©Peter van Alfen Working Paper v.29.3.2014 Metoikêsis and Archaic Monetary Coordination: Teos-Abdera and Phokaia-Velia Peter van Alfen Introduction The phenomenon of archaic (and classical) period monetary unions has been well reviewed with a number of scholars recently cataloging instances of joint coinages and contemplating the reasoning that lay behind their production. 1 Even so, we still do not fully understand why such bi- and multi-lateral arrangements were conducted in the first place, how they were organized, and how they were maintained over time. Some commentators have sought the impetus for such arrangements within the realm of economics: creating a joint coinage would reduce transaction costs between the partners and could generate shared seigniorage revenues.2 These notions, however, have yet to be fully tested for the archaic period, and indeed work on modern monetary unions suggest that political factors, both domestic and international, weigh just as heavily in forming and maintaining monetary unions as economic factors do.3 To be sure, politics seem to have played a significant role in arranging the production of some archaic joint coinages. We can, in general, identify two political modes in these arrangements: one in which union was conducted between political equals on a voluntary basis, and another in which it was imposed from above by a hegemonic power.4 What evidence we have also suggests that arrangements between political equals might be formalized by treaties (or contracts) between the partners;5 it is possible that less formal arrangements, especially between unequal partners might also have existed. Among the various examples of joint monetary arrangements in the archaic period, two stand out for the very reason that it is far from clear if what we observe in the numismatic record is the result of a monetary union of sorts between two discrete partners or the continuing practice of a single political body. What makes the monetary 1 Psoma and Tsangari 2003; Mackil and van Alfen 2006; Mackil 2013: 247-255. See, for example, Mackil and van Alfen 2006. 3 See, for example, the papers in Capie and Wood 2003. 4 For a discussion, see Mackil and van Alfen 2006: 205-210. 5 An inscription (IG XII 2, 1) dated c. 400 BC and found at Mytilene details aspects of the treaty between Mytilene and Phokaia to produce jointly electrum hektai. For a full discussion and earlier bibliography, see Mackil and van Alfen 2006: 210-219. Cf. Bodenstedt 1981, especially pp. 29-31 2 1 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen arrangements of archaic Teos and Abdera, and Phokaia and Velia so peculiar is that they were born of their shared experiences of metoikêsis, or “urban relocation”. 6 Their relocations in the 540s BC resulted not in the total transfer of the populations, but in the near even splitting of the poleis, with half of the people staying or soon returning home, the other half setting out to establish a new settlement quite some distance away. Not long after the split each half of the polis produced coins similar to those produced by the other half; these were among the very first silver coinages produced by any Greek polis. The political and numismatic interpretation of these events is complicated by the divide between these communities not only in terms of distance and identity, but also by the apparent attempts to maintain unity, at least in some of their dealings with one another. Most political interpretations to date have assumed that there was from the beginning a complete, formal break between those relocating and those staying, with each community, new and old, (re)forming its own autonomous government, as well as its own identity. But this static model of autonomy, which presupposes a certain level of state formation and formal procedures for conducting external relations, does not fully capture the particularities of the experience of metoikêsis and its aftermath. The massive scale of relocation and strong (familial) ties between the halves of the split polis shaped their relationships with one another quite differently than those between a ‘normal’ metropolis and apoikia, or between two unrelated poleis.7 Since the interweaving of the communities, particularly in the case of Teos and Abdera, appears to have gone beyond what we would expect of autonomia, some have instead considered the relationship to be a sympoliteia, an interpretation that also poses problems.8 Numismatic interpretations meanwhile have ascribed the coin parallels either, in the case of Teos and Abdera, to some sort of communal decision making, a political act that receives no further 6 I borrow here Demand’s (1990) translation of metoikêsis, who discusses the phenomenon at length. 7 See Graham (1992) and Youni (2007) for the unusual nature of the relationship between Teos and Abdera. 8 Hermann 1981: 26-29; Youni (2007) and Graham (1992) discuss but dismiss the possibility of sympoliteia. See further below. For the concept of autonomia see Ostwald (1982) and Low (2007). 2 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen explication, or, in the case of Phokaia and Velia, simply to imitation, a cultural act that implies a lack of close contact and one which again is left mostly unexplained.9 In this paper, I set out to define more closely the nature of the monetary arrangements between these split communities, and to delineate the effect that the experience of metoikêsis had on these arrangements. I suggest that these bi-lateral arrangements were significantly different from those found in other monetary unions since they were predicated primarily on close political and social ties rather than on any pressing economic need. These close ties allowed the partners to structure their monetary union in ways that were much less formal than that between unrelated partners, and to set it on more equal footing than the unions between metropoleis and their apoikiai. This different type of arrangement I call “monetary coordination” to set it apart from more formal, but still voluntary “cooperative” arrangements, and non-voluntary “hegemonic” arrangements. This paper is divided into four parts. The first part reviews the historical and numismatic evidence for Phokaia and Teos and their settlements. Since monetary unions of any sort were presumably concluded among those having the power to make critical decisions, the second part of this paper addresses what it is we mean by monetary authority in the archaic period, and where this authority, politically and bureaucratically, was located within the polis. The third part expands the scope to consider problems of polis autonomy and elite interaction within the international realm, and the final part returns to monetary coordination in light of these considerations. I.A. Phokaia and Velia In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Sardis in the mid-540s BC, the Persians turned their attention to the rest of western Asia Minor.10 The Phokaians felt unable to come to terms with the Persian general Harpagos, then besieging them, and so abandoned their city by ship taking with them their families, all their moveable goods, and transportable cult objects After an initially slow start, they made plans to sail to the west, 9 Communal decision making in Teos and Abdera: Kraay 1976: 35, Chryssanthanki-Nagle 2007: 101; western Phokaian coinage imitating Ionian Phokaian models: Rutter 2002: 172. 10 The following paragraph is based on Herodotus 1.163-167 and ps.-Skymnos 250. 