THE MALAWI 2014 TRIPARTITE ELECTIONS: IS DEMOCRACY MATURING? ! ! Editors: Nandini Patel and Michael Wahman Published by The National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) P. O. Box 1046 Lilongwe Tel: +265 1770643 ©!NICE!2015! ! All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. Copy Editor: Celia Swann Design & Layout: Rafiq Hajat Printed by: Design Printers, Lilongwe. Published with financial support from the European Union II! Chapter 10 OBSERVING THE ELECTIONS Anna Kapambwe Mwaba 1. Introduction The 2014 elections marked Malawi’s 50 years of independence and 20 years of multiparty democracy. In a continued effort to support Malawi’s democratic process, international election observers have been present in varying capacities at all Presidential and Parliamentary elections since 1994. This election proved no different, with multiple international organisations146 present for election day. Therefore, this chapter seeks to place these elections in the larger Malawian political context and assess the role of international election bodies in the 2014 Malawi elections. Furthermore, it seeks to highlight the key critiques of observers in the last twenty years, in an effort to establish if, and how, election monitors are able to support the transparency of the election process. In doing so, it underlines what could be learnt about Malawi’s democratic development from these elections and the role played by international actors in supporting its consolidation process. It also highlights the limitations of these efforts and how domestic institutions can play a larger role in supporting democratic development in the country. 2. International Election Observation in Malawi (1994-2014) In the last two decades, the number of countries that have undergone monitoring has significantly increased; there were 80% of “non-established democracies” being observed in 2004, in comparison to 30% in 1990 (Kelley 2012: 17). There are several benefits to election observation. Primarily, it is considered a deterrent for electoral fraud, as leaders fear the repercussions of being caught by observers (Carothers 1997, Geisler 1993, Hyde 2011). These fraud-moderating effects of election monitoring, though not uniform across elections, are referred to as the “observer effect” (Hyde 2007). This “observer effect” is the result of these organisations being viewed as “the eyes and ears of the international community” (Carter Centre 2014). In addition, election observers are seen as “helping with the evaluation of the level of compliance with norms, which legitimises and increases support for the process” (Padilla and Houppert 1993: 77). These observer missions help reassure voters that their ballot is protected. Following election day, the activities undertaken by the organisations deploying these missions, such as projects focused on the protection and promotion of human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 146 The international observer missions present were: African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Electoral Commissions Forum –Southern African Development Community (ECFSADC), Southern African Development Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF), European Union (EU), Commonwealth Secretariat (CS), Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), National Democratic Institute (NDI), Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), Zimbabwe Elections Support Network (ZESN), Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), along with observer missions sent on behalf of diplomatic missions in the country. 158! rights, supporting civil society, refining the democratic electoral process and addressing economic or development challenges, all contribute to building local institutional capacity (Carter Centre 2014). In Malawi’s previous elections, observers were perceived as raising public confidence through their meetings with electoral stakeholders and by serving as neutral witnesses to the process (Pitso 2004, M’buka 2009). Since the founding elections in 1994, international observers have been granted unimpeded access to all election events, and the freedom to move around the country in order to verify and monitor the quality of the electoral process (Commonwealth 1994: 10). Additionally, they are responsible for the detection and exposure of electoral irregularities and assessing the extent to which the elections abide by international standards (Pitso 2004: 253). However, attitudes towards election monitors following the 2014 elections were not as positive. Certain groups challenged their announcement that the election was fair while acknowledging the “considerable shortcomings” of the process. This has shaken the faith of some in the ability of observers to serve as neutral monitors of an election; indeed civil and political rights activist, Chikondi Butao Banda, went so far as to refer to them as a “disgrace and deterrent to Africa’s democratisation process” (Nyasa Times 2014). Observer reports tend to be organised along similar lines, as follows: the legal framework, election administration, voter registration, registration of political parties and candidates, election campaign, media and elections, election day and transmission of results (EU 2014). These different areas indicate the key aspects of a functioning democracy and those taken into account when evaluating the “success” of an election (Diamond and Morlino 2004). Following this order, the sections below take a closer look at mission observations so as to establish points of overlap across the various electoral cycles. 2.1 Legal Framework The 1994 elections marked the start of Malawi’s democratic experiment, with the newly formed Electoral Commission responsible for ensuring a peaceful transition to democracy. However, the legal requirements at times made election administration efforts difficult. Specifically, there was the issue regarding the provisions made in the Electoral Law, drafted by the National Consultative Council (NCC), which allowed voters to register where they live, work or intend vote on election day. When the new constituency boundaries were introduced, this provision caused complications and allowed for the abuse of this flexibility in the law (IFES 1994: 13). Consequently, there was a lack of consistency in the registration process. Following the 1994 elections, the 1999 elections also highlighted ambiguities in the legal framework, leading observers to call for a “thorough review” of the laws governing the conduct of elections. For example, the Local Government Elections (LGE) Act 1996 and the Local Government (LG) Act 1998 did not agree on the term of election representatives, where Section 23 of the LGE Act indicated a three year term while Section 7(2) of the LG Act suggested that it was five (IFES 1999: 35). This confusion undermined the electoral process and the people’s ability to select their LG representatives in a timely manner. The fact that LGE were finally held in 2014, after ten years, is telling of the lack of will in the government to ensure that these elections be held without delay. 