Hassan Rouhani

The government of Iran in the post-revolutionary period may have religious leaders in central positions, but it is far from being a pure  theocracy. This paper pursues this topic in the spirit of Michel Foucault’s widely explored notion of governmentality. Foucault’s concept is broad, but generally
covers the ways that government adopts a cultural ideology for carrying out its duties, a structural framework for implementing this ideology, and a rationality associated with that framework From an anthropological standpoint, it is expected that different forms of governmentality will be observed in different societies, with different cultural underpinnings resulting in unique institutions. Iranian governmental institutions are unique to Iran, emphasizing legitimacy as a mark of authority, and martyrdom as the symbolic proof of legitimacy.

Iranian policy toward GCC states is subject to domestic and external institutional constraints. Within Iran, foreign and security policies are made through negotiations and compromises between three unequal centers of power, namely the presidency, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Leader. The fact that all three openly advocate their own preferences makes Iranian policy seem uncoordinated and contradictory. In reality, however, policy outcomes are negotiated behind the scenes and must ultimately be approved by the Leader. Once made, Iran’s policy initiatives in regards to the GCC enter an external institutional arena that is highly securitized and sectarianized. It also features a deepening regional security dilemma, and a trenchant American security umbrella. Within this context, Iranian efforts at rapprochement with the states of the GCC, especially with Saudi Arabia, are unlikely to bear results in the near future.

Under Hassan Rouhani a so-called moderate executions have spiralled. The clamp down on all forms of freedom of expression and of personal choice continues. Political dissidents face execution for 'enmity to God' offences. Unfair trials abound. Vested interests of major stakeholders in the economy

T his article provides a theoretical and empirical study of the co-occurrence of ideologizing and fundamentalism in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran under Pres. Hassan Rouhani. Without any doubt, it is essential to understand the foundations of the Iranian political system to analyze Iran's foreign policy objectives as well as actions undertaken by Iranian authorities. Iran's post-revolutionary history is often presented as a continuous struggle between idealists and pragmatists. 1 The first group of Iranian decision makers, often referred to as the principlists, focuses mainly on the ideological determinants and attempts to comply with them even when forced to sacrifice political or economic interests. The second group, namely the reformists, is ready to give up on selected ideological factors to achieve the set objectives and safeguard national interests. The 2015 nuclear negotiations could serve as the best example of such a political cleavage. Yet, the question is if the abovementioned observations are always valid and noticeable. The main research objective is to identify the level of co-occurence of ideolo-gizing and fundamentalism in the foreign policy of Iran under the Hassan Rou-hani presidency. The main hypothesis is as follows: the level of ideologizing in the current Iranian foreign policy is probably not convergent with the level of funda-mentalism. Do ideological principles form the basis for the final political decisions and actions of the Iranian authorities or are they nothing more than good-sounding declarations for the voters? The selected research method is source analysis, and the research technique is qualitative content analysis. Among primary sources are relevant speeches, declarations , and official documents approved by key Iranian state bodies. Secondary sources include selected monographs, reports, and academic articles. The empirical part of the article includes a study of elements that have constituted the core of the official state ideology since 1979 as well as an analysis of their implementation in Iranian foreign policy during the Rouhani presidency.

In the final days of 2017, a wave of protests erupted in Iran, bringing to surface a host of economic, social, and political resentments. Despite the profusion of slogans and demands, the initial trigger is widely believed to have been economic. This article aims to contextualize Iran’s protests by examining the changing dynamics between the state and the poor in the four decades since the country’s 1979 revolution. A case is made that while in the first decade after the revolution the poor became the primary social base of the post-revolutionary state, the (neo-liberal) shift in economic policies since the early 1990s has cultivated new dynamics in which the lower economic strata are increasingly disenchanted with and disenfranchised from the state.

Given the surprise electoral victory in May 2013 of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, which was attained on a recurrent platform of reform and change, this article seeks to investigate Iran's reform discourse by looking at how it systematically developed under President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Its chief purpose is to delineate the discourse in a retrospective analytical attempt to show why it has proven so resilient and persuasive in theory while briefly explicating the causes of its failure in practice under reformists, which set the stage for the rise to power of populist neo-conservatives marshaled by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). Divided in two main parts, it thus seeks to tease out the domestic ideology of reform as theorized by Khatami and his men on the one hand, and the foreign policy of détente and dialogue as performed by the reformist administration on the other. In so doing, the article draws primarily on the original Persian sources produced during the respective period and afterward, including Khatami's own writings as well as theoretical formulations and articulations propounded by his political strategists. Finally, it anticipates that Rouhani's “moderation” project can face the same fate as Khatami's “reform” project if the former does not heed the hard-earned historical lessons of the latter, even though it is operating in a different sociopolitical context.

