Internalism

Along with what J. McDowell has called the disjunctive conception of experience (DCE), and against a venerable tradition, the veridical experience that P and the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination that P are not type-identical mental states. According to McDowell, a powerful motivation for DCE is that it makes available the sole internalistically acceptable way out of a sceptical argument targeting the possibility of perceptual knowledge. In this paper I state in explicit terms the sceptical argument McDowell worries about, and show that DCE has not the epistemological merits that McDowell ascribes to it. To begin with, I join a series of commentators in arguing that the way out of the sceptical argument made available by DCE is not internalistically acceptable, and so argue that it is not a way out that an internalist about epistemic justification would have any special reason to prefer to a parallel externalist way out that does not commit to DCE. Secondly, I show that the internalist can resist the sceptical argument by denying a different premise of it that McDowell takes for granted. I conclude by maintaining that McDowell's epistemological motivation for DCE is undercut.

The paper defends Collingwood’s account of rational explanation against two objections. The first is that he psychologises the concept of practical reason. The second is that he fails to distinguish mere rationalisations from rationalisations that have causal power. I argue that Collingwood endorses a form of non-psychologising internalism which rests on the view that the appropriate explanans for actions are neither empirical facts (as externalists claim), nor psychological facts (as some internalists claim), but propositional facts. I then defend this form of internalism against a range of Davidsonian objections which attempt to weaken the distinction between reasons and causes.

The aim of the paper is to present the main conceptions in the cotemporary philosophy of mind. The debate is narrated in two ways: The first approach concerns the ontology of mind, with the questions such as: What is the nature of mind?; What is the relation between mind and body?; Is the mind reducible to its physical basis? The second approach has an epistemological character where
especially the problem of self-knowledge in the frame of the discussion between externalism and internalism is pointed out. The last part of the article gives an evaluation of the actual situation in the philosophy of mind which on the one hand tries to evolve in the direction of cognitive science but on the other hand stays in the frame of the traditional philosophy. The reason of it is the nature of the questions, which cannot be answered only by means of scientific disciplines.
It means that in contrast to the cognitive science the philosophical account of the mind-body problem is the preferred one.

Keywords
Philosophy of mind, mind-body problem, externalism, internalism, cognitive sciences

This paper focuses on the conception of metaphor in linguistics (the primary theoretical niche of the Handbook of Pragmatics), and, to a lesser extent, philosophical theories of metaphor (philosophy being the first field in which metaphor came to be looked at).
In the linguistic study of metaphor as a whole, two general aspects are important: (i) types of metaphors, i.e. the recognition and classification of different categories of metaphors as linguistic expressions; and (ii) theories of metaphor, i.e. the definition and explanation of metaphor as a linguistic process. This paper focuses on the first aspect, since extensive treatments of the different ways in which metaphors can be classified are relatively rare in the literature on metaphor, while distinctions and relations between theoretical frameworks have often been highlighted (cf. below), albeit not often in a comprehensive manner.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the variation between major types of linguistic approaches to metaphor will cursorily be looked at. Section 3, which forms the greater part of this paper, discusses a number of different classifications of metaphor. After this discussion, these typologies of metaphor are placed in a larger framework explaining the variation between them (§ 4). The paper ends with a summary of a number of further issues which have come to be highlighted in relation to specific types of metaphors, or in relation to particular perspectives on the classification of metaphor types (§ 5).

It is widely assumed that Descartes's philosophy of mind is organized around three major commitments. The first is to substance dualism. The second is to individualism about mental content. The third is to a particularly strong form of the doctrine of privileged first-person ...

A familiar assumption in much linguistic semantics is that meanings are to be identified conceptually as, or as subparts of, the conceptual representations deployed in general cognitive processes. However, this assumption has increasingly come into question as a result of developments in the study of cognition both within and outside linguistics. This article reassesses the place of concept-based explanation in semantics in light of these developments,
concentrating on the explanatory power, scope and uniqueness of the conceptual hypothesis as a substantive proposal about the mental architecture supporting meaning.
It concludes that while concept-based explanations of meaning are viable for a certain class of referents, their role in a cognitively natural account of the lexicon is subject to significant but little appreciated limitations.

