Dietrich Von Hildebrand

This article has been published in the summer 2017 in an improved version by American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
It discusses the criticism and autocriticism of Hildebrand's thesis that the will can only respond to a) states of affairs, b) to unrealized states of affairs, and c) to states of affairs that are realizable through me. It shows that these three theses are false and have influenced Hildebrand's ethics, philosophy of love and philosophy of the human person deeply but that the criticism and self-criticism of them renders Hildebrand's ethics as a whole much more consistent

Wspólnym mianownikiem poglądów J. Maritaina i D. von Hildebranda, odnoszących się do decyzji podstawowej człowieka, jest podkreślanie podmiotowego wymiaru moralności, a także próba uchwycenia jedności dynamizmu moralnego osoby. W decyzji podstawowej chodzi o taki wybór moralny, poprzez który osoba decyduje o sobie samej, nadając całościowy sens swojemu życiu. Wymienieni autorzy nie tylko dowartościowują podmiotowy wymiar decyzji podstawowej, ale równie mocno podkreślają jej wymiar przedmiotowy, ukazując jej ukierunkowanie na wartości obiektywnie istniejące. W przekonaniu wymienionych autorów decyzja podstawowa człowieka zawiera świadomość istnienia obiektywnego prawa, implicite zawartego w doświadczeniu dobra godziwego oraz intencję podstawowego ukierunkowana na świat obiektywnie istniejących wartości. Ważne jest to, że podmiotowy wymiar decyzji podstawowej ma pierwszeństwo w tym sensie, iż relacja do obiektywnego świata wartości wyznacza moralną wartość wszelkich aktów spełnianych przez osobę.

LES IMPLICATIONS PHILOSOPHICO-PÉDAGOGIQUES DU CHOIX DE BASE DE L’HOMME

Le soulignement de la dimension subjective de la morale et aussi l’essai de saisir l’unité fondamentale du dynamisme moral de la personne est le dénominateur commun des idées de J. Maritain et de D. von Hildebrand qui concernent la décision de base de l’homme. Selon les opinions des auteurs mentionnés l’homme par sa décision de base non seulement fait un choix moral, mais plutôt se définit soi-même envers le Bien donnant la direction principale à sa vie. Ces auteurs non seulement accordent la valeur à la dimension subjective de la décision de base, mais soulignent d’une manière aussi forte sa dimension objective. D’un côté c’est la conscience de l’existance de la loi objective, implicite, comprise dans l’expériance du bien admissible (bonum honestum) et de l’autre côté c’est l’intention de base, orientée vers le monde des valeurs. Il est important que la dimension subjective de la décision de base possède la préférence dans le sens que la relation avec le monde objectif des valeurs indique la valeur morale de tous les acts faits par la personne. Il faut ajouter que l’homme peut prendre les décisions morales stables par lesquelles est capable de réaliser “le projet” de sa vocation de vie uniquement à l’appui du monde des valeurs stables.

This paper examines in detail David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for his thesis that it would have been better for all people not to have begun to exist. Confused attempts to construe the thesis itself are dismissed, including some by Benatar himself (1). A more fitting reading is proposed: in all people self-regret due to one’s own coming into existence would be adequate (2). Benatar’s basic asymmetry of harms and benefits is accepted as a mere truism (3). The lack of any articulate transition from the asymmetry to the thesis on Benatar’s side is exposed. Although the transition is reconstructed from hints provided by
him, it is found wanting (4). Finally, the novelty of the asymmetry argument is highlighted.

Although material value-ethics was introduced into philosophy at least a century ago, confusion still persists as to what it implies. This article offers some clarification. It states how material value-ethics stands opposed to formalistic ethics, commonly – though perhaps wrongly – attributed to Kant. The resulting analysis allows us to establish a combination of features that give material value-ethics an advantage over deontological, consequentialist and other perspectives, regardless of the hermeneutics issue.

This is an article in the philosophy of happiness — but one with an untypical focus. It clarifies the claim of the phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand that (H) high happiness comes especially from loving others, and compares it with the apparently rival Aristotelian claim that (A) high happiness comes especially from contemplating God. The former claim is understood to be about felt love (love defined as an emotional rather than volitional state). Both claims are understood to be about felt happiness (happiness defined as an emotional state rather than a state of objective flourishing). The article argues that, in fact, the two claims are not rival but mutually consistent, since the beloved person can be God, and the contemplation can be a loving one. Both claims are also consistent with scientific evidence, although it is tangential and tentative. Moreover, both claims are plausible, since both are backed up by intuitive explanations of why they should be regarded as true. However, both are in need of a further philosophical or scientific research that could confirm them even more.