159! In 2004, observer missions repeated their calls for a careful restructuring of the legal framework for elections. While the missions considered the legal framework adequate, its ambiguities remained problematic (AU 2004, Commonwealth 2004, EISA 2004). Specific recommendations included “the composition of the MEC, clarification and clear division of the competencies of the MEC and the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) in regulating the media, and requirements for transparency in the declaration of campaign funds from private sources” (European Union 2004: 3). Without enforceable regulations, the electoral process risks being undermined, which greatly impacts the ability of Malawi’s democracy to improve. In highlighting these disparities in the legal framework, the international observers are seeking to protect a crucial aspect of democratic governance: the rule of law. The May 2009 elections exposed similar flaws in the legal framework to those stated above. These issues included the “timeframes relating to the dissolution of parliament, nomination of candidates, campaign period and election day”, as they caused confusion regarding incumbent members of parliament (EU 2009: 27). The elections being described as “generally in compliance with the recommended Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC region” indicated their problematic nature (SADC 2009: 28). In contrast, for the 2014 elections, the observers were unanimous in their evaluation of the legal framework, with each raising the point that legal and electoral reform remains necessary for Malawi to move forward. Despite having emphasised this issue in the previous elections, observers in 2014 found that the domestic institutions were still lacking. The EU found that there were still no rules dictating how political parties should be funded or election campaigns financed. As a result of this ambiguity, there was a lack of transparency and accountability from political parties and a lack of “clear and enforceable regulation to prohibit the use of state resources for campaign purposes” (European Union 2014: 13). There were disparities between the constitutional timeframes and statutory legislation at various stages in the electoral process, specifically concerning the dissolution of parliament and the start of the campaign period. In addition, the challenge of adhering to the 8-day limit for the announcement of results and of fulfilling the expectation that the MEC release credible results caused serious confusion (European Union 2014: 13). The African Union noted that the playing field was impacted by the nature of Malawi’s firstpast-the-post electoral system, which allows for a simple majority victory (African Union 2014: 4). Related to this, a delimitation of parliamentary constituencies is expected every five years but this exercise has not been undertaken since the increase of parliamentary seats from 177 to 193 in 1999 (Gloppen et al. 2006: 15). Consequently, those who live in highly populated areas tend to be under-represented in terms of seats in comparison to those in less populated areas. For example, there are 14 constituencies that have less than 20,000 voters while 18 have over 60,000 (EU 2014: 13). This unequal distribution does not allow for the fair representation of voters that is central to a functioning democracy (Dahl 1971, Diamond and Morlino 2004). This inconsistency suggests a lack of willingness to abide by the requirement on the part of the parties who continue to garner support in these areas. In addition, a valid assumption would be that any attempt by the government to undertake a delimitation exercise is intended to ensure the ruling party’s position. Even if that is not the 160! intention, there is a high risk that any action undertaken prior to elections would be seen as an effort to further skew the balance in the incumbents’ favour. With each election, mission reports made the point that legal reform is central to Malawi establishing a framework that allows for democratic consolidation. In particular, continued disproportional representation and the ambiguity of the law have led to major discrepancies in the manner in which elections are actually managed versus how they were planned. Though the Tripartite Elections Bill was adopted to deal with the timeline for results announcements (an extension from 72 hours to 8 days for presidential results), to establish a five year term for councillors, and to establish that complaints can be filed to the High Court 7 days after the determination of results, these among other changes appeared to be insufficient (Malawi Voice 2012, MEC 2014). An example is the confusion that arose regarding the calls for a recount, as the law does not provide for the contingency that the counting process is stalled. For this reason, the MEC was still expected to finish the count even though injunctions calling for a cessation of the voting process had been issued against them. These points show that the move towards a more open democratic system has been incremental, and the next section outlines the continued challenges of election administration in Malawi. 