risks
Article
The COVID-19 Pandemic and Overconfidence Bias: The Case of
Cyclical and Defensive Sectors
Md Qamar Azam 1 , Nazia Iqbal Hashmi 2, *, Iqbal Thonse Hawaldar 3, *, Md Shabbir Alam 4, *
and Mirza Allim Baig 1
1
2
3
4
*
Citation: Azam, Md Qamar, Nazia
Iqbal Hashmi, Iqbal Thonse
Hawaldar, Md Shabbir Alam, and
Mirza Allim Baig. 2022. The
COVID-19 Pandemic and
Overconfidence Bias: The Case of
Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Jamia Millia Islamia (A Central University),
New Delhi 110025, India; rs.qamarazam803@jmi.ac.in (M.Q.A.); mabaig@jmi.ac.in (M.A.B.)
Department of Finance, College of Business Administration, Prince Sultan University,
Riyadh 66833, Saudi Arabia
Department of Accounting & Finance, College of Business Administration, Kingdom University,
Riffa 40434, Bahrain
Department of Economics and Finance, College of Business Administration, University of Bahrain,
Sakhir 32038, Bahrain
Correspondence: nhashmi@psu.edu.sa (N.I.H.); i.hawaldar@ku.edu.bh (I.T.H.);
shabbir.alam28@gmail.com (M.S.A.)
Abstract: This research paper analyses the impact of COVID-19 to investigate the overconfidence
bias in 12 cyclical and defensive sectors in pre- and during COVID-19 periods using daily data from
1 January 2015 to 31 December 2020. The results of VAR show that in the pre COVID-19 phase
overconfidence bias is more prevalent in all the cyclical sectors; in particular, MEDIA, METAL and
REALTY have highly significant coefficients . In the defensive sectors, the VAR outcomes are not
as strong as we expected, except for SERVICES. During the COVID-19 period, the investor shifted
their focus to COVID-19-related opportunities, leading to a surge in the IT and PHARMA sectors. In
both phases, METAL, MEDIA and REALTY exhibit overconfidence-driven stock trading behaviour.
ENERGY is the only sector in both the phases that does not witness overconfidence bias.
Keywords: COVID-19; overconfidence bias; sectors; VAR
Cyclical and Defensive Sectors. Risks
10: 56. https://doi.org/10.3390/
risks10030056
Academic Editor: Salvador
Cruz Rambaud
Received: 5 February 2022
Accepted: 1 March 2022
Published: 3 March 2022
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Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
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4.0/).
1. Introduction
One of the most common behavioural anomalies is overconfidence bias. It is regarded
to be a primary source of excessive trading, which results in severe fluctuation in financial
markets (Abbes 2013; Gupta et al. 2018). Such disturbances produce an economic mirage,
causing healthy markets to collapse, with severe repercussions for both regulators at home
and abroad. These behavioural fallacies are more visible during times of high stress,
instability, or crisis, such as the recent COVID-19 outbreak. On 31 December 2019, China
confirmed its first ever case of coronavirus, causing a worldwide uproar (Corbet et al.
2020). The negative effect of the virus is felt over the world, leading the World Health
Organisation (WHO) to declare it a pandemic on 11 March 2020.
Further, several restrictions were put into place by the different governments of the
world, such as quarantine and limited mobility of the labour force, to curb the spread of
the virus. This led to the slowdown of economies. Several sectors/industries were hit
badly, such as automobile, aviation, realty, tourism, and health care (Mazur et al. 2021).
In addition, many world economies experienced growing unemployment and shrinking
GDPs (Shen et al. 2020). According to a study, India’s national unemployment rate hit its
greatest level since 1991 in 2020, when the coronavirus outbreak brought the economy to a
standstill (BusinessToday 2021).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, a plethora of studies have been conducted in behavioural finance, which examines the abnormal market trends, sentiment, mood and
Risks 2022, 10, 56. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks10030056
https://www.mdpi.com/journal/risks
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emotions of the investors (for example, Bouri et al. 2021; Chen et al. 2020; Cheema et al.
2020; Dhall and Singh 2020; Naseem et al. 2021; Salisu and Vo 2020; Shen et al. 2020; Sun
et al. 2021). Some of the studies found the negative impact of COVID-19 cases and deaths
on the stock market performance (Ashraf 2020; Al-Awadhi et al. 2020; Xu 2021). It has
wreaked havoc on important business sectors such as automobile, real estate, services, and
manufacturing, causing supply chain interruptions and mobility restrictions (Partner 2020;
Mazur et al. 2021). Moreover, Górowski et al. (2022) concluded that the law implementation
has had an impact on the financial health of the industries’ (gas, oil, energy and industry)
assets and liabilities.
There are number of studies that have analysed the COVID-19 pandemic and overconfidence bias at the market level (Shrotryia and Kalra 2021; Phan et al. 2020; Liu et al.
2021), but the disadvantage of analysing the impact at the market level is that it assumes
a homogeneous influence on sectoral performance, which indicates that COVID-19 has
the same impact across all sectors. According to Narayan and Sharma (2011), sectors are
heterogeneous and so react differently to market shocks. With the given gaps, we tried to
answer some research questions, such as whether overconfidence bias impacts both the
cyclical and defensive sectors alike; how the outbreak of COVID-19 affected the trading
activity of different sectors; and whether the contemporaneous relationship between market
volume and market returns differs pre and during COVID-19. Thus, this study intends to
investigate the overconfidence bias in 12 major sectors of the economy both in pre- and
during COVID-19 phases using vector autoregression (VAR) along with impulse response
functions (IRFs) for the time period spanning from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2020.
