Eu-Russian Relations

The EU should revert back to its pre-Minsk approach to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The main raft of sanctions were introduced before both of the Minsk Agreements were negotiated. Back then, the lifting of sanctions had been linked to a full restoration of, at least, mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only later was the prolongation of the sanctions tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – including those parts that concern Ukrainian domestic affairs.

The continuing international inattention for the Glazyev Tapes was and is surprising. If they are indeed authentic, the Glazyev Tapes should modify our understanding of the origins and nature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The most important aspect of the Glazyev Tapes is arguably not their contents. What is remarkable about these conversations is the time of their recording in February-March 2014, i.e. several weeks before the post-Euromaidan civil conflict in eastern Ukraine turned into a pseudo-civil war in the Donbass.

Когда развалится "путинская система", появится новый шанс на российскую демократизацию. Запад уже сегодня может способствовать отказу постпутинской России от экспансионизма, предложив россиянам включение будущей неимпериалистической РФ в евро-атлантическую систему экономического сотрудничества и военной безопасности.

Russia, as one of the world's largest natural gas producer and seller has an important place in the global energy market. The series of events that started in 2013 in Eastern Europe, including Ukraine and Crimea is still at top of the international policy agenda, which may start a new power struggle between the West and Russia based Eurasia.

The land border between Russia and the European Union is one of the longest land borders in the world, with very considerable trade flowing across the border in both directions. This book examines the nature of the EU-Russia border, and the issues connected with its management. It describes the territories and the societies on each side of the border, discusses the challenges which confront border management, including migration and criminal activities, and explores how people on both sides perceive each other and perceive threats and security issues. It concludes by assessing achievements to date in managing the border and by assessing continuing unresolved challenges.

On 21 January another round of trilateral gas talks between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union was held in Brussels. This meeting mainly concerned the new Russian-Ukrainian transit contract; the transit contract currently in force between Gazprom and Naftogaz will expire as of 1 January 2020. During the meeting, European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič submitted proposals to the parties concerning the parameters of a new contract transit, but did not make them public. The meeting was the latest in this series of trilateral gas talks; the previous round was held in Berlin in July 2018. In Brussels Russia declared its willingness to conclude a new transit agreement, although it highlighted the need for the legal dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom to be resolved before that could happen. The lack of success during the talks so far, the divergent interests of the various parties and the current political context suggests that a new contract transit will probably only be concluded by the late autumn or winter of this year, and possibly in the period immediately before the expiry date of the current contract between Naftogaz and Gazprom. It is also conceivable that the negotiations will be extended into 2020, and that meanwhile transit will take place on the basis of principles agreed in the short term, along the lines of the so-called winter packages in 2014 and 2015, something which would be very disadvantageous for Ukraine and the EU, but extremely convenient for Moscow. There is no reason to expect rapid progress in the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations; they are proceeding in complicated conditions, including the ongoing political conflict between Kiev and Moscow, the numerous legal disputes between Naftogaz and Gazprom, the construction of new Russian export pipelines, the continuing fundamental reform of the Ukrainian gas sector, and finally a packed political calendar (for both Ukraine and the EU) in 2019. The negotiation process is also difficult because of the contradiction between the long-term interests of Ukraine, which wants to maintain its status as a key transit route for Russian gas in the long term, and Russia, whose strategic goal is to become independent of the Ukrainian transmission network.

Во-первых, российский рынок имел, в сравнительном измерении, ограничен-ную важность для ЕС даже на своем пике в 2013 году, когда цена на нефть бы-ла выше 100 долларов за баррель, а рубль был относительно сильным. Во-вторых, и без того небольшая доля России в торговле ЕС сократилась в резуль-тате совокупного воздействия спада цен на нефть, западных санкций, а также других последствий агрессии Кремля против Украины, ее кампании в Сирии, столкновения с Турцией и различных других экономически негативных дей-ствий. В-третьих, частичное восстановление сегодняшнего низкого уровня прибыли для ЕС от торговли с Россией возможно произойдет в среднесрочной перспективе, но оно не может быть принято как само собой разумеющееся. В-четвертых, произойдет это восстановление или нет, относительная экономи-ческая значимость России для Европейского Союза – т.е. доля доходов ЕС от сотрудничества с РФ по сравнению с другими рынками – в течение многих лет будет ниже или даже намного ниже, чем это было до «украинского кризиса».

