Human enhancement debate

Abstract. This paper proposes an ordering of ideas to create politics that distinguishes itself from conventional politics. It is called extrapolitics. To define extrapolitics, the concept of politics, transhumanism and dialectic - dialogism have been briefly included. The  Politics Path has been schematized as a process of evolution that politics experiments and goes hand in hand with human evolution. A post-politicist proposal was suggested for the proper proliferation of transhumanist objectives, as well as an extension of the conventional political spectrum, one that includes the extra-political spectrum and arguments against human enhancement. It finalizes with the inclusion of two potential phenomena, one harmful and the other one ideal, that define the processes of application of extrapolitical policies, the bio-socio-political singularity and the bio-socio-political inflection, respectively.

Key words: transhumanism, politics, philosophy, extrapolitics, dialogism, ideologies, singularity, postmodernism, complexity.

In Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits, Nicholas Agar contributes once more to the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement, after his 2004 and 2010 books, Liberal Eugenics and Humanity’s End. The main thesis of Truly Human Enhancement is that it is important to take into consideration the “significance of differences in degree of human enhancement… human enhancement is a good thing, but one that it’s possible to have too much of it”. The author endorses moderate enhancements, while rejecting radical enhancements. The focus of the book on the degree of enhancement—not merely the mean or the goal of enhancement—is the novelty here. This means that Agar embraces some technological progress to a degree, within some limits. He illustrates his position using the imagery found in the movie Star Trek, “Here, recognizable human beings use fabulous technologies to travel the universe. They view these technologies very different from the way they view their brains and bodies. The technologies that transport humans across the universe are radically improved. Human brains and bodies are recognizes as grounds of valuable experiences and are preserved”. For the purpose of this review, I will briefly comment on the notion of radical enhancement and then focus on the idea introduced in this book that two ideals drive the enhancement enterprise.

John Harris’ newest book examines the ethics of moral enhancement.  The book focuses on whether new biotechnological interventions on our brain could be used as a means to moral enhancement. Put it simply, could we just take a pill to become morally better? For Harris, this raises important questions regarding the role our “freedom to fall” plays in our understanding of morality, and whether these sort of moral bioenhancements are truly enhancements or only a threat to human freedom. Harris suggests the later. For him, moral bioenhancements do not allow us to remain “masters of our fate, entities which create ourselves by decisions and actions”.

The ethics of human enhancement has been a hotly debated topic in the last 15 years. In this debate, some advocate examining science fiction stories to elucidate the ethical issues regarding the current phenomenon of human enhancement. Stories from science fiction seem well suited to analyze biomedical advances, providing some possible case studies. Of particular interest is the work of screenwriter Andrew Niccol (Gattaca, S1m0ne, In Time, and Good Kill), which often focuses on ethical questions raised by the use of new technologies. Examining the movie In Time (2011), the aim of this paper is to show how science fiction can contribute to the ethical debate of human enhancement. In Time provides an interesting case study to explore what could be some of the consequences of radical life-extension technologies. In this paper, we will show how arguments regarding radical life-extension portrayed in this particular movie differ from what is found in the scientific literature. We will see how In Time gives flesh to arguments defending or rejecting radical life-extension. It articulates feelings of unease, alienation and boredom associated with this possibility. Finally, this article will conclude that science fiction movies in general, and In Time in particular, are a valuable resource for a broad and comprehensive debate about our coming future.

When considering the use of enhancement in the world of sport, we should contemplate not only the enhancement of particular traits, but also that of the athlete (as a human) as a whole. In most sports, we are interested in comparing the fastest human performance and not the fastest performance. There can be room for both types of sports, but each will give different expectations, rules, limits, and kinds of participants in the endeavour. This paper argues that the underlying question of what it means to be human needs to be central in the context of enhancement in sport.

This is a paper in Dutch about human enhancement.

