynov's videos covering properties of ministers
and other high-level officials reached more than a million views on social media just before his
arrest.
Eleven journalists and bloggers, along with two writers, remain in prison for criticising the
authorities according to the Working Group on Political Prisoners, which comprises of domestic
human rights defenders. The latest report of the Working Group contains 138 political prisoners,
including 12 political activists and 15 participants of social protests.8
Civil society is denied free space to operate. Amendments introduced to the law on "Nongovernmental Organizations" and law on "Grants" in 2013-2014 severely restrict NGOs' access
to foreign funding and impede their operations. The amendments created obstacles to civil
society organization for receiving donations and introduced further limitations for organizations
without state registration. The Ministry of Justice continues to routinely deny organizations state
registration, while local executive authorities interfere with and prevent events (seminars,
trainings or conferences) organized by independent civic groups. The authorities did not address
calls of a number of international organizations to lift obstacles to civil society's independent
operation. Instead, the government left the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) in
March 2017.
8
A Unified list of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan https://smdtaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Political-Prisoners-Report_AzerbaijanAugust_2017.pdf
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b) Political repression
Chair of the Republican Alternative (REAL) movement Ilgar Mammadov remains imprisoned
for more than 5 years despite the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights demanding
his immediate release. Mammadov was sentenced to 7 years in prison in February 2017 on
charges of organizing mass disorder and resisting arrest. Numerous appeals of REAL for the
allocation of venue to hold a constitutive congress for forming a political party were denied by
Baku city authorities. REAL was forced to hold its congress in secret on 7-8 April and
announced the results after the event.
Contrary to the country's legislation and international commitments, the authorities refused
appeals of opposition parties and independent groups for holding peaceful assemblies in the city
centre without providing reasonable justification. Opposition parties were offered a small venue
far from the city centre (Mahsul stadium) but faced technical challenges like targeted electricity
and internet shortages during the assemblies. Dozens of activists were detained and harassed by
the police before opposition rallies. Fifteen activists were detained prior to two opposition rallies
during the election period, while 81 members of the opposition Popular Front Party were
summoned to police before the 10 March rally alone.
The government intensified the attacks on Azerbaijanis living abroad, targeting their family
members in the country and launching a smear campaign during the election
period.The"Recognize Dictator IlhamAliyev" campaign launched by a group of Azerbaijani
activists living in Europe caused a strong reaction by the authorities, which held a series of
discussions on public and private TVs attacking the organizers of the campaign. Family members
living in Azerbaijan were also harassed. The brother and father of TuralSadigli, one of the
organizers of the campaign, were summoned to the police several times. Tural's brother
ElgizSadigli was sentenced to 30-days of administrative detention on charges of resisting police
on 23 February. Sisters of another exiled activist OrdukhanTeymurkhan were repeatedly
summoned to and harassed by police and were pressured to publicly criticize their brother.
A number of political and civil society activists were harassed by police and local authorities
after meeting with long-term observers of the OSCE/ODIHR election mission. Activists in
Ganja, Gazakh, Goychay, Guba, Khachmaz, Hajiqabul, andMingachevir were followed, filmed,
warned, and threatened by local authorities for talking to international monitors.
V.
NOMINATION AND REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES
The nomination and registration of candidates started on 20 February and lasted until 12 March.
Candidates were required to collect 40,000 support signatures from at least 60 election
constituencies (at least 50 signatures from each constituency) for registration.Fifteen nominees
requested signature collection forms, and 12 returned them. The Central Election Commission
(CEC) registered eight candidates, while four below candidates were denied the registration due
to insufficient number of support signatures:
Ali Aliyev, Citizen and Development party;
TuralAbbasli, White party;
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FuadAliyev, Liberal Democrat party;
AnarUmudov, independent candidate.
TuralAbbasli and Ali Aliyev called the decision of the CEC politically motivated.
The following persons were registered as candidates:
1. IlhamAliyev incumbent president, ruling New Azerbaijan party, running for the fourth
term;
2. ZahidOruj independent (non-partisan) MP, second-time presidential candidate;
3. Araz Alizada MP from Social-Democrat party, second-time presidential candidate;
4. GudratHasanguliyev MP from Whole Azerbaijan Popular Front party, fourth-time
presidential candidate;
5. FarajGuliyev MP from National Revival Movement party, second-time presidential
candidate;
6. Hafiz Hajiyev Modern Musavat party, fourth-time presidential candidate;
7. RaziNurullayev independent candidate, first-time presidential candidate;
8. SardarMammadov Democrat party, second-time presidential candidate.
Unlike the 2013 presidential election, major opposition parties like Popular Front, Musavat and
REAL, as well as, the opposition umbrella organization National Council of Democratic Forces,
and NIDA movement boycotted the elections, calling it illegitimate and describing the election
environment as undemocratic.
