Kantian aesthetics

I look closely at one passage of the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche discusses Kant’s doctrine that the judgement of taste is disinterestedness. I separate Kant's view that the judgement of taste claims universal validity from Kant’s view that the judgement of taste should be impersonal and impartial. I then argue that Nietzsche has an interesting critique of the impersonal and impartial aspect of Kant’s disinterestedness doctrine, as opposed to claim to the universal validity of the judgement of taste. For Kant, the judgement of taste rests on something universal in human nature. So correct judgements of taste, like moral virtue, are available to all. Nietzsche disputes this democratic view. I highlight the distance between Nietzsche's critique and the much less interesting and less plausible views of various relativists, Marxists and feminists who have thought that Kant’s view that the judgement of taste claims universal validity is faulty. But for Nietzsche, this is unproblematic. I then address Nietzsche remarks about erotic beauty, which he contrasts with the pure pleasure in beauty. I show how Nietzsche’s is not criticizing Kant’s account of the pure judgment of taste. He thinks that Kant is right that such pleasures are actual and possible. (Nietzsche is no proto-Freudian.) Nietzsche’s point, however, is to question the Kantian value judgment, which ranks the pure disinterested pleasures above impure interested erotic pleasures. I connect the two themes since, I conjecture, the latter pleasure are the ecstatic pleasures of passionate noble souls who have access to higher beauty. On both these point, Nietzsche poses a profound challenge to Kant.

'Fine art' is a living phenomenon determined by the purposiveness of nature. 'Fine art' [schöne Kunst] contains a determination that arranges itself in accordance with the purposiveness of nature in Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) philosophy. This implies that 'fine art' is a living phenomenon, having a life of its own beyond its initial creation. In the Critique of Judgement 1790, Kant states that our aesthetic appreciation lies in the faculty of reflective judgment. What Kant incorporates into the third critique is that reflective judgment allows for the creation of new meaning in the face of the beautiful, the sublime, and 'fine art'. This paper will start by examining how Kant had previously set up the regulative ideal in his architectonic system which runs throughout his late philosophy. The purpose of this paper will be to show how Kant brings about a genuine unity between freedom and nature. This unity allows for the requisites for 'fine art' to synthesis with the purposiveness of nature. Kant extends this regulative in the third critique to show how judgment allows for new concepts that were previously unconceived by the understanding. In analysis of the requisites for 'fine art', we will discover how rules of reason harmonise and evolve through genius to originality.

"Paul Crowther, in his book, The Kantian Sublime (1989), works to reconstruct Kant's aesthetics in order to make its continued relevance to contemporary aesthetic concerns more visible. The present article remains within the area of Crowther's 'cognitive' sublime, to show that there is much space for expanding upon Kantian varieties of the sublime, particularly in art."
Published in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants: Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses [Right and Peace in Kant's Philosophy: Proceedings of the 10th International Kant Congress] 5 vols., ed. Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, and Guido A. de Almeida (Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), Vol. 3, pp. 565-576."

This article attempts to find common ground between Plato and Kant on the topic of beauty and aesthetic contemplation. The Kantian notion of “liking devoid of interest” is interpreted in such a way that it can be brought into harmony with two Platonic accounts of beauty found in the Symposium and the Hippias Major. I argue that both thinkers do justice to the relationship between desire and beauty, while also both asserting that the proper appreciation of beauty per se—whether in an object or as an essence—requires a disinterested stance.

