Middle East and North Africa

Some numbers on religiosity in the U.S.  We are far more religious than our narrative of secularity would suggest.  Religion and politics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Saba Mahmood, and Pierre Bourdieu's Doxa and Habitus.  Mahmood suggests:  what about a conservative, religious-orthodox feminism?  Teaching about women's empowerment / agency and the women's veiling movement in MENA.

For source links in blog pieces, go to blog link:

https://www.e-ir.info/2016/12/09/inhabiting-orthodoxy-discussing-islam-and-feminism-continued/

The climate of the Eastern Mediterranean region of the last 60 ky was determined by a high resolution study of the oxygen and carbon isotopic composition (1500 measurement pairs) of speleothems from the Soreq cave, Israel, with chronology provided by 53 precise 230Th–234U (TIMS) ages. The high precision of the speleothem TIMS ages permits us to determine the timing of

An analysis of the themes of religion, social cohesion and religious and cultural diversity emerging from the second Gallup/Anna Lindh Poll of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Published in the Anna Lind Report 2014, Alexandria, 2014. Also available in French and Arabic from the ALF website: http://www.annalindhfoundation.org/download-full-reports

Co-edited by Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish, this volume sheds light on the historical background and initial impact of the mass uprisings which shook the Arab world in late 2010 and early 2011. The authors provide unique understanding and first-hand accounts of events that have received superficial and partial coverage in Western and Arab media alike. While the book focuses on those states that have been most affected by the uprisings it also covers the impact on Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. The book covers the full range of issues involved in these historic events, from political economy and the role of social media, to international politics, gender, labour and the impact on culture, making this the ideal one-stop introduction to the events for the novice and specialist alike.

Under what conditions do individuals who profess to boycott products align actual and intended consumption habits? Inconsistency between self-reported participation and practice can help explain why few boycott campaigns harm targets despite high political consumption rates reported in surveys of Americans and Europeans. Arab boycotts are fertile yet unexplored settings in which to assess this proposition. Using data from 820 Algerian students surveyed after the 2004 Abu Ghraib scandal, we evaluate whether boycotters are more likely than others to weigh country-of-origin in preferences for soda, clothing, and mobile phones. Almost 60% claimed to boycott US goods – consistent with cross-national survey rates and a 2007 nationally representative survey of 800 Algerians – but fewer respondents expressed actual brand preferences consistent with this desire. We extend the political consumption literature by expanding its geographic scope and elaborating a mechanism by which product characteristics minimize or magnify collective action problems that undermine participation. Our results suggest that political consumers are more likely to maintain boycott behavior when targeting substitutable goods linked closely to identity (symbolic and visible), thereby reducing direct and information costs and enabling social network enforcement.

This chapter focuses on the Iraqi Kurdish response to the rapid and devastating advance of ISIS. Of course, the Iraqi Kurdish response to the ISIS advance has been a multifaceted, complex, and evolving one that includes military strategy, pragmatic politics, and aspirations of independence. Leaving aside the fact that the ISIS advance has granted the Iraqi Kurds unprecedented access to Iraq’s rich oil reserves and the fact that the initial Kurdish reaction was to ramp up their rhetoric toward complete secession from Iraq, this chapter focuses on two further dimensions of the Iraqi Kurdish response. Firstly, it documents the Iraqi Kurdish seizure of the so-called “disputed territories,” especially
Kirkuk, and their stated intent to hold a referendum on the future of these
regions (effectively to force a resolution to Article 140 of the constitution). Secondly, the chapter documents the Iraqi Kurdish use of the ISIS advance as leverage to enhance Kurdish relations dramatically with the US and Europe via direct military support (including airstrikes and weapons supply) and to become the key launchpad
in the fight against ISIS planned for 2015. The chapter concludes by briefly assessing the efficacy and wisdom of the Kurdish strategy of leveraging the ISIS onslaught to advance their own interests.

