Kazimierz Twardowski

Artykuł prezentuje najważniejsze osiągnięcia psychologii religii w Szkole Lwowsko-Warszawskiej K. Twardowskiego, rozwój i znaczenie dla współczesnej psychologii religii. Szkoła ta istniała paralelnie do innych szkół psychologicznych w Europie: Szkoły Wurzburskiej, założonej przez Oswalda Kulpe i Dorpackiej Szkoły Psychologii Religii, założonej przez Karla Girgensohna. Treść artykułu koncentruje się na dwóch nurtach psychologii, mających swoje uzasadnienie teoretyczne już w tekstach Twardowskiego, tj. na badaniach aktów i przekonań z użyciem introspekcji, a także na badaniach w nurcie psychologii historyczno-kulturowej. Szczególną rolę odegrały tu teoria czynności i wytworów a także teoria kratyzmu (podobna do teorii dążenia do mocy A. Adlera). Wyniki badań przekonań religijnych, prowadzone w ramach szkoły Twardowskiego, mają istotne znaczenie także współcześnie dla psychologów religii.

"Between the Person and the Appearance: On the Biography of Roman Witold Ingarden"

The article is a commentary on Radosław Kuliniak’s and Mariusz Pandura’s biography of Roman Witold Ingarden “Jestem filozofem świata” (Κόσμου φιλόσοφός εἰμι). Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Having edited and published together a number of archival materials related to the history of Polish pre- and post-war philosophy as well, the authors have brought out a book on life and philosophy that is strongly corroborated by the archival materials. They have employed the positivist model of biography that implies particular (biological, historical) determinisms along with traditionally linear and sequential view of the past, the model based on substantial concept of the subject that can be isolated from its discursive or institutional networks of relations. In the article I discuss whether the positivist model of biographical writing along with the style and rhetoric employed in the book serve to achieve the goals set by the authors. Could the phenomenologist’s biography be based on different conceptual and genological solutions? Can they be found among the notions and conceptions extracted from Ingarden’s writings?

Artykuł jest komentarzem do napisanej przez Radosława Kuliniaka i Mariusza Pandurę biografii Romana W. Ingardena pt. „Jestem filozofem świata” (Κόσμου φιλόσοφός εἰμι). Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970). Opracowawszy i wydawszy również pokaźną liczbę materiałów archiwalnych dotyczących przed- i powojennej historii polskiej filozofii, autorzy opublikowali, opatrzoną licznymi potwierdzeniami archiwalnymi, książkę spod znaku życia i filozofii. Zastosowali w niej pozytywistyczny model biografii, implikujący określone (biologiczne, historyczne) determinizmy oraz tradycyjnie linearny i sekwencyjny obraz przeszłości, model oparty na substancjalnie ujmowanym podmiocie, wyodrębnialnym z sieci zależności dyskursywnych, instytucjonalnych. W artykule rozważam, czy pozytywistyczny model pisarstwa biograficznego, wraz z zastosowanymi w książce stylem i retoryką, pozwala autorom zrealizować założone przez nich cele. Czy biografia fenomenologa mogła być oparta na innych rozwiązaniach pojęciowych i genologicznych? Czy można takie odnaleźć pośród pojęć i koncepcji czerpanych z pism Ingardena?

The article explores psychological motives in Leopold Blaustein’s philosophy. Blaustein was educated in Lvov, Freiburg im Breisgau and Berlin. In his original explorations, he attempted to connect a phenomenological perspective with descriptive psychology. As trained by Twardowski, he took over some motives of understanding the method of philosophy (psychology), its objectives and aims. The author situates Blaustein also in a dialogue with Stumpf and next to the context of Dilthey’s humanistic psychology is examined. Finally, the article explores the influences of Gestalt psychology on Blaustein. The ultimate thesis of the article is that Blaustein’s method can be grasped as a
phenomenologically oriented descriptive psychology.

Friederike Moltmann has recently proposed an account of truth-bearers that draws on Kazimierz Twardowski's action/product distinction. Her account is meant to provide a third way between the dominant view of primary truth-bearers as mind-independent entities and the recently revived construal of them as mental or linguistic acts. This paper argues that there is no room for Twardowskian accounts, because they are based on a notion of "non-enduring product" that defies comprehension, and no need for them, because the linguistic data that Twardowskians take to refute the act-theoretic approach can in fact be handled by that approach.