3 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen where other Phokaians had founded Alalia in Corsica and Massalia in Gaul a generation earlier (map 1). Before heading west, however, the mother group first sailed back to Phokaia, overcame the Persian garrison, and there called down mighty curses on anyone who would stay behind, and, to make the point more dramatic still, sunk a mass of iron in the sea swearing never to return to Phokaia until the iron resurfaced. Despite all the theatrics, over half of the Phokaians turned back around and stayed home. In the western Mediterranean, the other half landed in Alalia, and probably Massalia as well, and soon began to prey on regional trade until the Etruscans and Carthaginians had had enough of this. The Phokaians won their Pyrrhic sea battle against both forces, and for reasons unclear abandoned Alalia only fives years after landing there, once again setting off in search of a home, which they eventually found in Campania at Velia. And there the story, at least for Herodotus, ends.11 Long before the Persians arrived at their gates, the Phokaians had minted electrum coinage on their own standard, with an ideal stater weight of 16.45 g (figs. 1-2).12 Sometime around 520 BC, those who stayed behind concluded a formal agreement with the Lesbian polis of Mytilene to produce a joint series of electrum hektai, an arrangement that lasted for nearly 200 years producing a massive amount of electrum coinage, whose purpose still eludes us (figs. 3-5).13 The situation with their contemporaneous civic silver coinage is a little unclear, however. At least three separate silver series dated to the last half of the 6th century have been attributed to Phokaia: 1) those with the phokê (seal) as a punning type, used also on their earliest electrum coins. The denominations of this series are mostly small—obols and hemiobols—but there are as well a handful of extant larger “drachms” weighing close to 4 g (fig. 6).14 Findspots for this series include the western 11 The bibliography on Phokaian activities in the west is substantial. For recent, detailed overviews of these activities with extensive bibliographies see Malkin 2010 and Morel 2006. 12 Bodenstedt 1981, series E. 13 See above n.5. 14 Drachms: Bableon 1907, nos. 512-513 (“drachme lesbiaque”); BMC Ionia, no. 78 (“Phoenician standard”). Ten examples of these “drachms” have been recorded: 1) Bableon 42, pl. III, 9 (3.93 g = Jameson 1508 = Leu MM 1965, 390; from the Taranto hoard); 2) Babelon 42b (3.70 g, from the Taranto hoard); 3) Babelon 43, pl. III, 11 (3.75 g, from the Taranto hoard); 4) SNG Lockett 2847 (3.92 g, from the Taranto hoard); 5) ANS 1944.100.46729 (3.93 g, from the Taranto hoard); 6) Paris (3.82 g); 7) Paris, de Luynes (3.68 g); 8) London (3.78 g); 9) Berlin (3.85 g); 10) New York Sale XXVII (2012), lot 523 (Prospero col.)(3.93 g). Additional fractions appear to be related to the drachm: Bableon 1907, nos. 514-520; Balcer 1970: 26. This coinage is discussed more below. 4 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen Mediterranean Taranto (IGCH 1874) and Auriol (IGCH 2352) hoards; 2) the second is a series with a griffin head as a type, minted not, it would seem, on the Phokaic standard, but possibly the Aeginetan, in six denominations, from staters to tartemoria (figs. 7-8). The attribution to Phokaia rests primarily on the griffin, a type, as we have seen, possibly used by Phokaia on one of its earlier electrum series.15 Findspots include hoards found in Asia Minor (IGCH 1165, Asia Minor; 1183, Colophon), and the Auriol hoard. And, finally, 3) Herbert Cahn’s so-called Ionische Damen, a series of smaller coins with the type of a female head on the obverse minted on the Phokaic standard in three denominations: 1/12, 1/24, and 1/96 staters (figs. 9-10).16 These have been found in hoards in Asia Minor, Egypt, and in the western Mediterranean.17 In the west, the Phokaians who settled in Velia produced a series of “drachms” with a forepart of lion tearing at its prey beginning around 535 BC shortly after they settled there (fig. 11).18 Not long after, c. 525 BC, a series of small silver coins appeared in Massalia, the so-called Auriol types named after the large hoard of them found at Auriol near Marseille in 1867 (IGCH 2352)(fig. 12-13).19 Like the electrum hektai of Mytilene-Phokaia, these were minted with constantly changing obverse types; nearly 40 are known to date.20 The weight standard appears to be Phokaic, although the weights of 15 Babelon 1907, nos. 521-530 (Aeginetan standard); Balcer 1970: 26-27. Babelon 1907, nos. 531-532; Cahn 1998; see table 1 below. 17 Findspots: IGCH 1166 (Bayrakli); 1183 (Colophon)?; 1639 (Sakha); 1875 (Volterra, see Cahn 1998)?; 2311 (Morella, see Cahn 1998)?; 2352 (Auriol); 2353 (Ollioules, see Furtwängler 1978: 22); Blaundos (in Lydia; single find now in Vienna, no. 35.153, see Furtwängler 1978: 22); Smyrna (single finds, cf. Robinson 1960: 33); Phrygia (Furtwängler 1978: 22); Saint-Remy (3 found in excavations, see Furtwängler 1978: 36). 18 Williams 1992; Rutter 2002; Cantilena 2006; Brousseau (2007) analyses the weight standard, which I discuss below. 19 Furtwängler 1978 remains the key reference for the Auriol-type coinage; for the initial publication of the Auriol material see Babelon 1907: 1571-1618. The date of 525 BC for the earliest series of Auriol-type coins is based primarily on stylistic considerations and therefore subject to revision. 20 Picard (1981) argues that the multiple types correspond to individual magistrates, not to a civic program of commemorating the colonization and foundation of Messalia as Furtwängler (1978) proposed. Cf. Brenot 2002. 16 5 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen the coins vary considerably; the denominational structure was oriented towards small coins between c. 0.15 g to 1.20 g (see table 1).21 A third series of small silver coins, like those found in the Etrurian Volterra hoard (IGCH 1875, c. 475 BC), were minted using nearly a dozen obverse types and have long been attributed to yet another group of Phokaians in Etruria. More recently, however, this Greek-Estrucan origin has been brought into question by the large number of these coins found in the South of France, suggesting that these are rather Greek-Provençal issues, most likely early issues of Massalia.22 The denominations are again on the small side and the weight standard probably Phokaic (see table 1). In a recent article, Pere Pau Ripollès and Jean-Albert Chevillon argue that another Phokaian settlement, Emporion, began producing coinage c. 515 BC; previously the start date was placed well after 500. Like the coinage of Massalia, the earliest coins of Emporion were minted using a variety of obverse types in nine denominations, the smallest being a 1/64th stater of c. 0.17 g, while the largest is what Ripollès and Chevillon call a pentobol of c. 4.2 g (fig. 14). Like some of the coinage of Massalia, the weights vary considerably suggesting to Ripollès that this far west colony was not able to obtain mint workers of great skill. Phase A lasted until c. 500, when the more familiar ram head/cross with dots type, Phase B, began. I call attention here two things: that while there is affinity, in terms of the weight standard, the denominational structure and the types used between many of the coins produced by the Phokaians in Ionia and in their western settlements, this affinity is generally a little chaotic; and that silver coins produced in Phokaia circulated in the west, as the Auriol and Taranto hoards and single finds show.23 Also, it important to note that scholars have attributed the similarities between the eastern and western Phokaian coinages primarily to two mechanisms, neither of which includes direct administrative 21 The weight standard of the earliest coins of the western Phokaians remains a matter of controversy; see Brenot 2002; Brousseau 2007; Morel 2002; Ripollès and Chevillon 2013; Parise 1996. 22 Cristofani-Martelli 1975; Orsini and Mescle 2002. 23 To date, no western Phokaian coins have been marked as coming from find spots in Asia Minor. This, however, could simply be due to a lack of expectation of finding such coins in the east. The similarities between, for example, Furtwängler’s (1978) group F and Cahn’s (1998) Ionische Damen might easily lead scholars to confuse the Massaliote coins for their Ionian sisters if examples came to light in Ionia (cp. figs. 9-10 and 13). 