In dit paper onderzoek ik het onderwerp human enhancement nader.  De mens probeert de wereld rond hem heen aan te passen. Vanzelfsprekend heeft dit gevolgen voor mens en samenleving. Human enhancement roept vragen op. Dit betekent dat ik een tweeslachtig beeld heb van en over human enhancement. Ten positieve biedt technische vooruitgang mogelijkheden die van invloed zijn op een sneller en beter herstellen of genezen. De ontwikkeling van nieuwe technische mogelijkheden is niet tegen te houden. Zij helpt ons om langer gezond te blijven en ouder te worden. Ten negatieve roepen deze nieuwe ontwikkelingen ook vragen op. Moet alles wat mogelijk is ook mogen? Moeten we een kritische grens markeren die stelt:-tot hier en niet verder? Tot hoever willen we gaan? Dit zijn vragen die mij als theoloog en filosoof interesseren. Human enhancement heeft ook invloed op ons maatschappelijk functioneren. Wat betekent human enhancement bijvoorbeeld voor onze relatie tot arbeid? We worden ouder, we moeten langer doorwerken om onze oudedagsvoorziening betaalbaar te houden. Kunnen we dit volhouden, en hoe? Biedt human enhancement hiertoe mogelijkheden? Onze manier van werken is de laatste decennia veranderd en zal nog verder veranderen. Hoe willen we hiermee omgaan? Ook hier zullen we verder over moeten nadenken. In dit paper wil ik de huidige filosofische discussie over human enhancement kritisch analyseren aan de hand van een aantal denkers die zich met dit onderwerp bezighouden. Daarbij wil ik nagaan wat deze filosofische discussie kan betekenen voor het maatschappelijk debat hierover.

The author critically examines what role the notion of perfection should play in the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement. He argues that the concept of «human perfection» needs to be central when morally assessing human enhancements. This anthropological ideal provides an additional norm to evaluate enhancing interventions, extending the well-established bioethical principles of autonomy, justice, and safety.

The upcoming concept of converging technologies accentuates the coalescence of originally separated branches of science and technology. Tendencies of real technological convergence go along with a convergence of futuristic visions. Several of these visions have been deemed utopian or dystopian. Given this, and the historical importance of utopian thought, the article discusses utopian aspects of posthumanist technofuturism and the use of utopian and anti-utopian references in the ongoing debate on technological convergence. It will be argued that posthumanist visions function as common reference points in this debate and together form an intellectual repository for polemical and other purposes. Moreover, some possible consequences for the assessment of the ethical and societal implications of technological convergence will be addressed.

Abstract

Doping in elite-sport is a topical issue that polarizes public opinion. This dissertation outlines crucial, fundamental questions that go unasked in general discourse about doping in elite-sport and that through being answered will allow the debate to be had at more meaningful level. 

This interdisciplinary dissertation draws widely on: scientific journal entries, textbooks, multimedia and official documents in subjects of biochemistry, biology, psychology and ethics.

A comprehensive, balanced, inter-disciplinary approach to the research that was used to form this dissertation allows for a multifactorial coverage of the issues addressed and means that, at the very least, the conclusions made have some equity.

This​ dissertation examines include: what doping is and who decides, the (not so) valiant institutional structures through which doping detection is currently undertaken, and what the current prevalence of doping is likely to be.  It aims to answer two questions: (i) is the playing field levelled by the current paradigm of doping prohibition? and (ii) in this human world, there are many examples of ideals that only fitfully work in reality, but is this an argument for not making the effort to put ideals into practice?

Through this research it can be concluded that doping is far more pervasive that WADA's statistics would suggest, doping detection methods are unfit for purpose, it is questionable whether the true motives for those who organise testing are more political than egalitarian and there are great genetic dissimilarities between elite-athletes (who are, as a group, already genetically superior to the rest of the population in terms of athletic potential).

All of these conclusions highlight that elite-sport has never and probably will never be an even playing field.  Looking forward, there are far-reaching moral and political implications for organised testing.