Our findings for cyclical and defensive sectors in the pre-COVID-19 and during
COVID-19 phases are as follows: Firstly, the VAR results show that overconfidence bias is
more prevalent in all the cyclical sectors; in particular, MEDIA, METAL and REALTY have
highly significant coefficients in the pre-COVID-19 phase. Secondly, the relationship for
the defensive sectors appears weak and insignificant except for ENERGY and PHARMA.
Thirdly, during the COVID-19 period, the investor has shifted their focus to COVID-19related opportunities, leading to a surge in the IT and PHARMA sectors. This study has
relevant implications for investors, governments, and market regulators during times of
market instability, such as the COVID-19 epidemic.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: The selected literature for the study
is review in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 delves
into the empirical findings. Finally, in Sections 5 and 6, the study’s final remarks and
conclusions are provided.
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
In the literature, the existence of overconfidence bias is a well-known topic. According
to Daniel et al. (1998), overconfident investors overstate their abilities while making
an estimate.
Gender as a proxy has been used by Barber and Odean (2001) to analyse investors’
overconfidence from February 1991 to January 1997 using data of 35,000 households. The
study finds that men trade 45 percent more than women. The difference between turnover
and market return performance is even more noticeable between single men and single
women. Moving on, Kansal and Singh (2018) and Alam and Alam (2021) find no link
between the investor’s gender and overconfidence in India. Trejos et al. (2019) use a novel
qualitative comparison technique to show that gender significantly impacts biased trading
behaviour. Baker et al. (2017) also find that male investors are more likely to be biased than
female investors (Burlea-Schiopoiu et al. 2021).
Statman et al. (2006), in a seminal work, details the testable after-effects of overconfidencedriven trade behaviour. They examine how overconfidence leads to increased trade volume
using monthly data from August 1962 to December 2002. They conclude that the amount
of trading rose; consequently, successful investment increases the degree of overconfidence.
Furthermore, trading volume increases during a bull market and is positively correlated
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with prior stock returns. This supports the overconfidence hypothesis by demonstrating
the lead–lag connection theory. Griffin et al. (2007) employ VAR to link present trading
activity to past returns in 46 nations. They reveal that market volume and past return
have a positive association. Using similar econometric modelling, Zaiane (2013) found that
there is a positive association in trading volume and lag market return in the Chinese stock
market. Zia et al. (2017) found a similar result in the Pakistan stock market.
Metwally and Darwish (2015), using daily data for the Egyptian stock market, found
strong overconfident trading behaviour during the bullish phase, while the Tunisian and
Thai stock market show no indication of overconfidence bias (Zaiane and Abaoub 2009;
Phan et al. 2020). In the Indian stock market, Prosad et al. (2017) also found overconfidence
bias in the Nifty 50 stocks, both at the market and security level. Moreover, Mushinada
and Veluri (2018) investigated the overconfidence bias from April 2004 to March 2012 in
the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). They discovered that overconfident investors overreact
to private information and under-react to public information.
Previous studies on pandemics, for instance, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome(SARS) epidemic, Ebola Virus Disease (EVD), Zika, and H1N1, as well as HIV/AIDS,
have provided empirical evidence of epidemic impact, risks, and costs on the stock market
(Haacker 2004; Hoffman and Silverberg 2018; Liu et al. 2020; Loh 2006; Pendell and Cho
2013). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked global economies, slowed stock
market performance, and soured investor sentiment (Choi et al. 2020; Yarovaya et al. 2020).
Alam et al. (2021) analysed the severity of the lockdown impact on the Indian stock market
in the pre- and post-lockdown periods using data from BSE. The study found evidence of
positive abnormal return during the lockdown period, confirming that the lockout has a
favourable impact on stock market performance.
Albaity et al. (2022) found the impact of COVID-19-related cases, deaths and COVID
sentiment on the stock return of the banking sector of 16 Middle Eastern and North African
countries. The study found a negative impact of COVID cases and deaths, while pandemic
sentiment did not have an effect. Moreover, according to Utomo and Hanggraeni (2021),
the daily increase in COVID-19 confirmed cases has a negative impact on stock returns in
the Indonesian stock market. Liu et al. (2021) constructed a fear index to assess the impact
of COVID-19 for the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). The study reveals that the higher the
sentiment index value, the greater the influence of the pandemic on the stock market.
During the COVID-19 period, the stock markets exhibited different characteristics,
such as fluctuation in stock prices and index values in most sectors and countries (e.g.,
Ashraf 2020; Baker et al. 2017; Mazur et al. 2021; Sharif et al. 2020). Shrotryia and Kalra (2021)
investigated overconfidence bias in 46 global stock market indexes (developed, emerging,
and frontier economies) during the pre-and post-COVID-19 periods in their work for
2014–2020 using daily data on market volume and adjusted closing prices. According
to the study, the overconfidence bias is more prominent in the pre-COVID-19 period in
the Japanese, United States, Chinese, and Vietnamese stock markets. It is more prevalent
in the Chinese, Taiwanese, Turkish, Jordanian, and Vietnamese stock markets during the
turmoil period. The most striking conclusion is that the Indian stock market stays aloof
from overconfidence bias in both phases. According to Talwar et al. (2021), COVID-19 is
seen as a lucrative buy opportunity by those examining financial data and news.