FROM THE BACK COVER: What is the essential nature of meaning? . . . . . This book answers by examining interpretive theories from the past and present. It finds that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation, a struggle that reaches crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand, this crisis is mollified by Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology, which argues that we are always already in a meaningful relationship to the objects of the world. On the other hand, this crisis is exacerbated when phenomenology, structuralism, and aesthetic theory directly make meaning into an object of study. . . . . . . . . These historical developments culminate with the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, whose non-hermeneutical phenomenology delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity. Intriguingly, Lacan's work reveals meaning to be sexual in nature. By integrating his notion of sexual difference with his work in discourse theory and topology, this book demonstrates how the subject's struggle with meaning can be suspended.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GENERAL DESCRIPTION: Broadly speaking, the majority of books on Jacques Lacan focus on the earlier periods of his career. They also tend to target the psychoanalytic clinical community, or else discuss his work in various political, social, and cultural contexts. But in almost all cases these books refrain from a detailed exegesis of his actual texts. They instead prefer to comment on his theoretical apparatus as a whole before turning to its practical implications. . . . . . This book positions itself against this grain. Firstly, it closely analyzes some half-dozen key Lacanian texts. This analysis is organized under a single thematic – the question of meaning – in order to advance the reader's understanding of the trajectory of Lacan's thought across his entire career, as well as to promote the book's thesis that the field of meaning can be suspended. Accordingly, an initial chapter takes up the hermeneutical tradition from Flacius onward. This is then supplemented by a chapter which surveys phenomenological, structuralist and aesthetic theories of meaning and their differing methods of textual analysis. Together these two chapters provide a unique context for the sustained analysis of Lacan's texts which begins in the third chapter, an analysis that forms the bulk of the book's content. This contextualization potentially widens the book's appeal to any scholar wishing to explore his relationship to those textual objects he interacts with on a daily basis. And because this book assumes the reader has little to no familiarity with Lacan, the reader will find patient explanations of the basics of his theories before slowly being led up to the more difficult theories of his late years. Again the argument is that Lacan has something to offer all scholars. His work is not just reserved for psychoanalysts. . . . . . It is with his late theories that the serious student of Lacan will find the book's most original contribution. For in the fourth chapter a detailed account is provided of how Lacan derived his infamous formulae of sexuation from Aristotelian logic. These formulae are then extensively discussed against the backdrop of interpretive theory and textual analysis, showing how these formulae capture much more than just the difference between the sexes. Strikingly, this difference is also found to run through meaning itself, something the final chapter aims to demonstrate. It does this by amalgamating three key components of late-Lacan: sexuation, discourse theory and his use of topological spaces. This amalgamation is a first in the literature. But this amalgamation is not just useful in demonstrating the book's thesis. It further suggests how seemingly divergent aspects of late-Lacanian theory can be made to work together.

"ABSTRACT:
    This study assumes the subject's pursuit of meaning is generally incapacitating and should be suspended. It aims to demonstrate how such a suspension is theoretically accomplished by utilizing Lacan's formulae of sexuation integrated with his work in discourse theory and topology.
    Part I places this study into context by examining scholarship from the established fields of hermeneutics, phenomenology, (post)structuralism, aesthetic theory and psychoanalysis in order to extract out their respective theory of meaning. These theories reveal that an historical struggle with meaning has been underway since the Reformation and reaches near crisis proportions in the 20th century. On the one hand this crisis is mollified by the rise of Heideggerian-Gadamerian hermeneutical phenomenology which questions traditional epistemological approaches to the text using a new ontological conceptualization of meaning and a conscious rejection of methodology. On the other hand this crisis is exacerbated when the ubiquitous nature of meaning is itself challenged by (post)structuralism's discovery of the signifier which inscribes a limit to meaning, and by the domains of sense and nonsense newly opened up by aesthetic theory. These historical developments culminate in the field of psychoanalysis which most consequentially delimits a cause of meaning said to be closely linked to the core of subjectivity.
    Part II extends these findings by rigorously constructing out of the Lacanian sexuated formulae a decidedly non-hermeneutical phenomenological approach useful in demonstrating the sexual nature of meaning. Explicated in their static state by way of an account of their original derivation from the Aristotelian logical square, it is argued that these four formulae are relevant to basic concerns of textual theory inclusive of the hermeneutical circle of meaning. These formulae are then set into motion by integrating them with Lacan's four discourses to demonstrate the breakdown of meaning. Finally, the cuts and sutures of two-dimensional space that is topology as set down in L'étourdit are performed to confirm how the very field of meaning is ultimately suspended from a nonsensical singular point known in Lacanian psychoanalysis as objet a. The contention is that by occupying this point the subject frees himself from the debilitating grip of meaning."

This thesis considers the status of Deleuze as a Kantian, and as such committed both to the critical destiny of philosophy, and the contestation of the sense of this destiny. The focus of Deleuze's reading of Kant is an active conception of thought: the fundamental elements of thought are will and value rather than being or the concept. In the development of this idea we can note a progressive 'tapering' of the foundational instance of thought, in three stages: from the speculative field of being to the practical field of reason; from the intellectual category of the concept to the problematic category of the Idea; from the teleological notion of the organism to the aesthetic notion of the singular. Within each stage we can perceive a polemic between the two terms: it is in each case a question of the 'sufficient reason' of thought, its conditions of the actuality beyond its possibility. The highest expression of our reason, for Kant, is neither theoretical nor utilitarian, but moral: the realisation of our lawful freedom. For Deleuze, on the other hand, the ultimate secret of our freedom and thus all of our thought is to be found rather in the realm of the aesthetic.

There are two fields of artistry that Riegl has exhaustively studied and implemented in his visual grammar: the ornament and the art industry. Both are equally representative of the Kunstwollen of an age, to be understood as its “visual regime” . Both are comparable to Kant’s free and adherent beauty. Offering an equal status to ornament and art industry, Riegl blurs the line between accepted high forms of art and artisan creations. The formal attributes of free and adherent beauty display the characteristics of a style.