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die aktuellen, eng miteinander verbundenen Kontroversen über "Human Enhancement" und "Converging Technologies" sowie christliche Reaktionen auf diese. Aus bioethischer Perspektive stellen beide Kontroversen eine Ausweitung des Themengebiets dar, da es ihnen weniger um die seit Jahren breit diskutierten Fragen im Bereich der Genetik, Medizin und Biotechnologie geht als vielmehr um mehrere übergreifende, auch nichtbiologische Forschungs-und Entwicklungsfelder sowie deren Berührungspunkte und Überschneidungsbereiche. Zunächst ist zu skizzieren, von was die beiden Kontroversen handeln, und darzulegen, wer sie vorangetrieben hat. Offensichtlich hat sich in ihnen eine bestimmte technikzentrierte eschatologische Weltanschauung neuerlich manifestiert. Dieser so genannte Posthumanismus oder Transhumanismus wird von christlicher Seite schon seit Längerem und in jüngster Zeit verstärkt als eine Herausforderung diskutiert. Die politisch-ethische Spezialdebatte zu "Converging Technologies" ist daher vor dem Hintergrund eher akademisch und weltanschau-lich geprägter Diskussionen über den Posthumanismus zu untersuchen. In diesen Diskussionen spielen theologische Perspektiven bisher eine größere Rolle als in der eigentlichen Konvergenzdebatte. Nach einer allgemeinen Charakterisierung der Thematik und kurzen Begriffsklärungen wird in diesem Beitrag auf einschlägige forschungspolitische Visionen und den Stand relevanter naturwissenschaftlich-technischer Forschung und Entwicklung eingegangen. Danach werden die Auseinandersetzung um die posthumanistischen Technikvisionen und dabei vor allem christliche Reaktionen auf diese behandelt. Anschließend kommen christliche Beiträge zur Spezialdebatte über konvergierende Technologien zur Sprache. Den Schluss des Beitrags bilden eine kritische Würdigung der diversen christlichen Diskussionsbeiträge und einige Überlegungen zum Umgang mit den posthumanistischen Visionen.

Coeur artificiel, implants cérébraux ou encore œil bionique… La fusion entre la technologie et le corps donne lieu à de nombreux questionnements. C’est la combinaison des nanotechnologies, des biotechnologies, de l’informatique et des sciences cognitives (les NBIC) qui nous donne aujourd’hui la possibilité de «  réparer  » les capacités humaines, mais aussi de les améliorer. Le débat se trouve justement à la frontière de ces deux notions. Alors, où en est-on ? Vers où va t-on  ? Quelle est la limite  ? Autant de réflexions sur lesquelles se penchent chercheurs et scientifiques du monde entier afin de déterminer à quoi ressemblera l’homme de demain.

Faciliter les ruptures amoureuses au moyen d’un médicament qui estomperait le sentiment d’attachement, jugé néfaste et «addictif». Neutraliser chimiquement nos tendances les plus agressives dans le but de pacifier les relations humaines. Réduire génétiquement la taille des êtres humains afin de limiter notre empreinte écologique sur Terre. Et, ultimement, repousser les frontières de la mort jusqu’à ce que celle-ci ne soit plus une fatalité, mais bien un choix indivi­duel. Le continent des promesses transhumanistes semble sans limi­tes et suscite autant de fascination que d’effroi.

Mouvement prônant une amélioration radicale de nos performances physiques, intellectuelles et émotionnelles grâce aux avancées technoscientifiques et biomédicales, le transhumanisme et l’idé­o­lo­gie de l’humain augmenté gagnent de plus en plus en notoriété. Or, le sensationnalisme futuriste de ses thèses nous empêche de bien réfléchir à leur réalité scientifique, à leur rôle économique et à leur sens politique. En resituant le débat sur le terrain du politique, Nicolas Le Dévédec montre avec clarté que ce mouvement n’est en rien révolutionnaire: changer l’être humain pour mieux ne pas changer notre modèle de société constitue son ressort politique profond.