Russia remains a great power despite the loss of territory and political and economic transition suffered since 1989. Since then it has exercised its responsibilities in global business. Also, like other great powers, it has violated international law when its strategic interests demanded it or have been neglected by other States. The mismanagement of the crisis in Ukraine by the EU has led to the biggest crisis in Europe since the fall of the Wall. Russian actions in Ukraine is not in conformity with international law, nor was the invasion of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Iraq (2003), or the Golan Heights and the occupied Palestinian and funding and arming the rebels in territories Syria. Some EU members from the former Soviet space have influenced unhealthy resentment and harassment policy towards Russia.

Bulgaria, 2008
Abstract: EU-Russian relations  have  been a defining parameter  of European  security  during the post- Cold  War era. The axis of cooperation has  been  defined not only by EU-Russian common  goals but also the ability of the US to derail this emerging partnership. The recent crisis in Georgia  has illustrated Russia’s determination to defend its national interests


URGENT MEMO: On 2/11/2023 ALL MY TWITTER ACOUNTS WERE SUSPENDED.
THIS CAME AFTER I STARTED PUBLICIZINFG INFO ON THE BIGGEST EVER RECRUITING/INTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL NETWORK IN GREEK ACADEMIA SET UP BY USEmbassy Athens. Following this I have been denied access to my LINKEDIN account, MY SOCIAL MEDIAS & EMAIL ACCOUNTS WERE COMPROMISED!
ACADEMIC FREEDOM & FREE SPEECH AT RISK

Criminal US Intelligence Networks of Impunity in Greek Academia(12/2023)
PART I
In 2019 the University of Macedonia (Thessaloniki, Greece) Rector ordered an investigation after I publicly denounced a number of issues regarding transparency and criminal academic networks in academic affairs as well as massive cheating during final exams.
All these years the university authorities and at a later stage the Council of the institution did nothing to publicize the findings of the investigation despite my continuous requests. This very fact sets issues of rule of law and academic order.
In the meantime, I have been consistently targeted in many ways, while my car has been vandalized several times inside the university parking lot. I asked the then Dean (and former Rector) I. Kouskouvelis to take measures and condemn these acts, yet, his response was that this was Not falling within his administrative duties. I guess it was not within his moral, academic obligation to support a fellow academic under attack, either. This is indicative only of the level of democracy I have been cherished for years in University of Macedonia.
In an academic environment where students’ youth organization affiliated to Nea Dimokratia & PM K.Mitsotakis enjoy TOTAL IMMUNITY and IMPUNITY in massive cheating cases publicly acknowledged by students themselves in social media.
Eventually,it was the very same criminal milieu (DAP-UoM) that pulled the strings to change the Department of International & European Studies course load & turned all obligatory courses in 2nd,3rd,4th years to ELECTIVE. Practically there is no obligatory course in the aforementioned years of study.
The initial proposal for this radical change was made by the then Dean I.Kouskouvelis honoured by today’s university authorities despite the fact that he is an INSTIGATOR TO A CRIME committed by a student upon his request. The student started collecting signatures in Google demanding my removal from the department a very aim set by DAP-UoM for years now. Eventually he was forced to confess in Court that its was I. Kouskouvelis who asked him to do so!
The aforementioned Dean,f.Rector & f.Head of the Department was a member of the local criminal network of Tectonic Hall of Thessaloniki,Greece.
DAP-UoM (New Democracy ruling party youth organization in tertiary education)had been enjoying full protection in all kinds of illegal behaviour. Hundreds(at least)have cheated during final exams, yet NO INVESTIGATION took place whatsoever! For years they allowed students to open books & simply copy info & answers during the exams(!)without a single student being punished!
Instead of an investigation the Rector of University of Macedonia Katranidis ordered an investigation against me for publicizing these acts. A punishment, an intimidation act for doing my duty as a Head of Department.
Unlawfulness does Pay
1. A student carrying notes in the final exam room refused to handle his exam paper after he was caught cheating. Instead, he pushed back the exams supervisor, run to the exit and disappeared. NO student dared testify as they were intimidated. Students told me they knew who this person was, yet, they were afraid to speak up.
2. During class evaluation the forms were collected by an unknown student who had never been in class. The student picked up the forms & disappeared. I asked the Department Secretariat to inform me on his identity, yet, they refused to assist me on the grounds of this was personal data” not to be disclosed!
3. On another occasion a student filling in the evaluation form for that year’s classes was forced (upon my insistence) to reveal that he was NOT A STUDENT of the department. Eventually he admitted being a student of another university. The aim of this scam was evident. To under-evaluate me & “prove” that I was not good at my academic work. This is how the corruption system operated & the way they target those who refuse to be their tools