The power of judgment, to which Kant dedicated his third Critique, is not only a particular field of inquiry (dealing with knowledge, aesthetics, teleology), but also the place where crucial issues of Kant’s thought are located.
 
The standpoint of the power of judgment moves Kant's philosophy beyond the categorical foundation of the Critique of Pure Reason, towards a deeper understanding of the transcendental horizon enabling the emergence of pre-predicative experience, the dimension of inter-subjectivity, the singularity of the beeings.
 
This study – by pointing out that Kant’s ontology is far from being “pre-linguistic” – runs through the key moments of the in-depth inquiry into transcendental philosophy the power of judgment’s standpoint demands (even before the third Critique).

In this context, the book takes on several key points: Kant’s theory of existence as Position, the different conceptions of “reflection”, the transcendental ideal, the foundation of the principle of formal purposiveness, aesthetic experience and its “object”, the theories of language and symbol, the peculiar reference to the supersensible.

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La facoltà di giudizio, alla quale Kant ha dedicato la sua terza Critica, non è solo un tema d'indagine particolare (che coinvolge conoscenza, estetica, teleologia), ma il luogo di problemi cruciali della riflessione kantiana.

La prospettiva del Giudizio spinge la filosofia di Kant al di là della fondazione categoriale della Critica della ragion pura, verso una dimensione più profonda dell'orizzonte trascendentale, nella quale emergono esperienza antepredicativa, intersoggettività, singolarità dell'ente.

Questo studio - precisando il carattere tutt'altro che «prelinguistico» della ontologia kantiana – ripercorre i momenti principali dell'approfondimento che il punto di vista del Giudizio impone (già prima della omonima Critica) alla filosofia trascendentale.

Vengono analizzati in quest'ambito alcuni punti nodali, quali la teoria dell'esistenza come Position, i diversi concetti di riflessione, l'ideale trascendentale, la fondazione del principio di finalità formale, l'esperienza estetica e il suo «oggetto», le teorie del linguaggio e del simbolo, il rinvio peculiare al sovrasensibile.

This dissertation considers the experience of reflection presented in Kant‟s work in many subjective aspects. Thus it aims to recognize in contemporary art debate the topicality of the feelings of reflection, which consists in one of the most puzzling notions proposed by Kant.
Initially we have made the following questions: how the concept of reflection appears in The Critique of Judgment? Is it possible to submit the contemporary art to a dialogue with Kant´s concept of reflection? Lastly, the required updating of Kantian aesthetics would bring some
support to contemporary art? These questions were the starting point of this research, which the main goal consists of extending the concept of reflextion in The Critique of Judgment to the contemporary art production, identifying the conditions of possibility of an autonomous
aesthetics. We conclude that both universalist thesis and power of reflection (Kant´s aesthetic fundamental concept) are not obsolete. At least, what we want to bring up for discussion answers that they enable us to a complete and authentic reception of the contemporary art.

The following paper is an extract of my master Thesis entitled “The Kantian Sublime. Among Aesthetics, Ethics and Anthropology”.
The sample I offer highlights the sublime of the Critique of the Power of Judgement not only as a feeling, but mostly as a feeling of spirit, making a comparison with the feeling of life, that is rather accounted for by the beauty. In showing the main features of these two kinds of feelings, on my account, is argued that the feeling of spirit triggered by the sublime works as transcendental awareness of the subject, making it aware of its supersensible ground more than what is carried out by the beauty.

