CAUSE AND EFFECT -CAUSATION

CAUSE AND EFFECT – CAUSATION By Joelson ANERE Section I: What is a cause, what does it mean to explain something, and what are civil wars/conflicts about? First, it is fruitful to think about war as one part of a larger bargaining process. This process of bargaining between the parties usually begins before fighting breaks out, and continues after the fighting has ended? The causes of conflict, or disagreement, are not identical to the causes of war. Conflict is probably necessary for war to occur, but conflict is not sufficient. Many, very serious conflicts, are settled short of war.1 Civil Wars (Intra-state Conflicts) I will talk about civil wars in a rather restrictive sense. By civil war I will only mean the use of organized armed force for political purposes, by actors within one country. For the most part, I will also confine my attention to situations where the conflict is between the government of a country and an organized opposition. However, most of what I say is applicable to conflicts between any pair of organized parties – i.e. state versus state, opposition versus government, one communal group versus another, etc. We begin with an empirical puzzle: why is there sometimes war? Trying to understand why people sometimes fight wars, is trying to understand a variation. Why are there wars in some places, but not in others? Why are there wars at one point in time and not in others? To put it differently: What distinguishes cases that end up in war, from cases that do not end up in war? To discuss these questions we need to set down some parameters for causality by which we are able to identify the causes of conflicts and wars. See Magnus Oberg, 2000, Non – Strategic Explanations for the Onset of Ethnopolitical Rebellion: An Analysis and Critique. pp.26 - 75 1 Parameters for Causality 1. There must be co-variation (association) between the alleged cause and effect. By claiming that, for example, discrimination caused a conflict, we are claiming that if there had been no discrimination in that case, there would have been no conflict. 2. Isolation/control: we must also try to make sure that the covariation we observe is not spurious. For example, some people have observed that ethnically heterogeneous countries or societies experience more civil wars than the homogenous countries/societies. But may be fragmentation and conflict co-vary not because the other, but because they both have a common cause. The latter seems to be the case. Other scholars argue that both conflict, and the heterogeneity or homogeneity of a country is caused by the level of economic development. Economic development makes a country/society more homogeneous, and economic development makes for less conflicts. If this is correct, the association between heterogeneity and conflict should disappear if we control for economic development – and so it does. 3. Temporal order: causes must occur before their effects so we need to make sure that the alleged cause of the conflict happens before the conflict is initiated and not after. This is particularly important because many causes of conflict are also consequences of conflict. For example, poverty may generate conflict, but poverty may also be a consequence of conflict. So, if we wish to argue that poverty generates conflict we need to make sure which came first – the conflict or the poverty. 4. Finally, there must be some causal mechanism connecting the alleged cause with outcome. A causal mechanism is the explanation for how and why the causal factor generates the outcome, e.g. why and how does poverty generate conflict. More convenient to our purpose is the question: Is the impact of mining leading to environmental degradation connected to the Bougainville conflict? A causal mechanism is necessary for explanation because the association between cause and effect cannot be its own explanation. Even if we know that discrimination is associated with conflict, we still would like to know why this is so. Moreover, when we study war we are trying to explain human behavior. The causal factors, like poverty and discrimination, are not actors and thus cannot have any effect on conflict behavior without having their effects via some actor. Thus, mechanisms are explanations for how the causal factors affect the actor’s choice of behavior. What is war about? Almost all civil wars begin as conflicts over concrete and specific grievances, such as the distribution of land or wealth, impact of mining of mining on traditional land and resources, access to government jobs and education, rights to practice one’s religion freely, and so on and so forth. More than often when these grievances are inadequately addressed that conflicts escalate beyond what is normal politics and become conflicts over authority. Similarly, when the government refuses to accommodate the opposition’s grievances that the opposition begins to question the government’s authority. We can think of authority as legitimate power, i.e. the right to make decisions that are binding on others. Making legislation is the primary example. So, when an opposition group is challenging the government’s authority, it is denying or questioning the government’s right to make decisions that are binding on the opposition. Wars are almost invariably about