Teksty Drugie 2015, 1, s. 46-52
Special Issue – English Edition
A Different Take on Humanities
Włodzimierz Bolecki
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the humanities and posthumanism
Włodzimierz Bolecki
A Different Take on Humanities
DOI: 10.18318/td.2015.en.1.4
M
ore and more often a “crisis of humanities” becomes
the main theme of various books and articles. It has
not entered public debate yet, but it is increasingly difficult to ignore the subject. However, one could say that
questions about humanities are as old as its history. One
could also state, with a degree of legitimacy, that the “crisis” is a fundamental subject of the tradition of modernism, understood as the 20th-century reflection on contemporary culture. But even that broad context, explored
with the help of an increasing number of concepts and
models, fails to explain the intensity of today’s attempts
at describing problems haunting the humanities. Most
importantly – it does so in the context of changes connected to a search of new formulas for higher education
and research institutions. Without a doubt there are
many reasons for that situation, and it is impossible to reduce them to a single cause. One should also remember,
however, that the diagnoses are influenced by different
contexts, in which they were formulated (social, political,
civilizational, historical ones etc.).
However, one could safely say that several reemerging issues connect all those statements about humanities
(I am not including their close relationship with social
sciences here). I will list them randomly: the first issue is
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Włodzimierz Bolecki
– professor at IBL
PAN. Specialises in the
theory and the history
of the literature of
the 20th/21st c. His
recent publications
include: Inna krytyka
(2006; K. Wyka
Prize); „Inny Świat”
Gustawa Herlinga-Grudzińskiego
(1994; 2007); Ptasznik
z Wilna. O Józefie
Mackiewiczu (1991;
2007, 2014, “Kultura”
Prize); Modalności
modernizmu (2013;
nominated for the Jan
Długosz Prize). Author
of many editions of
critical studies about
inter alia W. Berent,
S. I. Witkiewicz,
A. Wat, B. Schulz,
W. Gombrowicz,
G. Herling-Grudziński.
Contact: www.
bolecki.eu
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concerned with a question about the specificity of the humanities, about the
markers of their separateness from the so-called experimental sciences; the
second one is concerned with their social justification and its place within
scientific research; the third one – with their position within today’s higher
education structure; fourth – with their “crisis” (whatever that means); fifth –
with problems of their particular domains, and ways in which those domains
are practiced; sixth – with a general perception of their depreciation; seventh – with their insufficient funding; eighth – never mind, let us stick with
seven.
A common characteristic of all of the above listed issues is the asymmetry between the general character of the theses (spanning the entirety of
humanities) and a usually modest representation of humanistic disciplines
seen in those discourses. A description of the “importance” of the humanities is most often concerned with philosophy, cultural studies and philology
(particularly, literary studies) – disciplines with a unique tradition of, and
a potential for interpretative and theoretical reflection, and especially with
theoretical-epistemological and methodological ones, notional rather than
empirical.
What strikes one the most, however, is the uniquely monolithic image of
the “external enemy”– all of those who, without understanding and needing
humanities, have come together and agreed to work towards its demise. The
list of “enemies” seems repetitive as well: commercialization and infantilization of contemporary culture, poor education, non-humanities sciences
attempting to take the “spot” of the humanities, merciless fight of other (nonhumanities) departments for the biggest slice of the university’s cake (sacrificing budgets of different humanistic disciplines), for the assigned hours,
for the faculty, office space, etc.
The identification of obstacles and dangers faced by the humanities is always formulated in a language directed to “one’s fellow people” is symptomatic. It is almost exclusively an internal discourse, often within one discipline,
or several closely connected ones at best. But what is the benefit of discussing
them among ourselves, if the dangers are external? What is supposed to be
the practical outcome of such “humanistic autism”?
Contemporary humanities are proud of their categories, with which they
describe the world: “dialogue” (and its “philosophy”), “difference” (and “diversity”), the “Other” (and “alien”) – to name just a few. Within the range of
individual discourses, within different areas of the social world and cultural
phenomena, these categories (and interpretative languages founded on their
basis) seem razor-sharp and stunning like a thunderbolt. However, when
the question is concerned with presenting the specificity of the humanities
in the public debate, its civilizational indispensability, and its relationship
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with other areas of sciences – the razor blade turns into a baseball bat, and
thunderbolts into cheap fireworks. When reading letters and proclamations,
protests and manifestos “in defense of the humanities”, I always have the
sensation of a ‘sudden wake-up call’ syndrome: “I jump to my feet suddenly,
but I don’t know where I am. I want to rush somewhere, maybe to the train
station, maybe to work, I mistake my left hand for the right hand, my pants
for my sweater, «what’s that person in the mirror doing in my house?», etc.”.