6 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen links: Greek engravers travelling west and there producing the types they produced at home; or just simply imitation.24 I.B. Teos Herodotus (1.168) relates that not long after the Phokaians abandoned their city, the Teians, also besieged by Harpagos, likewise took to their ships and abandoned theirs, sailing for Abdera in Thrace (map 2). He notes that all of the Teians left, leaving no one behind. But the city was not abandoned for long, if it was ever entirely abandoned at all. Composed to celebrate Abdera’s origins, Pindar’s Second Paian (fr. 52b SN.-M.) composed in the early fifth century, has been taken as evidence that some of the Teians in Abdera returned to Asia Minor and re-inhabited their city at some point after their arrival in Thrace, a return that may have been prompted by several episodes of brutal fighting between the Teians and Thracian natives (cf. Strabo 14.1.30). Whatever the reason for the return, for Pindar both Teos and Abdera were, as Huxley (1984) put it, “mutually metropolitan,” both simultaneously the metropolis of the other.25 Theirs was obviously not a typical relationship, a fact underscored by fifth century epigraphic evidence. An inscription discovered near Teos in the mid-1970s (SEG 31.985), part of the so-called Teian Imprecations (cf. Meiggs-Lewis 30), dated by P. Hermann in his editio princeps to the second quarter of the fifth century, lists various measures that were intended to restrict magisterial power and protect citizens against abuse including, for example, poisoning people, inhibiting the import of wheat, deliberately betraying the city, and introducing a tyrant. 26 The context would appear to be upheavals and possibly a tyranny in Teos following the Persian Wars.27 Astonishingly, the enactments applied equally to Teos and to Abdera. As L. Lokopoulou and M.-G. Parissaki (2004: 307) have noted: 24 Engravers: Chevillon 1990; imitation: Babelon 1907: 1575-1576; Kraay 1976: 170; Rutter 2002: 172. 25 The question of the date of Teos’ resettlement is controversial, taking place either soon after the Teian foundation of Abdera (540 BC?), or following the Ionian revolt. There may have well been several occasions in which groups of Abderites moved to Teos all throughout the period. See Balcer 1968; Chryssanthanki-Nagle 2007: 100-101; D’Alessio 1992; Dougherty 1994; Graham 1991 and 1992: 54. 26 Hermann 1981; Graham 1991; Youni 2007. 27 Lokopoulou and Parissaki 2004; Robinson 2010: 140-145. 7 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen The situation is unique. Indeed, we know of instances where mother cities promulgated legislation regulating their relations with their colonies, but the Teos inscription appears to be the first known case of a state law of such fundamental importance applying to both the metropolis and its colony. But how do we define this “unique situation”? With some reservation, Hermann (1985: 28) felt that the relationship between the two approached something like sympoliteia, both cities forming a single political entity, a suggestion that has become the fallback position.28 But when pushed, the evidence for sympoliteia in the classical period is, as Hermann noted, rather equivocal: both cities had separate assemblies and law courts. More recent commentators have continued to hedge. A.J. Graham (1992: 59), for example, concluded that Abdera and Teos “were independent states, but were so closely linked together that they admitted institutions and arrangements that effectively placed their political unity above their political independence.” Marika Youni (2007), in her close study of the Teian imprecations confirms Graham’s observations. Rubinstein (2004: 1101) has suggested simply that “that, to some extent, Teos and Abdera remained two parts of one polis.” The numismatic evidence does not help to clarify this “unique situation.” The coinages of both Abdera and Teos, however, have received a fair amount of attention in recent years, so the outline of both cities’ earliest coinage is now reasonably welldefined, even if the political situation is not.29 Aside from a possible early issue of electrum, the Teians first appear on the numismatic map sometime around the 540s, either before they left for Abdera or after they returned, when they initiated a short-lived silver series on the Lydo-Milesian standard. At some point soon after, Abdera and Teos started afresh, the southern city issuing silver now on the Aeginetan standard, while the northern city issued coins on a standard variously called Thraco-Macedonian, Thracian, or reduced Chian (figs. 15-16). The denomination range for both was extensive including some of the largest archaic silver coins known as well as some of the smallest. These 28 E.g. Gorman 2002: 189; Robinson 2010: 140. Chryssanthanki-Nagle 2007, Kagan 2006, and Matzke 2002, all building on the previous generation’s studies by Balcer 1968 and May 1966. 29 8 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen issues, with Abdera’s griffin facing to the left, Teos’ still to the right, began at roughly the same time,30 in what Katerina Chryssanthaki-Nagle (2007: 101) has called a “decision commune.” Colin Kraay (1976: 35) for his part called it a “planned conjunction”, a odd choice of words no doubt meant to convey the difficulties of defining what exactly went on between the two cities monetarily, again a problem stemming from what went on between them politically. In any event, the two different weight standards meant that these two coinages, despite their mirrored types, were not compatible in exchange and so were not intended to circulate together. II. Mapping Monetary Authority: Who Decides? Now that we have the basic outline of Phokaia’s and Teos’ relocations, and that of their coinages, we now turn to the problem of monetary authority, and specifically the question of who made the critical decisions about internal and external monetary arrangements. In its most basic form minting authority is simply authorship, a creative act by individuals or groups who have the resources, skills and desire to produce stamped pieces of metal for monetary use.31 Whether or not they can convince others to use the coinage they produce is another matter entirely. Adding a political dimension to this creative act complicates authorship considerably since it introduces power differentials between those organizing the production of coinage and those who ultimately consume it. Although there is no necessary relationship between states, however we choose to define them, and monetary instruments, states often do assume the power to regulate both the production and consumption of coinage as part of their larger command over public finance.32 30 Chryssanthaki-Nagle 2007: 383: “Le début du monnayage d’Abdère doit être légèrement antérieur à celui de sa métropole Téos.” But Kagan (2006: 55) has argued otherwise: “Chronologically speaking, the important point is that it is reasonable to assume that the coinage at Abdera, with its links to the Aeginetan standard, began at about the same time Teos adopted the standard. Hence the Milesian-weight coins of Teos are likely to be earlier than any issues of Abdera.” In any event it is clear that both coinages began within a very short time of one another. 31 Here and throughout I make a distinction between monetary authority, which controlled the totality of a polis’ monetary decisions, and minting authority, which oversaw only the production of coinage. Minting authority was subordinate to monetary authority; this distinction will become clearer below. 32 On the non-necessity of the relationship between states and monetary instruments see Cohen 1998; Dodd 1994: chp. 2. 