Características principales de la ética en Kant; su teoría estética frente el surrealismo. Introducción ¿Qué es la estética Kantiana? y ¿Qué es el surrealismo?, como es que estos dos movimientos pudie-ron verse inmersos en una confrontación de ideas y definiciones, y que influencia pudo tener la es-tética kantiana, un concepto estético que tuvo lugar alrededor de 1790 como disciplina de la filoso-fía con la " Critica al Juicio " y que aun así fue aceptada durante muchos años por los artistas en desarrollo durante esa época. La gran teoría de la belleza que imperó alrededor de dos mil años de historia de Occidente y parte de Oriente, fue cuestionada varias veces sobre su naturaleza objetiva, numérica, eterna e inmutable, pero en el siglo XVIII las críticas eran tan duras y continuas que provocaron una crisis. Muchos fi-lósofos e intelectuales escribieron sobre la naturaleza subjetiva de la belleza, entre ellos Hume y Smith. La belleza no consistía en ningún tipo especial de proporción o disposición de sus partes "La belleza no es ninguna cualidad de las cosas en sí mismas, existe en la mente de quien las contempla y cada mente percibe una belleza diferente " (Hume) y aunque yo habría estado de acuerdo con Hume, hasta ese momento toda había consistido en averiguar que propiedades del objeto determi-naban la belleza. Al finalizar el siglo todo pensamiento se cristalizó con Immanuel Kant y su " Criti-ca del Juicio " sacando aquella discusión de la belleza del terreno de la lógica. En su trilogía de críti-cas Kant separa los campos de la filosofía y en resumidas palabras establece que la discusión de la belleza no pertenece a la dimensión de la lógica ni a la ética, desde su punto de vista la razón tiene poco que ver con la percepción de la belleza. Pero, ¿Que implicaciones puede tener este pensamien-to? muchas, en todo sentido. Primero sobre el mismo concepto de belleza, ahora ya no preocupa si el arte es perfecto porque ya no se puede juzgar con criterios matemáticos o racionales. Ahora el arte se juzga por el impacto que ejerce sobre el espectador seguido de algunas reglas acerca del arte que en lo personal me incomodan, siendo el surrealismo un movimiento que pienso en cierto punto habría fungido en contraparte incluso si hubiera sido desarrollado o no en el mismo siglo. Este tra-bajo busca centrarse en las influencias que pudo tener la estética kantiana en el surrealismo, no solo en el ámbito artístico y si no también en la ética de los productores, realizar un acercamiento a estos dos movimientos y proponer el desacuerdo en el que se pudieron encontrar los artistas, principal-mente del surrealismo, como Leonora Carrington. Kant, la critica del juicio y la estética kantiana. Quiero comenzar hablando un poco sobre Immanuel Kant para luego proseguir con la estética kan-tiana. Immanuel Kant nace en Königsberg, el 22 de abril de 1724, en el seno de una familia de arte-sanos. Era el cuarto de once hijos. En 1790 aparece la " Critica del Juicio " como parte de una trilo-gía de críticas, barroco en su estilo, alcanza a dar a algunos de sus pasajes una fuerza literaria que todavía hoy admiramos. Es considerado uno de los filósofos más importantes de la modernidad y es un gran representante del idealismo alemán. La critica del juicio es una obra fundamental en la his-toria del arte como plantea Marina Silenzi, ya que en esta Kant desarrolla las dos categorías que marcan una gran división y a las que consideramos estética kantiana. La categoría de lo bello pre-domina en el paradigma clásico; una mera mimesis de lo real en la composición de la obra. La esté-tica kantiana nos sitúa en la superación de la representación mimética de la realidad, si bien esto podría sonar en pro al surrealismo mas adelante descubriremos algunas contraposiciones.

Kantçı “Aesthesis”in Sınırlarına Bir Eleştiri Olarak Maleviç’in
Süprematizmi
Kant (1724-1804) “aesthesis” kavramını Yunanca aslına, “algılamak” anlamına geri taşır ve bu kavramı insanın evren ve bilme karşısında temel konumunu belirleyen bir kavram olarak kullanır. Kant argümanının kaynaklarını Newtoncu evren anlayışından alır ve insanın bilme yetisini “aesthesis”in koşullarıyla, yani yer-merkezli, Newtoncu, Eukleidesçi zaman ve uzam kavrayışı ile sınırlandırır. Maleviç’in süprematizmi ise onun,
Eukleides-dışı geometrilere dayanan kendi evren, yani zaman ve uzam anlayışını yansıtır ve “aesthesis”in sınırlarını aşarak, yani Kantçı sınırları aşarak bilmenin bir yolu olarak düşünülebilecek olan “saf-duyum” kavramını temel alır. Şu halde onun süprematist resimleri ve manifestoları, Kant’ın insanın evrendeki bilme potansiyelini duyusal algısıyla, “aesthesis”in koşulları ile sınırlandıran bakış açısının bir eleştirisi, onu bir değilleme girişimi olarak değerlendirilebilir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Kantçı uzay-zaman, Eukleides-dışı geometri, süprematizm, dört boyutlu gerçeklik, projektif geometri.

Suprematism as a Critique of the Borders of Kantian ‘Aesthesis’

Kant takes the term “aesthesis” back to the original meaning in Greek, which means “to
perceive”. He uses it as a concept, which determines the position of human being against the universe and the act of knowing. He takes origins of his argument from Newtonian conception of universe and he limits man’s ability to know, with the conditions of “aesthesis”, in other words with the geo-centric, Newtonian, Euclidean conception of time and space. Malevich’s suprematism mirrors his own conception of universe, i.e. time and space, and bases on Noneuclidean geometries and on the concept of “pure –sensation”, which can be thought as a way to know beyond limits of aesthesis, which is beyond Kantian limits. So his suprematist paintings and manifests can be evaluated as a critique of Kantian point of view, which limits potentiality of human being in universe with his sense-perception, with the conditions of aesthesis.