(Penultimate proof version; page numbers differ from final version). Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Ethics is compared to another important work of moral philosophy published ten years earlier: Charles De Koninck’s On the Primacy of the Common Good: Against the Personalists. It is argued that there are important points of convergence between Hildebrand’s and De Koninck’s work, as well as certain divergences. The first point might seem counter-intuitive: Hildebrand’s Ethics is often considered a foundational text of Catholic personalism, whereas De Koninck (a Thomist of the strict observance) wrote against the personalists. Both thinkers were, however, trying to correct similar errors, and to defend similar insights into the objectivity of ethical categories. This shows itself primarily in the convergences between Hildebrand’s understanding of “value” in his Ethics and De Koninck’s understanding of the primacy of the good. Hildebrand’s understanding of the unifying power of values (hinted at in Ethics, but more fully explored in Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft), also converges in some respects with De Koninck’s understanding of the unifying power of the common good.

Dietrich von Hildebrand is often seen as being at odds with the scholastics in his anthropology. I argue that he in fact uses scholastic principles when distinguishing the powers of the human soul, but he uses these principles to distinguish many more powers in our souls than the scholastics do. His expansion of the list of human powers both is supported by and safeguards his expanded metaphysics of given reality. I first consider the principles that the scholastics use in reasoning about powers. I then show how von Hildebrand’s account of the human person is hylomorphic. I finally present von Hildebrand’s account of human powers, in light of the scholastic principles, considering his accounts first of bodily powers and then of powers in the soul.

Dietrich von Hildebrand's Aesthetics contains a number of significant metaphysical developments of the scholastic and Aristotelian tradition. Among these are the positing of a new category of being, aesthetic entities, which include things like landscapes. I systematize von Hildebrand's metaphysics of these entities in light of the older tradition. After giving some arguments that these are real beings, irreducible to other kinds of beings, I show, by comparison with the traditionally-enumerated categories, that they constitute their own category. Then, I show how considering aesthetic entities allows us to see how von Hildebrand builds upon the scholastic account of the principles and properties of being, positing new principles and properties of being such as the appearance of a being. This is, in fact, in continuity with the metaphysics of beauty found in Aristotle and some of his followers.

This paper focuses on the work-related aspects of the creation of an artwork (as traditionally construed). First, we briefly look into the Hegelian foundations of the emergence of the "artist" in opposition to the "artisan" (worker). This is then confronted with a proposed interpretation of Dietrich von Hildebrand personalist understanding of the artist's work, especially with regard to the value-response and "benevolence" as a specific attitude. Dietrich von Hildebrand casts new light on the problems considered in this essay with his distinction between three concepts of ethical value: a) value as an importance of an object or activity in itself, attributed to it by the human person; b) the value of an object or activity for satisfying a subjective good or need; and c) the value of an object or activity for guaranteeing the objective good of a person. According to von Hildebrand, although some labour may turn out to be artistic, not all types of work have that chance-even if in their efforts, their agents commit to generating a result of the highest possible aesthetic quality for the given sphere of activity. Such is true for the applied arts, as well as for all types of work whose primary goals are not aesthetic but otherwise, and for which the aesthetic value is a by-product. Von Hildebrand's theory retains the late modern understanding of the distinction between ordinary "work" and "art" as qualitative rather than quantitative.

"Mark Spencer is a rising star among Catholic philosophers. This is a big book in every sense. In confident and accessible prose, Spencer argues that the mystery of human personhood can best be understood by drawing together perspectives and schools of thought often deemed incompatible: phenomenology and traditional metaphysics, Thomism and Scotism, Balthasar and Aquinas, and many more. Sure to provoke a number of arguments due to the extraordinary range and boldness of the work, this book succeeds in showing that its 'aesthetic method' has a tremendous amount to offer to the study of human (liturgical) personhood in its manifold dimensions. A rich, exciting, vastly erudite, and immensely fruitful debut."―Matthew Levering, James N. and Mary D. Perry Jr. Chair of Theology, Mundelein Seminary

