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2022, Mail & Guardian
Continued USA Hegemony in Europe 2022: The fear, or rather hate of the "East", (or the "Other"; Muslim, Berber, Black, Latin American, Slavs, Chinese, Indian) in Western mindsets under the mastership of the USA is causing just another war with unforeseen outcomes in the Ukraine. The choices are not so simple. Either negotiate or act against a megalomaniac Western state, turned dangerous international rogue. The world cannot afford the USA any longer. "Let us trust that in the coming century resort to force and violence shall not be glorified and the essence of political power is compassion and justice externally manifested in a dialogue between civilizations" (President Mohammad Khatami, Iran, 2001). The appeal was made a year before the USA once again invaded a sovereign state, Afghanistan (2002), just after the invasion of Iraq and before NATO destroyed the sovereign state Libya. For the moment we will not discuss sanctions against Cuba or the uncountable deaths in Vietnam due to USA intervention nor assassinations by armed aerial vehicles (AAV) on African and Middle-East soil that transgress the sovereignty of people.
Caucasus Institute Yearbook
Muddling Through A Minefield: The West in the South Caucasus After Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in 20222024 •
This paper examines the context faced by Western states in the South Caucasus since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The article considers Euro-Atlantic interests, policy initiatives and practices in the areas of promoting democracy and human rights, resolving conflicts and ensuring security, energy politics and the containment of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. Several gaps and shortfalls are identified in Euro-Atlantic policy-making, and the rival project to 'regionalize' the South Caucasus as an arena dominated by regional powers Russia, Turkey (Türkiye) and Iran is considered. The article ends by considering possible future scenarios.
2017 •
The relationship between major powers in the world determines the level of global stability. Two constellations are imagin-able: balance of power and collective security. The end of major (world or cold) wars offers possibilities for change from one constellation to another. This article tries to explain the origins of the Ukraine crisis. It posits that the crisis in Ukraine is only a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers (or power blocs), whose origins can only be understood by assessing the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Instead of having integrated Russia in a collective security organization on an equal level, the West kept NATO alive and by doing so deteriorated the relationship with Russia. Despite different warnings from Moscow, NATO invited Ukraine to become member, and the EU offered Trade and Association Agreement talks to Ukraine. As a result, the relationship glided back towards a classic balance of power relation with spheres of influences. To prevent similar conflicts in the future, Russia should be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Ideally, the existing collective defence organization (NATO) should be transformed into a collective security organization with the inclusion of both Russia and Ukraine. Policy Implications • The way how the 'losers' of a (cold) war are treated determines the stability in the aftermath. The international community did well after 1815 and 1945, but failed miserably after 1918. The argument of this article is that also after 1989 the West missed an opportunity to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture (on an equal basis). The end of (cold) wars are perfect times for trying to move from one great power constellation to another (e.g. from pure balance of power to collective security). • Collective defence organizations (= alliances) are inherently unstable as they are constantly looking for an external enemy. This article argues that NATO's prolonged life after the Cold War is not normal, and contributed to the crisis with Russia (by extending NATO to the East, incl. plans to include Georgia and Ukraine). Collective security organizations (like the UN) are more stable. • American and European interests sometimes overlap, but not always, also within NATO. One can observe a pattern whereby the US pushes the Europeans to accept the American view. For instance on NATO extension (certainly in 2008), as well as on missile defence. This article implicitly argues that the European member states within NATO should be more careful to agree with the US view if it does not fit their own interests.
According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine. But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy. But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.
