Benjamin Libet

In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or function must it play? Are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? What about the actions of somnambulists or cases of extreme sleepwalking where consciousness is largely absent? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will. For example, do compatibilist reasons- responsive and deep self accounts require consciousness? If so, are they threatened by recent developments in the behavior, cognitive, and neurosciences? What about libertarian accounts of free will? What powers, if any, do they impart to consciousness and are they consistent with our best scientific theories about the world? In this survey piece, I will outline and assess several distinct views on the relationship between consciousness and free will.

This paper presents an overview of the key neuroscience studies investigating the neural mechanisms of self-initiated movements that form the basis of our human consciousness. These studies, which commenced with the seminal works of Benjamin Libet and colleagues, showed that an ensemble of brain areas — localized to the frontal and medial regions of the brain — are involved in engendering the conscious decision to commit a motor act. Regardless of differences in neuroimaging techniques, these studies commonly showed that early neuronal activities in the frontal lobules and supplementary motor areas, interpreted by some to be reflective of unconscious processes, occurred before one was conscious of the intention to act as well as the act itself. I examine and discuss these empirical findings with regard to the need to analyze the contents and stages of awareness, and devise paradigm-specific models or theories that could account for inconsistent findings garnered from different experimental paradigms. This paper concludes by emphasizing a need to reconcile the principles of determinism with the notions of free will in future development of consciousness research and theories. © The Institute of Mind and Behavior, Inc., P.O. Box 522, Village Station, New York City, New York, 10014. URL: https://umaine.edu/jmb/

In order to find a convincing position in the ‘free will’ debate, two sorts of determinism are distinguished. The merits of encompassing determinism, which is determinism as it is usually understood, and individual determinism, which focuses on the agent, are brought to the fore. The existence of encompassing determinism cannot conclusively be proven, but it may be demonstrated, on the basis of individual determinism, that actions come about in a determined way, leaving no room for ‘free will’. In order to facilitate the discussion, recent scientific developments in such diverse fields as, e.g., quantum mechanics and neuropsychology are incorporated. Balancing the arguments, I aspire to a consistent and nuanced viewpoint, not eschewing divergent conclusions.

In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or function must it play? Are agents morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are carried out automatically or without conscious control or guidance? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that are the result of implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings of which they are unaware? What about the actions of somnambulists or cases of extreme sleepwalking where consciousness is largely absent? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we want to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will. For example, do compatibilist reasons- responsive and deep self accounts require consciousness? If so, are they threatened by recent developments in the behavior, cognitive, and neurosciences? What about libertarian accounts of free will? What powers, if any, do they impart to consciousness and are they consistent with our best scientific theories about the world? In this survey piece, I will outline and assess several distinct views on the relationship between consciousness and free will.

There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

Tratar de convencer sobre la actualidad del tema de la libertad es tarea innecesaria por la centralidad que éste tema tiene en toda reflexión acerca del hombre y su condición. Sin embargo, en el presente trabajo pretendo suscitar el interés por el estudio de la libertad en Santo Tomás de Aquino confrontándolo con el pensamiento contemporáneo introducido por las neurociencias a través de varios autores. Para muchos neurocientíficos y filósofos de la mente, el fenómeno de la libertad puede ser explicado totalmente por la Neurociencia. En este trabajo pretendo mostrar algunas perspectivas de la Neurociencia que revela hasta qué punto esta tesis es problemática. Para ello, examinare algunos aspectos sobre cómo se aborda el tema de la libertad en algunos trabajos de neurocientificos, y terminar con la visIón tomista sobre la libertad.

The neurological experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet (1985) and Grey Walter (1993, in Dennett) provide evidence that our actions are caused by non-conscious brain events beyond our conscious awareness. Normally, we assume that our conscious choices lead us to do things. If these researchers have interpreted their evidence correctly, it may be that we lack free-will, for we could not control a non-conscious brain state. Libet however provides evidence that agents can “change their minds” just before performing some action. He felt that this was the elbow-room for free-will. But it may be inconsistent for him to suggest this, since his evidence indicates that there is no room for conscious choice. In this paper we discuss these results and various objections to the interpretation of the work.