2.2 Election Administration Both the 1994 and 1999 elections featured serious weaknesses in the management of the electoral process. In 1994, the MEC was highly reliant on international donors, due to its recent establishment under the 1993 Constitution. Thus the MEC’s capacity to undertake an election was severely limited (IFES 1994). In 1999, one main issue was that in certain cases there were materials being sent directly from the MEC to the polling stations without informing the MEC Regional Offices. This confusion highlighted the lack of communication channels between the MEC and its Regional and District offices, where each level was not always made aware of what its duties and responsibilities were. There were also issues with staff management and a lack of resources (IFES 1999: 5). Moreover, there was an error in the number of projected voters due to the 1998 census being inaccurate, which led to a host of challenges during the electoral process. For example, it was discovered on polling day that not enough polling kits had been ordered, the registration lists had not taken into account those who had transferred from one polling station to another, and there was no verification that each polling station had the correct number of ballot papers (IFES 1999: 7). While there was some improvement in the quality of election administration in the 2004 elections, the observer missions raised several key concerns. These were: the perception that the MEC was showing bias towards the ruling coalition; the failure of the MEC to meet the deadlines for voter registration; the variation in the size of constituencies; the incorrect printing of candidate information on the ballot sheets, and the failure to ensure proper checks on the ballot papers (European Union 2004: 38). These issues drew attention to the MEC’s inability to ensure quality control, which suggests the same lack of internal capacity that was a feature of the two previous elections. The MEC’s weak capacity and the lack of confidence in it on the part of the electorate were once again mentioned as issues in the 2009 elections. Observer missions called for a “review of procedures and capacity structures” that would allow the MEC to organise elections with 161! confidence (EU 2009: 27). This includes a higher level of communication with political parties, the improvement of the internal legal structure, improvement in the training of polling officials and a regulated results system that ensures the integrity and reliability of the vote aggregation process. In 2014, all international monitors found that, despite the significant challenges it faced, the MEC made all efforts to be impartial and ensure that all voters were granted their due right to vote. However, it was unable to complete all necessary preparations in time for election day and thus showed a lack of structural capacity. This lack of capacity was particularly evident in the failure to distribute election materials to all polling stations and the constant postponement of the voter registration exercise, which led to a delay in the printing of the final register. In addition, there were a series of tight deadlines, lack of internal communication, distance between commissioners and the deployment of these commissioners and other senior staff to the field, and a lack of physical structures for election administration at both district and constituency levels (EU 2014: 16). One of the compounding issues was the limited access to timely funding. The MEC is funded by the national budget and a basket of donor funds administered by the United Nations Development Programme, but there were multiple delays with budget approval and the subsequent disbursement of funds (AU 2014a: 5). Much of this delay was brought about by budget negotiations and the Malawian government stalling on granting the necessary funds to the MEC (Mkandawire 2013). Unfortunately, the observers found that the MEC was not as able to cope with the challenges it faced as it should have been. This continued lack of capacity in the MEC, a result of a disparity between the planning of, and implementation, of elections, highlights the challenges it faces in supporting the democratic process to move forward. It is crucial that the government support the MEC, as it is in charge of the central aspect of the establishment of a democratic nation. Election administration continues to be a problem for the MEC, as the lack of institutional memory does not allow for proper consolidation of their process. This issue is further complicated by the fact that with every election millions are added to the register, which places a great strain on the already stretched Secretariat. The extent of this strain on limited resources is manifested in the continued issue with the voters’ roll, and will be further discussed below. 2.3 Voter Registration The registration process for the 1994 elections was scheduled to begin on 21 February and end on 12 March. However, due to the inadequate civic education program and apathy among eligible voters, only 30% of eligible voters were registered. There were also reports of intimidation that prevented people from being registered. As a result, the registration process was extended to March 26. Following efforts on the part of political parties and NGOs, the Commission was able to increase the number of registered voters to 3,762,239, or about 80% of the eligible population (Commonwealth 1994:11). In addition, there were complaints that the larger political actors were buying voter’s registration certificates and there were reports that, in certain parts of the country, chiefs and headmen would hold these certificates for ‘safe-keeping’ (Commonwealth 1994:12). What made the situation more concerning were the observations that these village headmen, recruited by the MCP, would threaten voters with punishment or withhold their relief food if they did not vote for the MCP. The EC attempted 162! to curb this behaviour by issuing press releases and holding press conferences to urge people to hold on to their voter certificates (IFES 1999:15). There were a few significant issues noted regarding the registration process for the 1999 elections, starting with the lack of registration materials in the places where turnout was higher than expected. Nevertheless, observers noted that this did not deter all prospective voters, as there were those who opted to make multiple visits till materials were made available (IFES 1999:3). However, there were some situations that were more serious: some centres in the Northern region never opened due to the lack of registration materials, thus disenfranchising a part of the population. Elsewhere, party monitors were present during the registration process but the observers had doubts as to how well informed they were about