Candidates did not carry out an active countrywide signature collection campaign according to
the reports of independent observers. Cases of pressure or harassment of candidates'
representatives were not reported. There were reports of local executive authorities, employees
of state-funded organizations and municipalities taking part in the signature collection in favour
of some candidates, but no official complaints were lodged.
EMDS received credible reports about the collection of ID documents employees of state-funded
organizations, some private companies, school teachers and parents of students by directors of
these organizations, and local police officers prior to the election. These ID documents were
reportedly used for filling in support signatures in favour of some candidates.
Director of school no. 1 located in the 37th Election Constituency in Ganja instructed teachers to
collect copies of ID documents from students' parents. She stated that it was related to an
inspection from the Ministry of Education, but one employee of the school informed EMDS that
the ID details had been used for support signatures.
A member of the Precinct Election Commission (PEC) no. 4 of the 79th Constituency
MahlubZulfugarov took part in the signature collection process.
Employees of the Ganja city kindergarten no. 32 told EMDS that they were brought to the Ganja
branch office of the ruling YAP party where they participated in the signature collection for
another candidate ZahidOruj.
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VI.
ELECTION CAMPAIGNING
The campaign period started on 19 March and ended 24 hours before Election Day. The
campaign was marred bya lack of genuine competition or alternatives, unfair playing field,
restricted political activities, and limited discussions and overall public attention in comparison
with the previous presidential election.
a) Campaign on media
The campaign was characterized as low-key and lacking genuine competition. The CEC
allocated 3 hours of free air time on Public TV and 3 hours on Public Radio each week, equally
divided among the candidates. However, none of the candidates criticised the incumbent
president or any high-level officials during their TV appearances as part of the campaign.
Several candidates openly hailed the incumbent president during their speeches. EMDS
estimated that all candidates, with exception of SardarMammadov, spent 849 seconds in total
speaking positively about the incumbent president.9
State and private TVs aired campaign material in support of the incumbent before the official
start of the campaigning period in violation of the Election Code. On 9 February, a number
government-controlled organizations, including Writers Union, Composers' Association, Artists'
Association, Azerbaijan Theatre Employees' Association, National Academic Drama Theatre,
associations of architects, cinematographs, and Baku Musical Academy, held conferences
declaring their support for IlhamAliyev. State and private TV channels broadly covered these
events.
b) Participation of unauthorized persons in the campaign supporting the incumbent
In a blatant violation of the law on "Religious Freedoms," which prohibits the participation of
religious organizations in activities of political parties, on 14 February, leaders of the country’s
main religious confessions publicly called on their followers to vote for the incumbent
IlhamAliyev. These included SheykhulislamAllashshukurPashazada, chair of the Caucasus
Muslims' Board, Aleksandr, Archbishop of Baku and Azerbaijan, MelihYevdayev, leader of
mountainous Jews in Azerbaijan, Vladimir Fekete, Bishop of Roman Catholic Church, and
Robert Mobil, chair of the Albanian-Udine Christian community. Similarly, several NGOs issued
statements supporting the candidacy of Aliyev during the National Conference of NGOs, which
is a violation the law on NGOs.
EMDS also received reports that campaign in favour of the incumbent was carried out during the
Friday prayers in mosques in Aghdash, Ganja, Gazakh, andHajigabul regions. A representative
9
Pre-election monitoring results on 11 Aprel 2018 early presidential elections in Azerbaijan https://smdtaz.org/en/1996-2/
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of the Caucasus Muslims' Board for the Western region and official of the GanjaImamzada
shrine invited visitors of the shrine to support IlhamAliyev.
c) Abuse of administrative resources
The incumbent president signed a series of decrees increasing salaries of employees of statefunded organizations and allowances paid to large groups of the population during the election
period. Overall, the average 10% increase covered around 2 million citizens 30% of eligible
voters. This constituted an abuse of administrative resources to boost support for his candidacy.
Employees of state-funded organizations, teachers, and school students were brought to
campaign meetings with IlhamAliyev, Hafiz Hajiyev, FarajGuliyev, ZahidOruj and
RaziNurullayev. On 2 March, employees of state-funded organizations, and school students were
gathered in a meeting in Goychay supporting candidacy of IlhamAliyev under the instructions of
the head of the local executive authority. Similarly, employees of state-funded organizations and
school students were instructed to attend campaign concert in favour of IlhamAliyev's candidacy
in Imishli.
VII.