Abstract
Free will exists and the proof is simple: without symbolic freedom, no symbolic resources and, consequently, no free will. The existence of symbolic resources presupposes symbolic freedom, and this was only possible by the emergence of symbolic consciousness during the cultural evolution of Sapiens that triggered such a liberation. In return, symbolic resources nourish and amplify this symbolic freedom. As symbolic resources are indubitable and the milieu of exercise and ordeal of free will, its existence is beyond doubt even if its scope is still limited.
I just said that Free Will exist, but not in the absolute or naïve forms that the history of ideas established: a gift from God to man (Saint Augustine), a poisoned gift to punish him (Nietzsche), a pure act of the mind that would be a kind of unmoved mover, an instant consciousness that Libet's experiments in neuroscience could have adopt, at the beginning, so it could figure in an experimental protocol in a laboratory.       
Free will is the biological capacity of a particular physical system, Sapiens, to make conscious choices, drawing on symbolic resources that he has elaborate since the Upper Paleolithic. Selected, along with other species, as a "choice machine", a generator of diversity and unpredictibility and a Bayesian machine, like surprising a predator by suddenly changing its trajectory or choosing a shelter, this ability has become conscious through the combination of two types of innovations: the development of phenomenal consciousness - increased neuronal plasticity, new cognitive functions such as articulated language - and cultural evolution, which we can subsume under a single concept: the emergence of symbolic consciousness. The first type of decisive innovation is extremely difficult to study experimentally but is based on studies debated in the field of evolutionary biology, paleoanthropology and linguistics. But the second equally decisive innovation is perfectly clear since we can study cultural evolution and symbolic consciousness from our daily experience and written data, from parietal writing to articulated writing. I discuss the emergence of symbolic consciousness in my essay Le concept scientifique du libre arbitre – Emergence et coévolution (The Scientific Concept of Free Will – Emergence and coevolution).
I will start by fixing the epistemological framework (1) and the definition of Free Will in the biological and symbolic sense (2). I will present "Einstein's axiom" of symbolic freedom (3) and James’s axiom of conscious will (4). I will define the concepts of “symbolic consciousness”, "symbolic freedom" and "symbolic resource" (5). With these tools, I will establish the proof that is immediate by sketching a formalization using linear logic (6).
The proof (6.2)
All skeptical arguments are invalid, either they do not talk about the subject but about outdated or disembodied concepts of free will, or they rely on outdated conceptions of science such as the model of the manifest image and scientific image of Wilfrid Sellars or Arthur Eddington, or they distort scientific thinking, or, finally, they actually presuppose the existence of their free will in an attempt to refute it.
This brief essay is both an introduction and an outcome to the four essays I have devoted to the Scientific Concept of Free Will. In addition to the one mentioned, two essays delve into the interpretation of quantum physics where the freedom of the physicist was exercised with extraordinary acuity, a Free Will in action in the face of the conceptual upheavals produced by the quantum revolution. The last delves into the little-explored field of biosemiotics, the emergence of symbolic consciousness that accompanies biosemiosis at every stage of its development and its overtaking. 
La liberté du physicien – Complément au Concept scientifique du libre arbitre (Physicist Freedom - Complement to the Scientific Concept of Free Will)
La conscience symbolique de Erwin Schrödinger – Complément au Concept scientifique du libre arbitre (en cours d’écriture) (The Symbolic Consciousness of Erwin Schrödinger - Complement to the Scientific Concept of Free Will)
De la biosémiose primaire à la liberté sémiotique - Emergence de la conscience symbolique (From Primary Biosemiosis to Semiotic Freedom – Emergence of Symbolic Consciousness)
***
Résumé
Le libre arbitre existe et la preuve est simple : sans liberté symbolique, pas de ressources symboliques et, par voie de conséquence, pas de libre arbitre. L’existence de ressources symboliques présuppose la liberté symbolique et celle-ci n’a été possible que par l’émergence de la conscience symbolique au cours de l’évolution culturelle de Sapiens qui a déclenché une telle libération. En retour, les ressources symboliques alimentent et amplifient cette liberté symbolique. Les ressources symboliques étant indubitables et le milieu d’exercice et d’épreuve du libre arbitre, son existence ne fait aucun doute même si sa portée est encore limitée.