the technical procedures, and they did not seem to know how to challenge applications on grounds of age and nationality. There was also confusion as to the eligibility of Malawians living abroad (IFES 1999:6). More seriously, there was a problem with the aggregation of data, which led to major inaccuracies in the voters’ register. The 2004 voter registration process was inherently flawed, with the stakeholders once again having little confidence in the voters’ roll. First, it was observed that at most polling stations the actual number of registered voters was different from the number of voters registered during the registration period. Second, the extended verification period did not succeed in encouraging voters to participate, so the goal of ensuring that almost all would be verified was not attained (AU 2004:16). Poor voter education, the debate regarding the presidential third term, and the debate as to whether to hold bi- or tri- partite elections were all cited among the reasons for the unsatisfactory voter registration process (EU 2004:14). As a result of this extended registration period, the High Court instructed the MEC to postpone the election, to no later than May 25, and the MEC decided to hold them on May 20 (EU 2004:15). Due to the registration challenges in 2004, the MEC decided to undertake a new voter registration, as the old register had proven unreliable when used for by-elections. Despite planning for a 9-month period for registration, delays in the budget and procurement process limited the timeframe to August 2008 to January 2009. During voter roll verification there were several issues noted: double entries, mistakes in names and photos, inverted/missing names, and coding errors. The MEC sought to reduce the 24% error rate, but this exercise meant that the final register was not made available to all in a timely manner (Commonwealth 2009: 13). Observers highlighted the need to set aside time for proper training of staff and improved civic and voter education. For the 2014 elections, voter registration took place between July 22 and December 18, 2013 (Nyasa Times 2013). The verification of the register began on April 9, 2014 (Face of Malawi 2014). In addition, these were the first elections in which the MEC allowed voters to verify their information via mobile and SMS (Mwapasa 2014, Kazembe 2014). This effort indicated the MEC’s willingness to use technology as a means of legitimising the voters’ roll. The European Union noted that the “weaknesses in the MEC’s internal communication and capacity as well as logistical and technical difficulties resulted in significant delays in the processing of voter registration data” (EU EOM 2014: 17). As a result, the process originally scheduled for March 24-28, was delayed, which led to the late printing of the voter register and complaints of irregularities. Additionally, before the start of the election the AU EOM 163! had noted that the 5-day period was too limited and that there were concerns from various stakeholders regarding the errors in the register. The AU EOM also noted that leaving the review of the register until the week of the elections raised concerns regarding its accuracy, and significantly hampered its timely distribution to the various political stakeholders (AU 2014a: 6). Voter registration is central to a successful election and unfortunately this continues to be a major problem for the MEC. Despite an awareness of these voter register issues, as indicated by these efforts to encourage timely registration, funding delays plagued the process. Consequently, this is an issue that has continually been emphasised by observer missions. 2.4 Registration of Political Parties and Candidates / Election Campaign The 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 elections showed clear signs of incumbent advantage, with the use of party vehicles for government officials and the MBC serving as a tool for the ruling party. This culture of incumbent dominance was established at the onset of Malawi’s political history with junior officials of the MCP wielding greater authority than civil servants during the 1994 elections (IFES 1994). There were also isolated incidents of violence and intimidation. In addition, despite noting complaints that nomination fees were too high for minority parties, observer missions reported that this did not significantly limit the number of parties standing (Commonwealth 1994, IFES 1994, IFES 1999, EU 2004, ECF-SADC 2009). In 2014, all the observer missions noted, with concern, that there were still no clear rules for the use of campaign finances. Due to this lack of regulation, parties may accept funds from both domestic and international sources with no requirement to disclose their sources or report how they are used (EU EOM 2014: 20, AU 2014a: 5, EISA 2014a: 5). The resulting lack of transparency raises concerns regarding the manner in which public funds are used. For example, it was clear that the incumbent PP party had an advantage over the other parties due to its access to state-owned media outlets and the attention given to on-going government projects, where campaign events were often masked as “development rallies.” At these functions attendants and speakers, including the President, donned party cloth and paraphernalia. The events included “the inauguration of public works such as the Malawi Rural Electrification programmes, construction of roads and housing projects in Mulanje, Zomba and Thyolo, the promoting of traditional chiefs in Machinga, Chikwawa and Mulanje, where appeals to vote for PP were addressed to the audience” (EU EOM 2014: 20). In addition, the PP had substantial financial resources available, and “the EU EOM observed PP distribution of handouts such as maize (in Mangochi, Machinga, Phalombe, Blantyre and Mulanje), motorbikes and bicycles (Phalombe and Zomba), construction equipment (Mulanje) and blankets (Phalombe and Blantyre)” (EU EOM 2014: 20). In light of this flagrant political manipulation, each mission voiced the need for the introduction of a system of financial disclosure, one that instructs parties to be forthcoming with the source and use of their resources (EU EOM 2014, AU EOM 2014, EISA 2014a). The lack of campaign regulation poses a serious threat to the transparency and accountability of the electoral process. Inter- and intra- party tensions were reported by the various media outlets, which emphasised the continuing power of the ruling party. The international monitors drew attention to these anomalies, and the fact of their presence sent a signal that this behaviour was not in line with a democratic state. By not offering equal support to 164! parties, the opportunities for competition are significantly constrained, especially for minority parties. 