The full article can be found by following this link:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629387.2016.1150183
Below are some excerpts:

The start of the 1980s marks Djebar’s return—after a decade-long absence—both to writing in general and to the French language in particular. If the 1970s stand out in her bibliography as a conspicuous gap in productivity, the circumstances of this gap are well-documented. Djebar has written about this period in her work indicating that she thought that she could write in Arabic. Yet, Arabic written by her would never appear in print. In 1980, she published Femmes d’Alger dans leur appartement, soon followed by a series of novels, all in French. At first look, it seems as though Assia Djebar eventually forsakes her unfruitful Arabic experiment for a definitive return to publishing in French. However, her Arabic experiment did bear fruit, and her output in that language did see the light of day, only it was on screen, rather than on the page. Those familiar with the Algerian author’s oeuvre know that the 1970s’ gap in her bibliography corresponds to her foray into filmmaking, which yielded two films. These films will also remain her only works that are not in French.
If Djebar did not write in Arabic but made a film instead, then how is filmmaking, in her case, a more suitable medium for Arabic expression than writing?
In order to begin answering this question, I focus on the first of her two films, The Nouba of the Women of Mount Chenoua (1978), and articulate my analysis of both the film and its circumstances around the interrelated notions of aphasia, diglossia, and what I call arabophonie in Algeria. The last of these notions merits qualification straight away. The term arabophone is generally used in the objective sense of speaking Arabic. However, I intend it to convey the same connotation that francophone carries. Just as postcolonial implications of margin and centre result in francophone signifying not quite French, the Maghreb can be arabophone also in the sense of not quite Arabic. As to diglossia, while commonly addressed in the discipline of linguistics, and central to studies of Arabic within that field, it is, in this case, also relevant from a literary perspective. Nevertheless, it is necessary to start by considering the role of Nouba in Djebar’s work, and the role of speaking for the main character, or, as it happens, not speaking, which I designate as aphasia. This choice of word is not innovative by any means. Djebar herself used it as part of a chapter title in L’Amour, la fantasia (1985). By asking how is film a better suited medium than writing for Arabic expression in Djebar’s case, what I submit is that aphasia became essential to Djebar’s work specifically in its ties to Arabic, and the language’s position in Algeria at the intersections of French, Tamazight, and a broader Arabic-speaking region.
APHASIA
Nouba is a traditional form of urban music in the Maghreb, with its roots in Arab Spain, which is why it is sometimes also called Andalusian. The word nouba has entered French in its musical sense to mean a loud, carnivalesque revelry. However, it carries another meaning, still prevalent in the original Arabic, signifying ‘turn’ or ‘opportunity’ (as in take a turn, or get an ‘opportunity’ or a ‘chance’). This double meaning is intentional, and the women’s nouba in the title carries both senses of ‘women’s song’ (implying their song in their own voice), and ‘women’s turn’ (implying their turn to speak). The connection between the sense of ‘turn’ and the musical form is based on the trilateral root ن.و.ب, meaning representing (or acting as representative), it is also etymologically related to substitution and deputation or proxy. 
The titular nouba suggests that it is literally their turn to speak after they were overlooked by history, and their voices silenced, which is consistent with Djebar’s role as a historian. However, it is not enough to get a turn to speak, one needs a voice to speak with. In the other sense, of nouba, Lila substitutes the women of the Cherchell area’s voice for her own. With their turn to speak, they give Lila a voice as much as they are given one, and they represent her as much as the film represents them. Nouba is the facto the porte-parole of these women.
DIGLOSSIA
It is important to stress the difference between the two varieties of language that constitute Diglossia. Because these varieties are situational and socially-governed, they can easily be mistaken for tone or register, and diglossia can be misunderstood when the focus is only on the social factors that regulate the situations in which H or L is used. However, the differences between the two can be very pronounced, resulting in what may seem like two different languages, each with its own grammar, lexicon, and phonology. The implications of likening varieties of a language to separate languages can be highly inflammatory and politically laden. My purpose, however, is merely to indicate the apparent difference between H and L Arabic. Most importantly, however, it is essential to keep in mind that speakers of a diglossic language are not necessarily proficient in both varieties. While the L variety is acquired the way any language is acquired, namely through speaking to children, H is achieved through formal education.
This difference in acquisition is crucial. Using H or L is not necessarily a social choice, but a privilege of the literate. The first implications of this privilege for Nouba should be immediately apparent when taking into account the literacy rates of Algeria in the 1970s. According to UNESCO, and based on a 1971 census, the illiteracy rate in Algeria was 73.6% for segments of the population aged fifteen and over, and illiteracy among rural women specifically for that age group was 94.0% (1978, 42). While the literacy of the women in the film is unverifiable, the illiteracy rates among women in rural Algeria at the time were high by any standard. These women, speaking L Arabic only as a result of illiteracy, literally and very tangibly do not have a say in situations where the use of H is required. Consider, for instance, that parliament and political speeches are examples of some of these situations where H is used.
ARABOPHONIE
When taking into account the perceived superiority of certain varieties of Arabic, arabophonie, in this context, is analogous to what the term francophonie connotes, which is precisely not quite French. Arabophone, then, suggests a perceived inferiority in comparison to other varieties of Arabic. To clarify this analogy, I propose to focus on one crucial feature of francophonie, which is that it always entails the significant existence of at least one other language alongside French. Whether it is Wolof or the many other languages of West Africa, a Créole in the Caribbean, English in North America, Dutch or German in Europe. Naturally, the situation in each of these regions is considerably more complex than I am sketching here. However, the consistent feature that differentiates France from francophone countries or regions, is that in France only French is imagined to exist, regardless of the factual existence of other languages. In contrast, when French-speaking societies are francophone rather than French, the existence—officially acknowledged or not—of some other idiom is essential.
Similarly, arabophonie is demarcated by the apparent presence of one or more other languages in the region or society. It is the appearance of a presence of another language that is the significant feature here, rather than its actual presence. Defining Arabophonie as the fact of speaking Arabic in a bi- or multilingual context acknowledges the alleged inferiority of certain varieties of Arabic based on the belief that the presence of other languages in the region is corruptive, whether this belief and the hierarchy that it implies are adhered to or not. As such, it is different from a rivalry between regions (each claiming their variety of Spoken Arabic being closer to Fussha for example), but acknowledges without necessarily condoning the dynamic between an Arabic centre and a periphery, and the ensuing discrimination against, and/or paternalist attitudes towards, literary and cultural production in certain varieties of Arabic over others. In this sense, when one does not adhere to the language attitude that arabophonie describes, it remains possible to condemn and reject its hierarchical implications, or denounce the marginalization, silencing, or snubbing of the other languages that make it arabophone rather than Arabic.
Algeria is arabophone in that at least one other language is perceived to exist alongside Arabic. This is a fundamental difference between the Maghreb and other Arabic-speaking regions. In the Maghreb, the presence of French is obvious. In fact, often what defines the Maghreb as a region, is precisely that it is the three former French colonies of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. This makes it francophone, but, consequently, arabophone also. However, if The Maghreb is obviously arabophone given the existence of French as a result of colonialism, Tamazight (the Amazigh language also known as Berber) compounds the complexity of the diglossic situation in Algeria, and plays an even more important role in making the region arabophone rather than strictly Arabic. Although the women of the Cherchell area speak in Dardja with Lila, they are also Amazigh, making Dardja presumably their second language, and Tamazight their first.