Le libre arbitre existe, ai-je affirmé, mais pas sous les formes absolues ou naïves que l’histoire des idées a pu établir : un don de Dieu à l’homme (Saint Augustin), cadeau empoisonné pour pouvoir le punir (Nietzsche), un acte pur de l’esprit qui serait une espèce de moteur non mû, une conscience instantanée que les expériences de Libet en neurosciences ont pu adopter au début pour qu’il puisse figurer dans un protocole expérimental dans un laboratoire .       
Le libre arbitre est la capacité biologique d’un système physique particulier, Sapiens, de faire des choix conscients, en s’appuyant sur des ressources symboliques qu’il a élaborées depuis le Paléolithique supérieur. Sélectionnée, avec d’autres espèces, comme une « machine à faire des choix », un générateur de diversité et d’imprédictibilité, comme surprendre un prédateur en changeant subitement de trajectoire ou choisir un abri, cette capacité est devenue consciente par la combinaison de deux types d’innovations : le développement de la conscience phénoménale - une plasticité neuronale accrue, de nouvelles fonctions cognitives comme le langage articulé - et l’évolution culturelle, que nous pouvons subsumer sous un seul concept : l’émergence de la conscience symbolique. Le premier type d’innovation déterminante est extrêmement difficile à étudier expérimentalement mais repose sur des études débattues dans le champ de la biologie évolutionniste, de la paléoanthropologie et de la linguistique. Mais la seconde innovation tout aussi déterminante est parfaitement claire puisque nous pouvons étudier l’évolution culturelle et la conscience symbolique en partant de notre expérience quotidienne et de données écrites, de l’écriture pariétale à l’écriture articulée. Je traite l’émergence de la conscience symbolique dans mon essai  Le concept scientifique du libre arbitre – Emergence et coévolution, où tous les éléments de la preuve sont exposés, mais demandaient à être réunis ici de manière explicite.
Je commencerai par fixer le cadre épistémologique (1). Je présenterai « l’axiome d’Einstein » de la liberté symbolique  (2) et l’axiome de James de la volonté consciente (3). Je définirai les concepts de « conscience symbolique », de « liberté symbolique » et de « ressource symbolique » (5). Avec ces outils, j’établirai la preuve qui est immédiate en esquissant une formalisation au moyen de la logique linéaire (6).
En annexes des extraits de mon essai : La causalité symbolique et la conscience symbolique (résumé du chapitre 4) et Les critiques des expériences de Libet sur le libre arbitre (extrait du chapitre 13) qui illustrent l’exercice du libre arbitre en acte dans la vie quotidienne et dans les neurosciences.
La preuve (6)
Tous les arguments sceptiques sont invalides, soit qu’ils ne parlent pas du sujet mais de concepts du libre arbitre désuets ou désincarnés, soit qu’ils s’appuient sur des conceptions de la science dépassées comme le modèle de l’image manifeste et de l’image scientifique de Wilfrid Sellars ou Arthur Eddington, soit qu’ils dénaturent la pensée scientifique, soit enfin, c’est le cas le plus fréquent, qu’ils présupposent en réalité l’existence de leur libre arbitre pour tenter de le réfuter.
Ce bref essai est à la fois une introduction et un aboutissement des quatre essais que j’ai consacrés au concept scientifique du libre arbitre. Outre celui qui a été cité, deux essais plongent dans l’interprétation de la physique quantique où la liberté du physicien s’est exercée avec une acuité extraordinaire, un libre arbitre en acte face aux bouleversements conceptuels produits par la révolution quantique. Le dernier plonge dans le champ peu exploré de la biosémiotique, de l’émergence de la conscience symbolique qui accompagne la biosémiose à chacune des étapes de son développement et de son dépassement. 
La liberté du physicien - Complément au Concept scientifique du libre arbitre (Physicist Freedom - Complement to the Scientific Concept of Free Will)
La conscience symbolique de Erwin Schrödinger – Complément au Concept scientifique du libre arbitre (en cours d’écriture) (The Symbolic Consciousness of Erwin Schrödinger - Complement to the Scientific Concept of Free Will)
De la biosémiose primaire à la liberté sémiotique - Emergence de la conscience symbolique (From Primary Biosemiosis to Semiotic Freedom – Emergence of Symbolic Consciousness)