2.5 Media Emerging from 30 years of one-party rule, the government-owned and controlled Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) was expected to have significant bias towards the ruling party. Common complaints concerned the limited coverage of issues by newspapers and their lack of reach beyond the metropolitan areas. In addition, issue was taken with the “lack of balance in reporting news events” due to the fact that the majority of the newspapers were owned by those with a political stake in the electoral process (IFES 1994: 18). In order to reduce this bias, the Electoral Commission issued guidelines for media coverage that sought to “ensure that full and fair coverage is given, without censorship, to the campaigns of all registered political parties during the period of campaigning and up to the close of the poll in the parliamentary and presidential elections” and required that rather than buy airtime from MBC, the political parties were to be allotted a number of time slots for their political broadcasts (Commonwealth 1994:14). In the 1994 elections the observers felt that the MEC made every effort to ensure the media, particularly broadcast media, did not undermine the integrity of the electoral process. With regard to the media’s behaviour in the 1999 elections, the observers expressed some concerns with the MBC, especially in the coverage of daily activities, but noted that they saw an improvement in their conduct. Debates were held periodically, where the political parties participated equally, with five minutes accorded to each party (IFES 1999:7). In 2004, throughout the campaign period, the state controlled electronic media showed substantial bias in favour of the ruling coalition, almost to the exclusion of opposition parties and independent candidates. Despite not standing for re-election, President Muluzi’s campaign activities received a large amount of coverage by state controlled media. The Commonwealth expressed its deep concern with “the gross bias of the public media” (Commonwealth 2004: 1). Thus, “the roles of MACRA and the MEC in regulating the media during an election campaign should be clarified and the competencies of each body clearly defined and effectively implemented” (EU 2004:5). Once more the observer missions stated that “a level playing field for political contestants is necessary, in particular by taking action against the abuse of public resources and media bias” (EU 2004:5). But, in a welcome contribution to the electoral process, private radio stations and print media monitored by the EU EOM generally provided reasonably balanced coverage. In 2009, freedom of speech in the media was generally respected during the campaign period with no reports of any significant restrictions in the movement or access of journalists. However, the state owned media failed to ensure equitable campaign coverage due to its open bias towards the DPP. There was also concern regarding media coverage of election campaigns by various media houses; for example, Joy FM was known to show bias towards the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Malawi Congress Party (MCP) (ECF-SADC 2009: 6). Overall, the perception of the media was relatively positive during the 2014 elections, though 165! all observers noted the bias towards the incumbent, with the PP dominating airwaves, especially at the start. However, efforts to level this media playing-field through the regulation of radio, print and television channels were observed. For example, the AU EOM mentioned “the steps taken by MBC in redressing the imbalance in media coverage following the intervention of MEC and Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA)” (AU 2014a: 7). The European Union acknowledged that “Malawi made a step forward in the Reporters without Frontiers World Press Freedom Index ranking from position 146 out of 179 countries in 2012, to position 73 out of 180 countries” (EU EOM 2014: 20). However, despite this positive development, poor financial and logistical resources continue to affect media outlets in the country and severely undermine the capacity of these institutions. In an effort to address some of the challenges, the MEC purchased airtime for presidential candidates and provided 31 stringers to all districts to cover daily party and candidate activities. Despite this positive initiative, the lack of funding, coupled with the high number of candidates in these elections, challenged these efforts (EU EOM 2014: 22). The other observer missions share the above sentiment. The AU found that “the media coverage of campaigns and political events was for the greater part of the campaign period skewed in favour of the incumbent to the disadvantage of other parties” (AU 2014a: 7). COMESA (2014) stated that “the public media, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), appeared to be giving more coverage to the ruling party” (COMESA 2014: 3). Last, the Commonwealth was “concerned that the public broadcaster, the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), did not adequately demonstrate balanced coverage for political parties as required by the law” (Commonwealth 2014:2). This section stressed the importance of the media in politics that had been noted in previous elections and, while the MBC continues to be somewhat biased towards the ruling party, there has been an agreement by political stakeholders to address this and bias appears to be decreasing. It is worth noting that there was no impression given during these elections that the media undermined the legitimacy of the results in any way. 2.6 Election Day and Transmission of Results On May 17 1994, the observers noted that most polling stations opened on time or slightly after 6:00 a.m. While the facilities provided for polling purposes were generally adequate there were some cases of overcrowding (Commonwealth 1994: 22). There was confusion with the discard box and the ballot boxes, where voters would accidentally place their sealed vote in the wrong box. As a result, the process slowed down considerably at the voting booth (IFES 1994: 27). As for the counting process, it was generally peaceful but there were issues at the start. One problem was that the deployment of polling staff did not go as expected, with some staff not arriving until early the day of polling. In addition, some centres did not receive the correct number of ballot papers resulting in delays and, in certain cases, the use of improper ballot papers to compensate for the ones missing. Furthermore, many centres lacked stationery and other materials and so the staff had to find ways of managing this situation (IFES 1994: 27). Another challenge was the lack of adequate lighting in many of the counting centres, which made the tallying of ballots difficult (Commonwealth 1994: 22). 