9 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen Having powers of coercion they can mandate the types of coins, indigenously produced or not, that are acceptable for use in whatever markets or territories they control. This control over consumption brings further advantages when coupled with control over production: theirs alone is the power to manipulate monetary instruments, most notoriously by overvaluing them, and to compel people to use this currency, thereby bringing benefits, like revenues, to the state.33 Thus authorship becomes authority, and minting authority becomes linked to a community’s highest political power. Here we are faced with two problems: 1) where is this highest power located within a polis, and how is it defined?, and 2) what exactly is the nature of the link between this power and coin production? Locating and defining this power proves difficult on the one hand because the evidence for regime types, governmental structure, and the political machinations of most archaic poleis is thin, and on the other because the modern and ancient conceptualizations of this power do not exactly line up. While “sovereignty” is the term frequently used to describe the supreme independent authority associated with modern nation states, it is far from being a simple or unproblematic concept. Sovereignty encapsulates a broad range of ideas about internally and externally oriented power relations including the characteristics of the internal supreme power (the sovereign or sovereign power), the nature of the state, the relationship between state and society (vis-à-vis the rule of law), and state autonomy within the international community. This conceptual range makes sovereignty unwieldy in analyses of power relations, necessitating at the very least splitting sovereignty into its internally and externally oriented components.34 Even then its inherent exclusivity, which is often at odds with the reality of contemporary politics, also weakens its explanatory powers in describing more inclusive real-world relations. Thus some political scientists have declared that the concept of sovereignty has now run its course.35 These problems aside, modern approaches to sovereignty have long had significant influence on ways of 33 The evidence for ancient populations being compelled to use overvalued coins includes: Timotheos forced his soldiers to us a bronze coinage in the fourth century BC (Ar. Oec. II.2.23); third century BC citizens of Gortyn were forced to use new bronze oboloi under pain of a fine of silver staters (IC, iv, 163; Syll.3 525). 34 Davies (1994), for example, discusses Type A and Type B sovereignty, the former oriented internally, the latter externally. 35 See, for example, the papers collected in Kalmo and Skinner 2010. 10 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen thinking about power structures within and between archaic and classical poleis. Recent reappraisals of its applicability to the ancient polis, however, have shown the limitations of this framework, particularly for understanding relationships between poleis and other external powers.36 For understanding internal power relations, sovereignty also proves problematic. While there seems to have been a notion of a concentrated, supreme power within poleis, expressed elliptically by a combination of the words kratos and kyrion, a clearer expression of this, e.g., “sovereignty,” cannot be found.37 Pursuing the definition and nature of this power further will take us too far afield. Here my concern is simply to point to the existence of what I shall call, for the sake of convenience, “sovereign power”, that entity which was the font of all other authorities, including monetary authority, within a polis, and which acted as the final arbitrator of important decisions concerning the community. This existed somewhere within the ruling structures of the poleis, whether within the person of a tyrant, an oligarchic council, or the assembled demos. And while generally closely associated with governmental institutions, sovereign power could nevertheless exist independently of it. Here we might recall, for example, that Peisistratos left Athenian governing institutions intact when he became tyrant, but there is little question that he had the final say in any important decisions concerning Athens.38 Also, the location of sovereign power within the ruling structures was not static, but could shift from one group, institution or individual and back again, sometimes within a short period of time. Again with the Peisistratids as our example, following the collapse of their tyranny, power shifted momentarily to competing elites before settling squarely on the demos following the Kleisthenic refoms.39 The production of coinage has long been closely linked to sovereign power. Since the early modern period the link between sovereignty and coinage has been made explicit by various treatises defending the sovereign’s role as the sole provider of legitimate currency. This tradition in turn has provided the conceptual and legal foundations for 36 See Berent 2000; Davies 1994; Hansen 1998: 73-83; Ostwald 1982; for problems of external sovereignty and Greek coin production see Martin 1985 and Ziesmann 2005. 37 E.g., Arist. Pol. 3.10-11: τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως; Cf. Davies 1994, Hansen 2010: 500. 38 Hdt. 1.59.6; Thuc. 6.54.6 39 See Ostwald (1986: 15-28) for a concise account of power shifting in late archaic Athens. 11 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen today’s territorial currencies.40 Certainly by the fourth century BC, if not the fifth, sovereign powers were claiming monopolies over coin production, but we cannot be certain when or by what means sovereign powers laid this claim. Elsewhere I have suggested that such claims were not widespread at the beginning of coinage in the early sixth century, and offered an explanation for how later monopolies came to be (van Alfen forthcoming). Here I assume that the sovereign powers already had full control over coin production, but what is not clear is what sort of decisions pertaining to production were made by the sovereign power. We can presume that the most important decisions about coinage rested with the sovereign power, such as deciding whether or not to mint at all, what denominations to produce, how many, in which alloys, etc., since the expense and liabilities involved were significant. Thus monetary authority and sovereign power in most cases were one. But the situation is complicated by the fact that monetary authority could extend above a sovereign power, while generally it was also distributed below it. Above it there was sometimes a hegemonic power. A fair number of archaic poleis were, as Mogens Hansen has detailed, dependent poleis, controlled to some greater or lesser degree by another polis or foreign imperial power.41 While Hansen’s typology of dependency makes it clear that this was a complex phenomenon—he identified 15 different types of dependency--the common factor was that at least some portion of the decisions concerning the dependent polis were made externally, if not by the hegemon itself, then in alignment with or in deference to it. This might mean, for example, that major decisions about coin production were, in fact, made elsewhere and not necessarily by a polis’ sovereign power. During the archaic period there seems to have been a sliding scale of hegemonic interference in coin production. At one end, that of minimal interference, the hegemon left most, if not all production decisions to a polis’ internal sovereign power. Such generally seems to have been the case with the Persians in their dealings with the coinproducing poleis in Asia Minor and the northern Aegean. If, for example, the arguments offered by Olivier Picard and others are correct, tying Thracian coin production to Persian tribute payments, the Persians may have specified that they wanted tribute paid in 40 41 Cohen 1998; Helleiner 2003. Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 87-94. 12 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen coin and simply left each polis to decide how best to fulfill this command.42 At the other end of the scale, that of maximum interference, the hegemon would be far more involved in the decisions, directing that coinage conform to set guidelines, as might have been the case with the Sybarites and some of their dependencies, the Korinthians and some of their colonies, and various Sicilian producers.43 In the case of the Korinthians the metropolis seems to have taken it all a step further and actually produced the coins for one of its dependent colonies, Ambrakia, and possibly others as well.44 Below the sovereign power, the actual business of coining was generally turned over to a number of agents, a magistrate or panel of magistrates, who would then see to carrying out the decisions made by the sovereign or hegemonic power. As a sort of middle manager, the magistrate(s), or minting authority, would probably be responsible for a number of lesser decisions pertaining to organizing the production of the coins, such as, we might imagine, procuring monetary metals. Father down the chain, the magistrate(s) might delegate further responsibilities to yet other agents, including the mint master, contractor, vel sim., who would make on the spot decisions about coin production as it was happening, including, for example, whether or not a die was too worn for continued use.45 Here my concern is with the authority that lay with the internal sovereign power, and not with hegemonic powers or agents. Although the Persians controlled Asia Minor from the mid-sixth century onward, they do not appear to have had interfered with the production of coinage in Phokaia or Teos c. 530 BC, the primary period of focus here.46 And while evidence for magistrates—namely ancillary symbols on coins and possibly the changing types—can be found on archaic coinages from Teos, Abdera, Phokaia, and the 42 Picard 2011; Tzamalis 2011. Sybaris: Rutter 2012: 129, 131; Korinth: Graham 1999: 121-152. 44 Psoma 2012: 166; cf. Kagan 1998. 45 By way of analogy, in the United States, Congress holds sovereign power, at least when it comes to coinage and notes, while the Secretary of the Treasury is the top agent whose charge is to carry out the will of Congress; his signature appears on US currency, along with that of the US Treasurer. In some matters, such as commemorative coinage, the Secretary has latitude to act as he sees fit, while in others, such as the denominational structure of the coins and bills, this is not the case. Below the Secretary, the Directors of the US Mint and US Bureau of Engraving and Printing are sub-agents whose task is to oversee the operations of coin and note production. 46 The Persians’ control of Thrace, and thereby Abdera, from c. 514 BC, is of less concern here since my focus is primarily on the beginnings of the parallel coinages, not those that came later. 43 13 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen western settlements, their actions are of less concern to me than are those of the sovereign power. Unfortunately, we have no solid evidence for archaic regime types in any of the poleis considered here, so we cannot say where exactly this power resided or how it was distributed.47 In the absence of evidence, it is probably safe to assume that as in most other archaic poleis, some type of (narrow) oligarchy ruled, with sovereign power thus lodged among a comparatively small number of men.48 It is also safe to assume that these men were social and economic elites, who ruled by virtue of their own or their extended family’s wealth and social standing. It was these men, likely in council, who made the important decisions about monetary policy and coinage, while the role of the demos in this process, if there was one at all, was probably insignificant, limited to ratifying the decisions made elsewhere.49 III. Autonomy and Elites If sovereign power, and by extension decision making about coin production, was then located within a (small?) group of elites, what happened to this power when Phokaia and Teos split in two? The simplest answer, of course, is that sovereign power divided as well, with each smaller portion of the former larger metropolis forming independent political and governing structures in each location. Certainly by the second quarter of the fifth century, long after the initial acts of relocation and rehabitation had taken place, this would seem to be the case for Teos and Abdera, and we can imagine for Phokaia and Velia as well. But was this splitting of sovereign power the result of an enactment at the moment of relocation, or was this the result of a process over the course of a generation or more? There is no way to know for certain, but we do know that the rituals of separation 47 By the 470s BC there appear to have been democracies in both Teos and Abdera, which may have been immediately preceded by (Persian installed?) tyrannies; see Robinson 2010: 140-145. A narrow oligarchy ruled Massalia in the archaic period: Arist. Pol. 1305 b, 1-16. Cf. Morel 2006: 379. An archaic oligarchy of wealthy and lustrous individuals is reported in Velia: Diod. 9.21 and Diog. Laert. 9.26. Cf. Cappelletti 2011: 9. 48 See Teegarten’s (2014) appendix entitled “The number and geographic distribution of regime types from the Archaic to early Hellenistic periods.” 49 For the (limited) role the demos in archaic governance and power struggles see Anderson 2003; chp. 2; Forsdyke 2005: chp. 1; Rose 2012: chp. 7. 14 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen between those leaving to form new settlements and those staying behind sometimes included an agreement spelling out the legalities of the new relationship. We possess a small number of these so-called foundation decrees from the late archaic and early classical period, discussed in detail by A.J. Graham, which in the case of Cyrene and Naupaktos, for example, were concerned primarily with issues of citizenship, land ownership, taxation, inheritance, and rights of return.50 Both decrees assume that there will be on-going social, economic and political interaction between metropolis and apoikia but they set up barriers to keep the communities from becoming fully integrated. Elsewhere we can find examples of greater political and legal integration, which may have existed from the time of foundation, if not soon after. Potideia, for example, received a magistrate every year from its metropolis Korinth, while the Milesians and some of their apoikiai enjoyed isopoliteia, or shared citizenship, an arrangement that dated at least to the early fifth century if not earlier.51 We can only speculate where on this spectrum of integration the Phokaians and Teians initially arranged relations with their other halves. But their enactments, if they existed, would probably have aimed for greater integration for a number of reasons: 1) their acts of relocation (and re-habitation) were a large-scale events, far more unusual and traumatic than any typical colonial enterprise, however we chose to characterize such endeavors.52 This would arguably encourage greater cohesion, not dissolution; 2) we have no evidence of political or other conflicts within the communities immediately before or after their relocations indicating there was no immediate reason to keep one another at arm’s length;53 3) each half of the 50 Graham 1999: 40-70. Potideia: Thuc. 1.56.2; cf. Graham 1999: 135-37; Miletos: Gorman 2002; cf. Hdt. 6.19.2-22.1. From the late fourth century, we have two treaties, one between Miletos and Olbia, and another between Miletos and Kyzikos, both of which establish isopoliteia. Gorman maintains that both were restatements of earlier treaties initially enacted during the refoundation and resettlement of Miletos in the aftermath of the Battle of Mykale, after which most of Miletos’ population was taken to Susa by the Persians. In order to bulk up the population of the old metropolis, she argues, special privileges were extended to citizens of the Milesian apoikiai that they might come back home as it were. 52 On the nature, purpose, and modern mischaracterization of archaic “colonial” enterprises see Osborne 1998; van Dommelen 2012; see Asheri 1999 and Demand 1990 for the scale and trauma of urban relocation. 