This paper outlines a novel semantics of attitude reports based on attitudinal objects rather than propositions. It also outlines a novel semantics of (deontic) modal sentences based on modal objects rather than quantification over possible worlds. On that semantics, sentences act semantically as predicates of attitudinal and modal objects, specifying their truth making (or satisfaction) conditions along the lines of Fine's recent truthmaker semantics.
    Attitudinal objects divide into cognitive (and illocutionary) products, entities like judgments, thoughts, decisions, claims, and requests, and mental states. Modal objects are entities like obligations and permissions. Based on Twardowski's (1912)  distinction between actions and products, the paper argues that cognitive products are best understood as (nonenduring) artifacts products by the corresponding action. Going beyond Twardowski, it furthermore argues for the recognition of modal products, as (abstract) artifacts (on a par with laws) that may endure beyond the act that establishes them.

Austin (1962) introduced not only the notion of an illocutionary act, but also that of a locutionary act, which consists in a rhetic, a phatic, and a phonetic act.This paper will outline a novel semantics of verbs of saying and of quotation based on Austin’s distinction among levels of linguistic acts. It will propose a particular way of understanding the notion of a rhetic act and argue that it is extremely well-reflected in the semantics of natural language.  The paper will furthermore outline a novel, unified and compositional semantics of quotation which is guided by two ideas. First, quotations convey properties related to lower-level (phonetic or phatic) linguistic acts; second, such meanings of quotations are strictly based on syntactic structure, namely a lower-level (phonetic, phonological or morpho-syntactic) structure as part of the syntactic structure that is input to semantic interpretation.  Such lower-level linguistic structures will contribute properties of utterances to the semantic composition of the sentence, in one way or another.

For a long time Franz Brentano has been widely perceived almost exclusively as the re-discoverer of intentionality and the founder of the continental phenomenology. It was only during the last 30 years that his immense importance for the development of analytic philosophy (and also the arbitrariness of the very division between analytic and continental philosophy) became clear. This volume is devoted to Brentano’s influence on the Polish Analytic Philosophy better known under the name of: “Lvov-Warsaw School”.
The founder of this school – Casimir Twardowski was himself a student of Brentano. He took over Brentano’s intentionality thesis as well as many other elements of his philosophy (e.g. his non-propositional theory of judgement or the conviction that psychology is the only acceptable basis of any scientific philosophy), but at the same time, as early as in his doctoral dissertation On the Content and Object of Presentations, he severely criticised Brentano’s central idea of an ‘immanent object’.
The first three papers in this volume centre on this important Brentano-Twardowski connection. Dale Jacquette addresses the afore mentioned critique by Twardowski and elucidates his important distinction between content and object. Maria van der Schaar analyses Twardowski’s later development of the notion of content, which remained influenced by Husserl, and Arianna Betti argues that many aspects of Polish analytical philosophy could be better understood, if we focus rather on the traces of Bolzano’s thought in Twardowski’s philosophy.
The next two essays concern the philosophy of Stanisław Leśniewski, who is (beside Alfred Tarski and Jan Łukasiewicz) probably the most important Polish philosopher. Peter Simons traces important parallels between Brentano and Leśniewski, focusing mainly on reistic or particularist ideas which are relevant for the late Leśniewski, but beginning with his early critique of Brentano’s non-propositional theory of judgement in “A Contribution to the Analysis of Existential Propositions”. While Simons writes that “[t]he paper on existential propositions is […], apart from some of its incidental features, a complete mess” (p. ??? in this volume), Arkadiusz Chrudzimski tries to concentrate on these incidental features and make some sense of them.
Various facets of the reistic approach are also investigated by Barry Smith. He focuses mainly on Tadeusz Kotarbiński but also outlines some systematic relations between several kinds of reism.
In the next paper Dariusz Łukasiewicz describes the evolution of Tadeusz Czeżowski’s views concerning the concept of existence, which are closely connected with the Brentanian non-propositional theory of judgement.
If we were to choose the single most important and influential achievement of Polish philosophy, then the choice would most probably be the semantic definition of truth formulated by Alfred Tarski. In the last article of this volume Jan Woleński argues that Tarski’s discovery of semantics may have been influenced also by his remotely Brentanian background.