166! During the 1999 elections, polling stations, for the most part, opened on time. However, there were some that ran out of ballot papers and others that were unable to open due to a lack of materials. The counting process was transparent but, as was the case in 1994, few counting centres had electricity; they had to use candles and lamps, which slowed the process down significantly (IFES 1999:16). In 2004, the AU reported that some polling stations opened late but that this was addressed by extending the polling period to accommodate all those who had turned up to vote. The polling stations that they observed had adequate supplies of election material. The AU also noted that there were a sufficient number of polling stations spread across the country, which facilitated participation in the vote because people did not have to walk so far to cast a ballot. However, despite these positive factors the AU Observer Team commented that the lack of training among polling officers affected the quality and conduct of the polls. They went on to report that there was a limited amount of space at these polling stations, which risked undermining the integrity of the vote, and there was no standard procedure for marking the voters’ roll to establish who had voted (AU 2004). The EU observers found delays in the counting and tallying of votes, which made it difficult to release the election results on time. Specifically, the counting process was “overly bureaucratic, slow and conducted in poor conditions, often without sufficient lighting” (EU EOM 2004:5). While EU observers noted no reports of fraud and the results were made publicly available at most polling stations, there were “a number of fundamental ballot security safeguards missing from the regulations. This must be addressed prior to future elections” (EU EOM 2004:9). The effect of this was that the transmission of results from the districts and the constant sending of results for verification and signatures by the MEC added to the delay in the announcement of final results. The recommendation was that “electoral results should be published within the legal deadline and clearly broken down to the polling station level” (EU EOM 2004:5). For the 2009 elections, the majority of polling stations opened on time except for a few which were delayed by the late delivery of voters’ rolls. This delay in delivery was due to the lack of transport available for the delivery of voting materials. Voting went well, despite the wait and the long queues; where the numbers of registered voters were high they were placed in several streams. In addition, the polling stations were adequately staffed and most of the personnel trained. The SADC mission confirmed that the secrecy of the ballot was safeguarded and that campaigning materials were not visible near the polling stations. However, they pointed out the lack of communication between the district offices and the polling stations. Other challenges included the need to verify registered voters who did not appear on the voters’ roll, and this delayed the process. In addition, the polling stations were not clearly marked and signposted. When it came to the counting the ballots, the process was prolonged due to inadequate lighting. Lamp batteries were insufficient, and even more problematic were the reports from stations with generators that they were faulty or had run out of fuel. Yet, despite these challenges, due to the presence of party agents and consensus during the process, the counting process remained transparent (SADC 2014). So overall, observers found the polling and counting process to have been done in a free, fair and transparent manner. It is especially important to acknowledge the fact that political party monitors were present and participated during the whole voting process. 167! During the 2014 elections, the MEC received support to offset their lack of capacity, with civil society organisations playing an important role in providing increased transparency at polling stations. Domestic election monitors were deployed to nearly all polling stations in the country, providing increased transparency. The main groups to deploy monitors for these elections were the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) that deployed some 4,200 monitors to polling stations and the Malawi Election Support Network (MESN), which deployed 1,400 monitors (EU EOM 2014:5). Overall, voting was conducted in a calm manner and the process was well organised. Polling procedures in 85 per cent of polling stations visited by European Union observers were assessed as satisfactory or positive, and although there was inconsistency in following certain procedures such as security checks related to the voter register, the intent of the officials was to be inclusive. Although polling officials generally followed procedures during the counting process and it remained transparent, there were several instances of mistakes made in reconciliation (EU 2014:24). The aggregation process that followed counting at district level was slow, as it took time to retrieve material from polling centres. Although the process was considered transparent and political stakeholders and monitors were allowed to observe, the system for the transmission of results proved problematic. Poor training and instruction led to confusion as to what procedures to follow and forms to send. Most problematic was the “total breakdown of the fax transmission system to relay results from the districts to the national