Several decades of polishing those subtle notions, and a complete inability
to communicate with “alien” and “other” disciplines, or to explain its own
“otherness”, as a result. Am I exaggerating? Of course I am, but it is difficult
to negate the fact that the result of the jeremiads of humanists on the cult
of experience, comparisons, bibliometric factors, indexes and calculations,
applicability, innovation, pragmatic approach and commercialization in
contemporary sciences resulted in… further alienation. Thus the particular
disciplines of science, which should be connected by the concept of u n i v e r s i t a s – a community of all sciences – seem to be dialects of different tribes,
which do not know how to communicate because they did not discover that
a translator is missing.
Contrary to appearances, these forces are not equal, and both sides are not
on leveled positions. The “hard sciences” do not need to justify their existence (and their ever-increasing funding), and they do not need a translator.
The humanities, on the other hand, constantly try to prove – with pavonine
pride, although most often without results – that it can also boast the status
of a science, only a “soft” one, impossible to be compared with anything else,
but most importantly (and ex definitione) – better, because reflexive and valuegenerating, disinterested because impossible to be reduced to some narrow,
objective-driven tasks of other particular disciplines. In the eyes of “hard”
sciences, such explanations do not make the situation of the humanities any
better. According to “hard” sciences, a science should be concerned with what
is concrete and not undetermined, with what is empirical (verifiable), and not
“because-I-said-so”. A science should be interested in what is inter-subjective
and not solipsistic, with what can be compared. If something cannot be compared with anything else, it might potentially be art – but it is not a science.
In an excellent essay entitled Humanities: an Unfinished Project by Michał
Paweł Markowski, which can be found in this very issue of Teksty Drugie (Second
Texts), the author states (following Marta Nussbaum) that “the humanities
reveal to us the relativity of what we do with the world […] Because of that,
it could take the spot of a primary science, since its subject is not that or the
other, that object or the next one (literature of romanticism, cubism in painting, or an adjunct), but a human existence in its different, more or less institutionalized manifestations”. That thesis must be close to every humanist’s
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heart, however it is a concept which could serve as a foundation for a separate
college or a department, and not an entire system of contemporary science,
or higher education. Contrary to another thesis, also authored by Nussbaum,
from that same excellent work: “the humanities are merely a certain critical
disposition […], since it introduces well-established lexicons used by particular disciplines into a state of crisis (or potential change), or plants doubt in
the purity of every lexicon, designed to uphold the separateness of particular
disciplines. Therefore the humanities is not a collective name for those various disciplines (literary studies, philosophy, art history, etc.), but an academic
framework, within which those separate areas of research exist” – I believe
that without negating the validity of this concept, one could act entirely in
reverse.
Without questioning the subtlety of “internal“ calibrations within the humanities and their disciplines (and the absolute necessity for those calibrations to last), I would like to stress only one issue – a rather obvious question
of the ontological, cognitive and functional difference between the humanities and other branches of science.
Primarily, it is composed of the following assumptions: (1) the humanities, let us assume, focus on the products of human culture (works of art, actions, social phenomena, ideas, values), while non-humanities sciences focus
on what is external to a man (nature, matter, etc.); (2) the humanities are,
to a great extent, dependent on languages and national cultures, while for
non-humanistic sciences language and culture are entirely irrelevant (language, today it is English, is a cognitively irrelevant platform of communication). Neutrinos, proteins, acids, black holes and white nights remain indifferent towards the language in which they are being described; ergo: (3) the
humanities perpetually require translations into other systems of cultural
meanings, while for non-humanistic sciences translation is unnecessary; (4)
humanists can conduct their research together but a basis for the presentation of the results is individual expression (an article, or a book), while nonhumanistic sciences are characterized by team work, and there are instances
of numerous authors assigned to a single article; (5) in the humanities, the
process of writing constitutes a foundation of research and cognitive processes, and is individualized, while in non-humanities writing of an article is
detached from research, and takes place after its completion. For the humanities, expression is a crucial element of content, while in other sciences it does
not exist as a research question – it might occur only as a question of grammatically correct form of expression in English (or congress) language; (6) for
the humanities, the history of a given discipline is not only an integral element
of all its subjects and means of its research, but also – as h i s t o r i c i t y – it
is a fundamental problem of the entire field. Whereas in the non-humanities,
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the history of a discipline has no necessary connection with present research,
and rarely becomes an object of research interest. What is more: (7) publishing in the humanities (periodicals, publishing houses) is polycentric
(multitude and diversity), and quality of a publication is most often not connected to the outlet, while in other sciences, publications are monocentric,
which means that the outlet (a particular periodical) is a universally accepted
marker of the high quality of a publication. In the humanities, a published
book (monograph) is considered a measure of achievement, while in nonhumanities an article plays that same role. The humanities hold the collecting
of articles written over many years into a single book (finis coronat opus) as
its standard, while in the non-humanities the publishing of the same article
once again is unacceptable. (8) In the humanities novelty can mean a return
to works of the past, and their reinterpretation (or even simply their recollection), however there is no need to go back to the past in non-humanities,
since discoveries are ruled by the principle of “first come, first served”. That
is enough.