When he took office in early 2009, President Barack Obama made improvement of the United States’ relations with Russia – the so-called “reset” policy – one of his signature foreign policy initiatives. That hope lies now in tatters, shattered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine. The goal of turning US-Russia cooperation – and, by extension, West-Russia cooperation – into a building block of international governance looks now as distant as it was during the Cold War. The best one can hope instead is that relations between Moscow and Western capitals do not further deteriorate to the point of a complete breakdown. The rationale for the “reset” policy was the pragmatic recognition that the recurring tensions with Russia – prompted by issues ranging from Kosovo’s independence to the US plan to install a ballistic missile defence system in Eastern Europe and Georgia’s and Ukraine’s prospective membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – were thwarting US and Western interests in Afghanistan and the management of Iran’s nuclear issue as well as creating new fault lines on the European continent. Tellingly, after reaching a low point in relations in the wake of Russia’s short and victorious war against Georgia in August 2008, both Russia and Western powers took steps to avoid a scenario of full confrontation. Several member states of the European Union (EU), particularly Western European countries with little memory of recent Soviet domination, viewed the new US course as being more in keeping with their interest in establishing a constructive relationship with Russia, a key player on the European stage and the Union’s main energy provider. While some EU member states, particularly in Eastern Europe, felt the United States was too prone to seek cooperation with an unreliable Russian government, the whole European Union eventually signed WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 12 off on Obama’s policy. The election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia’s president, who depicted himself as more liberal-minded than his patron and predecessor, Vladimir Putin, had in fact helped create an atmosphere more forthcoming for dialogue and cooperation. The “reset” policy did produce some important results, most notably the US-Russian agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons known as the New START (the only relevant nuclear disarmament agreement struck in twenty years); Russia’s greater cooperation on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, particularly thanks to its agreeing to tough sanctions against Tehran in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in June 2010; and Russia’s agreement to let key military supplies for the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan transit its airspace, an important development given the growing difficulty NATO was experiencing in keeping open its supply lines through Pakistan. While significant, these achievements did not pave the way for what many had hoped the “reset” policy would eventually produce: a renewed West-Russia relationship based on mutual respect and cooperation on issues of common concern. In fact, relations between the West and Russia continued to be fraught with problems of mistrust, rhetorical competition, and fundamentally different views of how security issues should be managed internationally. In hindsight, the “reset” policy seems to have been just a lull in a process started in the early 2000s which has seen West-Russia relations steadily deteriorate. While none of the “reset” policy achievements has thus far been reversed, a succession of events, including the re-election of Putin as Russia’s president in 2012 and culminating in Russia’s forced takeover of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine, have plunged the West-Russia relationship to its lowest point in twenty-five years. For many in the West, the crisis over Ukraine has laid bare the most unsettling features of President Putin’s government: lack of any appreciation for political pluralism; readiness to dispense with opposition forces by de-legitimisation through state-controlled propaganda and possibly forceful repression; and resolve to defend what Putin perceives as Russia’s vital interests with any means, including the use of force, land grabs, and destabilising practices such as fomenting and directing pro-Russian nationalist protests in other countries. INTRODUCTION 13 Ukraine is a special case because influence over Kiev is of paramount importance to Russia’s security strategy and national pride. However, it should not be seen in isolation. It is part of a broader design by President Putin to re-establish as much influence as possible over the former Soviet space. Central to this objective is Putin’s plan for a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) including most of the former republics of the Soviet Union, be them in East Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. The problem with the Eurasian Economic Union is that the Russian president sees it as incompatible with any significant form of integration of its members into Euro-Atlantic frameworks, notably NATO but also the European Union. The crisis in Ukraine has also made it clear that the West is now confronted with the problem of handling the revanchist instincts of a former superpower. The West faces an intractable regime centred on the personal power of President Putin, who has increasingly tied his legitimacy to a pledge to embody and defend an exceptionalist Russian identity, mostly defined in opposition to Western values and norms. In other words, the conflict between the West and Russia is framed by Putin himself not only as a conflict of interests, but of identity too. This narrative has been used by Putin to rebut any sort of criticism coming from the West, be it directed at Russia’s takeover of Crimea or at Putin’s increasingly strict control over Russia’s media and marginalisation and repression of