Keywords:  Kantian time- space, non-euclidean geometry, Suprematism, four dimensional
reality, projective geometry

That Kant defines aesthetic experience as the aesthetic judgement of taste is a fact, which deserves more attention than is perhaps given. In so doing, Kant grants beauty the same transcendental structure as pertains all possible experience: the working together of the three powers of cognition, the faculties of sensibility, imagination and understanding, under the auspices of reason, within the one unified subject. To do otherwise would imply that aesthetic experience is different to experience in general, functioning outside the structure that makes experience possible. It would mean making a claim not to be made lightly, that aesthetic experience would not be an experience as such.

Which is precisely the claim Deleuze makes in his short essay “To Be Done with Judgement.”  The essay is a continuation of Deleuze’s well-known critique of representation, but in this specific case from the point of view of the doctrine of judgement. Surrounding himself by what he considers to be the four disciples of Spinoza – Nietzsche, Lawrence, Kafka and Artaud – in “To Be Done with Judgement” Deleuze offers a genetically constructed alternative to the doctrine of judgement, outlining the beginnings of an ethical aesthetics, which in contrast to the rigid structure of Kant’s transcendental philosophy would be based in an affective system of forces.

But what does this mean for us practically speaking? Leaving aside the problems Deleuze’s genetically constructed account might hold for philosophy, what does it mean to experience something without recourse to representation, to encounter a body as affect? What does it demand from us, to let go of the predetermination afforded by the doctrine of judgement in order to pursue an affective relationship with the world? What kind of life would this be? What kind of person could live this life? And where does this leave aesthetics, art and artists?

This paper presents a philosophical approach to the semiotics of lawin terms of an exercise in symbolic transposition whereby aesthetic categories arebrought to bear on jurisprudence, and inparticular on two of its foundational questions. These questions, the backdrop against which the analysis unfolds, ask (1)whether law is static or dynamic; and (2)whether law `constitutes' human beings, in some specific sense, or whether the reverse holds. The notions of universality and necessity andthat of utopia are employed together with twoopposite art symbols and a model of their antitheses is constructed revealing diverse answers as to how to conceive law in relation to the two questions. One answer is singled outby adopting the principles of Kantian aesthetic(reflective) judgement: to elicit an aestheticclaim, law must be seen as a utopian socialorder exhibiting purposiveness without, however, presupposing any predetermined substantive normative end. This is effected by a special reading permitting the combination o fnecessitation (obligation) with free play – this being the common ground shared by both law andaesthetics but only in this limiting utopian moment. This is a unique sense in which legal discourse is formally assimilated to aestheticnon-purposive judgements yet without relinquishing law's distinctive feature aspurposive order prescribing, however, prescription alone as a formal end.

The many permutations of modern art can be viewed as strategies to cope with the threat of obsolescence. The threat from the industrialisation of method and materials challenged painting’s claim to social utility as constructor of resemblances. Consequently, painting changed its "regulations", and was followed by a challenge to the definition of “art”. The readymade was one such strategy. It copes with these threats by completely upturning any ordinarily intuitive idea of aesthetic judgement. This is the challenge to the “retinal” or “physical” aspects of art. Whilst this has great intellectual significance, Duchamp, as its flagbearer, still owes much to the “retinal” in his conceptual steps. This amounts to a crossover with Kantian aesthetics. A history of the readymade will be given, with mention to Dada's two primary schools. It will be argued that a Kantian or "objective" aesthetics is able to accommodate the readymade without the need for Thierry de Duve's "Duchampian substitution". It is suggested that the substantive leap from readymade to “art” is unnecessary and this does not harm the importance of Duchamp's work. This will be investigated with respect to two of Duchamp’s works: In Advance of the Broken Arm (1915) and Trébuchet (1917).