The aim of this article is to introduce the work of Leopold Blaustein – philosopher and psychologist, who studied under Kazimierz Twardowski in Lvov and under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau. In his short academic career he developed an original philosophy taken from both phenomenology and Twardowski's analytical approach. One of his main publications concerns Husserl's early theory of intentional act and object, introduced in Logische Untersuchungen. In the first part of the article I briefly present Blaustein's biography and some general features of his philosophy. The second part provides an overview of Blaustein's dissertation concerning Husserl's early phenomenology. In the third and final part I summarise Blaustein's research including the critical remarks of Roman Ingarden.

Some Austro-German philosophers considered thoughts to be mind-dependent entities, that is, psychic products. Yet these authors also attributed “objectivity” to thoughts: distinct thinking subjects can have mental acts with “qualitatively” the same content. Moreover, thoughts, once built, can exist beyond the life of their inventor, “embodied” in “documents”. At the beginning of the 20th century, the notion of “psychic product” was at the centre of the debates on psychologism; a hundred years later, it is rather at the margins of the history of philosophy. While Twardowski’s theory of products has been frequently studied, those of Stumpf and the late Husserl have been much less discussed. A presentation of the Austro-German debates about psychic products is all the more important since these discussions might be of direct interest for contemporary philosophy. This paper examines the Austro-German notion of psychic products in Stumpf, Twardowski, and the late Husserl.

"Indice


Premessa

Avvertenza

Il problema
1. Per cominciare, alcuni esempi dal linguaggio ordinario, – 2. Perché uno studio sul principio di contraddizione – 3. Ipotesi di ricerca.

I. Incontraddizione
Il principio di contraddizione nella tradizione. Fonti, problemi, spiegazioni e implicazioni

1. La duplice via di Aristotele
1. La proposizione nel De interpretatione – 2. Le forme di opposizione fra proposizioni – 3. La portata esistenziale delle proposizioni e la negazione – 4. I principi di contraddizione e del terzo escluso come assiomi negli Analitici secondi – 5. Il principio di contraddizione come principio primo nella Metafisica, i: la formulazione ‘ontologica’ classica – 6. Il principio di contraddizione come principio primo nella Metafisica, ii: la formulazione ‘psicologica’.

2. La non-contraddittorietà come principio primo, legge del pensiero e condizione di pensabilità in Kant
1. La logica come scienza delle leggi naturali e formali del pensiero – 2. Non-contraddittorietà = possibilità = pensabilità – 3. Il principio di contraddizione nella Critica della ragion pura – 4. Critica del principio di contraddizione kantiano.

3. Priorità, formalità ed estensione del principio di contraddizione. Discussioni nell'ambito della tradizione logica ottocentesca
1. Primi passi verso un dibattito sul principio di contraddizione quale legge del pensiero – 2. William Hamilton – 3. John Stuart Mill – 4. Herbert Spencer – 5. Un dubbio e la posizione di Gerardus Heymans – 6. Il principio di contraddizione aristotelico e quello kantiano secondo Christoph Sigwart – 7. Critica delle interpretazioni psicologistiche del principio di contraddizione (Bolzano, Husserl, e i giovani Russell e Lukasiewicz) – 8. La logica formale non può prescindere dal riferimento al reale: la critica di Adolf Friedrich Trendelenburg – 9. Un'altra voce: Rudolf Hermann Lotze.

4. Dimostrabilità del principio di contraddizione? La natura del soggetto della proposizione
1. Sulla necessità di una giustificazione del principio di contraddizione – 2. La dimostrazione per via di confutazione di Aristotele – 3. La ‘dimostrazione diretta’ di Friedrich Ueberweg... – 4. ... e quella di Alexander Pfänder – 5. Le critiche del giovane Lukasiewicz contro la presunta priorità del principio di contraddizione – 6. La ‘dimostrazione’ di Lukasiewicz – 7. Il principio di contraddizione e la logica simbolica secondo Lukasiewicz – 8. Note conclusive sulla logica formale tradizionale.