authority, that is to say that they are about – who has the right to make binding decisions for whom, where, when and on what issues. Consequently, civil wars are typically fought over different issues: Figure One – The Distribution of Authority in Conflicts/Wars Part of the authority Sovereign (total) authority The whole territory Share in government power Government Part of the territory Autonomy Separatism/Irredentism To seek autonomy is to seek some of the authority over some of the territory of the country, i.e. to seek that right to make some decisions independently of the central government in some defined part of the territory. Put it differently, to seek autonomy is to reject government authority on at least some issues in at least some regions of the country as is the case in Bougainville. To seek separation from the State is to seek sovereign authority over some part of the country’s territory. In other words, it is to completely reject all government authority over some region of the country and claim that authority for oneself. To seek a share in State power is to seek access to, or control of, at least some of the government’s authority over the whole country. The opposition may wish to have a say on some issues for the whole country, or to have say on all issues in the whole country. To seek government power is to seek sovereign authority over the whole country. In other words, it is to completely reject all government authority over the whole, and claim that authority for oneself. Causal Factors A number of factors are known to be associated with civil wars. These factors are usually divided loosely into three categories depending on what effects they are believed to have on the actors. 1. Incentive factors (i.e. factors generating incentives for action); 2. Capability factors (i.e. factors affecting the actors capabilities to act upon incentives); 3. Opportunity factors (i.e. factors generating opportunities for action).2 There are ways to divide these factors. Some divide them into proximate causes and root causes, or international factors and domestic factors, and so on. This may be fruitful for some purposes, but if we are trying to understand how these factors cause conflict it is more fruitful to divide them according to their effects, than for example, according to their origins. Below a number of factors have been enumerated that have been associated with civil wars. Note that some of these factors may have more than one effect, e.g. they may generate both incentives for action and opportunities to act. I do not suppose that this list is in any way exhaustive, on the contrary, I am simply giving a number of examples for the convenience of understanding the Bougainville civil war. More importantly, I have deliberately formulated the factors in a general way so that many different specific circumstances can be subsumed under each general factor, that is, I have put together a number of factors under more general rubrics. I have put a (+, – or x) at the end of each bullet point to indicate if it has been 2 Ibid, p.78 associated with increases or decreases in the probability of civil war. Factors Generating Incentives for Action.  Discrimination (cultural, economic and political) +  Expansion of State power and control (e.g. state – and – nation-building) +  Slow economic growth and economic crises +  Low level of economic development (e.g. low GDP/capita) +  State repression +  History of lost autonomy (i.e. groups who have once been independent) +  Material inequality (i.e. an uneven distribution of wealth within the country) +  Frames for political action (e.g. ideas about national self-determination, minority rights, human rights, democracy, political ideologies and so on) x  Historical experience (past repression, discrimination, etc) +  Future prospects (expectations repression, discrimination, etc in the future) + These factors are worth some explanation. First, material inequality has only a weak relation to civil war. At any given time, most countries with high material inequalities do not experience civil war. The reason for material injustices do not generate more conflict is probably that while large inequalities generate large incentives for action, they also deprive those who are aggrieved the means to act. Put simply, poor and exploited people have strong incentives to try to change their situation, but because they are poor and exploited they lack the means to change their situation. In contrast, low level of economic development has a strong effect because it generates both incentives for action and it makes the State relatively weaker (an opportunity). Second, Frames for political action are legitimizing ideas about authority, i.e. ideas about whom have the right to make decisions for whom, where and on what issues. Nationalist ideas suggest that every national people have the right to its own independent state. The role of frames in causing war is that of catalyst. Frames do not by themselves generate war, but they are vital in helping groups to organize around their grievances, legitimize their actions, and de-legitimize the authority of the State. New Zealand has done this successfully to the government of Papua New Guinea in mobilizing the BRA and BPC to a negotiation table. Factors Affecting The Actors’ Capabilities to act upon its Incentives The following are some of the factors that affect the capabilities of actors to action their incentives.  