The pandemic also served as a blessing and provided a platform for investors to buy
the rising stocks. Mazur et al. (2021) used data from US financial market during March 2020
assess the impact on sectoral analysis caused by COVID-19. They found that stock prices
in the food, natural gas, technology and healthcare industries have surged. According to
them, the losers’ stocks have much asymmetric volatility. Using an event study method,
Alam et al. (2020) analysed the impact of eight sectors of the Australian stock market. The
results reveal that due to the announcement of the COVID-19 date in Australia, the indices
of sectors such as food, pharmaceuticals and healthcare exhibit positive returns. Moreover,
satisfactory performance is shown by telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and healthcare,
while the transportation industry demonstrates bad performance. Kuranchie-Pong and
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Forson (2021) employs Granger Causality to test the presence of overconfidence bias in preand during COVID-19 pandemic periods in Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). The findings
show that there is an overconfidence bias in GSE during the COVID-19 phase, which
contributes to excessive volatility.
It has also lowered investor overconfident in the stock market (Liu et al. 2020). Baek
et al. (2020) used the Markov Switching AR (1) model to investigate the influence of
COVID-19 on stock market volatility in the United States for thirty main industries. The
results show that industries such as petroleum and natural gas, restaurants, and hotels
face greater risk during the COVID-19 period, but industries such as food production, beer,
and liquor face smaller or minimum changes. Despite the significance of overconfidence
bias and its impact on trading volume, market return and volatility, empirical research on
numerous sectors (cyclical and defensive) for the overconfidence bias is scarce in the Indian
equity market, making it difficult to diagnose the implications and link such trade with
overconfidence bias. Therefore, the hypotheses of the research are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: There is significant observed overconfidence bias in the cyclical and defensive sector
during the regular (pre-COVID-19) period.
Hypothesis 2: There is significant observed overconfidence bias in the cyclical and defensive sectors
during the COVID-19 period.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Data
To examine the overconfidence bias, this study uses daily data on variables such as
market volume, return and volatility for the study period: 1 January 2015–31 December
2020. The data are obtained from the official NSE website. The sectoral indices of NSE
depict the collective performance of stocks in the respective sectoral index. The sectoral
indices are classified into cyclical and defensive sectors, as per the Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) list (November 2018). Table A1 (see Appendix A) shows the sample
for the study, which includes the industry index with their industry name and the number
of firms that make up the industry index. Thus, we have 8 cyclical sectors (AUTO, BANK,
FIN, IT, MEDIA, METAL, REALTY and INFRA) and 4 defensive sectors (FMCG, PHARMA,
ENERGY and SERVICES).
The WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020. According to the report
released from the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India, the first
positive case of COVID-19 was found on 30 January 2020, (Narasimhan 2020). Furthermore,
there are no market shocks prior to COVID-19, such as a worldwide collapse or a sovereign
debt crisis. Moreover, the government is stable, meaning that it is a good moment to
examine the impact of overconfidence bias and COVID-19 and differentiate the results from
a pandemic scenario. The two subsamples are as follows:
1
2
Pre-COVID-19 phase: 1 January 2015 to 29 January 2020.
COVID-19 phase: 30 January 2020 to 31 December 2020.
The daily market return is the log difference of today and the previous day’s closing
prices (Shrotryia and Kalra 2021).
Mkt rtnt = LN ( Pt /Pt−1 ) . . .
(1)
where Mkt rtnt is index return on dayt, Pt is closing price on dayt, and Pt−1 is closing price
on day t − 1.
The natural log of volume has been taken as market volume ( Mkt volt ). In addition,
market volatility is used as a control variable (Karpoff 1987). In the financial market, it is
considered a measurement of risk. It is calculated from the daily high and low index values
(Prosad et al. 2017).
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3.2. The Model
Statman et al.’s (2006) methodology is employed to test the overconfidence bias in
the chosen industry indices. The lead–lag relationship between lagged observed returns
and current trading volume is the basis of this methodology. The endogeneity problem is
addressed in this approach by allowing the two different endogenous variables to interact
with one another.
The current VAR model depicts how one endogenous variable is a function of past
values of itself, other endogenous variables, and residual term after controlling for the
exogenous variable (volatility). Controlling for volatility further adds to the significance of
the return–turnover relationship (Griffin et al. 2007). Finally, the following bivariate VAR
model is presented below:
K
Yt = α +
∑ Ak Yt−k + Bt Xt + et . . .
(2)
k =1
where Yt is an n×l vector of endogenous variables—market volume and market return—in
time interval t, and Xt is an exogenous variable (market volatility); Ak and Bt are the
coefficients of endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively.et is a residual term at
day t. The relationship of endogenous variables over time is shown through the impulse
response function (Hamilton 1994). Moreover, it graphically explains the impact of one
variable on another; it becomes a useful tool to examine the empirical causal analysis.