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION
Election administration is carried out by election commissions formed every five years. Despite
the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on election violations, which were
responsibility of Central and Constituency Election Commissions, the commissioners hvae not
been changed since 2003.On 6 February 2018, the CEC published the electoral calendar and
guidelines on the electoral process. EMDS recorded shortcomings in operations of the CEC and
the Constituency Election Commissions (ConEC) that are similar to previous elections.
a) Failure to ensure transparency
EMDS recorded cases of the CEC and lower election commissions failing to provide
transparency during the election. The CEC did not publish financial disclosures of presidential
candidates, despite information requests from media and widespread public interest. Some
candidates shared the information about their incomes and assets with journalists, but the
incumbent president IlhamAliyev did not provide this information. Despite recommendations by
credible election observersafter previous elections, the CEC also did not carry out the signature
verification process in an open and transparent manner.
b) Voter registration
The CEC did not clarify the almost 2-million-persondifference between the number of voters
announced by the CEC and the number of Azerbaijanis of voting age published by the State
Statistics Committee. The CEC puts the total number of voters at 5.2 million, while the Statistics
Committee states that there are 7 million peopleabove the voting age of 18 living in the country.
Despite being repeatedly raised by media, civil society groups and the OSCE/ODIHR, the CEC
did not address this discrepancy.
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c) Independence of election commissions
Election commissions failed to demonstrate independence from the government during the
election. Neither the CEC nor ConECs adequately addressed the reports of abuse of
administrative resources during the signature collection and election campaigning stages. The
CEC did not express concern when some NGOs and religious communities took an active part in
election campaigning (a clear violation of the Election Code), even though these actions were
widely covered by media.
d) Citizen observer accreditation
Azerbaijan’s long tradition of independent, nonpartisan citizen observation faced significant
challenges during this election, including accreditation.The CEC violated the timeframe for
accreditation of observers stipulated in the legislation according to many reports received from
independent observers. The legislation requires the CEC to review an application from an
observer within three days, but some applications were reviewed for three weeks. Furthermore,
more than 60 observers were denied registration due to questionable reasons like unverified
signatures, ineligible photos, incomplete documents, or not filling in the application personally.
Some ConECs asked observers illegal and unnecessary questions, including about their
workplace, political affiliation, and intentions for observation, during the accreditation process.
Local authorities harassed some observers through their employers and educationalinstitutions in
an attempt to discourage them from taking part in the election.
EMDS also received reports that employees of state-funded organizations were accreditedas
observers at ConECs on behalf of candidates and organizations without their consent or
information.
VIII. ELECTION DAY
a) Monitoring methodology and deployment of observers
On Election Day, EMDS deployed observers to a random, representative sample of polling
stations across the country in adherence with the sample-based observation (SBO) methodology.
SBO is a proven methodology used worldwide to monitor election day in the most accurate and
timely manner. Due to the statistically representative sample, the findings can be extrapolatedto
the entire country. EMDS aimed to inform the public about the quality of the conduct of the
electoral process by carrying out nonpartisan, independent, and impartial monitoring of the
election.
One hundred sixty six (166) short-term observers deployed to monitor the opening, voting, and
counting processes on the Election Day across the country. This report is based on information
received from 125 randomly selected polling stations, which together constitute a nationally
representative sample. The information covers voting, turnout, counting of votes, and declaration
of results.
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Observers reported their findings several times during Election Day via SMS and Facebook
Messenger. Observers also sent videos and photos of violations via WhatsApp.
b) Access of observers to polling stations and pressure on observers
Some observers were prevented from observing. In 20% polling stations, an observer was
prevented from observing at some point during the day. Some observers faced psychological and
even physical threats. In some cases, observers were removed from the polling station and not
permitted to return. For example, in Balaken District 109, PEC 11, an unknown person tried to
beat an observer. In Khazar District 14, PEC 24,while an observer was trying to take a picture of
an electoral violation, a group of unknown people intimidated the observer, and police were
called, causing the observer to leave the polling station. In Sabunchu District 28, PEC 25 the
municipal authority called the observer's family to pressure them. Another student observer was
pressured by his own university’s administration.These cases raise serious doubts about the
transparency of voting and counting process in those polling stations.
c) Set-up and opening of polling stations
EMDS is compiling and analyzing observer data on the opening process and will include those
findings in its final report.
d) Voting process
The voting process was marred by a significant number of violations across the country. Major
violations, such as ballot stuffing and multiple voting, occurred an even greater scale than the
last presidential elections in 2013. EMDS received reports of various violations during the voting
process and the table below shows the most impactful violations and their rate of occurrence
nationwide.
Type of the violation
Voting without being on the voters list
Multiple voting (including voting on someone's behalf)
Ballot box stuffing
Carousel voting or voters were brought to the polls in
special groups
Voters instructed to vote for a specific candidate.
Percentage of polling stations
47%
53%
53%
56%
28%
e) Closing and Counting
The closing and counting process was affected by several problems, including:
In 17%of polling stations, the counting process was not transparent.