Poverty -  Political mobilization of the group +  Group cohesion +  Pre-existing organizations that can be used by the opposition +  Leadership (legitimacy and skill are important aspects) +  Foreign support (from great powers or neighboring countries, or from ethnic, religious, or ideological kin abroad) +  Easy access to arms +  Access to natural resources which can be sold for hard currency (e.g. preferably non-perishable resources like mineral deposits [Bougainville copper] but also drugs like heroin and cocaine) + An important point worth mentioning is that group mobilization in turn depends on a prior group awareness of collective disadvantages, as well as upon leadership and a common identity (i.e. as an ethnic group, religious group, or class).3 Factors Generating Opportunities for Action The following causal factors amount to generating opportunities for action:  Political transitions from one State system of government to another (e.g. democratization) +  Regime transitions (succession of governments or government leaders, coups etc). +  State weakness (low GDP/capita, weak institutions, poor control over the territory, infighting within the government, etc) +  Repression –  Cross-boarder sanctuaries for opposition movement (e.g. foreign support, or ethnic groups straddling boarders such as the Kurdish people) +  Other rebellions against the government +  Foreign wars (especially if they do not go well for the government, viz. Iraq after the Gulf War in 1991) +  Diffusion and spillover of conflicts in neighboring countries (as was the case between Bougainville and Solomon Islands) +  3 Regime type that is, authoritarian or democratic +/- Ibid.pp.112-120 Section II: Causal Mechanisms Figure Two – The Structural Mechanisms for Civil War – the standard model. Causal factors Background & Proximate Conditions Correlations 1 Mechanism Outcome 3 2 Incentives, Capabilities, Opportunities Choice Note that arrow No.1 represents the situational mechanism; Arrow No. 2 represents the actionformation mechanism; and arrow number No. 3 represents the transformational mechanism. The structural explanation4 for civil war basically says that there are a set of factors that generate incentives, capabilities, and opportunities for political action by an opposition group. The idea is that given the proper incentives, capabilities and opportunities, the opposition group will take up arms against the government to change the status quo and this was precisely what transpired in Bougainville. The first step of the model outlines how various factors or conditions create grievances and incentives to change the status quo. The first step also shows how other factors affect the actor’s opportunities and capabilities to act on its initiatives. The second step in the model should explain how the actor chooses among the available courses of action, depending on its incentives, capabilities and opportunities. The third step is about how the choices of different actors combine to generate the joint outcome, which may be war or not. 4 Op.cit.pp.125 -130 In the structural explanation, if the opposition group chooses to go to war against the government, then war will be the outcome. The problem with the structural model is that it does not really explain how the third step works. Why is it that if the opposition decides to go to war, then war will be the outcome? For it to be war, the government and the opposition will have to decide to go to war simultaneously. It is not enough to explain why and how the opposition decides to take up arms. Unless the government decides to resist the challenge from the opposition, the opposition will have no one to fight the war against. Consequently, the structural model explains why there are conflicts of interest, but not how and why conflicts of interest sometimes end up in war. Explaining why both parties in a conflict sometimes choose to take up arms is surprisingly difficult. It is not enough to show that both the government and the opposition have the necessary incentives and capabilities to fight a war. The reason why this is not enough to explain war is a bit subtle, but we shall attempt to explain why. Both parties have to have a reason to fight simultaneously otherwise there will be no war. Essentially the problem is thus: For a conflict to exist the parties’ interests has to be incompatible, otherwise both would get what they want simultaneously at will. The definition of a conflict is such that the parties cannot both get what they want simultaneously at will. Consequently, in a conflict if the government can get what it wants by fighting, then logically, the opposition cannot get what it wants by fighting. In this situation the government would fight if it had to, because in that way it would get what it wants. But why should the opposition fight if it cannot get what it wants by fighting? In the reverse situation, the opposition can get what it wants by fighting. In this case, the opposition the opposition could fight if it had to, because in that way it would get what it wants. But why would the government fight if it cannot what it wants by fighting? The problem is that in no