Adhérant à l’horizon productiviste de notre temps, le transhu­manisme est indissociable du néolibéralisme et de l’appropriation capitaliste toujours plus poussée de nos corps et de nos vies, comme en témoigne l’intériorisation des normes de performance individuelle calquées sur le modèle de l’entreprise. Cristallisant l’imaginaire de la maîtrise de la nature, le mouvement contribue éga­lement à entre­tenir un rapport au monde, à l’humain et au vivant profondément dévastateur. À l’ère de l’Anthropocène, il est temps de reconquérir notre autonomie politique et de formuler une véritable «éco­logie politique de la vie et du vivant».

In contemporary philosophical thought, the ethical consequences of new technological developments are discussed and evaluations are carried out to develop these technologies in a more ethical way. Human enhancement technologies (HET), the subject of this study, is one of these new technologies. HET aims to increase human capacities and characteristics and overcome the current limitations of the human body through technological, genetic or neurological interventions (rather than health needs). An attitude known as “technological imperative” or “can implies ought” exists in technology studies and it also applies to HET. Considering the stance of transhumanists, it appears that technological feasibility in HET has become a normative concept for them. Proponents of this view imply that we ought to enhance ourselves and our children because we can. Some of them even regard this as a moral obligation.

In this study, I first mention the reasons underlying this stance. These are technological feasibility, metaphysical, and moral acceptability. Technological feasibility has been achieved through biotechnological developments, in particular, by gene mapping. As for metaphysical acceptability, it was ensured by the loss of the privileged position of human beings in the classical philosophical thought within the process started by modern science. At this point, modifications such as human genetic interventions could then be viewed as permissible. With regard to ethics, because ethics has lost its guiding power, the protection provided by moral values has become ineffective and the question of ethical “ought not” could not come to the fore. Consequently, technological feasibility has tended to become the sole criterion of decisions without considering metaphysical and ethical restrictions.

Some philosophers, especially bioconservatives, oppose transhumanists by drawing attention to the potential risks of HET. On the basis of philosophical, moral, spiritual, and political concerns, they argue that these technologies should be limited. This study addresses some of these concerns. These can be listed briefly as follows: parents’ interventions on children or the interventions of this generation on the next could lead to problems in terms of their autonomy and responsibility; enhancement interventions for individuals or the species as a whole could lead to dehumanization, and they could overshadow concepts like human nature, human dignity, life as a gift, the authenticity of human beings; these technologies could provide unfair advantages to enhanced individuals. Therefore, HET could exacerbate existing social inequalities and create new ones between those who are enhanced and those who are not. These technologies, which could be used for political or ideological purposes could be transformed into the means for repression; through the criticism of “playing God,” it is stated that these technologies could transgress the boundaries which are considered sacred and divinely ordained. In classical terms, HET is an indicator of the “hubris” of human beings.

All these concerns are valid reasons for requesting the limitation of HET. These concerns also remind us that “the ethical precautionary principle” should not be disregarded. For us, in addition to these concerns, HET have morally problematic aspects in terms of their purposes. One of these aspects is that HET are a manifestation of the “technological fix.” However, the capability of technology to solve certain problems does not mean that it can solve all human problems. Moreover, the idea of generating solutions to all problems through technology could impede our capacity to generate ethical solutions. Another problem is that HET aim to realize the ideal of “good life,” which is the purpose of ethics through technology. However, technology ignores many aspects of life in realizing the ideal of “good life.” Without willful, deliberate effort, “enhanced human beings” would not be “morally better human beings” and their lives would not be “a better life.” Finally, HET does not answer any questions concerning purpose. The transhumanist perspective also lacks a vision of what is good or better. Moreover, they oppose holding a normative ideal and having an ultimate goal.

Considering the concerns related to HET and the problems of the transhumanist perspective, we can assume that the call for ethical limitations on HET does not represent a technophobic or irrational anti-progress attitude but rather prudence and cautiousness. From this point of view, it is obvious that the research and studies on HET should be discussed, the technologies in this field should be evaluated considering ethical “ought not”s, and the medical practices in this scope should be negotiated with philosophers, theologians, legal experts, and social scientists.