In 52% of polling stations, a copy of protocol was not given to observers.
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f)
Turnout
In its sample of polling stations, EMDS instructed observers to count each voter that cast a
ballot. EMDS then compared these numbers to the officially announced turnout figures on the
CEC’s website and found that the turnout recorded by EMDS observers was significantly lower
than the officially reported turnout a large majority of polling stations. This finding, combined
with EMDS’ observation of ballot staffing in more than half of polling stations, points to the
likelihood that turnout was artificially inflated, which raises doubts about the credibility of
results.
The significant gap between EMDS’ observed turnout and the officially reported turnout was
consistent for each reported turnout time throughout the day, as shown below:
For 10:00 turnout: In 43% of polling stations, the turnout recorded by observers was at
least 50% lower than the officially reported turnout.
For 12:00 turnout: In 47% of polling stations, the turnout recorded by observers was at
least 50% lower than the turnout reported by officials.
For 15:00 turnout: In 55% polling stations, the turnout recorded by observers was at least
50% lower than the turnout reported by officials.
For 17:00 turnout: In 53% polling stations, the turnout recorded by observers was at least
50% lower than the turnout reported by officials.
For 19:00 turnout: In 45%of polling stations, the turnout recorded by observers was at
least 50% lower than the turnout reported by officials.
EMDS also found several other anomalies in the officially reported turnout figures that further
undermine trust in the process, including:
IX.
In at least 13 districts (covering more than 400 polling stations), the turnout rate at all
polling stations within each of the 12 districts was almost exactly the same percentage,
at all five reporting times.
o For example, in Nakhichevan District 1, all 35 polling stations had turnout of 24%
at 10:00, 38% at 12:00, 57% at 15:00, 72% at 17:00, and 83% at 19:00.
57 polling stations had 100% turnout, and another 65 polling stations had between 97 –
99% turnout.
Hundreds of polling stations had officially-reported turnout figures with unreasonably
high rates of voters per minute – some even as high as five voters per minute during
certain intervals.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
a) Conclusions
The early Presidential Election was declared without inclusively debating the political
need for it, in violation of the principle of the periodicity of elections, without informing
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all stakeholders in advance, and benefiting the powers granted by undemocratic 26
September 2016 Constitutional Referendum.
Opportunities for political activities have been further restricted and the number of
political prisoners doubled since the previous presidential election resulting in failure to
establish a real competitive political environment.
Restrictions on political freedoms, in particular with regards to freedoms of expression,
assembly,and association, were further increased in the last five years and did not allow
for free expression of public will during the 11 April 2018 Presidential Election.
The authorities did not lift restrictive amendments to the Election Code adopted in 2008
and 2010 and failed to address the recommendations of domestic and international
organizations.
The CEC did not publish financial disclosures of presidential candidates. Although
candidates did not lodge any complaints about the signature collection process, the
involvement of local executive authorities in the signature collection in favour of several
candidates was recorded.
Equal and competitive political conditions among opposing political forces, including the
candidates were not ensured during the election campaign. The process was held in an
environment lacking political alternatives, with some candidates openly campaigning for
the incumbent president.
Shortcomings noted in previous elections were recorded with regards to the
administration of elections and the activities of the CEC which did not demonstrate
efforts to prevent undue interference into the electoral process, illegal campaigning in
favour of the incumbent president and pressure on observers and voters.
On the Election Day, EMDS noted widespread, serious violations, including cases of
multiple voting, bringing voters to polling stations in groups, ballot box stuffing, and
harassment of observers, which cast doubts on the results of the voting in many polling
stations.
The 11 April 2018 Presidential Election was marred by gross violations on the Election
Day, pre-election period lacking equal and competitive environment, violation of the
national legislation and international standards and therefore cannot be considered free or
fair.
b) Recommendations
EMDS offers the following preliminary recommendations:
The election commission should hold relevant officials responsible for election violations
and inform the public about these decisions.
The government should demonstrate the political will to ensure freedoms of expression,
assembly, andassociation, should stop all persecutions of its opponents with dissenting
and critical views to eliminate political tensions in citizen-state relations, and should
release all political prisoners.
The authorities should improve the Election Code based on the recommendations of
credible domestic and international election observation organizations, as well as the
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
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The election commission should guarantee transparency in the electoral process and
create the necessary conditions for all citizens to carry out full and unobstructed
observation of the process.
EMDS Executive Board
Baku, 12 April 2018
For more information:
E-mail: emc.az2001@gmail.com
Phone: (+994 50) 333 46 74
Web:
www.smdtaz.org
Facebook: www.facebook.com/AZEelections/
Twitter: @SMDT_EMDS
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