Therefore, Equation (1) is written in expanded form for our study as:
Mkt_volt
Mkt_rtnt
=
k
Mkt_volt−k
α Mkt_vol
+ {volatility}+
+ ∑ Ak
α Mkt_rtn
k =1
Mkt_rtnt−k
e Mkt_vol,t
...
e Mkt_rtn,t
(3)
Equation (2) explains that the change in residuals emkt_trn t impacts the current value of
market volume and market returns and affects the future value. Similar interpretation runs
for other variables. Thus, to test the market prediction of the overconfidence hypothesis,
we give one standard deviation shock to the residual of market returns emkt_rtn,t to notice
the response in market turnover over time t. Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) is used
to determine the optimal lag length (K). Then, for each of the sectors, individual VAR
is estimated.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the pre-COVID-19 and during COVID-19 periods are
shown in Table 1. All relevant series are stationary at the level for all sectors, according
to the ADF test. The stationary test is not reported due to brevity purpose. As a result,
we can employ the unrestricted VAR model rather than the vector error correction model
(VECM).In the pre-COVID-19 period, the FIN sector has the greatest average market return
of 0.001 and 0.002 for PHARMA, and IT has highest average return, respectively, in the
COVID-19 period. It is also worth noting that, during the COVID-19 phase, all sectors
have positive mean returns. In the pre-COVID and COVID-19 periods, the REALTY sector
has the largest return deviation (0.018) with an average volatility of 0.023, whereas the
banking sector has the largest return deviation (0.029) with a mean volatility of 0.031. From
Table 1, it is seen that the market return distributions are skewed and heavily dispersed,
with kurtosis values greater than 3.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Pre COVID-19
Time
Periods
Lags
During COVID-19
1 January 2015–29 January 2020
Parameters
Indices
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
Mkt return
Mkt volume
Volatility
AUTO
10
BANK
11
ENERGY
10
FIN
11
FMCG
13
INFRA
7
IT
11
MEDIA
11
METAL
13
PHARMA
14
REALTY
14
SERVICE
11
Mean
Std Dev
0.000
17.55
0.015
0.000
18.554
0.014
0.000
17.644
0.015
0.001
18.12
0.013
0.000
16.807
0.013
0.000
18.846
0.014
0.000
16.733
0.014
0.000
16.757
0.021
0.000
18.01
0.021
0.000
16.465
0.017
0.000
17.597
0.023
0.000
18.992
0.011
0.012
0.49
0.008
0.012
0.671
0.008
0.012
0.569
0.007
0.011
0.449
0.007
0.01
0.457
0.007
0.011
0.49
0.007
0.011
0.576
0.007
0.015
0.75
0.013
0.016
0.46
0.01
0.012
0.536
0.009
0.018
0.801
0.012
0.009
0.52
0.006
Lags
30 January 2020–31 December 2020
Skewness Kurtosis
0.049
0.533
2.796
0.151
0.492
2.561
−0.805
0.112
2.739
0.042
0.256
2.495
−0.211
−0.17
3.107
−0.232
0.297
2.057
−0.128
0.106
1.908
−1.203
0.54
5.145
−0.008
−0.43
1.599
−0.294
0.295
2.578
−0.515
−0.36
2.188
−0.249
0.615
2.36
7.532
3.705
21.845
6.841
3.084
16.538
8.327
3.968
16.906
6.481
4.454
15.062
6.723
5.593
24.628
5.669
4.217
10.378
4.854
3.921
8.854
18.751
3.288
66.149
4.464
4.154
7.342
5.063
4.178
17.525
7.635
2.826
11.242
6.163
4.236
13.533
1
1
6
6
9
1
6
5
6
2
3
6
Mean
Std Dev
0.001
18.776
0.026
0.000
19.719
0.031
0.000
18.878
0.023
0.000
19.19
0.028
0.000
17.762
0.019
0.000
19.452
0.02
0.002
17.475
0.023
0.000
17.613
0.032
0.001
18.769
0.030
0.002
17.53
0.026
0.000
16.67
0.031
0.001
19.921
0.022
0.024
0.379
0.019
0.029
0.36
0.023
0.021
0.343
0.018
0.027
0.389
0.022
0.017
0.355
0.015
0.02
0.296
0.018
0.022
0.467
0.017
0.025
0.485
0.018
0.026
0.317
0.019
0.02
0.451
0.018
0.026
0.422
0.019
0.023
0.321
0.019
Skewness Kurtosis
−1.077
−0.203
3.354
−1.378
−0.128
2.796
−0.673
0.462
4.843
−1.458
−0.774
3.034
−0.737
0.335
3.416
−1.457
−0.047
4.349
−0.77
0.075
4.257
−0.931
−0.269
2.137
−1.04
−0.25
4.881
−0.153
0.057
3.757
−1.026
1.013
2.371
−1.65
−0.547
3.763
11.669
5.159
21.264
10.95
8.649
14.144
8.682
4.125
41.09
10.905
6.585
15.789
15.717
5.683
21.694
12.995
5.943
32.734
8.626
7.138
31.804
5.578
4.817
11.243
6.826
6.188
45.373
7.84
5.311
27.953
6.237
4.799
11.07
11.741
12.26
23.774
Author’s Estimation.