53 Herodotus (1.165) says that Phokaians split because half were already homesick after their initial excursion away and so decided to stay, despite the curses called down on anyone who did stay. Given the potential for conflict in such a scenario, Herodotus probably would have recorded 51 15 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen split polis would probably haven been balanced in terms of relative political power with the other, and so their relationships would be comparatively free of the inherent power disparities and associated problems that often colored the relationships between those who left and those who stayed behind. A.J. Graham’s (1999) and R. Werner’s (1971) studies of metropolis-apoikia relationships, for example, have shown how off balance these relationships could be, with the metropolis often exerting primacy or rights over the daughter settlement no matter its autonomy. We get a sense of such hegemonic intrusions in the foundation decrees, but its fullest expression is found in Thucydides (1.31-43) in the speeches presented to the Athenians by the embattled Korkyrians and the Korinthians on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the former insisting on the equal standing of mother and daughter and thus the moral right to be left alone, the latter demanding the deference and obedience owed to the parent. The Korinthians were particularly meddlesome parents, as detailed by A.J. Graham, since the apoikia’s sovereign power was often cowed by the metropolis’ desires.54 Thasos too, as Graham (1999: 96) put it, “exercised a strict political, and possibly also economic, control, to the extent that her colonies were at times treated like parts of the Thasian state.” While metropolis-apoikia relationships could veer towards such power imbalances, nothing in our evidence suggests that this was the case between Phokaia and Velia, or between Teos and Abdera, despite the fact that these relationships were later characterized as ones between a metropolis and an apoikia.55 This is important because it suggests that in dealing with one another, both halves of the split polis approached the table as equals, neither trying to exert hegemonic control. Whether their post-relocation starting point was formalized as a type of sympoliteia, isopoliteia or something else we don’t know, but equality and integration must have been key components however the relationship was structured. tensions were there any. What tensions between Teos and Abdera might be teased out of the Teian Imprecations (see above; Graham 1991, 1992; cf. Youni 2007: 726-727), these reflect issues of the early fifth century, not of the 540s BC. The unusually close relationship between the two poleis three generations later indicates that there were no serious problems to begin with. 54 Graham 1999: 152: “The position of Corinth’s colonies seems to have lain somewhere between autonomy and absorption into the state of Corinth.” 55 Strabo (14.1.30) quotes a line from the archaic Teian poet Anacreon in which Abdera is already called an apoikia of Teos. 16 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen From such beginnings there was no doubt a continually evolving process of defining and redefining the relationship as time brought changes to each community’s self-identity and introduced new challenges.56 If not dealt with in the beginning, later on there certainly would have been the need to define as precisely as possible the issues of property ownership, inheritance, tax liability, eligibility for office and citizenship between the two communities as they each grew in their own location. Yet curiously, in the case of Teos and Abdera, even after two or three generations of evolution, by which time the autonomies of both cities had fully matured and the institutional processes of doing business together had solidified, we still observe smudged lines where we would expect more political demarcation. We have, in fact, no idea of where exactly the Teians and the Abderites of the mid-fifth century drew the line between governing autonomously and constant coordination. For purely local, low level business we can presume that communal decision making was not required, whereas it seems to have been for higher level political business like the “Teian Imprecations” noted above. This political coordination at higher levels thus shaded into political unity, which in turn shaded into political independence some levels below. If this was the case around 470 BC, the time of the Imprecations, how much more blurred was their autonomy and split sovereignty 60 or so years before? I would expect a great deal more. Whatever formalities, legal or not, structured the relationship immediately post-relocation, these, I would suggest, were largely conditioned, and perhaps even eclipsed by the strong interpersonal ties, identities, and age-old practices that existed between families, associations, and other sub-polis units, as well as those between the governing elites of that first generation, who arguably continued to link the now geographically divided but still entwined and enmeshed community at large. Again, what little evidence we have for late archaic regime types in Teos and Phokaia and their settlements in the north and west suggest that like many other archaic poleis they too were ruled by a fairly small group of elites, as noted earlier. This is all the more reason to expect that when the community split, the personal and political interconnections between these elites would continue. 56 See, for example, Dougherty (1994) for the role played by Pindar’s Second Paian in the evolving identity of the Abderites, and Dominguez (2004) for evolving identity issues in the western Phokaian settlements. 17 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen Here, the example an elite named Akêratos is instructive. His late sixth century epitaph found on Thasos boasts that he was magistrate in both Paros and Thasos, a metropolis and apoikia with famously close ties, illustrating precisely how the decision making in two related communities could become entangled at a personal level, despite a formal separation of sovereign powers.57 Personal entanglement could also occur at the level of sovereign power as an episode concerning the notorious Histiaios of Miletus shows. While still tyrant of Miletus, the Great King rewarded him with a place to settle in Thrace near the Strymon River. There he founded the polis Myrkinos. Although Herodotus (5.11, 23-24), our only source for the episode, does not go into further detail, its not hard to imagine that many of those who followed the tyrant north were Milesians, as were those who followed Histiaios’ successor Aristagoras to Myrkinos a number of years later (Hdt. 5.124-126). If so, then the sovereign power of the two poleis, Miletos and Milesian Myrkinos, was entangled within in the person of the tyrant. My point is this: post-relocation sovereign power, and by extension monetary authority, in Phokaia-Velia and Teos-Abdera was probably highly personal, residing not so much in a bureaucratized, independent “State” hovering above society and tethered to a single location, but rather residing with a handful of governing elites who remained politically interconnected and entangled with their brethren in the community’s other half. This entanglement, reflected in the community at large, in their still unified identity, and in the many relationships that no doubt held them together even, most critically, when they were living hundreds or thousands of kilometers apart, would persist until time and distance lessened the intensity of these relationships and necessitated change, eventually dividing the single polis more fully into two and in the process forging more coherent separate identities, as Pindar’s Second Paian set out to do for the Abderites. With this in mind, let us now look again at the monetary arrangements of Teos and Abdera, and of Phokaia and Velia. 