The aim of the paper is to present the main conceptions in the contemporary philosophy of mental (mind). The debate is narrated in two ways: The first approach concerns the ontology of mental, with the questions such as: What is the nature of mental?; What is the relation between mental and body?; Is the mental  reducible to its physical basis? The second approach has an epistemological character where especially the problem of self-knowledge in the frame of the discussion between
externalism and internalism is pointed out. The last part of the article gives an evaluation of the actual situation in the philosophy of mind which on the one hand tries to evolve in the direction of cognitive science but on the other hand stays in the frame of the traditional philosophy. The reason of it is the nature of the questions, which cannot be answered only by means of scientific disciplines.
It means that in contrast to the cognitive science the philosophical account of the mind-body problem is the preferred one.


Keywords
Philosophy of mental, (mind), mind-body problem, externalism, internalism, cognitive sciences

The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning outside the brain or mind (semantic externalism). This, I'll show, doesn't follow. Besides, the intuition itself is misconstrued here. To say the term “water” expressed a thought or concept or belief denoting H2O before its actual discovery around 1750, is to make a claim without real content and be guilty of after-the-fact rationalizing. If anything, Twin Earth undercuts the theory of semantic externalism and its core-notion of rigid designation. A pluralized, descriptivist model of reference, I claim, is a better fit for our scientific data and ordinary intuitions either way.

This thesis aims at laying the groundwork for a research program in philosophy of mind by arguing for two theoretical positions, internalism and representationalism (intentionalism), which are rarely defended jointly, but which together can form the basis for a plausible theory of the mind.

The first chapter argues for internalism against the dominant externalist view. Firstly, it is discussed what the best way is to elucidate the debate between internalism and externalism rooted in the Twin Earth thought experiment. (Putnam 1975) It is argued that the issue between internalists and externalists is whether concrete items that stand in a referential relation to mental states are among the constitutive bases of mental states. The Dry Earth thought experiment (Boghossian 1998) is introduced to make a case for internalism, relying on concepts that do not refer. Externalist counter-arguments are introduced and rejected.

The second chapter argues for representationalism/intentionalism against qualia theory. It is argued that there are no mental qualities (qualia) that account for the qualitative aspects of phenomenology. What do account for the qualitative aspects of phenomenology are apparent qualities of the intentional objects of conscious experiences, the qualities the world is represented as having by the experiences. Three sets of arguments for qualia are introduced and rejected. The first set of arguments are the type of arguments that are variants of the argument from error, which are rejected by an intentionalist analysis of mentality, and an epistemology of experience is developed where experience provides an acquaintance relation between a subject and something abstract such as a possibility. This makes it unnecessary to postulate epistemic relations both to concretely instantiated items in the environment and to mental items such as qualia or sense-data. Arguments based on allegedly non-representational states such as double vision and afterimages are shown to fail by demonstrating that such states are non-endorsed representations. Arguments that rely on spectrum inversion cases where representational content allegedly differs while qualitative phenomenology stays the same are rejected by arguing against the account of representation that underlies such arguments. (The order of the two chapters is largely arbitrary, though a rejection of externalism is useful in arguing against the argument from spectrum inversion.)

The account is completed by briefly discussing and rejecting the disjunctivist theory of perception, and some other motivations for externalism such as externalism’s advantage in providing a naturalistic account of mentality is discussed. The thesis concludes by pointing at the naturalistic prospects for an account of mentality that analyses mental states as representational states while the representational content is based neither on mental qualities like qualia, nor on causal-informational relations to environmental items. I further speculate about the role of powers and dispositions of organisms that might underpin a future naturalistic analysis of mentality, and also consider the plausibility of a mysterian account of mind where the special mystery regarding the explanatory gap about consciousness is downgraded by suggesting that explanatory gaps might be widespread in nature, such as in our failure to logically link qualities like color and sound as we experience them to the lower-level physical phenomena they supervene on.

The challenge of handling fictional discourse is to find the best way to resolve the apparent inconsistencies in our ways of speaking about fiction. A promising approach is to take at least some such discourse to involve pretense, but does all fictional discourse involve pretense? I will argue that a better, less revisionary, solution is to take internal and fictionalizing discourse to involve pretense, while allowing that in external critical discourse, fictional names are used seriously to refer to fictional characters. I then address two objections to such realist theories of fiction: One, that they can't adequately account for the truth of singular nonexistence claims involving fictional names, and two, that accepting that there are fictional characters to which we refer is implausible or ontologically profligate.

Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus to choose to believe. I show that the arguments that have been offered against doxastic voluntarism fail; and that, if the denial of doxastic voluntarism is part of a strategy to defeat scepticism, it is inept, because knowledge presupposes doubt.

Research Articles
Mark J. BOONE, Inferential, Coherential, and Foundational Warrant: An Eclectic Account of the Sources of Warrant
T. Ryan BYERLY, A Dispositional Internalist Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology
Tjerk GAUDERIS, On Theoretical and Practical Doxastic Attitudes
Patrizio LO PRESTI, Moore’s Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Discussion Notes/Debate
Giovanni MION, Grueing Gettier

¿Fue realmente la necesidad de responder a los retos del escepticismo –y, en concreto, del escepticismo de Montaigne– lo que incitó a Descartes a formular el argumento del cogito? Este artículo defiende una respuesta negativa, pues no fue la herencia del escepticismo sino la del estoicismo clásico, también revitalizado en el Renacimiento, lo que fue determinante en el surgimiento del internalismo epistémico moderno.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Montaigne, Descartes, Epicteto, escepticismo, estocismo, internalismo epistémico moderno.

Was Descartes’ Cogito argument an answer to the challenges of Scepticism and, in in particular, to Montaigne’s version of it? This paper claims that the answer to this question should be negative, since it was not the influence of Scepticism, but the one of classic Stoicism –a trend that was also retrieved in the Renaissance– the one that had the main role in the rise of modern epistemic internalism.

KEYWORDS: Montaigne, Descartes, Epictetus, Scepticism, Stoicism, modern epistemic internalism.

This paper examines the relationship between the KK principle and the epistemological theses of externalism and internalism. In particular we examine arguments from Okasha (Analysis 73(1):80–86, 2013) and Greco (J Philos 111(4):169–197, 2014) which deny that we can derive the denial of the KK principle from externalism.

Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed critically.

The main aim of the conference is to present the new approaches to the problem of consciousness and rationality and to provide an effective dialog between disciplines and the different fields of philosophy, which can be fruitful for the solving of general problems of cognition. There are many reasons why the question of the conjunction between self-consciousness and rationality is important. The main and general is the problem of the compatibility between thoughts and acts. Still the following questions need to be answered: Is there a relationship between pre-reflectivity and rational thinking? Is phenomenal subjectivity non-representational? How is pre-reflectivity to implement in cognitive-architecture? Does phenomenal consciousness have a priority over other mental states and actions? The notions of consciousness and rationality have their own long philosophical history of use. That is why the conference will start with the block of presentations devoted to the question of the problem of consciousness and rationality in the light of the classic philosophical theories especially with reference to modern philosophy. In the following blocks the core of presentations will be shifted to contemporary conceptions combining philosophy and cognitive science.

Bu makalede çağdaş epistemolojide gerekçelendirmeye ilişkin bir yaklaşım olarak ortaya  konulan içselciliğin ana savları ve epistemik sorumluluk anlayışı ele alınacaktır. Temel olarak  epistemik gerekçelendirme sorununa ilişkin içselci yaklaşımın açımlanması ve bu anlayışın  epistemik sorumluluk düşüncesiyle uyuşan içeriminin gösterilmesi hedeflenmektedir. Bu  çerçevede gerekçelendirmeye ilişkin deontolojik yaklaşımın yardımıyla epistemik  sorumluluğun önemi ortaya konulmaktadır. Sonuç olarak epistemik sorumluluk söz konusu  olmadığı takdirde, inançların gerekçelendirilmesi eksik kalmış olarak görülmektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İçselcilik, deontolojik gerekçelendirme, epistemik sorumluluk,  bağdaşımcılık

In this paper, main tenets of internalism about justification and related conception of  epistemic responsibility will be examined. The main goal is to explicate the internalist  account on the problem of epistemic justification and to show the compatible position of this  account with the idea of epistemic responsibility. Within this framework, it is intended to  present the significance of epistemic responsibility by the help of the deontological  conception of justification. It is concluded that, without the requirement of epistemic  responsibility, justification of beliefs wil be a defective activity. 
Key Words: Internalism, deontological justification, epistemic responsibility, coherentism

Within the current philosophical landscape surrounding consciousness and mind, certain figures would have us reinterpret Sartre's early philosophy in order to locate an enduring insight relevant to contemporary academic discourse. Such a project, however, inherently involves the age-old problem of pre-reflective consciousness as regards the foundation of consciously mental states. This chapter lays out logical and diachronic groundwork for an attempted turn towards early Sartre, locates Sartre's position and import within this framework, and seeks to offer yet another open-ended question to the productive interchange among both American and European philosophers of mind which a return to the early Sartre has recently come to inspire.