Davis (2014) called for "extreme caution" in the use of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) to treat neurological disorders in children, due to gaps in scientific knowledge. We are sympathetic to his position. However, we must also address the ethical implications of applying this technology to minors. Compensatory trade-offs associated with NIBS present a challenge to its use in children, insofar as these trade-offs have the effect of limiting the child's future options. The distinction between treatment and enhancement has some normative force here. As the intervention moves away from being a treatment toward being an enhancement—and thus toward a more uncertain weighing of the benefits, risks, and costs—considerations of the child’s best interests (as judged by the parents) diminish, and the need to protect the child's (future) autonomy looms larger. NIBS for enhancement involving trade- offs should therefore be delayed, if possible, until the child reaches a state of maturity and can make an informed, personal decision. NIBS for treatment, by contrast, is permissible insofar as it can be shown to be at least as safe and effective as currently approved treatments, which are (themselves) justified on a best interests standard.

L’augmentation des facultés psychiques est un aspiration humaine très profonde. Depuis quelques décennies, une nouvelle réponse a vu le jour avec la banalisation des « smart drugs » aux Etats-Unis et des « psychostimulants » en France. Cet article est une étude philosophique des dictionnaires pratiques de psychostimulation. Plusieurs particularités doivent être remarquées. Premièrement, ces livres ont du succès : le phénomène n’est pas marginal. Deuxièmement, ils associent savoir scientifique, information pratiques et rêves de science, voire même un espoir de génialité. Troisièmement, ils s’adressent à des individus en bonne santé : ils ne s’agit pas de pratiques médicales mais anthropotechniques. Quatrièmement, elles changent notre propre conception de l’humanitude : nous sommes à la fois sujets et objets des techniques, à la fois acteurs autonomes et produits modulaires. Comme Janus, les psychostimulants impliquent des potentialités ambivalentes. D’un côté, améliorer l’intelligence et accroître la mémoire forment des buts positifs. De l’autre, la toxicité et l’addiction ne sont pas des problèmes négligeables, surtout lorsque ces usages viennent en réponse à des pressions professionnelles de performance.

resumen El término «eugenesia» está lleno de connotaciones negativas, por lo general debidas a su asociación con los crímenes cometidos por los nazis y con prácticas tales como la esterilización forzosa. Al mismo tiempo, su significado es indeterminado. Esto influye en el debate contemporáneo sobre el conocimiento genético y las técnicas asociadas aplicadas a la reproducción humana. Con el objetivo de clarificar el debate, en este trabajo ofrecere-mos tanto una visión histórica más amplia de la eugenesia de finales del siglo XIX y princi-pios del XX como una discusión de los rasgos distintivos de la nueva eugenesia. Por último, centrándonos en la eugenesia liberal en su vertiente positiva, repasaremos algunas de las críticas principales, así como los argumentos ofrecidos en su defensa. abstract «Eugenics» is a term full of negative connotations, mainly due to its association with Nazi crimes and policies of compulsory sterilization. At the same time, its meaning is indeterminate. Both things have an enormous influence in the contemporary debate about the new genetic knowledge and technologies applied to the human reproduction. With the aim of clarifying this debate, we first offer a more accurate picture of the history of the old eugenic movement and a review of the distinctive characteristics of the new eugenics. In the last part, we focus on the positive liberal eugenics, considering some of the main criticisms as well as the arguments put forward in its favour. Palabras clave Eugenesia, eugenesia liberal, eugenesia positiva, reprogenética, mejora genética.