Focusing on the EU’s relations with its periphery, this paper takes issue both with persistent ‘normative’ conceptions of the EU’s international role in the European Studies literature and with the constructivist–rationalist divide in IR theory. The conceptualization of the EU – a vast, composite and ever-expanding entity with ‘fuzzy’ borders – as an empire of sorts bridges the theoretical divide and offers a powerful explanation of the EU’s behaviour vis-à-vis its vicinity.

Through the transfer of rules and practices beyond its borders, the EU is indeed engaged in ‘normative’ policies, which however primarily serve the security and economic interests of the EU and its Member States. Thus, the EU’s (allegedly) norm-based behaviour is in itself a utility-maximizing strategy, which also serves the construction of a normative identity. The EU’s response to the Arab uprisings serves to illustrate the argument, with the concept of ‘empire’ resolving the puzzle of seemingly inconsistent EU policies.

This research reflects on two democratization theories that seek to explain the differences in the transition process after the fall of dictatorship in Tunisia and Egypt. The modernization theory elaborates on the role of the middle class, whereas the elite theory highlights the importance of liberal elites in the emergence of a democracy. After process tracing it appears that both theories explain the differences in the state of democracy between Tunisia and Egypt, though the presence of a large middle class is crucial to guide the elites to make choices towards democracy.
Key words: democratization, transition, Egypt, Tunisia, modernization, elite

In the mid-90s, Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement and the Iranian Ayatollah Khamene’i both banned bloody forms of self-flagellation such as tatbir (cutting the forehead with a sword), calling them backward and un-Islamic. They argued that Shi‘a Muslims ought to imitate Husayn by actively fighting against oppressors rather than passively mourning Husayn’s martyrdom. This prohibition has not been unanimously applied in all Muslim
countries, including Syria, where such practices persisted until the Arab Spring (when virtually all Shi‘a Muslims left the shrine-town where these practices were performed). By closely reading the linguistic, conceptual, and juridical discourses that circulated in Syria in order to justify this position, the paper shows that the performers of tatbir conceived of these rituals in revolutionary, rather than reactionary, terms. By examining the performance and reception of flagellation processions in terms of differing modalities of affect, the paper opens up spaces for rethinking ‘revolution’ and ‘redemption’ in contemporary Twelver Shi‘ism.