La conscience qui nous ouvre à la représentation d'un monde autrement clos sur lui-même, est un donné fondamental de la nature, un opérateur essentiel à la genèse des structures vivantes et des processus cognitifs qui y sont associés. La conscience est la clé du vivant, en son absence aucune vie ne serait apparue sur la Terre ni sur aucune exoplanète. La 'théorie computationnelle de l'esprit' où l'esprit humain fonctionnerait comme une machine informatique est tout à fait infondée. Un robot construit à partir des seules mises en relations de composants techniques gérés par les lois physiques ne peut pas être fondamentalement autonome, auto-organisé, à l'image des êtres humains. Ce n'est qu'un automate plus ou moins efficient dans un environnement qui a été spécifiquement défini par son constructeur lequel, lui, est naturellement doté d'une conscience qui est irréductible à toute interaction physique.

Este artigo compara as teses do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo – sobretudo o computacionalista – com o naturalismo biologico de John Searle quanto a possibilidade do livre-arbitrio. Em tal contraposicao, cada corrente e decomposta em seus enunciados para que os mesmos possam ser analisados criticamente. Defende-se que o naturalismo biologico searleano consegue esclarecer mais do que as outras duas correntes filosoficas como pode a acao livre ter a origem da sua motivacao no que e externo ao estado mental que a faz ser realizada. Enfim, mesmo que a questao do livre-arbitrio ainda fique em aberto, verifica-se que o livre-arbitrio nao encontra espaco no cenario apresentado pelas correntes do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo.

In dit essay staat de vraag centraal wat de inzichten die Hannah Arendt in haar boek 'Willen' heeft geformuleerd over het wilsvermogen kunnen betekenen voor het debat over de vrije wil zoals dit zich op grond van de neurowetenschappelijke experimenten van Benjamin Libet heeft ontwikkeld.

Conscious "free will" is problematic because (1) brain mechanisms causing consciousness are unknown, (2) measurable brain activity correlating with conscious perception apparently occurs too late for real-time conscious response, consciousness thus being considered "epiphenomenal illusion," and (3) determinism, i.e., our actions and the world around us seem algorithmic and inevitable. The Penrose-Hameroff theory of "orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR)" identifies discrete conscious moments with quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons, e.g., 40/s in concert with gamma synchrony EEG. Microtubules organize neuronal interiors and regulate synapses. In Orch OR, microtubule quantum computations occur in integration phases in dendrites and cell bodies of integrate-and-fire brain neurons connected and synchronized by gap junctions, allowing entanglement of microtubules among many neurons. Quantum computations in entangled microtubules terminate by Penrose "objective reduction (OR)," a proposal for quantum state reduction and conscious moments linked to fundamental spacetime geometry. Each OR reduction selects microtubule states which can trigger axonal firings, and control behavior. The quantum computations are "orchestrated" by synaptic inputs and memory (thus "Orch OR"). If correct, Orch OR can account for conscious causal agency, resolving problem 1. Regarding problem 2, Orch OR can cause temporal non-locality, sending quantum information backward in classical time, enabling conscious control of behavior. Three lines of evidence for brain backward time effects are presented. Regarding problem 3, Penrose OR (and Orch OR) invokes non-computable influences from information embedded in spacetime geometry, potentially avoiding algorithmic determinism. In summary, Orch OR can account for real-time conscious causal agency, avoiding the need for consciousness to be seen as epiphenomenal illusion. Orch OR can rescue conscious free will.

The belief that conscious will is merely ‘‘an illusion created by the brain’ ’ appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial ‘Libet-experiments’, as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity causes conscious will. We show that the illusion-claim is based on the behaviorist ‘input-output ’ paradigm, and discuss the notions of ‘self-organization ’ and ‘self-steering ’ to provide an alternative perspective on the causal efficacy of conscious will. In the final sections, a tentative theoretical picture is sketched of conscious will as an instance of self-steered self-organization. We conclude that the su...

This article presents a new conceptual view on the conscious will. This new concept approaches our will from the perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system and not from our anthropocentric perspective. This approach not only repositions the will at the core of behavior control, it also integrates the studies of Libet and Wegner, which seem to support the opposite. The will does not return as an instrument we use to steer, but rather as part of the way we learn new automatic behavior and of how our neural system steers us. The new concept suggests that understanding of our will is more about understanding of our daily behavior than about the will itself.