II. In-contraddizione
Oggetti esistenti e oggetti non-esistenti

1. L'universo di Bolzano e l'in sé
1. Sulle “somme leggi del pensiero” – 2. L'anti-Kant: sulla logica e la forma logica – 3. L'in sé – 4. Le rappresentazioni senza oggetto.

2. Dalle rappresentazioni senza oggetto agli oggetti non-esistenti
1. La mediazione storica di Robert Zimmermann: breve storia redazionale della Philosophische Propaedeutik – 2. La Philosophische Propaedeutik e la Wissenschaftslehre a confronto, i: la concezione della logica e l'in sé – 3. La Philosophische Propaedeutik e la Wissenschaftslehre a confronto, ii: le rappresentazioni senza oggetto – 4. Rappresentazione, contenuto e oggetto in Kazimierz Twardowski – 5. Il capovolgimento delle rappresentazioni senza oggetto in Twardowski: rappresentazioni i cui oggetti non esistono.

3. Oggetti impossibili
1. La Gegenstandstheorie di Alexius Meinong: eine daseinsfreie Wissenschaft – 2. Oggetti impossibili e teoria dell'Außersein nella Gegenstandstheorie – 3. Russell versus Meinong: descrizioni ed esistenza.

III. In contraddizione
Verso logiche non-aristoteliche

1. Principio di contraddizione e sillogismo
1. An. post. A 11. 77a10-21: le interpretazioni di Jan Lukasiewicz e di Isaac Husik – 2. La finzione di Lukasiewicz e l'idea della logica non-aristotelica.

2. Mondi possibili con oggetti impossibili. La logica immaginaria di N.A. Vasil'ev
1. Cenni introduttivi – 2. Giudizi universali e giudizi particolari in Sigwart – 3. Sui giudizi particolari, il triangolo delle opposizioni e la legge del quarto escluso – 4. I contributi di Meinong e Husik e l'idea della “logica immaginaria (non-aristotelica)” – 5. Negazione e legge di contraddizione nella logica immaginaria – 6. Giudizi e sillogismi nella logica immaginaria - 7. Breve confronto con Lukasiewicz.

3. Individui, continuo e vaghezza in Peirce
1. Peirce, Vasil'év e la logica non-aristotelica – 2. Individui, contraddizione e terzo escluso – 3. Alcuni aspetti del continuo in Peirce – 4. I casi al bordo: Peirce versus Frege – 5. Vaghezza: oggetti indeterminati e predicati vaghi.

Per continuare

Bibliografia

Indice dei nomi

Indice analitico
"

Before engaging with intentionality, the philosopher of mind must consider the intrinsic nature of psychological elements. Conscious states, contrary to ordinary and scientific objects, seem to penetrate each another in such a way that it becomes impossible to enumerate, class or organize through laws the various experiences at stake. In this context, how is a science of consciousness conceivable? How is it possible to apply the epistemological requirements of any science to a domain whose ontological nature contradicts such demands? The paper reconstructs Husserl’s solution to this issue in the Fifth Logical Investigation. I show how his appeal to the mereological framework of the Third Investigation gives him the tools to rationalize the domain of the mind and to establish phenomenology as an authentic science of consciousness. I first demonstrate that the very task of phenomenological investigations is defined in mereological terms. I then reconstruct the issue regarding the inclusion of the intentional object within the act, by exposing the nuances of the Husserlian position in this famous controversy. In a last part, I show how mereological concepts are at the core of the Husserlian reinterpretation of the Brentanian thesis according to which all acts are presentations or based on presentations.

Despite their virtual absence in the subsequent phenomenological tradition, Husserl himself held in high esteem the analyzes – often referred to as ‘Husserl’s mereology’ – he undertook in the Third Logical Investigation (Husserl 1913, p. XV). This appreciation was not only due to their quasi-rigorous, quasi-formal aspect. Actually, it relied primarily on their fruitfulness, that is, the multiplicity of their applications. In later works, they will extend from time-consciousness (Huang 2019) to genetic phenomenology (Van Eynde 1999), but they are in fact remarkably diverse as early as the Logical Investigations. The Third LI indeed directly enables Husserl to deal, in the framework of one, unified theory, with a range of problems, whose vastness has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature. The aim of this paper is thus to identify and synthetize all the problems and debates here at stake, the richness of which testifies to the tremendous power of Husserl's mereology. Five such issues are exhibited: abstraction, moments of unity, formal ontology, pure grammar, and unity of consciousness. Particular emphasis is placed on the last of these issues, which has been rather overlooked in the literature, even though it unveils the essential dependence of phenomenology on mereology. In so doing, the paper also demonstrates that the whole Brentano’s school is involved, in one way or another, in the debates surrounding the Third Investigation. As a conclusion, a comparison between the function of mereology in Brentano and Husserl is offered.