57 IG XII, suppl. 412 (CEG 416). In his initial publication of the inscription, Launcey (1934) characterized the relationship between Thasos and Paros as an isopoliteia; Robert (1935: 500) suggested a sympoliteia. Without committing to a formal description, Graham (1992: 59) highlighted how blurred the relationship could become even if there was legal separation between the two states. 18 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen IV. Monetary Coordination In the case of Teos and Abdera, the governing elites decided to produce two entirely different coinages, designed for local use and not for intra-poleis circulation as the different weight standards and the hoard evidence indicates.58 They bowed to the realities of the different economic and monetary needs of their two locations and pursued two currencies, rather than attempting to shoehorn, as it were, both halves of the polis into a single ill-fitting currency. Earlier commentators were correct to call this a communal decision, but failed to appreciate the subtleties of its communality. Paros and Thasos, which also were politically entwined as we have seen, also produced two very different local coinages. But significantly they did not share types, a sign that their monetary intimacy and identities did not run quite so deep.59 In the case of Teos and Abdera, that initial decision to mirror the griffin on each polis’ coinage is, I suggest, a reflection of a sovereign power and monetary authority not yet fully divided, one that insisted on symbolizing continued unity despite the necessity of dividing the currency systems. The symbolism of this act is key to understanding this monetary arrangement, since indeed there is little else to it. The underlying sensitivities here are far more emotive than bureaucratic, more political than economic. Nothing in this arrangement entailed great administrative or economic risk; without the need to negotiate the finer points of a common currency, such as the weight standard, the alloy, and the denominations, or to decide how responsibilities would be divided and enforced, what else was there to discuss besides which direction the respective griffins would face? Even if the elites involved were not as politically entwined as I have argued, there still was no need for the formalities of a treaty or contract in such an arrangement. If either the Teians or the Abderites decided unilaterally to removed the griffin from the coins, what harm would be done? Nothing monetarily, but it would send strong signals of political rupture 58 Chryssanthanki-Nagle 2007; Kagan 2006. Jonathan Kagan (2008:107), however, has suggested rather close and unusual late sixth century monetary ties between Thasos and Paros: “It is my suspicion that the Parian drachms were minted in the region around Thasos and were shipped to Paros. They should be seen as a form of payment—e.g., tribute, tax, royalties etc.—sent by the silver-rich colonies to the mother city.” Kenneth Sheedy (pers. com.) has expressed grave doubts about this theory. 59 19 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen among those making the decisions. The replication of this arrangement generation after generation attests to the ongoing desire to uphold its symbolism even as time and distance made it less poignant. It also attests to the ease of maintaining a low-risk, informal arrangement, even as sovereign power shifted and governing institutions changed, especially when compared to high-risk, formal monetary cooperative arrangements like the one between Phokaia and Mytilene to produce electrum hektai. The monetary arrangement among the Phokaians themselves is much less tidy compared to that among the Teians. Part of the problem stems from the uncertain nature of the relationships between the early western Phokaian settlements and between the Massaliotes and the newly arrived Ionian Phokaians, which in turn complicates how we interpret the (dis)similarities between the coinages produced by each group.60 The starting dates given for the coinages of Velia (c. 535 BC), Massalia (c. 525 BC), and Emporion (c. 515 BC) are little more than best guesses, and might suggest a progressive line of influence running from the transplanted coin-using Ionians to the Massaliotes, and finally to those in second tier settlements, like the Emporitai. Such a progression might simply be an illusion; all the Phokaians settled in the west may well have decided to produce coins at more or less the same time, decisions that may have been more communal than unilateral as suggested by the frequency of shared types and weights (see table 1). Given the intensity of later inter-Phokaian cohesion in the west, it would not be out of place to presume some form of earlier monetary coordination. 61 Even so, the nature of any such coordination, and the role played by those left behind in Phokaia, is rather unclear since not all the types and weights line up as nicely as we would hope, and those that do present problems of their own. Both in Asia Minor and in the west, the Phokaians adopted multiple obverse types, which has the effect, from our perspective especially, of diluting the symbolic significance of any single type. Thus even though, for example, the lion type of the 60 It is unclear from our sources, as Morel (2006: 368-370) notes, how welcoming or hostile the Massaliotes particularly were to the massive influx of Ionian Phokaians. Cf. Malkin 2010: 146. 61 Morel 2006: 409-413. Morel does, however, note that for the earlier period “archaeology fails to demonstrate solid economic links and commercial relations between Massalia, Emporion, Alalia or Hyele, and the written sources are silent.” 20 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen Velian drachms is also found on coins minted in Massalia and Phokaia (figs. 5, 11, 12), we cannot press this too hard as evidence for sovereign power connections the way we can for the Teian and Abderite griffins (figs. 15-16). We simply do not know what the Velian lion type means in a context where types changed regularly, as they did in both Massalia and Phokaia. Despite the caveat, the (near?) concurrent use of the Velian lion type in three Phokaian localities was not random and did symbolize important connections, but whether this was shared cultural or civic legacies (the lion as a cultural icon?) or shared governance (the lion as an elite’s personal seal?) we cannot say.62 Nor can we do much better for most of the other shared types.63 Whatever the nature or intensity of the links symbolized by the types, the monetary aspects of the coins also are problematic since they generally do not perfectly align. The wide variations in the weights of the Phokaian coins minted both in Asia Minor and in the west make it difficult to discern both the weight standard(s) and the denominational structure(s) used. The variation in the west has been attributed either to sloppiness on the part of unskilled mint workers,64 or to the use of different weight standards. This latter was the suggestion of Andreas Furtwängler (1978), who argued that the mint at Massalia produced coins first on the Phokaic weight standard, before switching towards the end of the sixth century to the Milesian standard. Few have followed Furtwängler in this, preferring instead to see all of the coins produced by the Phokaians in the west on the Phokaic standard, although using a denominational structure that was more suited to western purposes.65 I do not wish to enter into these problems here, but will note that there is considerable, although not complete overlap between the weights, denominations, and even the obverse types of coins produced before c. 500 BC in the west and those produced in Phokaia (see table 1), which again might indicate there 62 See Cantilena (2006: 426-427) for the origin and possible significance of the lion type. The phokê type (figs. 2, 4, 6) produced in both Phokaia and Massalia was clearly a shared civic icon. If Cahn’s (1998) Ionische Damen and Furtwängler’s (1978) identical Massaliote type F (figs. 9-10, 13) represent a deity, particularly Phokaian Artemis, these types then represent a shared cultural icon. For the spread of the Phokaian cult of Artemis in the west see Malkin 2011: chp. 6. 