An Academic Institutional Crisis
Some critical issues arise from this clientelistic environment
Critical questions need answers
1. Is impunity a “local”(institutional failure),national issue or is it the outcome of blatant interference of power networks operating in universities? The answer is a common secret & I would not try to answer it because of a major and revealing lawsuit to come.
2. What was the meaning and purpose of an INGOGNITO visit to the Department of International & European Studies & the University of Macedonia of the then US Ambassador to Greece G. Pyatt?This is a multi-million-dollar question that NO-ONE dares to bring forward. Is it customary for an ambassador to SECRETLY visit a university department without academics knowing about this odd visit? The question becomes a real puzzle taking into consideration the ANONYMOUS Greece revelation that a network of counter-information with the aim to supposedly deal with Russian influence in the city was built on the pillars of University of Macedonia, ELIAMEP & a number of journalists. They denied everything, yet, some facts cannot be explained. Nor can there be an explanation as to why the university authorities did not support my demand to provide an answer to why my university office was bugged. Why was I forced to deliver the monitoring device to the police?Why didn’t the only witness to the incident testify? The answers to these questions may be found in the operating of USA Embassy in Athens & the way to “deal with” those who refuse to be recruited.
3. On speaking out about corruption & clientelist, un-meritocratic networks in the university a DEFAMATORY campaign against me started with individuals at the institutions spreading rumours of me being mentally sick! This is classic intelligence practice applied by secret services particularly by the US. Is this related to the incognito visit of f. US Athens ambassador to the UoM? It appears that he had a “preference” to the institution. In the process I had to file a lawsuit against a colleague at the department as he was involved in communications mails with defamatory content (he suggested that I was mentally sick & should seek help).To this day justice has NOT BEEN DONE . I dispose of sms corroborating this standard intelligence practice of character assassination.
4. What is the relation between f. Rector I. Kouskouvelis & USEmbassy Athens? How did he use his structural power as a freemason member of the local Tectonic Hall (a criminal network)to persecute all those who stood up for meritocracy, equal treatment, transparency & those exposing clientelist networks?His cooperation with DAP (New Democracy Youth Organization)is well-known as well as the huge clientelist network they built. In a sms sent to me by a New Democracy party official he underpins that “he is capable of everything” meaning he is extremely dangerous for anyone who stands in his way

Умланд убежден, что крах «системы Путина» — это только вопрос времени, поэтому готовиться к нему нужно уже сейчас. Поэтому необходимо разработать систему предложений для России, чтобы показать, что может быть и «жизнь после Путина». По мнению немецкого политолога, таким сценарием станет постепенная интеграция нашей страны в Европу по грузинскому, молдавскому и, конечно, украинскому образцу. Ведь все мы видим, как «успешно» проистекает в этих странах евроинтеграция и к какому колоссальному «росту» экономики и уровня жизни она привела.

The documents signed in Minsk constitute agreements between Moscow (and its proxies in Ukraine’s Donets Basin) and Kyiv. Whether, when, and how the various aspects of this particular treaty are fulfilled should not guide any longer EU policies towards Russia. The sanctions were imposed not in connection with Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, but after a repeated and especially grave violation of basic foundations of the international order by Russia. Discussion about their prolongation, extension, or modification should thus only refer to Russian correction or non-correction of its behavior, and not to Kyiv’s actions and non-actions. Unless Kyiv’s sovereignty in the Donets Basin is restored in full, all or at least most sanctions should remain in place.

Die Juli-Erklärung des Willy-Brandt-Kreises wird, wie auch der Dezember-Brief der 60 Prominenten, seine „Abnehmer“ vor allem in Moskau und nicht in Berlin oder Brüssel finden. Obwohl die direkten Auswirkungen solcher Deklarationen auf die Ost-West-Beziehungen gering sind, ist zu befürchten, dass derartige Publikationen eine indirekte Wirkung im Hintergrund entfalten. Durch ihre verwirrende Signalwirkung auf die russische Elite, verzögern derartige Stellungnahmen bekannter europäischer Persönlichkeiten ein Umdenken der Meinungsbildner und Entscheidungsträger in Moskau. Sie suggerieren der russischen Elite die Möglichkeit, dass der Westen nach der Zerstückelung Moldaus und Georgiens letztlich auch die Teilung oder gar Auflösung der Ukraine stillschweigend akzeptieren könnte. Damit fördern solche Stellungnahmen nicht die Lösung der sogenannten “Ukraine-Krise”, sondern behindern sie.