Umjetničko stvaranje: od Kantova genija do suvremenih kognitivnih znanosti i umjetničkih praksi Sažetak Kant je svojom tezom o geniju koji ne zna odakle mu ideje i kako dolazi do njegova stva-ralaštva ostavio neizbrisiv trag na promišljanje o umjetnosti i umjetničkome stvaranju, in-zistirajući na stavu da ono predstavlja jedinstveni čin za kojega je zaslužan prirodni dar i stoga je specifičan isključivo u domeni umjetnosti, nikako u domeni znanosti. Iako danas znamo da je to pogrešno, mnoge njegove postavke potkrijepljene su suvremenim teorijama kognitivnih znanosti, ali i samim umjetničkim praksama. U ovom će se radu analizirati Kantova teorija lijepe umjetnosti i umjetničkoga stvaranja iz konteksta suvremenih istraži-vanja o kreativnosti i talentu te pritom pokazati koliko je njegova teorija o lijepoj umjetnosti i umjetničkome stvaranju eksplanatorno bogata, posebno za razumijevanje i promišljanje umjetničkoga stvaranja, umjetničke recepcije i umjetničkih praksi. Ključne riječi genij, Immanuel Kant, kreativnost, umjetnost, umjetničke prakse Genij i umjetničko stvaranje: Kantova teorija* »Kada sam u potpunosti sam, ili noću, kada mi san izmiče, tada se moje ideje gomilaju slobodno i u najvećem broju. Odakle i kako dolaze, to ne mogu reći, niti ih mogu prizvati (…). U svojoj imaginaciji ja ne čujem odvojene dionice, već ih čujem sve zajedno, istovremeno!« 1 Kantova teorija umjetničkoga stvaranja sačinjava relativno sažet dio njegove treće Kritike (okvirno, odlomke 43-54) no unatoč takvoj konciznosti, izuzet * Ranija verzija ovoga rada predstavljena je na simpoziju Filozofija i stvaralaštvo u organ izaciji Hrvatskog filozofskog društva (prosi nac 2018.). Velika hvala publici na izuzetno zanimljivoj raspravi, a hvala i recenzentima časopisima na njihovim nadasve vrijednim komentarima. Rad je financiralo Sveučilište u Rijeci putem projekta 17.05.2.2.05 Knji-ževnost kao domena etičnosti i sufinanciralo putem projekta unirihuman18239. 1 Joan Baranow, David Watts (ur.), Tell me Again: Poetry and Prose from The Healing Art of Writing, University of California Medi cal Humanities Press, 2012., str. 194. Ovaj se citat pripisuje Mozartu koji je navodno u jednome od svojih pisama tako opisao svoje umjetničko djelovanje. No postoje i stajališta po kojima je riječ o krivotvorinama i Mozart nije na ovaj način tumačio svoje stvaralaštvo. Zahvaljujem Luki Perušiću koji mi je uka zao na ovu zanimljivu činjenicu. U ovome radu neću se baviti pitanjem originalnosti ci tata, a citat ostavljam kao ilustrativni primjer umjetničkoga stvaranja koje preplavljuje genija bez da on pritom ima spoznaju o tome kako je takvo stvaranje moguće i odakle ono dolazi.

The Kantian judgment of taste famously claims necessary universality. To ground this claim, Kant introduces the sensus communis. Moreover, the sensus communis is also supposed to solve a certain paradox consisting of non-conceptuality and necessary universality. However, how exactly it can serve these functions is unclear and highly disputed. In this article, I will suggest that the sensus communis should be interpreted in analogy to the categories and the principles of pure reason: Including the disposition for a cognition in general, the sensus communis has a kind of a priori and transcendental status. Moreover, it functions as the major premise in a quasi-syllogism whose minor premise is the pleasure being felt and whose conclusion is the judgment of taste. This is only a felt syllogism or quasi-syllogism because its premises are non-conceptual.

The notion of the ordinary or everyday is of seminal importance in Cavell’s readings of literature. The transcendental and anthropological dimensions of skepticism and the ordinary, however, may sometimes appear to be treated by him in an essentially ahistorical manner. But the discovery of the ordinary, which is always a re-discovery, can also be shown to be deeply embedded in Cavell’s treatment of modernism in the arts. The present essay therefore proposes that we can deepen our understanding of the ordinary by relating it to Walter Benjamin’s ideas about the “loss of aura,” which he develops with regard to Baudelaire, Proust and film, most famously in his essays about “The Artwork in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproducibility” and on “Some Motifs in Baudelaire.”

I try to interpret the notion of "scientific cognitivism" that can be found in Allen Carlson's works. I argue first that, contrary to Carlson's view, scientific knowledge does not play a necessary role in the aesthetic appreciation of nature but may even be detrimental to it. Mark Twain's aesthetic experience from the perspective of a practical level is exemplary. I argue scientific cognitivism has no plausibility in the appreciation of nature. I then analyze an inappropriate sense of scientific cognitivism in the aesthetic appreciation of nature on a theoretical level, including Kant's theory and other environmental philosophers such as Hepburn, Zangwill, and Berleant. In conclusion, I claim that scientific cognitivism enables inappropriate aesthetic appreciations of nature.