situation would both parties gain by fighting, and it is hard to think of a real world case in which both parties won the war, i.e. where both parties were better off after the war than before the war. Another useful way to think about this problem is to turn the “why war?” question upside-down. Instead of asking why do they choose to go to war, we ask: why are they unable to find a mutually acceptable agreement without going to war? War is extremely costly, and it would be better for both if they could reach an agreement without going to war. So why don’t they. It is because the actors want different things, and neither is prepared to make sufficient concessions to avoid a war. However this traditional answer simply begs the question: why is it that they cannot make concessions before the war, when they can make them after the war? To put it differently: all wars end with some form of division of the contested issue. It may be 50/50 split or a winner takes all division, but all wars do end with some settlement or at least a de facto settlement on the issues at stake. Why is it that at the end of a war, the parties can find a settlement but were unable to find it at the beginning? What is it that prevents them from reaching the same agreement without fighting? What is it about fighting that makes an agreement possible at a latter stage, when the same agreement was impossible at an earlier stage? Incentives, capabilities and opportunities cannot explain this puzzling fact, so there must be other reasons. Obviously the reason would be that parties have divergent expectations about the nature of the terms and conditions by which they will be forced to settle after the war, as well as the costliness of that war. We know from history that in all the international wars the actors almost invariably do have divergent expectations about the outcome, length and costliness of the war. Let me give a hypothetical example to make the logic clear. Imagine we have two parties disagreeing on the division of a piece of land. Suppose they both claim that 70% of the land is rightfully theirs. Since both parties cannot get 70% of the disputed area they must ask themselves: what is the minimum percentage of the area that I will have to accept if push comes to shove? If he rejects my demands for 70%, how much can I get by using force? Consequently, I do not think that I will have to settle for anything less, because if I my rival rejects my demands I will take it anyway. Now, if my rival has the same expectations as I have, he also believes that if we fight I will get 70% and he will get 30%. If this is the case, he has no reason to reject my demands for 70% of the land, because he believes that if he says no I will take the land anyway. Thus, we can reach an agreement without fighting, and consequently there is no reason to fight a bloody war. Compare this situation where my rival believes that if we fight it out to the bitter end, he will receive at least 60% of the land. If he believes that he can get 60% by fighting, why should he accept my offer of 30%? And, if I still believe that I can get 70% by fighting, then I have no reason to settle for the 40% that he is offering me. Thus we both think that we will be better off by fighting, and consequently, we may both choose war. At least one of us will eventually discover, by fighting, that we were wrong in believing we could get as much as we thought. Once this happens, our expectations will converge and we will agree on what we will have to settle for, and at that point continued fighting is pointless, so peaceful negotiations can resume. Armenians versus Azerbaijan Take for instance, the conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabagh territory or the Bougainville conflict for our convenience. The Panguna Landowner Group led by Mr. Francis Ona chose war because all efforts through peaceful negotiations were fruitless. Papua New Guinea paid the price of a costly twelve years of civil war leaving the country almost bankrupt. In the former conflict, they are unable to reach an agreement because they have divergent expectations of the final outcome of the conflict. The Armenians have successfully conquered both the disputed territory and a large surrounding area, so they think that they do not have to settle for less than the whole territory of Karabagh. They are prepared to give up surrounding areas on certain conditions, but feel that even if there was a renewed war they would not have to give up Nagorno-Karabagh because they are militarily stronger, better trained and motivated and so on. The same analysis could be said of Bougainville where they have demanded for greater political autonomy and referendum in year 2015 for political independence and nothing less. The government of Papua New Guinea is helpless however, it maintains that after twelve years of civil war, independence for the island of Bougainville is still non-negotiable. Greater political autonomy can be granted within the sovereign state of Papua New Guinea, but, not independence for Bougainville. The Azeris, on the other hand, have entirely different expectations for the future. They agree with the Armenians that they are not capable of recapturing Nagorno-Karabagh today, and consequently Armenians and Azeris are not fighting today – they