"Mark Spencer has given us a tour de force, an extremely ambitious and irenic work of synthesis in which he attempts to sketch out a philosophical portrait of the human person, attentive to beauty, that does not suffer from various opposing kinds of reductionism. He brings phenomenology, Thomism, Scotism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Nouvelle théologie, and analytic philosophy into dialogue as he ventures into debates on metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, nature and grace, affectivity, liturgy, and eschatology. In doing so he also proposes synthetic solutions to many nodal metaphysical and anthropological problems, including the interactions of divine causality and human freedom, divine simplicity and energeia, and the spiritual soul and the body, here and in heavenly beatitude."―Lawrence Feingold, Kenrick-Glennon Seminary

"Mark Spencer has produced a remarkable work of reconciliation. He proposes to harmonize strands of thought in the Catholic philosophical tradition that are too often at odds with each other. In particular, he wants to harmonize the work of those who take seriously the modern turn to the subject, with the work of pre-modern Catholic thinkers who smell subjectivism in the turn to the subject and who want to build on a more "objective" and "metaphysical" basis. Spencer wants to capture the truth in each position, and to root out the onesidedness (he speaks of the reductionist tendencies) in each. On this basis he wants to work towards a new Catholic synthesis. This is an original project, and much needed in a world in which Catholic philosophers seem to prefer refuting each other to harmonizing their views. Spencer also maintains the original idea that this new synthesis is achieved by a certain kind of aesthetic imagination. Spencer brings to his ambitious project a vast knowledge of the different movements of thought within the Catholic tradition."―John F. Crosby, Franciscan University at Steubenville

"I can think of few if any books so comprehensively synthetic. Spencer draws from traditional – and nontraditional – Thomism, the personalist tradition, phenomenology (which overlaps with but is not identical to personalism), the Fathers, the work of thinkers in Eastern Christianity, and several contemporary secular sources; it is a work of extremely impressive breadth and learning."―Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina

Catholic philosophical anthropologists have defended views of the human person on which we are irreducible to anything non-personal. For example, it is not the case that we are nothing but matter, souls, or parts of society. But many Catholic anthropologies have overlooked ways in which we are irreducible and so have not given an adequate account of the uniqueness of each human person. This book presents a philosophical portrait of human persons that depicts each way in which we are irreducible, with the goal of guiding the reader to perceive, wonder at, and love all the unique features of human persons. It builds this portrait by showing how claims from many strands of the Catholic tradition can be synthesized. These strands include Thomism, Scotism, phenomenology, personalism, nouvelle théologie, analytic philosophy, and Greek and Russian thought. The book focuses on how these traditions' claims are grounded in experience and on how they help us to perceive irreducible features of persons. While many metaphysical claims about persons are defended, the picture of persons that ultimately emerges is one on which persons are best grasped not through abstract concepts but through aesthetic perception and love, as unique kinds of beauty.

This book also explores irreducible features of our subjectivity, senses, intellect, freedom, and affections, and of our souls, bodies, and activities. It includes discussions of divine simplicity and causality, and of the nature of angels, matter, organisms, and artifacts, all of which must be understood to fully grasp our irreducibility. In showing how to synthesize various traditions' claims, the book also offers new solutions to a number of debates in Catholic philosophy. These include debates over natural law, the natural desire to see God, the separated soul, integralism and personalism, idealist and realist phenomenology, and scholastic accounts of the act of existence.