RESUMEN: El presente trabajo tiene por propósito analizar las funciones de las ideas de la razón pura, centrándose en el tratamiento que recibe esta temática en el Apéndice que cierra la Dialéctica trascendental de la Crítica de la razón pura. En particular, se aborda la función sistematizadora de las ideas y el problema del uso hipotético o regulativo de las mismas, así como el vínculo entre ambas funciones. Se mostrará cómo la búsqueda de la unidad sistemática por parte de la razón posibilita el uso coherente del entendimiento, y cómo las ideas, a modo de focus imaginarius, orientan al enten-dimiento y ensanchan el conocimiento y el ámbito de la experiencia dada desde fuera del campo del conocimiento empírico posible. PALABRAS CLAVE: ideas; unidad sistemática; uso regulativo; totalidad absoluta; focus imaginarius. The functions of the ideas of pure reason ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the functions of the ideas of pure reason, focusing on this treatment of this subject in the Appendix that concludes the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, it addresses the systematizing function of the ideas and the problem of their hypothetical or regulative use, as well as the link between both functions. It will present how the reason's search for systematic unity makes possible the coherent use of the understanding, and how ideas, as focus imagarius, guide the understanding and widen the knowledge and the scope of the experience given from the outside of the possible empirical knowledge. KEY WORDS: ideas; systematic unity; regulative use; absolute totality; focus imaginarius. introducción Kant cierra la Dialéctica trascendental de la Crítica de la razón pura con un apéndice que se divide en dos apartados, el primero de los cuales se titula «Del uso regulativo de las ideas de la razón pura». Como han hecho notar algunos autores, este apéndice dista mucho de ser un mero añadido o desarrollo marginal. En efecto, en él se plantean cuestiones fundamentales relativas al estatus epistémico de las ideas de la razón pura y de sus principios, así como al imprescindible uso válido de aquellas, de manera que más bien constituye la culminación de la Dialéctica y la realización de su propósito más significativo 1. 1 Extremando y simplificando un poco las posturas de los especialistas con respecto al valor de este Apéndice, podríamos decir que se reducen a dos: o bien ven en el Apéndice el verdadero cumplimiento de la tarea crítica de la razón, o bien ven en él la apertura hacia la Crítica del juicio, por cuanto sólo en esta última se completaría y se resolvería el planteamiento kantiano en lo referente al papel sistematizador de la razón por medio de la determinación y distinción de la facultad del juicio. En cualquier caso, también los que sostienen esta segunda postura reconocerían en el Apéndice el planteamiento decisivo de la Dialéctica y la culminación de su propósito al menos dentro de los límites de la primera

In § 38 of the third Critique, Kant provides a deduction for judgments of taste that purports to ground the universal validity of aesthetic judgments. The deduction is remarkably brief and—if Kant’s own evaluation can be trusted—relatively “easy.” Recently, some have worried that Kant’s deduction may be rather too easy, suggesting that it is not sufficient to prove that particular objects must always produce the same response in those who encounter them (sometimes called the “particularity problem”). In this essay, I argue that Kant’s deduction is sufficient on its own, that is, valid without appeal to any premises not explicitly employed in the deduction itself.

Oğuz HAŞLAKOĞLU
Doç. Dr. | Assoc. Prof. Dr. İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, Mimarlık Fakültesi, Mimarlık Bölümü, İstanbul-Türkiye İstanbul Technical University, Faculty of Architecture, Department of Architecture, İstanbul-Turkey ohush@yahoo.com
KANT ESTETİĞİNDE SEMBOL TANIMININ ELEŞTİRİSİ
Özet
Bu çalışmada Kant’ın Yargıgücünün Eleştirisi’nde yer alan sembol kavramı güzellik bağlamında ele alınmış ve eleştirel açıdan incelenmiştir. Buna göre, söz konusu kavramın sadece ilkesini bulduğu “şematizm” bağlamında anlaşıldığı şekliyle hatalı değil aynı zamanda tümüyle bir analojiye indirgenmiş olduğu tespit edilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kant, Sembol, Analoji, Şema.
THE CRITIQUE OF THE DEFINITION OF SYMBOL IN KANTIAN
AESTHETICS
Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the role of symbol within the context of beauty in Kantian aesthetics as it appears in The Critique of Judgment in order to arrive at a critical remark in which the definition of symbol as it was made by Kant not only founded to be irrelevant in terms of having its rule in “schematism” but also as being reduced to a mere analogy.
Keywords: Kant, Symbol, Analogy, Schema.

""It might at first seem that the senses (the five traditionally recognized conduits of outer sense) would have very little to contribute to an investigation of Kant's aesthetics. Is not Kant's aesthetic theory based on a relation of the higher cognitive faculties? Much however can be revealed by asking to what degree sight is essential to aesthetic judgment (of beauty and the sublime) as Kant describes it in the 'Critique of Judgment.' Here the sublime receives particular attention."
Published in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses [Kant and the Berlin Enlightenment: Proceedings of the 9th International Kant Congress] 5 vols., ed. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher (Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), Vol. 3, pp. 512-519."