64 E.g., Ripollès and Chevillon 2013. 65 See Borel 2002; Morel 2002. Nicola Parise (cited in Morel 2002: 35, 45) has argued that there was designed flexibility in the Massialiote system in order to operate within several different systems, including the traditional Phokaian system. 63 21 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen was an attempt to coordinate a single currency system, although perhaps one somewhat loosely conceived.66 Within all this confusion, there is, however, one set of coins that is different from the rest: the “drachms” of Velia, and the phokê “drachms” of Phokaia. As can be seen in table 1, the weight of both the Velian and phokê drachms stands well apart from all other Phokaian coin weights, but again we are not sure what this rather unique weight represents. Some suggest its an Aegientan tetrobol, others a Lesbian drachm, a Chian drachm, or a Phoenician ½-stater; it could just as well be a Phokaic ¼-stater.67 Whatever the denomination, the weights, fabric, and reverse punches of these two drachms are so similar that George Hill (1902: 2, no. 13) suggested over a century ago that the Velian drachms were minted in Phokaia for use in the west, a suggestion that has been since ignored due to the large number of finds of the Velian type in Italy. Significantly, the only find spot recorded for the ten known examples of the phokê drachms is the famed western Taranto hoard of c. 500 BC (IGCH 1874), which produced at least four of the coins. While we might entertain the possibility that the phokê drachms were also produced in the west--smaller denominations with a phokê were produced in Massalia-the fact that one drachm from the Taranto hoard has a clear phi for Phokaia on the obverse, and the fact of the Taranto hoard findspot itself, which included a large number of coins from the Greek mainland and Asia Minor, weakens any such arguments.68 Keith Rutter sees in the similarities between eastern and western Phokaian coinage a “transplantation,” part of the “cultural baggage of migration.69 For her part, 66 The use of Ionian denominational terminology (“2 ½ hektai”) in a mid-fifth century lead business letter found at the Phokaian settlement at Pech Maho in Iberia (SEG 38.1036; 48.1308) suggests at the very least that there was informal alignment between the monetary systems within Phokaian networks, if not more coordinated, official efforts. The letter records a transaction between a (western?) Ionian and another merchant, probably Greek and probably based at Emporion concerning the purchase of a boat. 67 See n.14 above. 68 Drachm with phi = Babelon 1907, pl. III, 11. For the Massaliote phokê coins see Orsini and Mescle 2002. 69 Rutter 2002: 171: “Il legame con Focea ha una certa importanza, e su questa base si ha la tentazione di suggerire non solo un debito generale alle monetazioni egee, ma piu specificamente la diffusione o il trapianto di una forma particolare della monetazione tramite la migrazione: 22 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen Renata Cantilena (2006: 426) ascribes the similarities to “an intense bond with the traditions of the homeland.” These ideas of “tradition” and “transplantation,” however, are predicated on notions of distance and separation, both temporal and geographic, implying a clean and impassable break between the Phokaians who went west, and the other half who stayed behind.70 The considerable distances involved between Ionia and the western Mediterranean would make this a fair assessment. But we need not assume, particularly in the case of the Phokaians, who were famed for their long-distance seafaring abilities, that when half of them went west, they immediately severed or lost connections with those who stayed behind.71 In fact, the Velian and phokê drachms suggest that contact between the two halves was quite vigorous, at least initially. If we consider the exceptionality of the drachms through the lens of evolving post-metoikêsis sovereignty issues as discussed above, we may see in these coins an attempt to coordinate a unified monetary system, one that would operate within and across their entire transMediterranean network. Finds of the phokê drachms in the west in a context (the Taranto hoard, IGCH 1874) that included Velian drachms certainly suggests that both drachms circulated together within the same extended system. The organization of any such system would have required considerably more planning and decision-making than just choosing obverse types, as at Teos and Abdera, and carried greater risks. While formalities, like a treaty, might not have been needed again because of more unified than divided ruling power, this arrangement would still require political harmony, diligence, and some degree of enforcement to maintain over time. Whatever energy and good will there was initially to maintain the system, it does not appear to have been especially longlived, pointing perhaps to political will and sovereign unity petering out despite whatever economic benefits they might have derived from the arrangement. Elsewhere, however, the Ionian Phokaians did have great long-term success pursuing a different long-distance sembra che la monetazione sia arrivata sulla costa tirrenica come parte del bagaglio culturale dei nuovi colonizzatori focei.” 70 For his part, Morel (2006: 371, 373, 409) sees little evidence in the archaeological record for direct commercial links between the eastern and western Phokaians. 71 Herodotus (1.163) remarks that the Phokaians “were the earliest of the Greeks to make long sea-voyages, and it was they who discovered the Adriatic Sea, and Tyrrhenia, and Iberia, and Tartessus, not sailing in round cargoships but in pentekonters.” On the pan-Mediterranean Phokaian commercial, social and religious networks see Malkin 2011: chps. 5-6. 23 Working Paper v.29.3.2014 ©Peter van Alfen monetary relationship, the one they had to produce electrum hektai with the Mytileneans. This arrangement was highly formalized and regulated, and arguably originated not in deep-seated political bonds between the partners, but rather in a mutual desire to generate revenues from their arrangement.72 Conclusions In view of the larger problem of understanding the various modes and mechanisms of joint coinages and monetary unions in the archaic period, I have focused on one group of monetary interactions, those arranged between portions of poleis split by metoikêsis. I have proposed a starting point in which sovereign power, and therefore monetary authority, was stretched between the two poles of local rule by bands of elite interaction and interconnection. In time, these bands broke. In the case of Phokaia and Velia, the drift apart, at least monetarily, became permanent. In the case of Teos and Abdera, the change saw a shift to more formal ways of interacting and an embedding of the relationship in government. 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