The present work is an excerpt of my original dissertation which is divided into two parts, each consisting of four chapters. For the purposes of this extract, I have included chapters 1, 7 and 8, along with substantial portions of the dissertation’s conclusions.
Part I focuses on the problem; part II, on solutions to be derived from Hildebrandian value theory. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to value theory as a philosophical discipline, offers the theoretical apparatus necessary for understanding the ensuing discussion in the following chapters, and articulates in greater detail the nature of popular value subjectivism. The problem must be understood within a historical framework and in light of the overwhelming tendency within the philosophical discipline to favor subjectivist conceptions of value. Chapter 1 explains the crucial concepts of value ontology, value subjectivism and value objectivism. The following chapters engage in an historical synopsis of value theory from its inception to the present.
Chapter 2 offers a brief historical overview of value philosophy on the Continent, including Herbart, Windelband, Rickert, Lotze, Brentano,
Meinong, Ehrenfels, Nietzsche, Hartmann and Scheler. Chapter 3 continues this survey with a more in-depth glance at value philosophy in the Anglo-American world. It begins with Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of the genesis of the notorious fact/value distinction, and the impact it has had on value theory in the form of Emotivism. It then continues with an account of Moore’s non-naturalism, and the naturalism of the two most prominent American value theorists, Wilbur Urban and Ralph Barton Perry. The chapter closes with a summary of the historical overview which suggests the nature of the peculiar dynamics by which theoretical value subjectivism engenders its popularized counterpart.
Chapter 4 considers the status-quo of contemporary North American
value language and value theory. After a brief consideration of three recent
theoretical works (McShea, Goldthwait, and Bok), the chapter brings
into sharper focus the contemporary crisis in value language. It then closes
with a summary of criticisms which value language—and particularly its
employment in moral discourse—has drawn from a number of academics
in recent years (Warren Murray, Iain Benson, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Allan
Bloom, and George Parkin Grant). In one way or another, their criticisms
respond to the many pernicious consequences of popular value subjectivism outlined above, and invite us to look, in Part II, to the value philosophy of Dietrich von Hildebrand for possible solutions.
After a biographical introduction to von Hildebrand in chapter 5,
chapter 6 introduces us to his philosophical presuppositions and method.
Von Hildebrand is a phenomenologist. Consequently, the solutions to be
gathered from his value theory are ultimately rooted in his philosophical
method and his conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge.
And only in light of both of these will we be able to readily grasp his objectivist account of value. Von Hildebrand’s conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge—to which we will dedicate a detailed study—is by far one of his most outstanding contributions to philosophy. His phenomenology stands as a sign of contradiction in the face of establishment philosophy stagnated, more often than not, by analytic and linguistic deconstructionist agendas—a stagnation not unlike that wrought by neo-Kantianism a century earlier, and which brought von Hildebrand and companions flocking to Edmund Husserl in the hopes of discovering new avenues for fecund thought under the maxim: “Back to things in themselves!”
The present dissertation proposes to evidence the manner in which
Hildebrandian phenomenology (the phenomenology of the early Husserl
and which contemporary phenomenologists such as Josef Seifert refer to as realist phenomenology) offers a valid, thorough-going challenge to all
forms of philosophical idealism, relativism, and linguistic reductionism. It
seeks to evidence furthermore, how phenomenology offers a philosophically convincing groundwork for a realist epistemology and ontology. Above all, through von Hildebrand’s phenomenology we will discover and articulate the ontological status of value and its place in the order of reality.
          Chapter 7 engages us in a detailed account of von Hildebrand’s conception of value. Here we will discover a second of von Hildebrand’s most outstanding contributions to philosophy, namely, his articulation of the distinction between the category of the important-in-itself, and the subjectively satisfying—terms already familiar to us. Indeed, it is to von Hildebrand’s great merit to have diagnosed several decades ago the pathology which is the central concern of this dissertation. Although he did not employ the term, von Hildebrand understood popular value subjectivism as that modus vivendi which takes as its point of departure for practical and moral endeavors the dynamic of subjective satisfaction. While the
category of importance is certainly a basilar notion in any person’s life, von Hildebrand engages in a phenomenological analysis of this datum which parses importance into three categories: the subjectively satisfying, the objective good for the person, and the important-in-itself. This latter category, and only this one, does von Hildebrand term value.
Finally, in chapter 8, we evaluate the precise manner in which von Hildebrand’s value theory suggests solutions to the overwhelming problem of value subjectivism, specifically in terms of reforming our contemporary subjectivist notion of value. Any proposed reform of the concept of value must begin on the level of theory, and Hildebrand’s value theory contains a core of theoretical applications which form an effective starting point for such a reform. In chapter 8, I elucidate four such applications. Hildebrand’s value ontology a) instructs us in rendering a philosophically rigorous account of the ontological objectivity of value; b) it constitute’s a sound theoretical basis for inculcating and inciting the North American populace to living examined moral lives and engaging in an examined
moral discourse; c) it offers a theoretical medium for aiding individuals to
discover or rediscover the category of the important-in-itself in their practical living; and d) it provides, in turn, a theoretical medium for revealing a road to authentic human fulfillment.