The claim of my article is that the views on music and humour as set out by Kant and present-day researchers are mutually illuminating. For one thing, Kant’s explicit association of musicking and joking prompts a comparison of recent studies in these disparate domains. Secondly, the juxtaposition stimulates a rethinking of the relations between the hedonistic and information-processing aspects in the appreciation of both music and humour. Kant believed that the feeling of refreshment and sensual pleasure brought about through music was related to the oscillation of inner organs, distinct from any mechanism of cognition. In the light of the current research findings, however, it has become clear that the degree to which individuals experience such visceral reaction is largely dependent on the mind’s engagement in the task, in terms of predicting imminent and future outcomes. Present-day researchers hold that pleasure derived from both music and humour arises not only from prediction confirmations, but also from errors since these also contribute to the understanding of environment. This insight diverges from Kant’s account, but at the same time helps resolve the discrepancy between his two incompatible viewpoints: “music as culture” (the appreciation of aesthetic forms) as opposed to “music as the free play of sensations” (sensual pleasure).

In this essay, I highlight some particular points of Kant’s theory of the imagination and contrast them with Derrida’s concept of différance, thereby juxtaposing two accounts of what happens in the process of imagining. I shall argue that in creative production the imagination is a capacity that opens up new spaces of thought, in effect realizing what Kant broadly characterized as “transitions of the mind.”

Images formed through the imagination are imagistic entities that possess a special type of “depth”. Their imagistic content straddles both the conceptual and non-conceptual domains, and while concepts can be applied to them, they are not reducible to them.

Thus, some objects possess a surplus of sensible (intuitional and imaginational) content. This content either cannot be conceptually categorized at all, or at least it cannot be fully conceptually categorized. Some objects are therefore “open” – they extend well beyond what concepts can tell about them.

This openness produces differences as each encounter with an object can produce different interpretations. The openness of objects invites and stimulates thinking beyond the concepts we possess to describe them. This surplus of sensible content serves as an unresolved tension that puts the imagination and understanding to work. It enforces them to complement and contradict each other.

A full, final or ultimate description of any object is continually deferred because there is a nonconceptual surplus of experience that cannot be described by concepts. The openness of an object continues to persist because the object as such is not exhausted by the concepts applied to it. The space of thought expands infinitely. It forms a kind of unconceptualized negative that contrasts with the conceptualized domain.

Read through Derrida, Kant’s imagination becomes an immensely creative faculty that works through continuous differentiation, much like Derrida’s différance. This reading frees Kant’s version of the imagination from the conceptual structure in which it seemed trapped in the first Critique. Moreover, it sits comparatively well with a nonconceptualist reading of Kant. The openness of objects and the way in which they extend outside the cupola of the conceptual is suggestive of a larger nonconceptual domain in which they are deeply embedded.

To understand the metaphorical use of language, consideration must be given, not only to living metaphors, but also to dead ones, those which no longer seem like metaphors but have become more akin to concepts, and which are present in the language, without denying that in the language there are also terms with literal meaning. As a result, we can distinguish the concept from the metaphor by its use and its meaningful function, from where we can examine the different roles or functioning that the productive imagination has on both and, finally, indicate the expressive function of metaphors or aesthetic ideas in relation to the ideas of reason.

The notion of the ordinary or everyday is of seminal importance in Cavell’s readings of literature. The transcendental and anthropological dimensions of skepticism and the ordinary, however, may sometimes appear to be treated by him in an essentially ahistorical manner. But the discovery of the ordinary, which is always a re-discovery, can also be shown to be deeply embedded in Cavell’s treatment of modernism in the arts. The present essay therefore proposes that we can deepen our understanding of the ordinary by relating it to Walter Benjamin’s ideas about the “loss of aura,” which he develops with regard to Baudelaire, Proust and film, most famously in his essays about “The Artwork in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproducibility” and on “Some Motifs in Baudelaire.”

El presente trabajo tiene por propósito analizar las funciones de las ideas de la razón pura, centrándose en el tratamiento que recibe esta temática en el Apéndice que cierra la Dialéctica trascendental de la Crítica de la razón pura. En particular, se aborda la función sistematizadora de las ideas y el problema del uso hipotético o regulativo de las mismas, así como el vínculo entre ambas funciones. Se mostrará cómo la búsqueda de la unidad sistemática por parte de la razón posibilita el uso coherente del entendimiento, y cómo las ideas, a modo de focus imaginarius, orientan al entendimiento y ensanchan el conocimiento y el ámbito de la experiencia dada desde fuera del campo del conocimiento empírico posible.