The paper seeks to answer the question about the proper subject matter of the internalist-externalist debate over justification in contemporary analytic epistemology. It argues that both sides of the debate are talking about the same matter, but from different perspectives: internalism gives an account of justification from the first person perspective, and externalism from the third person perspective. The paper shows also that both sides might be a matter of degree with respect to the three dimensions of justification (i.e. grounds for justification, adequacy of grounds, and the relation between belief and its ground), and, accordingly, it tries to offer a systematic order to the debate according to these three dimensions of justification.

Semantic internalism is the view that linguistic meaning amounts to forms of conceptual instructions, and that the process of forming linguistic representations does not involve reference to extra-mental entities. Contemporary philosophy of language remains predominantly externalist in focus, having developed systems of extensional reference which depart from classical rationalist assumptions. I will defend semantic internalism using a broad range of case studies, accruing what I see at the most convincing arguments in its favour. Particular focus will be placed on exemplar cases such as natural kind and artifactual terms. Copredication via inherent polysemy will be used as a strong source of evidence for internalism, countering the received view of the externalist character of meaning. Overall, my aim is to comprehensively defend internalism against its critics and to push the exploration of linguistic content and meaning "back into the brain".

In the following I discuss the debate between epistemological internalists and externalists from an unfamiliar meta-epistemological perspective. In doing so, I focus on the question of whether rationality is best captured in externalist or internalist terms. Using a conception of epistemic judgments as “doxastic plans,” I characterize one important subspecies of judgments about epistemic rationality—focusing on the distinctive rational/functional role these judgments play in regulating how we form beliefs. Then I show why any judgment that plays this role should be expected to behave the manner internalists predict. In this way, I argue, we can explain why our basic toolbox for epistemic evaluation includes an internalist conception of rationality.

Una prima versione di questo articolo è stata pubblicata in inglese in «Acta Philosophica», XVII, 2008, pp. 145-61. La disputa su internismo ed esternismo, uno dei temi maggiormente dibattuti nell’ambito dell’epistemologia contemporanea1, riguarda la terza condizione della definizione di «conoscenza», cioè la giustificazione, o ciò che rende una credenza vera una conoscenza. Lo scopo di questo articoloè di prendere in considerazione le posizioni degli internisti e degli esternisti, in modo da stabilire se, quando avanzano argomenti relativi alla giustificazione, essi parlino della stessa cosa.
Sosterrò che essi parlano davvero della stessa cosa, ma da punti di vista differenti: in particolare, l’internismo cerca di spiegare la giustificazione dal punto di vista della prima persona, mentre l’esternismo si colloca in una prospettiva di terza persona. La distinzione fra internismo ed esternismo rinvia anche al significato consueto di «interno» come «conoscibile per via introspettiva». Ma le ambiguità della disputa derivano dal fatto che i modi in cui le due prospettive rappresentano le tre dimensioni della giustificazione (vale a dire, i modi in cui affrontano la questione del fondamento della giustificazione, la questione dell’adeguatezza delle ragioni fondanti e la questione della relazione fra una credenza e la ragione su cui si basa) sono molteplici e presentano tra di loro differenze di grado: si può essere internisti (o esternisti) relativamente a una sola, a due o a tutte tre queste questioni. A mio avviso queste distinzioni permettono di evitare confusioni tra teorie della giustificazione parzialmente internistiche e teorie della giustificazione parzialmente esternistiche.
Per raggiungere lo scopo che mi sono prefissato, analizzerò i due corni della controversia e presenterò gli argomenti a favore e contro di essi. Nel corso dell’esposizione, porrò una certa enfasi sui due diversi punti di vista da cui si può considerare la disputa: la prima persona e la terza persona. E alla fine, tracciando una distinzione tra i tre aspetti che caratterizzano la giustificazione, cercherò di fornire una sistematizzazione dei termini in cui si svolge il dibattito.