RESUMEN: El clásico debate entre determinismo y libertad se ha reavivado con el experimento neu-rológico de Libet y sus diversas versiones. Algunos han querido ver ahí una confirmación científica e irrebatible del determinismo, o sea, de que la subjetividad y la conciencia no son agentes sino un mero efecto de procesos objetivos neuronales. En el artículo se sostiene que esa interpretación es inco-rrecta porque olvida un elemento: el proceso de preparación del experimento, y porque no ve otro: el carácter subjetivo del cuerpo propio, pues metodológicamente la ciencia ha de tratar sólo lo objetivo y hacer abstracción de todo otro modo de ser. ABSTRACT: The classic debate between determinism and freedom has been revived with the neurological Libet experiment and its various versions. Some have wanted to see in it a scientific and irrefutable confirmation of determinism, that is, that subjectivity and consciousness are not agents but a mere effect of objective neuronal processes. The article argues that this interpretation is incorrect because it forgets one point, the process of preparing the experiment, and because it doesn't see another, the subjective nature of the body since, methodologically, science has to deal only with the objective being and must make an abstraction of any another way of being.

This YouTube lecture summarizes the themes and contents of my book "Free Will and Human Life." The lecture and the book address arguments against free will, arguments for free will, and my own view that free will, properly understood, exists and is beneficial to human life.

Ich möchte den Neurowissenschaftlern, die glauben, mit empirischen Mitteln etwas über menschliche Freiheit herausfinden zu können, eine philosophische Herausforderung entgegensetzen. Meine These lautet: Die Frage nach der menschlichen Freiheit ist ein metaphysisches Problem, das sich empirischer Naturforschung entzieht. Um das zu begründen, werde ich ein extremes Gedankenexperiment durchführen. Ich werde zuerst hypothetisch die Situation eines Subjektes beschreiben, dessen Naturwissenschaft berechtigterweise einen durchgängigen kausalen Determinismus im Gehirn postuliert und dessen Libet-Experimente für all seine Handlungen fatal ausgehen (nicht nur für unbedeutende Handbewegungen). Dann werde ich zeigen, dass die deterministische Neurowissenschaft in dieser gedachten Situation gar nichts für oder gegen die Entscheidungsfreiheit des Subjekts austrägt, weil sich die Entscheidungen des hypothetischen Subjekts nicht dort abspielen, wo seine Naturwissenschaft hinzielt. – Wenn es mir gelingt, so eine Situation zu konstruieren, stellt sich die Frage, ob wir nicht in einer ähnlichen Situation stecken könnten. Meiner Ansicht nach lässt sich diese Frage zwar aufwerfen, aber nicht beantworten. Sie gehört ins Reich der metaphysischen Spekulation, genau wie die Frage, ob unser geistiges Leben nach dem biologischen Tod im Jenseits weitergehen könnte. Ziel der Überlegungen ist es, verwirrende Redeweisen wie die von meta-physischer oder transzendentaler Freiheit durch konkrete Modelle verständlicher zu machen. Die Position, die hierbei herauskommen wird, hat einige Gemeinsamkeiten mit Kants Position zur Freiheit.

This is the bibliography of the 180 works cited in Alan E. Johnson, "Free Will and Human Life" (Pittsburgh: Philosophia, 2021). The titles in this bibliography include representative writings supporting and opposing free will as well as representative compatibilist/soft determinist books and papers. Some other references involve informal logic, hermeneutics, and literary portrayals of free will issues.

There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human choice a matter of chance and this is no better as a basis for practical rationality and moral responsibility than the most rigid determinism.  I suggest that a similar problem arises on deterministic assumptions: although human choice is no longer a matter of mere chance, it remains arbitrary since whatever explains a person’s choice to act on the reasons for an action rather than those against, it is not a matter of reasons that were reasons FOR THAT PERSON.  The explanatory gap is closed in the wrong way for the impression of sheer arbitrariness to be cancelled.  I discuss (via a digression on F. H. Bradley) whether Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ would, if correct, necessitate any modification to this conclusion.  I also ask how the problem addressed in this paper relates to Galen Strawson’s rejection of the possibility of complete autonomy or self-determination.

(1) In a famous series of experiments Libet has proved, many believe, that the way for human action is physiologically paved already before the conscious intention is formed. (2) A causal interpretation of these experiments which follows Libet's lines implies that even a compatibilist freedom of action and decision, as well as actions in a narrow sense, do not exist. (3) A compilation of several critiques of the experiments' interpretation, however, questions the most important parts of these interpretations, e.g. the temporal order, the nature of the conscious intention. (4) In addition, a more sophisticated picture of the work of intentions makes clear that in Libet's experiments in most cases there were no proximal intentions to flex one's finger but that these actions are intentional in virtue of the distal general intention to follow the experimenter's requests. (5) Finally, an elaboration of the role of consciousness and deliberation in decisions shows how the latter intentions can be free despite being based on unconscious processes.