results centre in Blantyre. After 24 hours the Electoral Commission decided to receive the aggregated results in hardcopy from the constituency returning officers that on one hand expedited the release of national results, but on the other hand, meant security measures and auditing to identify and correct errors were neglected” (EU EOM 2014:5). This breakdown caused significant delays in the counting process and once again emphasised the institutional weakness of the MEC. Notwithstanding the few instances of violence and the significant logistical challenges at certain polling stations, all observer missions noted that election day was fairly calm. However, each mission mentioned several concerns about specific issues. First, the EU noted that the “lack of essential material (voter registers, indelible ink, ballot boxes, seals and ballot papers, etc.) resulted in delays in the opening of polling stations, mainly in the Southern region” (EU EOM 2014: 27). In Blantyre, Mangochi and Chikwawa some polling stations opened as late as 4:00 p.m., and of the polling stations visited only 51% opened on time or with a delay of less than 30 minutes. To make up for late opening of polls or interruptions in voting, polling stations extended voting until 9:00 p.m. In order to ensure the vote of every registered voter, 46 polling stations in Blantyre, Lilongwe and Dedza had their voting process annulled on the 20th and voting was held from the 21-22nd. Despite the lack of proper lighting in multiple polling stations, the overall assessment of the closing and counting process was “good” or “very good” in 64% of the polling streams observed, with the transparency of the process being assessed as “good” or “very good” in 82% of them (EU EOM 2014: 29). Under the watch of political party representatives and local monitors, the EU found the counting process to be sufficiently protected. However, in 61% of the observed stations the results sheets were not publicly displayed and in 36% they were not handed over to party 168! officials. In addition, the EU noted that the lack of training and the fatigue among polling staff led to a high number of errors, which was compounded by the failure of the results transmission system. Even when MEC was aware of the issues encountered by polling staff as they attempted to devise solutions such as correcting result sheets, it lacked the capacity to adequately address the communication issues between the national and local tally centres. This lack of consistency made it difficult to assess the integrity of the process and differentiate between genuine correction attempts and fraudulent manipulation. Therefore, while the EU EOM has taken into account the efforts on the part of the MEC to provide a transparent process, the following key issues raise concerns among electoral stakeholders: “organisational mismanagement, lack of capacity and training, significant logistical shortcomings on election day resulting in non-compliance with polling procedures, failure to transmit results electronically using the planned results management system and consequent ad hoc and non-secure transmission of results by a variety of means, and the tense political environment since election day” (EU EOM 2014: 29). The other observer missions noted the same issues and concerns. In addition, while the AU observers found the polling centres to be organised in a manner that guaranteed the flow of voters and secrecy of the ballot, they found some to be overcrowded, such as the Blantyre Secondary School, and that “the use of outdoor facilities without barrier demarcations made crowd control particularly difficult” (AU 2014a: 9). ECF-SADC found fault with there being no signage to polling stations, remarking on the long queues of voters in the morning, the undermining of secrecy at certain polling stations, the late or non arrival of Part “A” of the voters’ register, and inconsistency in the management of the voting process. Other concerns raised were with the lack of lighting in some polling stations during polling and counting, and the occasional incidents of disruption (ECF-SADC 2014b: 3, COMESA 2014: 5, Commonwealth 2014: 2). Although the overall quality of the election suffered, these issues were not viewed as “fraud”. These challenges were seen as an issue to be addressed, but not one that undermined the people’s ability to express their will in the vote. 3. Discussion Malawi’s last five elections indicate a continued struggle for democratic consolidation. Despite having held elections internationally recognised as “reflecting the will of the people,” its democratic institutions continue to suffer. Specifically, the consensus across all election and observer reports was that there were notable disparities between the planning and the implementation of the elections. Consequently, none of the elections were managed as well as they could and should have been, a fact that was clearly stated in the reports. With the help of technical advisors the MEC seemed able to adequately prepare for upcoming elections but the challenge always arose when it came to the execution of the plans. The trends noted above offer insight into the role of international observer missions. In reading the previous election reports, it becomes clear that these missions open the process to criticism, which has allowed democracy in the country to move forward, albeit more slowly than hoped. By publishing statements and holding press releases, international observers make it clear that their presence is to ensure that the process goes well. Consequently, the observer reports over the last five elections have raised similar concerns regarding the issues 169! that arose during the voter registration, the campaign and polling processes. As a result, there have been overlaps in the recommendations made on the part of international bodies. These are recommendations that have been brought up at multiple post-election meetings (Patel 2002: 30, MESN 2014). There is, therefore, a clear consensus that electoral management in Malawi could benefit from the input of these organisations. The main issues are the lack of adequate civic and voter education, weaknesses in the voter registration process, lack of capacity on the part of the MEC both internally and in its external relationships, and the fact that legal framework continues to undermine