Defensores de concepções bem-estaristas sobre o melhoramento humano em geral consideram que a distinção entre melhoramentos e tratamentos não tem valor moral. Se tratamentos forem compreendidos como uma subclasse de melhoramentos, dizem esses bem-estaristas, nada justifica a restrição à oferta apenas de ações ou medidas capazes de curar ou controlar doenças. Em defesa dessa visão, Julian Savulescu e Guy Kahane estendem o conceito de “incapacidade” de modo a incluir qualquer estado capaz de piorar a vida de alguém, classificando “doenças” como uma forma de incapacidade entre outras. Neste artigo, pretendo argumentar em favor do valor da distinção entre tratamentos e melhoramentos e mostrar como podemos defender a promoção do bem-estar humano sem rejeitar a distinção. Todavia, ao fazer isso, pretendo mostrar como certas abordagens bem-estaristas sobre o melhoramento humano escondem certa ambiguidade no emprego de “melhoramento”. Isso porque alguém pode estar “melhor” (ou “pior”) relativamente a um padrão comum, ou “melhor” (ou “pior”) por comparação aos demais (ou a si mesmo). Pretendo explorar essa diferença com o fim de justificar por que tratamentos têm um valor especial em justiça distributiva. A conclusão é de que ninguém pode ser impedido, em princípio, de fazer uso de melhoramentos, mas disso não se segue que possamos exigi-los dos demais ou do governo. Contudo, isso é diferente no caso das necessidades em saúde. Viver sem saúde é viver abaixo de um certo padrão decente de bem-estar e é isso que faz da saúde um tema especial e objeto prioritário de políticas públicas.

L’objectif du projet de communication scientifique «Superhumains.ch » est d’informer et de dialoguer avec des collégiens et des étudiants professionnels sur les questions bioéthiques concernant l’utilisation des technologies émergentes sur les êtres humains. Les récents progrès technologiques permettent de plus en plus de modifier technologiquement l’être humain. Beaucoup de « traits normaux » peuvent être artificiellement « améliorés ». Par conséquent, les questions éthiques de l’amélioration humaine ont commencé à être sérieusement prises au sérieux par les chercheurs du monde entier dans le milieu académique. Bien qu’une telle révolution technologique concerne la société dans son ensemble, les débats portant sur ces questions sont souvent limités au monde universitaire. Bien que le grand public soit souvent informé à travers les médias sur l’emploi de ces technologies émergentes, il est peu conscient des discussions portant sur ces questions et n’est pas nécessairement équipé pour participer pleinement aux discussions. L'objectif de « Superhumains.ch » est donc de créer un dialogue avec trois classes de collégiens et d'étudiants professionnels afin d’analyser ces questions d’amélioration humaine en réfléchissant et dialoguant avec des experts dans des groupes de travail. La première étape du projet consiste à dialoguer et informer les participants sur les possibilités présentes et futures de modifications technologiques de l’être humain. La deuxième étape consiste à leur donner des outils conceptuels qui leur permettront de construire de solides arguments afin de répondre aux questions concernant l’amélioration humaine. La troisième étape donne aux participants l'occasion de partager leur réflexion à un plus large public à travers une exposition et une présentation de leurs projets.

(1) Ce texte a été repris et adapté de la présentation du projet sur le site du FNS: http://p3.snf.ch/Project-151527

Conventional medicine already made great progress in fighting diseases and extending average life expectancy; but now, previously unimaginable developments have been achieved in biotechnology, including preimplantation genetic diagnosis, genome editing techniques, prostheses, implants, cosmetic surgery, and medication designed to enhance intelligence or specific characteristics of the human body or personality. These novel tools and modalities do not function merely therapeutically, but they also serve to transcend people’s capacities beyond their biological limits, provoking concurrent debate on the possibility of even further or radical enhancements, such as designer babies. According to some contemporary philosophers, who describe themselves as “transhumanists,” use of such technology should be allowed and discussed in the context of respect for autonomy, while their opponents, mostly known as “bioconservatives,” agree in that the very same procedures have a potential to change the human nature in a nonhuman way.
Accordingly, this paper adopts a normative approach discussing both transhumanist and bioconservative philosophers’ arguments based on notions as such as consistency, human nature, human dignity, and pursuit of perfection as well as referring to the four main principles of biomedical ethics developed by Beauchamp and Childress.