Cet article porte sur la notion de vérité chez Kazimierz Twardowski. Celui-ci fut un disciple de Brentano, dont il a diffusé la méthode et les idées en Pologne. Mais Twardowski ne fut pas que le propagateur des idées de son maître. Comme l’exposent les deux premières parties de cet article, il s’est notamment opposé à Brentano en défendant une conception absolutiste de la vérité. Pour ce faire, il a d’abord montré que tous les soi-disant exemples de vérités relatives étaient ambigus et pouvaient être complétés de manière à exposer les jugements absolus dont ils dérivent. Il a ensuite mis en évidence le fait que la forme de relativisme qui consiste à affirmer que tout jugement est vrai pour nous est incompatible avec certains principes logiques fondamentaux, et ne peut pour cette raison être dérivée d’une thèse plus générale. La dernière partie de cet article est consacrée à la critique twardowskienne de la version forte de la vérité-correspondance développée par Russell. Après avoir montré les défauts de cette théorie en dénonçant la conception du jugement sur laquelle elle reposait, il en a proposé une version affaiblie reposant sur une conception du jugement comme acte sui generis.

The purpose of the paper is demonstrate the thesis that Ingarden's ontological system allows a better understanding of the “part-whole” problem then previous theories. Especially, if we take into account the existential ontology of Ingarden, which refers to Husserl “part-whole” theory, we can see that development of terms made by Ingarden sheds new light on old problems. In this context, particularly important is to distinguish between two existential moments: contingancy/inseparatness, because thanks to them we can talk about many different types of relationships and hence many types of objects.
Keywords: existential moments, part, whole, object, Husserl, Ingarden.

"""This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to get what we want.

I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains EFFECTIVITY by claiming that each time one wants G, one accomplishes the action of doing F ( it is argued following Von Wright that every action has a result as a proper part, here F). And the action-theory explains  FALLIBILITY by claiming that although willing G entails making some F happen –the result of the action of willing–, it does not entail that G –the intended consequence of our willing– will happen.

By contrast, behaviorist accounts of the will (which merely equate willing with an action) captures its EFFECTIVITY but loose its FALLIBILITY. And volitionist accounts (which introduce naked volitions lacking any essential results) capture the FALLIBILITY of the will, but loose its EFFECTIVITY.

I consider disjunctivist accounts  of trying  (such as O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby's ones) as an alternative way to reconcile EFFECTIVITY and FALLIBILITY. I argue that though the view manages to reconcile these two constraints, it does so only at the price of gerrymandering the concept of willing (or trying): failed tryings end up having nothing in common with successful ones.

I then address three objections to the action-theory of the will, to the effect (i) that not all actions have a result (ii) that total failures are possible (iii) that willing is  more fundamental than acting. I argue in answer (i) that all actions have results (results which can be irrelevant to the production of the goal, pr which can be merely mental images), (ii) that total failures do not correspond to  acts of will, but mere desires or wishes, and (iii) that given the possibility of basic actions, acting has to be more fundamental than willing (and trying)."""

In the following paper, I will discuss the motives behind Franz Brentano’s judgment contents and the strategies offered by him to support them, suggesting that most of these strategies – based on his treatment of true negative existential judgments – are not akin to logical realism in spirit. More generally, I would like to suggest in this paper that although there definitely is a realist concern in Austrian philosophy regarding states of affairs, reducing their introduction to a realist concern is misguided. As shown by the case of Brentano, states of affairs were not always introduced in order to answer the question of what makes our assertions true, but rather to provide a psychological account of judgments that would help to distinguish between the two basic classes of acts: presentations and judgments. I will suggest that Brentano’s way of dealing with states of affairs actually shares some similarities with the way nominalists’ strategies concerning states of affairs are sometimes conducted.