the electoral process. Over the last five elections, both international observer missions and domestic actors have drawn attention to the need for legal reform. It is important to take into account the effort made on the part of the government and the MEC to address some of the discrepancies in the law. For example, it is important to note that the 2014 elections saw an improvement in terms of media coverage (AU 2014, EU 2014), and Parliament, prior to the 2014 elections, allowed for the extension of polling hours and of the time given to the MEC to count the results, in response to the recommendation that 72 hours was simply inadequate for such an exercise to be done properly. While the newly implemented 8-day requirement was still problematic during the 2014 elections due to the lack of provisions made in the case of calls for recount, it did provide for more time to deal with challenges than in previous elections. In addition, the MEC should be commended for undertaking boundary delimitation following the 1994 elections and for their efforts to improve the voter register prior to the 1999 elections. Both these issues were noted as highly problematic by observer missions. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the extent to which observer missions have decreased the actual level of fraud during the electoral process, the above point emphasises the fact that calling attention to violations leads to action, no matter how small, on the part of those challenged. Thus, these election observer reports serve as a depiction of the electoral process and a benchmark by which the quality of Malawi’s democracy can be assessed. These missions, over the years, have served as observers of a complex process and have offered suggestions as to how to improve the current political structures. Yet the magnitude of the challenges that Malawi’s democratic system still faces cannot be ignored. Before one assumes that missions have not been effective because some of these challenges persist, especially in regard to funding and legal amendments, it is necessary to note the lack of political will on the part of the political actors. While the recommendations made over several electoral cycles included “legal reform,” “adequate civic and voter education,” “verification of constituency boundaries,” over the last twenty years we have not seen all these recommendations implemented. It is therefore important not to undermine the role of observer missions, as they do draw attention to anomalies in the process and they are important parties when trying to establish Malawi’s political identity. The most important sign of a lack of political will is the limited integration of civil society into the political process. As noted in previous elections, the legal framework makes no clear provisions for the inclusion of domestic observers (M’buka 2009: 378). Though there have been greater efforts to do so, the 2014 elections emphasized just how important these actors can be in supporting a fragile democracy, especially a country where voter apathy is prevalent, as indicated by the multiple reports of voters simply not showing up for registration. By integrating civil society and domestic observers, governments are held more 170! accountable and citizens feel as though they are taking ownership of their own process. These domestic groups can serve as the link between observer recommendations and state action. The EU in particular pointed out that civil society organisations played a key part in the electoral process in 2014. These domestic organisations supplement the efforts of international organisations, by providing a local and more nuanced eye due to their familiarity with the country, despite the logistical challenges they face. A small number of civil society groups did deploy observers, with the main two being the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) and the Malawi Election Support Network (MESN). It was pleasing to see an unprecedented level of cooperation between the MEC and domestic organisations. For example, a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercise in 800 randomly sampled polling stations nationwide was conducted by MESN in close cooperation with the MEC and the data obtained corroborated the results released by the MEC (EU 2014: 9). In doing so, the PVT granted credibility to the electoral process. Furthermore, MESN launched three initiatives: the Malawi Election Information Centre (MEIC), the Election Situation Room and Citizen Journalism Initiative. These were funded by the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), and HIVOS, who conducted a real-time observation of all polling stations in the country, with more than 4,500 local observers and over 100 mobile supervisors deployed in the field (HIVOS 2014). This contribution should be valued and replicated by other observers in future elections. This is a means of supplementing the efforts of international observer missions as “foreign observers are not omnipotent, ubiquitous, or infallible” (Carey 1991: 1). Religious organisations, such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), also deployed local monitors, though their missions tended to be smaller. Previous reports do not emphasise the role of domestic observers, and moving forward, these groups could serve as the link to stronger local institutions if the government is willing to set aside the necessary funding and political space for them to operate. 4. Conclusion Observer missions continue to be a part of democratic process in Malawi, by serving as both supporters of the process and as evaluators of its challenges. Considering that some of the recommendations have been taken into account, such as improving the voter register after 1994, seeking to harmonise the electoral laws and reducing the ability of the incumbent to use the media to undermine the electoral process, there is evidence that there continues to be a place for observer missions to make an impact. However, this chapter also suggests that more can and must be done to support Malawi’s democracy. As emerging democracies continue to invite monitors to oversee their electoral processes, attention to the dynamics of these relationships is central to understanding the role of international institutions in domestic politics. 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