have similar expectations about the present. However, they have very divergent expectations about the future. Azerbaijan expects that it will one day in the future become a rich country, because of its abundant petroleum reserves. Using money from the oil exports they expect that they will be able to re-arm and re-train their armed forces so they can take Nagorno-Karabagh by force if necessary. Consequently, Azeris do not think they have to settle for the offer made by Armenia. Armenians, aware of the potential for re-armament of the Azeri Forces, will not accept the offer made by the Azeris, because the Armenians think that they can prevent Azeri re-armament from happening – if necessary by forcefully preventing oil exports from Azerbaijan. I do not know who is correct in their expectations, but at least one of them will be proven wrong by history, and it may require a new war to determine whose expectations are correct. Bougainvilleans have gold and copper which, were mined by Rio Tinto of Australia and to-date the Bougainvilleans wanted greater political autonomy with a police force, judiciary, independent executive arm of the State and a foreign service with the ultimate aim of independence by the year 2015. Eventually they would re-open this gold and copper mine to financially assist re-arm the Bougainville Revolutionary Army in preparation for the referendum. We may require a new war to determine whose expectations can be accommodated, and this time – it may be a prolonged bloody and costly war. Palestinians versus Israel Let us take another more controversial example to illustrate our point. Take the Palestinians versus Israel. First, we have discussed previously the fact that parties have divergent expectations about the outcome of war does not mean that they do not agree on who is the probable winner on the battle field – although that may also be the case. It simply means that they have divergent expectations about the final settlement would have to be, if they fought to the bitter end. A weak actor can thus fight a strong actor, knowing that that it cannot defeat the strong actor on the battlefield, but believing that it will still be able to get a better settlement by fighting, or not by giving up. The Palestinian struggle is a case in point. The Palestinians believe that they can get a better deal than what they are currently being offered by the Israelis. By not giving up what is rightfully theirs, and by continuing to inflict pain on the Israelis, the Palestinians believe that in the end the Israelis will give them a better deal. The Israelis, in contrast, believe that they do not have to make any more concessions because they can keep what they want, by force if necessary. It is a test of will power, and of force – the Palestinians mostly relying on their will power, the Israelis mostly on their superior force. In the end, one of the parties will give in. The Palestinians, on the other hand, thinks that they have enough will power to go on forever, so ultimately, the Israelis will have to give in. By the same token, a similar analysis could be drawn on the Bougainville conflict. The armed forces of the government of Papua New Guinea thought they had the military might to conquer the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. To help better train the PNG Defense Force soldiers – a team of mercenaries from Executive Outcomes of South Africa and Sandline International of Great Britain were recruited to train what is considered by politicians as ‘ill-trained soldiers’ to be better equipped to fight the rebellion on Bougainville.5 Head of the Sandline International mercenaries Colonel Spice confirmed that the PNG Special Forces Unit employed in the “Operation Oyster” to “wipe-out” the BRA rebels were “ill-equipped and ill-trained” or better still, ill-disciplined let alone lacking willpower 6 to engage in any combatant situations. This was a complete disgrace to the PNG Defense Force, which, prompted Major General Gerry Singirok to withdraw the Operation Oyster project arguing that his conscience was not satisfied in what could have become a “bloody civil war.” Instead, he demanded that Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan and his entire Cabinet resign for engaging the mercenaries to eliminate BRA rebels, and the rest is history. The truth of the matter was that the PNG soldiers did not have the willpower to conquer the BRA rebellion, and in the end, the latter won. Negotiations of to-date on the future of Bougainville are therefore more to their favor than the government of Papua New Guinea. The testing point will be in year 2015, that is, whether or not PNG will grant Bougainville independence if the referendum proves successful.7 In sum, the parties to a conflict have to have divergent expectations about what they will have to settle for if they fight over the issue at stake, otherwise there is simply no reason for the usage of force to reach an agreement. The parties may have different expectations for several reasons. One possibility is that they are suffering from some form of cognitive, or emotive, bias such as wishful thinking, groupthink, or misconception (that the K10 billion compensation for environmental damages could be paid by Rio Tinto [then CRA] of Sean Dorney, 1999, The Sandline Affair, page.228 