В Германии антироссийские санкции пока воспринимаются как неизбежное зло В июне ЕС будет принимать очередное решение о сохранении или отмене санкций в отношении России. Возможные варианты все активнее обсуждаются политиками и экспертным сообществом. Эксперты Atlantic Council выступили со статьей о необходимости сохранения санкций в отношении России. Российский политолог Владислав Иноземцев на страницах престижного Internationale Politik призвал европейцев к отказу от идеологии «доходов и потерь» и возложил на них моральную ответственность за предстоящее решение. EUObserver, со ссылкой на американских дипломатов, рассказал о европейских дискуссиях по приостановлению отраслевых санкций, а нижняя палата парламента Франции даже приняла резолюцию, рекомендующую правительству страны не поддерживать продление санкции ЕС в отношении России. Вопрос о возможности полной или частичной отмены санкций повис в воздухе. Выдать желаемое за действительное Судя по настроениям политиков и бизнеса в Германии, от которой во многом зависит предстоящее решение, реальных предпосылок для отмены санкций уже этим летом нет. С этим соглашаются даже самые горячие сторонники отказа от санкционного режима. По словам Андреаса Метца, представителя Восточного комитета немецкой экономики, «отмена отраслевых санкций вызывает серьезные сомнения, а аннулирование или смягчение персональных санкций в краткосрочной перспективе просто невозможно», потому что это стало бы «катастрофой для ЕС», «показателем игнорирования» позиции отдельных государств ЕС — Польши и стран Балтии, настаивающих на их сохранении. Хотя он и допускает, что «частичная отмена отраслевых санкций, например в области энергетики, была бы возможна».

Unlike Russia's exclusion from the SWIFT bank payment system, an EU oil embargo would involve a physical obstacle the Kremlin couldn't easily circumvent. While Russia may have a Plan B in case its banks can no longer use SWIFT, the country cannot redirect its oil trade routes overnight because it relies largely on pipelines to the West. In addition, the EU doesn't depend on Russian oil to the degree many assume. Being fungible, Russian crude could be replaced with oil delivered via tankers and other means from elsewhere. To be sure, Russia could find ways to export its oil elsewhere. Yet, for at least awhile, Moscow would encounter enormous logistic, infrastructure, legal, and financial challenges delivering sufficiently large amounts of oil to non-European customers.

«Українська криза» матиме різні наслідки для міжнародних відносин поза межами Східної Европи. У зв’язку з тим, що Будапештський меморандум про ґарантії безпеки 1994 року щодо Укра їни знецінився, ця криза підриває всесвітні зусилля, спрямовані проти поширення зброї масового знищення. Вона здійснює дедалі помітніший неґативний вплив на економіку Росії та її становище у світі і цим завдасть довгострокової шкоди важливому гравцеві на міжнародній арені. «Українська криза» стоїть на заваді подальшій европейській інтеґрації Росії, а отже, постанню Великої чи Широкої Европи, а також створенню спільної зони торгівлі та безпеки від Лісабона до Владивостока. Популярна сьогодні ідея, що Москва зможе замінити своє партнерство із Заходом китайсько-російським союзом, є сумнівною.

* The European Union has been pushing some countries in Eastern
Europe and the South Caucasus to choose between a comprehensive free trade agreement and integration into Russia's led customs union.
* Although there may be technical arguments in favour of this position, it does not reflect political and security realities on the ground, as clear from recent developments.
* Instead of pushing these countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) to make this hard choice, the EU should strive to gradually build up relations with them, without forcing them to choose between Brussels and Moscow.
* As a pragmatic, business oriented country, the UK is in a unique
position to push for such views.

Letztendlich kann Russlands Zukunft nur in einer schrittweisen Integration in westliche Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitsstrukturen liegen. Für Moskau gibt es keine asiatische Alternative zum europäischen Integrationsprojekt (wenn man von einer ungleichen Allianz mit China oder einer fragilen Diktatorenachse absieht). Russland ist zu schwach, um einen eigenständigen Pol in einer multipolaren Welt zu formieren. Ähnlich Putins Kleptokratie ist seine Eurasische Wirtschaftsunion ein Gebilde auf Zeit. Russland ist Teil Europas und nicht eines mythologischen Eurasiens. Anders als nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion sollte der Westen auf einen neuen russischen Regimekollaps und eine – nach dem Februar 1917 und August 1991 – dritte prowestliche Wende in Moskau bereits im Voraus vorbereitet sein.