Low-carb Instant pot Cookbook
★★★
low carb food lists, delicious keto & low carb recipes and lots of diet recipes combined to Instant pot



Instant Pot isn't just an electric instant pot. As a for real multi-cooker, it consumes, tans and salutes sustenance like a stove-top skillet. It more over steams delicate things, for instance, fish, eggs, and vegetables. Minute Pots twofold as autonomous electric rice cookers more over.
You can use them to prepare bread, cakes and different desserts like custards, flan, even cheesecakes. Numerous Instant Pot models accompany uncommon yogurt modes. What's more, indeed, they work as moderate cookers, as well.
Instant Pot isn't just an electric instant pot. As a for real multi-cooker, it consumes, tans and salutes sustenance like a stove-top skillet. It more over steams delicate things, for instance, fish, eggs, and vegetables. Minute Pots twofold as autonomous electric rice cookers more over.
You can use them to prepare bread, cakes and different desserts like custards, flan, even cheesecakes. Numerous Instant Pot models accompany uncommon yogurt modes. What's more, indeed, they work as moderate cookers, as well.

I give an interpretation of Lonergan's claim that values are apprehended in feelings. I situate his project within fundamental theology rather than in foundations for ethics arguing that Lonergan was concerned to give an ecumenically conceived apologetic in order to conceive the " leap " of faith. To this end I show how the later work was informed by the 1952 Analysis of Faith. I show how Lonergan drew creatively on his sources: on Scheler he takes up Pascal's " the heart has its reasons " (now in the context of the value of believing) and on Hildebrand he takes up the self-transcendence of the value-response. I offer a new perspective on the emotional element of intentionality in Lonergan and suggest that fears of anti-intellectualism stem from a concern to situate his emotional phenomenology primarily within ethics.

Resumen: En el presente estudio pretendo recuperar la fenomenología de un pensador todavía por descubrir en nuestro ámbito iberoamericano. Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977), nacido en el mismo año que Martin Heidegger y tras haber sido pupilo de Max Scheller y Edmund Husserl, trabajó con brillantez en el método fenomenológico. No explicaremos aquí la fenomenología fundamental hildebrandiana, sino su fenomenología aplicada a la afectividad, en cuanto que sutil provocación para la teología. Este trabajo retratará, por tanto, una fenomenología especial y no general; dedicándonos a la cualidad personal de una afectividad a la vez diversa y unitaria.

Abstract: In the present study, I would like to recover the phenomenology of a thinker that remains still undiscovered in the Ibero-American realm. Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977) was born the same year as Martin Heidegger, and was a disciple of Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl, working brilliantly in his phenomenological method. I am not going to explain here the fundamental phenomenology of this author but his phenomenology as it is applied to affectivity, in order to subtly provoke theology. This paper, then, is going to take notice of a special phenomenology and not of a general one, by dedicating our efforts to the personal quality of a diverse and unified affectivity.

No es infrecuente escuchar cómo algunos santos quedaban arrebatados al celebrar o contemplar la Eucaristía ; también la historia recoge testimonios sobre portentosos milagros eucarísticos en Europa y, especialmente, en Italia . La Iglesia reconoce en ambos casos un don de Dios extraordinario para la fe de los bautizados, y un reclamo para muchos que son o viven como agnósticos.
La situación ordinaria en muchos rincones del mundo es tan variada como desconcertante: o personas que participan mudas y frías en las celebraciones dominicales; o bien otras que las viven con una fuerte carga emotiva, ignorantes quizá de lo que acontece y de cómo aquello compromete su vida; son muchos también los que no acaban de ver la relevancia de tales ceremonias sagradas en una sociedad que –al menos en Europa y Estados Unidos– se autodenomina postsecular. Creo que es necesario salir al encuentro del analfabetismo espiritual y doctrinal que se extiende entre los mismos cristianos.

Desde la pastoral y la teología académica se aboga por la formación litúrgica a todos los niveles. La tarea es ingente y la movilización general necesaria. La dificultad es cómo presentar este mensaje y ponerlo en contacto con la vida real.

Con su obra Liturgia y Personalidad  (1933), este autor sabe unir la altura moral y espiritual que tantos buscan, a través de unos agudos análisis fenomenológicos de la interioridad humana, con una propuesta orgánica que responde a este anhelo . El presente estudio no es una interpretación, sino es una modesta incursión en esta obra con el fin de recuperar algunas de sus intuiciones.