In a first part of this paper I expound briefly the essential characteristics of free will. The second part deals with the objections of Benjamin Libet, allegedly based on brain-scientific foundations, against «positive free will». The third and main part shows that Libet's anti-positive-free-will-position is due to an almost complete failure of a phenomenology of the conscious acts that precede, accompany and follow voluntary movement. The fourth part defends the thesis that Libet's experimental results, far from supporting his philosophical stance, contain strong empirical confirmations of human free will, which, apart from a phenomenology of human acts, becomes further clear upon noticing striking philosophical deficiencies and contradictions in his distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' free will. The conclusions summarize the results, according to which positive free will and causality through freedom exist and are confirmed by Libet's and oth...

Teil 1:
Das limbische System
Das unterbewusste Programm Balanceinstruktion Dominanzinstruktion Stimulanzinstruktion
Teil 2:
Der Aufbau des Gehirns
    1 Kleiner Rundgang durchs Gehirn    
    2 Gerhard Roth
    3 Rechtes und linkes Gehirn
    4 Persönlichkeit
    5 Gruppen & Arten von Mitgliedern
    6 Lebenszyklustheorie
    7 Neuronale Gesetze des Alterns
    8  Auflösungsgrad
    9  Was prägt Kulturen?
  10  Sinnsysteme

RESUMEN. En este trabajo se describen los experimentos realizados en la década de los cincuenta del siglo pasado por el neurocientífico B. libet, cuyos resultados se han interpretado como una demostración empírica de la falsedad del libre albedrío. Frente a las interpretaciones determinis-tas de estos experimentos (y frente a la idea de que la neurociencia puede desplazar a la filosofía en la discusión sobre estos temas) se esgrimen dos argumentos de G. H. von wriGHt que tratan de mostrar la imposibilidad (por razones conceptuales y filosóficas) de probar empíricamente el determinismo universal (que es un presupuesto de las tesis de quienes niegan el libre albedrío con este tipo de argumentos) y la imposibilidad de reducir lo mental a lo neuronal. ABSTRACT. This paper describes the experiment that the neuroscientifist B. libet carried out during the 1950s. The conclusions of these experiments have been interpreted as an empirical de-mostration of the falseness of free will thesis. Against the determinist interpretation of these experiments (and against the idea that neuroscience can displace philosophy in the debate of these questions), the paper presents two arguments of G. H. von wriGHt which attempt to show that it is impossible (by conceptual and philosophical reasons) to prove empirically the universal determin-ism (which is a presumption of the thesis rejecting free will on the basis of arguments of this type) and the imposibility of reducing the mental dimension to the neuronal one.

Este artigo compara as teses do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo – sobretudo o computacionalista – com o naturalismo biologico de John Searle quanto a possibilidade do livre-arbitrio. Em tal contraposicao, cada corrente e decomposta em seus enunciados para que os mesmos possam ser analisados criticamente. Defende-se que o naturalismo biologico searleano consegue esclarecer mais do que as outras duas correntes filosoficas como pode a acao livre ter a origem da sua motivacao no que e externo ao estado mental que a faz ser realizada. Enfim, mesmo que a questao do livre-arbitrio ainda fique em aberto, verifica-se que o livre-arbitrio nao encontra espaco no cenario apresentado pelas correntes do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo.

Am Ende einer Reihe von wegweisenden Experimenten resümierte der Kognitionswissenschaftler Benjamin Libet enttäuscht, dass der freie Wille eine Illusion sein müsse. Aufgefordert eine bestimmte Körperbewegung zu vollziehen, konnten in den Gehirnen seiner Proband*innen schon kurz vor dem Bewusstwerden der Handlungsabsicht neuronale Aktivitäten nachgewiesen werden konnten, die typisch für die entsprechende Bewegung sind. Doch das implizite Verständnis der Natur des freien Willens, das diesen Versuchen zugrunde liegt, ist problematisch und hat seine Wurzeln in der philosophischen Idee des interaktionistischen Substanzdualismus von René Descartes. In diesem Aufsatz werde ich dieses Verständnis offenlegen und historisch verorten. Zum Schluss werde ich noch eine plausiblere Alternative anbieten.