The point is that these differences are as much obvious as they are banal,
and have been formulated at different times, and in different circumstances.
OK, well, – somebody might ask – but what is the practical conclusion coming
from such a division? As far as the issues associated with the peculiar nature
of the humanities and their particular disciplines, this division has marginal
importance. However, this division might be a strong argument, particularly
for comparisons with “hard” sciences, and particularly for the thesis about
the (non)sense of financing humanities and social studies (together with the
practical results of those theses) that are currently debated.
The thesis about man-created works (ontologically different than the
“works” of nature), and the linguistic entanglement of the humanities, turns
them into a “hard” foundation for describing their autonomy. These are not
“imagination”, “sensibility”, “disinterestedness”, “poeticism”, “talent”, “ideas”,
“inexpressibility”, “historicity”, “duty”, “thinking”, “critical disposition”, (and
sometimes non-critical…) and other similar, but always justified, descriptions, but rather the ontological, cognitive and methodological differences
firmly anchored in the linguistic nature of the entire field of disciplines, which
creates a limes between the humanities (and social studies), and the nonhumanities. This polar division fits popular practices in both fields of science,
but the problem lies in the fact that it is not obvious. Are we not dealing with
works of man in the, so-called, “hard sciences” (for example, in biology, chemistry, mechanics)? Are chemical compounds, materials, machines, etc. not
man-made, just like a poem or a painting? Such confusion, however, turns out
to be helpful. Wherever man-made objects come into the picture, the humanities and experimental sciences are “hard” all the same, since they ask about
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the same thing: how are the creations of man’s cognitive activity made, and
what are their social functions?
Internal differences (huge ones) between particular disciplines within the
range of each of those fields are secondary in respect of that primary division.
If we were to agree with such a polar division between “hard” and “soft” (here:
hardened) disciplines of science, and simultaneously with their “identicality” in respect of examining human creations, the next step – to finish this
introduction – would be to pose two theses.
The first one: for more than a century the humanities were not able
to firmly establish its discoveries concerning the system, functions and
meanings of language in all spheres of human activity in the broad social
consciousness (in this case: in the consciousness of “hard” scientists). The
“linguistic turn” became an irrelevant and meaningless label for the fads
in the humanities, just like all the other ones. As a result, today, while every schoolchild knows what does the discovery of proteins, chromosomes,
genes, atoms, elemental particles, DNA, etc. mean for science, the common
knowledge about language and the discoveries of linguistics (from distinctive
features and phonemes, through semantics and syntax, to questions of ethnolinguistics, cognitive science and neurolinguistics, or even more importantly
the cultural, mental, linguistic and communicative determinants of semantics) is reduced to a statement that … well, “people talk”, somehow. When,
for example, chemistry, biology, physics, mathematics, etc. were establishing
their image as the most important branches of cognitive search for man, and
necessary for the civilizational progress, humanists (maybe with an exception for historians) kept affirming the image of their disciplines as spaces
for activities, which are civilizationally irrelevant, unproductive and de facto
obsolete. For that, all humanists should wear sackcloth and ashes, and flog
themselves until their circulation (of thoughts) gets better. The decision of
many years ago, made by the Polish government, to dedicate funds from the
European Union (the so-called structural funds) solely towards Info-Bio-Tech
disciplines was an effect of that honestly earned, permanent depreciation
of humanities, and simultaneous nursing of barren jeremiads (“they took it
away, kind sir, they cut our funding, took our post-doctoral degree”), as well
as of self-satisfaction and “autism of argumentation”, or “autism of presence”
in matters crucial for the very foundations of the existence of the humanities
and social sciences in Poland. As a result of this (accompanied by a complete
silence of the scientific community and all of its representative bodies), not
a single dime from over four billion zlotys received for scientific research from
Brussels (for all sciences), have been spent on humanities and social sciences
(as well as on mathematics and theoretical physics). Within a year, or two,
new decisions will be made, regarding another tranche of structural funds.
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And now for the second thesis: the humanities, in order to be revitalized
(in every sense of the word) and to redefine their position, need a renewed
model (if it ever had any to begin with) of research – not only an interdisciplinary model, but also an inter-domain one1.
“The horn, […] bore the music into the forest and an echo repeated it”.
Translation: Jan Pytalski
1
I write about that model with Przemysław Urbańczyk in a separate article that is being prepared for publication.
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