Artificial heart, brain implant and even bionic eye… Merging technology with the body has given rise to several issues. This is the combination of nanotechnologies, technologies, information technologies and cognitive sciences (NBIC) which enable us to “fix” human’s abilities and to improve them. The debate precisely lies in the boundary of these two notions. What has been made ? Where are we going ? What are the limits ? These are all the questions that researchers and scientists from around the world are studying in order to know how tomorrow’s human will look like.

A new chapter in the history of technology seems to be unleashed. Until recently, man-made technologies basically functioned as prostheses, as external prosthetic extensions of human bodies, directed towards the outside world, allowing us to interact with and manipulate objects more effectively, eventually transforming humans into ‘prosthesis-gods’ (Freud 1930). Currently, technological devices have begun to move inwards: entering our bodies and brains, functioning as implants rather than as extensions. Self-monitoring is an important objective of this trend. Due to recent developments in technosciences, such as synthetic biology, tissue engineering and nanomedicine, our sway over the human ‘condition’ (in its literal, biomedical sense) is increasing, down to the molecular level, and up to the point of becoming uncanny. New options for drug delivery and bio-implants are entering (pervading) human bodies and brains. On the one hand, this may be seen as strengthening human autonomy and agency. On the other hand, we must consider the possibility that we are the targets rather than the agents of this process. Rather than being in control, we may become increasingly dependent on these new technologies, emerging in the boundary zone between therapy and enhancement. On the one hand, intimate technologies allegedly open up new practices of the Self, enabling individuals to become the ‘managers’ of their own life and health. On the other hand, human beings are controlled by the gaze of the Other, which invokes a sense of unease. An exemplification is the Snyderome project. A prominent geneticist was closely monitored over the course of 14 months, measuring everything, resulting in the integrative Personal Omics Profile, a comprehensive omics portrait (“extremely high coverage”), combining “deep sequencing” with more than 3 billion measurements of molecules. This portrait is highly personal, but at the same time highly impersonal: opening up individuals to a digital panopticon: a molecularised version of the ‘voice of conscience’ in the form of a computer monitor, informing us that we must change their life on a daily basis: the superego of intimate technologies in the terabyte age. What is the fate of the human subject in the era of Big Data and intimate technologies?

Bioconservative view holds that we should prevent dissemination of biomedical inteventions enhancing human capacities. One of arguments against this view shows that it is based on status quo bias which gives unjustified preference for actual state of affairs. According to this argument reasons against human enhancement are not conclusive. The aim of this article is to show the possibility of the interpretation of the bioconservative view, under which it is possible avoiding the status quo bias objection.

This doctoral dissertation critically examines what role, if any, the notion of perfection should play in the debate regarding the ethics of human enhancement. After distinguishing between the concept of perfection and different conceptions of perfection, I first argue that the concept of perfection is unavoidable in this debate, as the notion of human enhancement itself is interconnected with the notion of human perfection. This invites the further question of what particular conception of perfection should be used in the debate; and in what ways. After dismissing various problematic possibilities, I conclusively defend the idea that the best view of human perfection should fulfill certain criteria: it should be an objective ideal, not holding a fixed view of what a human being ought to be, in order to allow room for pluralism and political deliberation, while giving guidance, not only restrictions, to the practice of human enhancement. I show here how Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach fulfills these requirements and can be used to morally assess human enhancement, in addition to other bioethical standards such as safety, justice, and autonomy. This research finds itself, therefore, in a balanced position between the so-called bioconservative stance, which use some particular conceptions of perfection to argue against human enhancement, and the so-called bioliberal view, which also, at times, use some specific conceptions of perfection (or as I will further illustrate: some particular perfectionist notions of what it means to live a good life), in order to argue in favor of human enhancement. This thesis surprisingly demonstrates that a particular conception of human perfection – based on a harmonized combination of Nussbaum’s central capabilities – is in some cases for human enhancement, and in other circumstances against it. In other words, this conception of human perfection helps us to distinguish between true human enhancement and so-called dis-enhancement.