Ibid. pp. 228 - 249 7 See Selected State Documents on the Future of Bougainville Autonomy 5 6 Australia). Another possibility is that they have better information about their own abilities and incentives. If so, they may rationally arrive at different conclusions about what they would have to settle for if they fought a war over the issue at stake. In the case for Bougainville, there are two stages to the conflict, first is the demand for K10 billion compensation by Panguna Landowners for environmental damage from Rio Tinto, and second, a demand to the Government of Papua New Guinea for Bougainville to secede and become an independent State. The civil war was fought based on these two issues. There are three more possible scenarios in which the parties to a conflict may be able to reach an agreement short of war. The first is if they are unable to provide credible guarantees to each that the agreement will be upheld in the future. This so called commitment problem, can prevent an agreement from being reached. The commitment problem seems to be a common problem in transitions from war to peace, and from autocracy to democracy. In both cases, one side in the transition process is giving up power to the other side, hence the issue of Bougainville autonomy. Once the power has been handed over, what prevents the side with power from reneging on the agreement? This uncertainty may prevent the parties from being able to implement an agreement, for rebels to disarm, and for incumbent power holders to hand over the power. The Bougainville autonomy process is right now walking down this path – to where? I do not know, may be bloodbath first followed by ultimate independence. That is, if the current paradigms for the autonomy process are altered, which is not at all impossible in the land of the unexpected? Anything is bound to happen in this span of 15 years to referendum and ultimately, independence for Bougainville. Many peace processes run into this problem of decommissioning weapons. A possible solution is to share power in some way, e.g. by integrating the armed forces of the two parties. The second possible situation occurs when there are large first strike advantages, high tensions, and uncertainty about whether the opponent has hostile intensions or not. Such a situation is called a security dilemma, and it may induce parties to strike first even if they would have preferred a negotiated outcome. This is so because the parties fear that if they do not strike first, then their opponent will and that would seriously weaken their bargaining position. Examples of security dilemmas in civil wars are mostly from ethnic conflicts with complex demographic settlement patterns that create first strike advantages (e.g. it has been argued that the security dilemma was important in both Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabagh). What about the BRA striking first to weaken the position of the PNG security forces through out the ten years of armed conflict? Are we no different to what is going on in other parts of the world? The third possible reason why parties are unable to reach an agreement is if at least one party is planning to fight the war, not to win what is at stake in the war, but for some ulterior reason, e.g. to earn a reputation. The purpose of the war is then to fight, not to bargain for any advantage, i.e. fighting is then its own end. I know of no such case, but it is a logical possibility. Some Common Mistaken Assumptions about War  Most current theories of war explain conflicts of interest, rivalry and tensions, not war.  Most current theories about war ignore the central question: why are rivals unable to settle their differences by peaceful means? To be sure, conflicting interests are at the core of all wars, but to emphasize conflicting interests, or grievances, and to ignore the means by which these interests and grievances are pursued, is to ignore the main puzzle that has been explained. The outbreak of war and peace are essentially decisions about what means to use in pursuit of one’s interests. To explain war is to explicate why forceful means were selected.  No wars are unintended or accidental. What is often unintended is the length and bloodiness of the war. Defeat too is unintended.  The idea that mankind has an innate love of fighting cannot be carried far as an explanation for war. War and peace are fluctuations, human nature is a constant.  Ancient hatreds between peoples cannot be carried far as an explanation for war for the same reason. Evidence in history has shown that ancient hatreds are present in a great many places, almost all of which do not end up in war. The role of ancient hatreds in conflicts seems to facilitate the mobilization of people to fight wars for other reasons.  The clash of civilizations suggested by Samuel Huntington is a myth. Evidence suggests that most clashes take place within civilizations, not between them.  Balance of power theory is not supported by evidence. The historical record suggests that the relationship between the balance of power and war is highly ambiguous. Contrary to balance of power theory, the only thing that can be inferred from the evidence is that wars are slightly more common when the parties are roughly equal in power.  