political dissent. Signs of growing competition between the West and Russia were visible long before unrest in Ukraine escalated into a full-blown crisis. The Arab uprisings are a case in point. From the start, Russia and the West have held different views of the cycle of revolutions and counterrevolutions which has engulfed the most part of the Arab world. While the United States and the European Union initially insisted on the antiauthoritarian and pro-democracy nature of popular protests, Russia has consistently seen the so-called Arab Spring as a bearer of instability and, more worryingly, as an opportunity for Islamic fundamentalism to find new ways to gain influence. Moscow opted for a cautious approach in the beginning, even letting the Security Council authorise the use of force to protect endangered civilians in the prolonged conflict between Libya’s longstanding ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, and a West-backed rebel WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 14 coalition. Russia came to regret its choice in a matter of months if not weeks, as it became clear that NATO’s intervention in defence of civilians rapidly “crept” into what the Russians perceived as an open policy of regime change by force. Bruised by the Libya case, Russia has ever since been adamant in refusing any form of UNSC support for rebels fighting against established rulers in the Arab world, irrespective of how brutal such rulers could be. This has been most evident in Syria, where Russia has steadfastly protected its ally Bashar al-Assad from any form of UN action. West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NATO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers alike pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots, re-calibrating itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. However, it is important to notice that cooperation has not collapsed altogether. Russia has continued to be a committed member of the P5+1, the group of nations (including also the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and China plus the European Union) dealing with Iran’s nuclear dispute. It has also continued to assist NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. And it has agreed with the United States upon a plan for the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria, forcing the Assad regime to deliver. Thus, while competition has increased in strategic areas – most notably in the former Soviet space and the Middle East – the need for cooperation has not vanished. Clearly, this is far from an ideal scenario. Tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations is certainly present. Yet neither party would benefit from it. It was with the goal of exploring ways by which Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating on issues of mutual concern, that the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institution of Washington co-organised an international conference on West-Russia relations. The conference was the seventh edition of the Transatlantic Security Symposium, the IAI-run annual forum in which experts from America, Europe and other countries convene to discuss the main topics in the transatlantic security agenda. The event, sponsored by Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and InternaINTRODUCTION 15 tional Development, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Rome Office) and Unicredit Bank, saw the participation of over forty senior experts from think tanks and other institutions from a number of EU member states (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria), the United States, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Russia took part. This volume collects a revised version of the papers that were presented at the event as well as a summary of the main points that were discussed. (R.A.)
The Ukraine Crisis has changed European and US security policy. Irrespective of the impact the crisis will have in the short, medium and long term, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent destabilisation of eastern Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences for the following three reasons: It will reduce strategic warning due to Russia’s will and ability to use armed force in its neighbouring area. It is apparently the definitive Russian departure from the idea of a united, free Europe that began with the Helsinki Process and was realised with the integration of economies and societies after the end of the Cold War. An important element in the idea of a united, free Europe is that conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means and not by force of arms. It demonstrates that a number of the partnerships, etc., that have formed the foundation for EU and NATO policies, have been inadequate. Therefore, the crisis creates a need to rethink Western strategy. In the light of this new risk, the West’s existing policy is inadequate. This does not necessarily mean that the policy hitherto has been mistaken, and it absolutely does not mean that we are facing a new Cold War. However, the West must realise that Russian governance does not have the same general goals as those of the West. Although the West can thus in the short term be content to overcome the crisis, the consequences for the European security policy framework in the medium and long term will be appreciable. These consequences will apply not least to the West itself because the crisis has revealed differences in priorities among the Western powers and challenged the world view that the West’s policy has been based on. Furthermore, the West must acknowledge that Russia is willing to use military means to accomplish its goals. This presents EU foreign policy in particular with a number of fundamental challenges and means that NATO must rethink and thoroughly reconsider its obligations under Article 5, especially with regard to the East European member states, where the Baltic States are particularly vulnerable.