This is a short commentary on a talk by Patrick Haggard that distinguishes some broad classes of action experience and discusses the Libet experiments and some of Patrick's experiments in the light of these distinctions. (Text available in the Miscellaneous section)

Resumo: Este artigo compara as teses do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo-sobretudo o computacionalista-com o naturalismo biológico de John Searle quanto à possibilidade do livre-arbítrio. Em tal contraposição, cada corrente é decomposta em seus enunciados para que os mesmos possam ser analisados criticamente. Defende-se que o naturalismo biológico searleano consegue esclarecer, mais do que as outras duas correntes filosóficas, como pode a ação livre ter a origem da sua motivação no que é externo ao estado mental que a faz ser realizada. Enfim, mesmo que a questão do livre-arbítrio ainda fique em aberto, verifica-se que o livre-arbítrio não encontra espaço no cenário apresentado pelas correntes do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo. Palavras-chave: Fisicalismo. Funcionalismo. Livre-arbítrio. Naturalismo biológico. Intencionalidade intrínseca. Abstract: This paper compares the theses of physicalism and functionalism-particularly the computacionalist line-with the biological naturalism of Jo...

Resumo: Este artigo compara as teses do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo-sobretudo o computacionalista-com o naturalismo biológico de John Searle quanto à possibilidade do livre-arbítrio. Em tal contraposição, cada corrente é decomposta em seus enunciados para que os mesmos possam ser analisados criticamente. Defende-se que o naturalismo biológico searleano consegue esclarecer, mais do que as outras duas correntes filosóficas, como pode a ação livre ter a origem da sua motivação no que é externo ao estado mental que a faz ser realizada. Enfim, mesmo que a questão do livre-arbítrio ainda fique em aberto, verifica-se que o livre-arbítrio não encontra espaço no cenário apresentado pelas correntes do fisicalismo e do funcionalismo. Palavras-chave: Fisicalismo. Funcionalismo. Livre-arbítrio. Naturalismo biológico. Intencionalidade intrínseca. Abstract: This paper compares the theses of physicalism and functionalism-particularly the computacionalist line-with the biological naturalism of Jo...

The present paper describes and analyses ten scientific experiments on free action, which followed Benjamin Libet’s experiment in 1983. Through the study of neuronal activity previous to the decision of acting freely, these experiments have engaged with the philosophical themes of consciousness and human freedom. Given the diversity of perspectives and conclusions of these experiments regarding these notions, I offer a description and analysis of these experiments, in order to construct a framework in which future interdisciplinary research and dialogue could flourish. My strategy is threefold. First, I will briefly consider Libet’s experiment. Second, I will present ten of the most relevant and most quoted replications of Libet’s experiment. These replications began shortly after Libet’s experiment and continue to be performed until today. Finally, I will present a short comparative analysis of these replications. As a conclusion, I will present the four main lines of research in which the experiments are framed and through which the definitions of the philosophical notions of consciousness and freedom used are defined: 1) research focused on cortical electrophysiological activity preceding motor activity, 2) research focused on the study of consciousness, 3) research arguing that Libet wasn’t studying real free acts and aim at doing so, and 4) research that criticises Libet’s methodology and aims at improving it.

Spontaneous actions are preceded by brain signals that may sometimes be detected hundreds of milliseconds in advance of a subject's conscious intention to act. These signals have been claimed to reflect prior unconscious decisions, raising doubts about the causal role of conscious will. Murakami et al. (2014. Nat Neurosci 17: 1574-1582) have recently argued for a different interpretation. During a task in which rats spontaneously decided when to abort waiting, the authors recorded neurons in the secondary motor cortex. The neural activity and relationship to action timing was parsimoniously explained using an integration-to-bound model, similar to those widely used to account for evidence-based decisions. In this model, the brain accumulates spontaneously occurring inputs voting for or against an action, but only commits to act once a certain threshold is crossed. The model explains how spontaneous decisions can be forecast (partially predicted) by neurons that reflect either th...

El objetivo de este trabajo será presentar, de manera sucinta, una propuesta de conciliación entre los datos y descubrimientos, totalmente válidos y valiosos, que la neurociencia ha desarrollado en estas últimas décadas con una reflexión antropológica y filosófica rigurosa.

This article presents Libet's experiment and its different philosophical interpretations. This experiment invites to analyze and distinguish the various phases of volition and to study the relation between voluntary actions and semi-automatic performances of human behavior.