Evidence does not support the idea that there has been a fundamental transformation of civil wars in the post-Cold War era. Some scholars have argued that changes in society and technology, along with globalization, have profoundly altered the nature and causes of war. Evidence does not support these speculations. Conclusion A number of factors can be identified that generate incentives for conflict, as well as factors that generate the capabilities and opportunities to act on these incentives. This explains why we have conflicts of interest and when we can expect parties to such a conflict to actively pursue their interests. It does not, however, explain why parties sometimes pursue their interest with violent means. Showing that an actor is willing and able to pursue his interest by force is not the same thing as showing that war must happen. To show this we must explain why the parties were unable to reach an agreement by less costly means than war. One reason why parties to a conflict may sometimes fail to reach an agreement by peaceful means is that they have divergent beliefs about the outcome, length and costliness of the war. If the parties have divergent beliefs about the eventual outcome of a war, they may disagree on what terms they could be forced to settle if they fought a war over the issues at stake. Thus they may be unable to reach an agreement without fighting a war. War is a bargaining process. The difference between peaceful negotiations and war is the means used to bargain for advantage. The break down of negotiations leads to war, and the break down of war lead to negotiations. This has been the trend of events for the Bougainville conflict since 1987. The break down of negotiations reflects the belief by each side that it that it would gain more by fighting than by peaceful negotiations. The breakdown of war reflects the belief by each side that it will gain more by negotiating than by fighting. Bougainville leaders and the PNG Negotiating Team have reached this level, now talks and preparations are well in advance to creating the Bougainville autonomous State Government, now a reality in what is to-date, the Autonomous Government of Bougainville (ABG). War and peaceful negotiations are not opposites. They are both part of the same coin, i.e. they are part and partial of the same bargaining process in which both parties try to get the most favorable agreement they can. War and peaceful negotiations have largely the same causes, and follow the same causal logic. War and peaceful negotiations are both caused by the incentives, capabilities or opportunities facing the actors. The difference is that for war to happen the parties must be unable to reach an agreement by peaceful means. This might happen when the parties have divergent beliefs about the eventual outcome, duration and costliness of fighting over the issue at stake. When leaders decided on whether to begin, continue or end a war, they are asking themselves variations of the same question: they are assessing their ability to impose their will on their rival. Wars usually begin when two parties disagree on their relative strength and resolve, and wars usually end when the parties agree on their relative strength and resolve. Thus each factor is capable of promoting both war and peace. Any factor which increases the likelihood that the parties agree on their relative strength and resolve is a potential cause of peace. Unfortunately, war provides the most widely accepted measure of strength and resolve. Wars lead to peace or peaceful negotiations, precisely because eventually fighting a war will reveal to the parties their relative strength and resolve, thus forcing their expectations to converge and thereby making an agreement possible. What then is the future of Bougainville? Bougainville’s ultimate dream is to have an autonomous State Government with its own judiciary, legislature and an executive arm of the government independent from the PNG national civil service. It will have its own police force and a paramilitary force supervised and controlled from Waigani. Its judiciary and foreign affairs will be supervised and guided from Waigani too. But the burning question is – for how long considering the economic constraints Papua New Guinea is facing? Two central issues must be considered in relation to the future of Bougainville: Can PNG afford another civil war with Bougainville before the year 2015 so that we can impose our will on them, that is, no independence for Bougainville? On the contrary, can PNG contain and sustain the emergence of the Bougainville State Government, because to do so would mean its applicability to all other nineteen provinces of the country. This is a dilemma PNG is bound to face in the midst of the current IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs instituted in the country. Come the referendum in year 2015 (or before 2020), the socio-economic and political indicators are all pointing that direction – Bougainville will eventually become an independent State. All causes can only be attributed to bad management of the economy and negligent political leadership since independence in1975. This country’s short history is full of its own evidence of mishaps and corruption. Name it all – Papua New Guinea is indeed a multi-racial society and land of the unexpected.