Resumo: O Golfo Pérsico possui caráter prioritário nas agendas internacionais dos EUA e do Irã, países-chave nas relações internacionais da região, mas que possuem um histórico de litígios. Visto que, em 2013, durante os governos de Barack Obama e de Hassan Rouhani, foi assinado um acordo de caráter inédito entre o Irã e o P5+1 (Estados Unidos, França, Inglaterra, China, Rússia e Alemanha), torna-se útil analisar os motivos que levaram a uma perceptível alteração da política tomada previamente. Assim, o objetivo deste trabalho é compreender como se desenrolaram as relações entre os dois países após o fim da Guerra Fria, a partir da hipótese de que somente em 2013 houve uma coincidência de governantes interessados em alterar o status quo da relação, o que efetivou o processo de reaproximação entre eles. O método escolhido é o da análise de política externa dos pares presidenciais dos dois países, observando o interesse de cada gestão de se reaproximar ou não. Busca-se concluir, então, que a reaproximação que acontece é deliberada por Obama e Rouhani, sendo seu indicador os acordos nucleares do P5+1, que abre espaço para maior cooperação entre os dois países no Golfo Pérsico. Palavras-chave: Irã. Estados Unidos da América. Golfo Pérsico. Acordo Nuclear. Oriente Médio. Abstract: The Persian Gulf is essential to the US's and Iran's foreign policy agendas, two major actors in the International Relations of the Middle East, though their history of conflicts. In 2013, during the Barack Obama's and Hassan Rouhani's governments, the first nuclear agreement was signed between Iran and the P5+1 (USA, France, UK, China, Russia and Germany), making useful to evaluate the main reasons that lead to a visible change in the policy taken previously. Hence, this article aims to understand how the relations between USA and Iran developed since the post-Cold War, assuming that only in 2013 it was possible to see both governments interested in changing the status quo of the relationship, creating a space for re-engagement between both of them. The chosen methodology is the foreign policy analyses of the presidential peers, noting the interest of each administration to re-engage or not. The aim is to conclude that the re-engagement that occurred is due to deliberative policies of both presidents, Obama and Rouhani, indicated by P5 + 1 nuclear agreements, that open new possibilities for cooperation between both countries in the Persian Gulf.

Questo lavoro tenta brevemente di delineare perché l'elezione di Hassan Rohani del 14 giugno scorso possa rappresentare una svolta per la nazione iraniana ed in quale contesto questa svolta si collochi. Pur non essendo un lavoro esaustivo si è tentato di far comprendere l'importanza strategica dell'Iran facendo venire a galla le numerosi variabili che lo riguardano nel contesto regionale ed internazionale.

هویت، گفتمان و انتخابات در ایران (مبانی ایدئولوژیک انتخابات 1392)


اسلام سياسي و فقاهتي در پي انقلاب ‌اسلامي و به‌ويژه از خرداد 1360 در عرصه سياسي- اجتماعي ايران مستقر گرديد. هم‌سو با هژموني‌يابي اين منظومه‌ي فکري و ايدئولوژيک، ساختار سياسي و بافتار اجتماعي نيز در يک فرايند تکويني و تدريجي متحول گشت. در طول سال‌هاي استقرار جمهوري اسلامي، اين نظم و ديسيپلين گونه‌اي از نظم معناشناختي و گفتماني را توليد و بازتوليد کرده است. خرده‌گفتمان‌هاي سياسي متعددي ضمن تفسير و بازتفسير نشانگان کانوني اين ابرگفتمان نمايان گشته و ضمن فراچنگ‌آوري صندوق‌هاي راي به جايگاه هژمونيک ارتقا يافته‌اند. اين اثر مي‌کوشد تا با بررسي مباني زبان‌شناختي، نشانه‌شناختي و گفتماني انتخابات رياست‌جمهوري خرداد 1392 کيفيت هژموني‌يابي گفتمان اعتدال‌گرايي به نمايندگي حسن روحاني را مورد تجزيه و تحليل قرار دهد. در اين راستا مستندهاي تبليغاتي حسن روحاني، و براي يافتن زاويه‌ديدي تطبيقي و مقايسه‌اي محمدباقر قاليباف و سعيد جليلي به‌عنوان نامزدهاي دوم و سوم انتخابات، به‌مثابه‌ي مساله و ابژه‌ي شناخت مورد واکاوي قرار گرفته است. کتاب پيش رو ضمن طراحي يک سازه‌ي نظري و روش‌شناسانه (که قابليت تعميم بالايي نيز دارد) با کاربست عناصر و مولفه‌هاي زباني-گفتماني، ساخت هويت-ديگري و مدارهاي ايدئولوژيک را مورد پردازش قرار داده و کوشيده است نموداري را با دو طيف واقع‌گرا-عمل‌گرا و آرمان‌گرايي- مقاومت ترسيم نمايد. در اين جستار ميان‌رشته‌اي ضمن بازخواني روايت‌هاي موجود، تعامل‌ها و تقابل‌هاي مطرح در ساحت زبان، گفتمان، هويت، ايدئولوژي، سياست و جامعه در يک آوردگاه انتخاباتي رمزگشايي مي‌شود.