4.2. Pre-COVID-19: VAR and IRFs
Table 2 shows the pre-COVID-19 coefficients for cyclical and defensive sectors, respectively. The statistical significance is provided at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. The market
trading volume is autocorrelated with itself. All the sectors show the largest coefficient
values at the initial lag and then decreasing coefficient values as the lags increases. However, during the first lag, the REALTY sector has the largest autocorrelation coefficient
(t-value = 18.152). Furthermore, the market volume shows a positive serial correlation in
industries such as FMCG, INFRA, METAL, PHARMA, and SERVICES; however, it shows a
declining trend in the other sectors.
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Table 2. VAR results for pre-COVID-19 periods.
Cyclical Sector
Defensive Sector
Parameters
AUTO
BANK
FIN
INFRA
IT
MEDIA
METAL
REALTY
ENERGY
FMCG
PHARMA
SERVICES
Mkt vol (−1)
Mkt vol (−2)
Mkt vol (−3)
Mkt vol (−4)
Mkt vol (-5)
Mkt vol (−6)
Mkt vol (−7)
Mkt vol (−8)
Mkt vol (−9)
Mktvol (−10)
Mktvol (−11)
Mktvol (−12)
Mktvol (−13)
Mktvol (−14)
Mktvol (−15)
Mktvol (−16)
Mktrtn (−1)
Mktrtn (−2)
Mktrtn (−3)
Mktrtn (−4)
Mktrtn (−5)
Mktrtn (−6)
Mktrtn (−7)
Mktrtn (−8)
Mktrtn (−9)
Mktrtn (−10)
Mktrtn (−11)
Mktrtn (−12)
Mktrtn (−13)
Mktrtn (−14)
Mktrtn (−15)
Mktrtn (−16)
Constt
Volatility
0.364 ***
0.080 ***
0.063 **
0.071 ***
0.075 ***
−0.003
0.022
0.086 ***
−0.016
0.119 ***
0.444 ***
0.093 ***
0.016
0.091 ***
0.064 **
0.051 *
0.022
0.083 ***
−0.010
0.010
0.092 ***
0.372 ***
0.088 ***
0.072 ***
0.097 ***
0.071 ***
−0.007
0.025
0.053 *
−0.005
0.031
0.083 ***
0.451 ***
0.054 *
0.151 ***
0.032
0.093 ***
0.068 **
0.047 *
0.461 ***
0.105 ***
0.074 ***
0.003
0.033
0.054 *
0.047
0.015
0.033
0.012
0.070 ***
0.285 ***
0.069 ***
0.052 **
0.069 ***
0.091 ***
0.028
0.021
0.005
0.048 *
0.057 **
0.057 **
0.002
0.097 ***
0.468 ***
0.057 **
0.064 **
0.051 *
0.058 **
0.047
−0.017
0.025
0.032
0.037
0.024
−0.012
0.057**
0.032
0.320 ***
0.103 ***
0.067 **
0.080 ***
0.090 ***
0.065 **
0.059 **
0.050 *
0.013
0.078 ***
0.338 ***
0.075 ***
0.058 *
0.100 ***
−0.002
0.044
0.043
0.022
0.040
0.063 **
0.015
0.012
0.070 ***
0.366 ***
0.096 ***
0.092 ***
0.044
0.032
0.029
0.037
0.048 *
−0.027
0.066 ***
0.397 ***
0.118 ***
0.035
0.078 ***
0.071 ***
0.066 **
0.003
0.076 ***
0.031
0.006
0.065 ***
1.384 **
1.500 **
0.903
−0.451
−0.450
−1.017
0.355
0.111
−0.163
0.651
1.576 **
1.308 *
0.054
−0.227
1.276 *
−0.656
0.663
0.224
0.611
0.459
0.630
1.412 **
1.386 *
−0.441
0.458
−0.139
0.281
1.126
−0.169
0.897
−0.193
0.722
−0.237
1.744 **
0.884
1.039
0.542
−0.418
1.439 *
2.404 ***
0.336
1.422 **
1.221 *
0.423
1.182 *
0.602
1.487 **
−0.167
1.068
1.235 *
3.787 ***
1.781 ***
1.252 ***
0.313
0.567
−0.331
1.053 **
0.544
0.093
0.016
0.078
0.167
0.295
3.445 ***
1.077 **
1.281 **
0.008
1.296 **
0.575
0.843
−0.247
0.769
0.329
0.244
−0.147
0.712
1.021 *
0.789
0.913
0.410
−0.346
0.782
−0.959
0.418
−0.184
0.904
0.143
3.219 ***
1.433
−1.551 *
−0.122
0.341
−0.440
−0.133
−0.259
0.917
0.308
−0.690
1.917 **
1.088
0.952
0.355
−0.532
−0.059
0.081
1.354
0.164
−1.128
1.173
0.790
0.567
2.180 ***
0.536
0.518
1.842 **
−0.591
0.955
0.211
0.407
0.740
1.432 *
2.241 ***
13.355 ***
0.635 ***
13.077 ***
1.989 ***
14.415 ***
1.840 ***
8.192 ***
0.354 ***
0.104 ***
0.083 ***
0.050 *
0.042
0.025
0.023
0.019
−0.010
−0.013
0.043
0.033
0.049 *
−0.001
0.057 **
0.052 **
1.505 *
1.827 **
0.788
0.343
2.742 ***
−0.090
0.685
0.467
−0.188
0.030
0.852
1.048
−0.512
1.821 **
0.529
−0.759
1.247 ***
18.809 ***
1.297 ***
11.533 ***
1.858 ***
13.607 ***
0.965 ***
15.745 ***
1.155 ***
11.193 ***
1.817 ***
19.193 ***
3.280 ***
18.028 ***
0.891 ***
13.430 ***
The table reports coefficients from market VAR analysis, which contains the natural log of volume (Mkt vol), market return (Mkt rtn), constant (Constt) and volatility at different lags
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significant values at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
Risks 2022, 10, 56
8 of 15
For most lags, as seen from the Table 2, there is a positive relationship between the
market volume and the market return. This contemporaneous relationship, on the other
hand, is found to be significant for AUTO (lags = 1 and 2 days), BANK (lags = 1, 2 and
5 days), FIN (lags = 1 and 2 days), FMCG (lags = 1 and 13 days), INFRA (lags = 2 and
7 days), IT (lags = 1, 2, 5 and 14 days), MEDIA (lags = 1, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 11 days), and for
METAL (lags = 1, 2, 3 and 7 days). This supports the hypothesis that there is a lead–lag
relationship between volume and return, indicating excessive trading by the investors.