Russia’s engagement in the crisis in Ukraine, as well as its previous aggression against Georgia in 2008 are the two concrete examples that reveal in the foreseeable future Russia will not hesitate to use its muscles to realize its geopolitical ambitions that have grown since Putin’s ascendance to power. In fact, it would not be wrong to conclude that recent events that are taking place are the indicators of a new era of ‘post-soviet cold war’; what is happening is the ‘return of the reel politik', the footsteps of which was already heard in 2008 in Georgia. Both the 2008 August War in Georgia and the recent strife in Ukraine reveal that the West...is not prepared enough for the ‘post-soviet cold war’. Not only the absence of vigor and hard-power, but also the lack of an accurate understanding of the developments, coherent and convincing discourse, and implementation of such a discourse into articulate policies are the weaknesses of the West. Given that against Russia’s hard-power the West asserts its soft-powers, failure to realistically analyze the developments, to construct a coherent discourse and to actualize such a discourse in practice are more consequential defects than not having enough muscles.
The tragedy of 11 September 2001 should not blind us to the immense significance of what has been called by the US administration Operation Enduring Freedom. This, it should be remembered, has been defined as a " campaign " to uproot " terrorism " that will possibly last for decades. The war on Afghanistan was only the first phase of this campaign, which, in addition to US military involvement in the Philippines, Georgia, Yemen and now Indonesia, will in all probability be continued with a full-fledged war on Iraq in the very near future. The Afghanistan war, however, has already given us an indication of the objectives of US imperialism underlying Operation Enduring Freedom. By far the most important among these is imperialist domination over Eurasia, itself the key to the imposition of a new order on the entire continent of Asia. The long-term nature of the US engagement in Central Asia is graphically shown by the setting up of US bases in Afghanistan, Uzbekist...
2024 •
The aim of this article is to examine applicability of classical geopolitics to interpret the context of the war in Ukraine. The author argues that the classical geopolitical approach has shortages in explaining the current warfare in Ukraine, because territory, space, and geography are not sufficient to explain complex international relations in today's globalized world. The interventionistic policy of the US, the main force of Atlanticism, undoubtfully has the key role in shaping the situation in Ukraine, but a wider picture indicates presence and influence of corporate and financial non-state actors that benefit from strengthening military-industrial complex. The author concludes that critical geopolitics offers deeper inquiry into the geopolitical claims than the classical geopolitical thought because the former recognizes that nowadays states are not only geopolitical agents. There are indications that the war in Ukraine is waged by Western political, economic, military, and financial elites against Russia as a part of the strategy to maintain global power and prevent rising multipolarity.
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly
The West versus the Rest: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Crisis of the "Post-Western" Order2023 •
Since gaining independence twenty-five years ago, Azerbaijan has pursued three major foreign-policy goals: resolution of the Karabakh conflict based on the territorial integrity of the country; preservation of its own independence and security; and finally becoming the major regional player by using its energy and geographical positions. Azerbaijan's foreign policy actions may be considered a kind of " silent diplomacy, " which Baku is using to gradually develop Azerbaijan's role in the region, playing off of contradictions among other powers. During this time, Baku has taken some bold actions that indicate its policy is not dependent on regional powers and that its interests are to be taken into account. Today, looking at the fast-changing situation in the region, we can conclude that none of these goals have been fulfilled completely. In fact, the country is perhaps facing more challenges than before. The Karabakh conflict remains one of the most problematic issues. In terms of security and trade, Azerbaijan is still struggling to find its place in the mosaic of such institutions as the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. In addition, the sudden drop in oil prices and the inability of the country to create a diverse economy has become another headache for the political establishment. Moreover, the lack of needed investments decreases the chances that the country will become a regional hub. This chapter reviews current problems challenging the country and recommends ways the transatlantic community can deal with Baku on pressuring issues.
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Manual de dupla tarefa: exercícios físicos e cognitivos para pessoas idosas (Atena Editora)
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