Panel proposal by Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad for the 24th International Congress of the German Middle East Studies Association (DAVO) combined with the 33rd German Oriental Studies Conference (Deutscher Orientalistentag, DOT) of the German Oriental Society (DMG) | To be held at Friedrich Schiller University Jena, on 18-22 September 2017.

Dünya tarihinde tüm tarafları eşit ölçüde memnun edecek uluslararası bir anlaşma yoktur. 14 Temmuz 2015 tarihinde Viyana'da İran ve P5+1 ülkeleri arasında imzalanan ve o dönem Ortadoğu siyasetinde görece bir rahatlamaya vesile olan anlaşma da bunlardan biri. Tahran sokaklarını mutluluğa boğan anlaşma, Obama yönetiminde memnuniyet, İsrail'de tepki, Körfez ülkeleri ve Suudi Arabistan'da ise büyük bir endişe ile karşılanmıştı. Uzun, yorucu ve yıpratıcı bir müzakere sürecinin ardından İran ve Batı arasında imzalanan nükleer anlaşmanın bölgede ya sürekli gelişen mutabakata ya da daha derin ayrışmaya neden olacağı söyleniyordu.

What is the rationale behind Iran’s nuclear policy? This article identifies and reviews five answers: (i) Economy, mainly energy needs; (ii) Identity politics, pride and prestige; (iii) Deterrence of foreign intervention; (iv) Compellence to boost regional influence; and (v) Domestic politics, mitigating, through ‘nuclear diversion’ the regime’s domestic crisis of legitimacy. How should we assess the theoretical validity and practical viability of these accounts? I suggest four factors: (i) Compatibility, the extent to which the various rationales are mutually exclusive; (ii) Consistency, the historical stability of the nuclear motivation; (iii) Rationality, the relevancy of ascribing rationality/irrationality to Iran in order to ascertain its nuclear rationales; and (iv) Falsifiability, our ability to refute theses on nuclear motivations. The article addresses recent events, including Rouhani’s election and the Geneva interim agreement, and concludes with policy implications.

As Iran seeks “constructive engagement” with neighbors and the world at large under the Rouhani administration, Iran-GCC relations once again prove to be a critical test case for the success of Iran’s prudent diplomatic endeavor. Indeed, echoing Iran’s previous attempts at moderation and détente with the Gulf states during the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, the recent impetus to mend fences starts from the very neighborhood that Iran holds vested strategic and economic interests. Whether the new era under Hassan Rouhani’s presidency will mark a qualitative shift in relations that have been troubled by rising concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and hegemonic aspirations in the region is yet to be seen. In this regard, Iran’s assertive nuclear diplomacy and the signing of the Geneva Deal as a prelude to a long-term solution to the nuclear crisis definitely bring a new dynamic that should be addressed. However, the prospects of Iran-GCC relations are also tied to regional developments at large, particularly the crisis in the Levant. The ongoing civil war in Syria and growing destabilization of Lebanon attest to the perils of sectarianism and intensified regional competition over the future of these states and societies. This paper aims to address the role of the Levant in Iran-GCC relations which has become an integral part of the politics of the Persian Gulf increasingly so in last few years with the advent of the Arab uprisings. It will argue that any prospect for positive change in Iran-GCC relations, especially Iran-Saudi Arabia relations will also depend on how they manage their countervailing positions on the future of Syria alongside other issues pertaining to the security of the Persian Gulf. In this regard, the paper will focus on Iran's recent attempts under Rouhani administration, fostered by its quest for moderation, progress in nuclear talks, growing political, economic and ideological costs of the Syrian turmoil as well as the rising threat of extremism in the region with ISIS. It will assess the domestic, regional and international developments which offer prospects for cooperation, if only Iran and Saudi Arabia choose to do so.
Keywords: Iran-GCC relations; Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations; the Syrian Uprising; “Constructive Engagement”; Iran’s regional policy under President Rouhani

"The prospects of 'constructive engagement' in Iran-GCC Relations:The Levant Dimension" in Warnaar, Zaccara and Aarts (eds), Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry (Berlin: Gerlach Press, September 2016). (Forthcoming) (ISBN: 978-395-9940-04-7)

http://www.gerlach-books.de/attachment/INFO%20Gerlach%20Press_Iran-GCC%20Relations_Aug2016.pdf

U.S and its allies fight against Iran’s nuclear power is mostly a geopolitical issue. Iran’s power in the region though is advancing more than ever without a nuclear power. Still, guarding U.S and its allies interests in the region, such as Israel is what they are pursuing. Hence, the discourse of a nuclear Iran is constantly shifting according to power shifts in the Middles East.

Two Muslim Presidents. Two speeches celebrating the anniversary of Prophet Muhammad’s birth. Two very different messages.

Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, on two different occasions ((Dec. 22 and Dec. 24) iterated his call for “changes in approach” that would bring Islam peaceful coexistence of all races, religions and doctrines. He stated: “No one should define someone by their appearance or religion.”

Sisi insisted Muslims should acknowledge that times have changed and, therefore, Islam has to be modernized.