For defensive sectors, ENERGY and PHARMA, the coefficient values for these sectors are
‐
statistically insignificant; therefore, they do not reveal overconfident trading behaviour, and
‐
SERVICES coefficients at lags = 2, 5, and 11 days are significant, explaining overconfident
‐
‐
trading behaviour in the pre-COVID-19 phase, respectively. Among all the cyclical sectors,
MEDIA, METAL AND REALTY sector coefficient values are highly significant because
‐
investors are optimistic about the rise in market return and showing interest in these sectors
(Table 2). Further, there is a positive correlation between trading volume and market
volatility for all the sectors in the study (Statman et al. 2006).
As a whole, VAR findings suggest that overconfidence bias is more prevalent in
‐
all the cyclical sectors, particularly MEDIA, METAL and REALTY, which have highly
significant coefficients in the pre period. In the defensive sectors, the VAR outcomes are
‐
not as strong as we expected, except for SERVICES. We also found that the investors are
‐
− = −1.652) sector at the third lag.
underconfident concerning investing in the FMCG
(t-value
‐
This can highlight that the defensive sectors may not provide adequate liquidity to enable
investors’ fast and exorbitant trading. Another possible explanation includes exhibiting
lower volatility resulting in low return and lower trading cost because the businesses of
defensive sectors are not much dependent on economic activities.
Moving forward, IRFs (Figure 1) have been plotted for 10 days for all the sectors to best
‐
gauge the overconfident trading. Here, Figure 1 only depicts the market volume responses
to market return shocks only for brevity purposes. It shows that one standard deviation
(SD) in market return shock leads to an increase in volume of 0.017, 0.026, 0.018, 0.024,
0.009, 0.014, 0.015, 0.022, 0.032, 0.027, 0.016, 0.025, 0.037, 0.022, 0.061, 0.047, 0.012, 0.009,
‐
0.062, 0.051, 0.005 and 0.022% in the subsequent two days for AUTO, BANK, ENERGY,
‐
FIN, FMCG, IT, MEDIA, METAL, PHARMA, REALTY and SERVICES. The response of
market volume at the first day to market return shock is not visible since the values are
close to zeroes. Furthermore, for some sectors, the positive impulse responses remain over
the course of 10 days (BANK, FIN, IT, MEDIA, METAL, REALTY and SERVICES). The
‐
MEDIA sector received the highest cumulative response of 0.306%, followed by the METAL
sector 0.277%.
BANK
AUTO
FIN
.4
.30
.30
.25
.25
.3
.20
.20
.15
.15
.2
.10
.10
.1
.05
.05
.00
.00
.0
-.05
-.05
-.10
-.10
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Figure 1. Cont.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Risks 2022, 10, 56
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INFRA
MEDIA
IT
.4
.4
.4
.3
.3
.3
.2
.2
.2
.1
.1
.1
.0
.0
.0
-.1
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-.1
1
10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
7
8
9
10
REALTY
METAL
.30
.40
.25
.35
ENERGY
.4
.3
.30
.20
.25
.2
.15
.20
.10
.1
.15
.05
.10
.00
.0
.05
-.1
-.05
.00
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
1
2
3
4
FMCG
5
6
7
8
9
2
3
4
5
6
9
10
10
PHARMA
.4
.4
SERVICES
.30
.3
.3
.2
.2
.25
.20
.15
.10
.1
.1
.0
.0
.05
.00
-.05
-.1
1
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
‐
Figure 1.‐Market volume responses to market return shocks for the cyclical and defensive sectors:(pre‐
‐
COVID-19 period).
‐
4.3. COVID-19:
VAR and IRFs
‐
The COVID-19
VAR estimation for cyclical and defensive sectors is shown in Table 3
‐
The market volume is autocorrelated with itself for all the sectors. In addition, the relationship in volume–volatility documented in literature holds true in most cases. In the case
of cyclical sectors, the VAR holds significantly positive for the automobile, banking and
media sectors (lags = 1 day), FIN (lags = 1, 2, 3 and 6 days), IT (lags = 1, 2 and 5 days), Metal
(lags = 1 and 2 days) and realty sectors (lags = 1 and 2 days). ENERGY is the only sector
witnessing no overconfidence bias in the defensive sectors. FMCG exhibits low significant
‐
value at the 5th lags and at the 9th lag shows the underconfident trading behaviour of the
‐
investors. PHARMA sees noticeable overconfidence-driven stock
‐ trading at lags = 1 and
2 days, which are highly significant, and SERVICES (lags = 6 day) is found to be weak with
low a coefficient value significant at 10%.