Phenomenologist Dietrich von Hildebrand argues that many properties of the material world only exist in relation to persons, that sense perception is not merely a bodily act, but a properly spiritual, personal act, and that our highest act is not purely intellectual but involves bodily sense perception. By his own assertion, his philosophy must be understood in the context of the Catholic philosophical tradition; here, I consider his account of the material world and of sense perception in comparison to two strands of the Aristotelian tradition in Catholic philosophy, represented by Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas. I show how von Hildebrand's views on the material world and sense perception can be better understood, their phenomenological bases defended, and their deficiencies corrected, by drawing on the notion of energeiai from Palamas' thought, and of participation and obediential potency from Aquinas' thought.

I kapitel 1 har jeg fulgt Hans Lipps og Edith Steins faerd gennem de fire krigsår. Og i dette kapitel suppleres det med en skildring af en raekke af de øvrige tidlige faenomenologers deltagelse i krigen. For at danne sig et billede af krigsårenes betydning i bred forstand er det nødvendigt at følge enkelte personers ofte meget forskellige skaebne gennem denne tid. De yngre faenomenologer er generelt patriotiske og forsvarsvenlige, ikke blot i de entusiastiske augustdage i 1914, men selv om krigens meningsløshed efterhånden går op for dem, så gør de deres pligt, så godt de kan, indtil afslutningen. Men der er stor forskel på hvor godt soldatermateriale, de hver isaer er. Adolf Reinach, opdageren af de performative talehandlingers betydning i jura og hverdag, viser sig også at kunne tale det tunge maskingevaers sprog og yder ved for-reste frontlinje en indsats ud over hvad pligten kraever; og mister livet som følge heraf, da han i november 1917 melder sig frivilligt til en risikabel natpatrulje. Edmund Husserls 3 børn tilsvarende. Den yngste, Wolfgang 18 år ved krigens be-gyndelse, og den knap 2 år aeldre Gerhart melder sig omgående og laerer kort efter i oktober/november krigens gru at kende ved Langemarck, men udmaerker sig i tje-nesten og maerker den; Wolfgang bliver først truffet i lungerne, men vender hurtigst tilbage, forfremmes til løjtnant og falder ved Fort Vaux ved Verdun. Gerhart får et hovedskud, men en trepanering fjerner knoglesplinterne i hjernen, så han kan gøre kasernetjeneste; i krigens sidste måneder vender han frivilligt tilbage til fronttjene-ste som kompagnifører; han kan på grund af sin opration ikke baere stålhjelm og bliver igen truffet i hovedet og mister synet på et øje. Elli gør tjeneste som sygeple-jerske gennem alle krigsårene. Max Scheler, 40 år (22. august 1874), forsøger af al kraft at blive luftskibssoldat, men stoppes heldigvis. Martin Heidegger indkaldes til vejrtjenesten. Fritz Kaufmann kommer som feltartillerist på en lang rejse fra Frankrig til Rumaenien til Ukraine. Jean Héring kommer naer døden af en infektionssygdom. Arnold Zweig må slide sig gennem krigen, bl.a. med pionerarbejder umiddelbart foran Verdun, oplevelser som han først 10 år senere kan bearbejde i romanform. Alexandre Koyré melder sig straks til den franske fremmedlegion, og overføres senere til den russiske haer og kaemper på den rumaenske front, og udmaerkes med både det franske krigskors og zarens. Og deltager i revolutionstidens kampe, indtil han i 1920 kan genoptage sine studier i Paris. (Koyrés brogede krigsdeltagelse beskrives i et senere saerskilt kapitel.) Hedwig Conrad-Martius' tre brødre deltager, som tidligere skildret, helhjertet i krigen. En bror, som opholder sig på Filippinerne ved krigsudbruddet, kommer slipper under besvaerlige omstaendigheder hjem og melder sig og falder kort efter. Hedwigs mand Theodor Conrad er derimod ikke tjenesteduelig. Dietrich von Hildebrand og Herman Weyl slipper lettere gennem krigsårene.

While all phenomenologists aim to grasp the “things themselves,” they disagree about the best method for doing this and about what the “thing themselves” are. Many metaphysicians, especially Catholic realists, reject phenomenology altogether. I show that many phenomenological methods are useful for reaching the goals of both phenomenology and realist metaphysics. First, I present a history of phenomenological methods including those used by Scheler, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Marion, Kearney, Rocha, and others. Next, I consider two sets of challenges raised to some of these methods. Finally, I outline how to join these methods with each other and with the methods of realist metaphysics, ultimately arriving at an aesthetic method, inspired by the work of von Balthasar, for considering fundamental phenomena.