‐ ‐
‐
‐
‐
Risks 2022, 10, 56
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Table 3. VAR resultforCOVID-19 period.
Cyclical Sector
Defensive Sector
Parameters
AUTO
BANK
FIN
INFRA
IT
MEDIA
METAL
REALTY
ENERGY
FMCG
PHARMA
SERVICES
Mkt vol (−1)
Mkt vol (−2)
Mkt vol (−3)
Mkt vol (−4)
Mkt vol (−5)
Mkt vol (−6)
Mkt vol (−7)
Mkt vol (−8)
Mkt vol (−9)
Mkt vol (−10)
Mkt rtn (−1)
Mkt rtn (−2)
Mkt rtn (−3)
Mkt rtn (−4)
Mkt rtn (−5)
Mkt rtn (−6)
Mkt rtn (−7)
Mkt rtn (−8)
Mkt rtn (−9)
Mkt rtn (−10)
Constt
Volatility
0.453 ***
0.527 ***
0.305 ***
0.064
0.021
0.103
0.131 **
0.081
0.414 ***
0.320 ***
0.112 *
0.125 *
−0.012
−0.036
0.118 **
0.410 ***
0.125 *
−0.017
0.041
0.201
0.241 ***
−0.008
0.034
0.134 **
−0.091
0.140 **
0.311 ***
0.121 **
0.214 ***
0.309 ***
0.175 ***
−0.070
0.085
0.006
0.126 **
0.344 ***
0.122 *
0.023
−0.069
0.082
−0.120 *
0.004
0.075
−0.117 *
0.355 ***
0.125 **
0.435 ***
0.075
−0.024
0.030
0.043
0.069
3.078 ***
1.405 **
1.272 **
1.202 *
1.435 **
0.799
−0.395
1.196 *
0.979
3.156 ***
2.717 **
0.611
0.914
4.256 ***
1.539
5.226 ***
0.883
1.281
−0.013
1.271
2.048 ***
1.295 *
0.973
0.013
1.453 **
0.943
6.432 ***
2.045 ***
0.216
0.452
−1.324
−0.478
1.447
1.026
1.254
0.751
0.099
−1.339
0.183
2.340 *
1.758
0.891
0.121
−3.298 ***
6.486 ***
3.435 ***
0.220
0.459
0.361
0.614
−0.204
1.356 *
10.165 ***
4.066 ***
9.203 ***
3.778 ***
5.494 ***
6.002 ***
11.311 ***
4.106 ***
6.259 ***
9.895 ***
3.973 ***
7.446 ***
10.099 ***
7.043 ***
5.702 ***
6.702 ***
6.843 ***
5.443 ***
11.539 ***
7.103 ***
8.921 ***
7.188 ***
7.298 ***
4.033 ***
This table reports coefficients from market VAR analysis, which contains the natural log of volume (Mkt vol), market return (Mkt rtn), constant (Constt) and volatility at different lag
specifications. Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant values at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.
Risks 2022, 10, 56
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Overall, the investor has shifted their focus to COVID-19-related opportunities, leading
to a surge in the IT and PHARMA sectors. One of the main reasons for investing in
pharmaceutical industries is that most of the stock in the PHARMA sector gave positive
returns during 2020, as it was characterised as essential services, meaning lesser disruptions
caused during the lockdown period. In the case of the IT sector, the adoption of digital
technologies during the COVID-19 surge led to the increase in market return.
The IRFs have been plotted for all the sectors during the COVID-19 period (Figure 2).
‐
This demonstrates that for 1SD in market return, market volume increases
by 0.074, 0.028,
0.040, 0.020, 0.033,0.042, 0.064, 0.067, 0.130, 0.081, 0.052, 0.039, 0.128, 0.109, 0.163, and 0.112%
for AUTO, BANK, FIN, IT, MEDIA, METAL, PHARMA and REALTY, respectively, in the
‐
subsequent 2 days. It is also observed that market return shocks bring out a negative
response in market volume for the energy sector on the third and fourth days, and it is
declining for infrastructure for all the 10 days. The largest accumulated responses have
been recorded for media (0.808%), followed by the realty sector (0.591%). The responses
‐
have been recorded as the lowest for infrastructure (0.028%) and energy (0.081%).
AUTO
BANK
.4
.4
.3
.3
FIN
.30
.25
.20
.2
.2
.1
.1
.0
.0
.15
.10
.05
.00
-.05
-.10
-.1
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
10
.30
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
MEDIA
IT
INFRA
.4
.4
.3
.3
.2
.2
.1
.1
.0
.0
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
.00
-.05
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-.1
10
1
REALTY
METAL
.30
.4
.4
.3
.3
.2
.2
.1
.1
2
3
4
5
ENERGY
6
7
8
9
10
4
6
7
8
9
10
6
7
8
9
10
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
.00
.0
.0
-.05
-.10
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-.1
10
1
2
3
5
PHARMA
FMCG
.4
.4
SERVICES
.30
.3
.3
.2
.2
.1
.1
.0
.0
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
.00
-.05
-.10
-.1
-.1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2
3
4
5
10
Figure 2. Response of market volume to market return shocks for the cyclical and defensive sectors
‐
(during the COVID-19 period).
‐
Risks 2022, 10, 56
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5. Policy Implications
This study is significant for investors, governments, and market regulators during
times of market instability, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The role of overconfidence
bias in stock selection must be considered for fair appraisal of financial assets. Individual
investors can make more informed and effective financial decisions in the face of the
COVID-19 pandemic if they are aware of overconfidence behaviour at the industry level.
This is because over confidence amongst investors encourages investing in more risky
assets that give more return, which may fuel the market volatility. This study provides
investors with easily accessible and quality information in the selection of risky assets
(cyclical sector).
The COVID-19 pandemic poses a considerable crisis to the health market, including the
pharmaceutical sector; identifying this effect may guide policymakers in making informed
planning to overcome the challenges. Money managers should educate investors on how
to hold a well-diversified portfolio to reduce transaction costs and risk in the long run. To
build positive industry sentiments, the government should provide relief to various worstaffected industries in tax benefits and try to strengthen market conditions. In addition,
certain policy measures, such as quantitative easing and reductions in margin requirements
may be implemented to ensure a consistent money supply, boosting consumption and
investment.
6. Conclusions
The primary objective of this paper was to delve into the overconfidence bias of cyclical
and defensive sectors, during regular and pandemic periods.
Using VAR and IRFs, we show that there is a relationship between market return and
volume for all the cyclical sectors in the pre-COVID-19 era because the relevant coefficients
are positive and significant for most lagged market returns. MEDIA, METAL and REALTY
exhibit higher significant coefficients among cyclical sectors, and we do not find any
significant coefficients for the ENERGY and PHARMA sectors, which are part of defensive
sectors in the pre-COVID-19 period. In the COVID-19 period, all the cyclical sectors
exhibit overconfident trading behaviour, except INFRA. In the case of defensive sectors,
overconfidence of the investors is more pronounced in the PHARMA sector. ENERGY is
the only sector that stays unaffected from overconfidence bias in both the periods.
These findings could indicate that some cyclical and defensive sectors have a disposition effect, in addition to overconfidence bias (or optimism).This suggests that behavioural
finance can explain the abnormal market behaviours produced by the current outbreak
in the Indian stock market. Similar results have been shown in the US market (Statman
et al. 2006) at the market level. Similar to Mushinada and Veluri (2018) and Prosad et al.
(2017), the current findings imply the presence of an overconfidence bias in the Indian
equity market.
The current pandemic provided an opportunity for some sectors to grow and prosper
while being disastrous to some industries. The pharmaceutical companies in the defensive
sector and infrastructure in the cyclical sector see uptrend and downtrend movement in
their market volume, respectively. COVID-19 provided a significant opportunity for the
Indian pharmaceutical industry to generate short-term profit due to the recent rise in the
price and share of imports from China and the pick-up in demand for COVID-19 drugs.
The sector had shown resilience in the face of numerous economic shocks, as evidenced
by India’s more than 18% increase in pharmaceutical exports during 2020–2021, a pandemichit year when world output and trade dropped (Business Standard 2021). According to a
study by Moody’s Investors Service, India’s first and second coronavirus waves caused
varying degrees of damage to the country’s infrastructure sectors and underperformance
in the market due to a decline in volume (Beniwal 2021). According to an analysis by the
Statistics Ministry, construction of everything from roads to ports was three and a half
years behind schedule.
Risks 2022, 10, 56
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The current study explores only one pandemic to investigate the overconfidence bias.
However, the other bias-like disposition effect and herding bias should be examined for all
the sectors to make the findings more robust. Moreover, this research should be extended
by examining other pandemics, such as SARS and EVD.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, M.Q.A. and M.A.B.; methodology, M.Q.A. and M.A.B.;
software, I.T.H. and M.A.B.; validation, M.Q.A. and M.A.B.; formal analysis, M.Q.A. and M.A.B.;
investigation, M.Q.A. and M.A.B.; resources, M.S.A.; data curation, M.S.A.; writing-original draft
preparation, M.Q.A.; writing-review and editing, M.S.A. and N.I.H.; visualization, I.T.H. and M.A.B.;
supervision, M.S.A. and M.A.B.; project administration, M.S.A. and N.I.H.; funding acquisition, I.T.H.
and N.I.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The datasets used and analyzed during the current study are available
by the corresponding authors on reasonable request.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Appendix A
Table A1. Sectoral Indices of NSE.
Indices
Industry/Sector
Abbreviations
N
Nifty Auto Index
Nifty Bank Index
Nifty Financial Services Index
Nifty FMCG Index
Nifty IT Index
Nifty Media Index
Nifty Metal Index
Nifty Pharma Index
Nifty Realty Index
Nifty Energy Index
Nifty Services Index
Nifty Infra Index
Automobile
Banking
Financial services
Fast-moving consumer goods
Information technology
Media and entertainment
Metal
Pharmaceutical
Real estate
Energy
Services
Infrastructure
AUTO
BANK
FIN
FMCG
IT
MEDIA
METAL
PHARMA
REALTY
ENERGY
SERVICES
INFRA
15
12
20
15
10
14
15
10
10
10
30
30
Source: Obtained from NSE website. N: Represents the number of companies in the constituents in an index.
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