Acknowledgement of Moorish treaty rights is a procedure that will require you to detail certain evidence that cannot be disputed. There can be none who assume that proof of good standing membership will entitle them to royal treatment and complete exemption of corporate domestic cooperation. There is something unique about the sovereign that binds he or she to a set of unspoken virtues remaining as quietly kept as the days before light. This should be seen in every declaration of heritage or sovereign rights proported. Due to the advent of technology, this has become relatively easy to construct with integrity. In order to make a declaration that is multilateral in transmission, it has to have simple to understand format to avoid mistranslation of style and origin. To illustrate this, I have constructed my personal format to an aboriginal declaration using my own DNA results (provided by 23andme) and historical reference to the origin of the selected people in which the sovereign treaty references.

After conquering large swaths of Syria and Iraq, the IS undertook an aggressive sectarian campaign in which they not only enacted horrific violence against the Shia people, but also damaged or destroyed several key Shia mosques and shrines. Drawing on Social Movement Theory (SMT), this article analyzes the response by various Shia nonstate actors—militia leaders, religious clergymen, populist preachers, and seminal poets. It argues that they used the IS threat to Shia holy sites to develop and deploy a mobilization frame that has come to be referred to as the “shrine protection narrative.” The article also documents the manifold consequences of the shrine protection narrative: it underpinned a mass recruitment drive that saw tens of thousands enlist; it legitimized foreign Shia militias to enter the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq; it justified the formation of entirely new militias who declared the centrality of shrine protection to their mandate; and it mobilized them to enact political violence. In doing so, this article extends existing studies of SMT to demonstrate that “sacred spaces”—and particularly the need to protect religious sites from specific threats—can serve as a powerful mobilization frame towards political violence.

This research paper examines thoroughly and critically all the causes and facilitators of the Arab Spring - from twitter and facebook to the relative deprivation of the numerous youth in the Arab World.  In addition, this research paper for the first time outlines the necessary and sufficient conditions under which regime change was effectuated and, thus, explains the resilience of certain regimes and the vulnerability of others.

In several previous articles, I examined the parallel characteristics of the fake colonial states of Sudan (real Ethiopia) and Abyssinia (fake Ethiopia) that have been the end result of the Freemasonic Orientalist fallacies of Pan-Arabism and Ethiopianism.

In this article, I will examine a bogus-historical term that has been constructed by the Freemasonic Orientalist ateliers and academia of France and England to further spread confusion in the wider region, and – more importantly – consolidate the two fallacies in the area, namely the pseudo-doctrines of Pan-Arabism and Ethiopianism: Nubia.
First published in:
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/143394

Republished here:
http://www.oromoparliamentarians.org/English/Facts%20about%20Oromo/Ethiopia%20Kushati%20land.htm
and
http://www.egyptsearch.com/forums/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=8;t=006830;p=1

This paper discusses the representation of Gay, Lesbian and Queer (GLQ) identities in one of the most influential industries in Egypt and the Arab World, cinema. It takes the time frame of the 1970s, also known for the presidency of Anwar El-Sadat for Egypt, who was one of the most enigmatic and controversial statesmen that ever existed. Litigations, freedom of expression, and dominant discourses in the cultural reproductions were affected by several factors such as: political events, alliances, economic policies, war and peace agreements, and the relation to the previous regimes and colonial history. This culminated in the cinematic productions of the 1970s in Egypt, making it probably the golden age in GLQ representations in the entire history of Egyptian cinema, in quantity and sometimes in quality.

This conclusion to the Special Issue on Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa: Mapping, Heritage Management and Research assesses developments in the use of satellite imagery for archaeological research in recent decades, and the potential to use the large EAMENA database, designed for cultural heritage management, for wider questions of archaeological research.

First published in the American Chronicle, Buzzle and AfroArticles on 2nd May 2010

Republished in the portal of the exiled Oromo Parliamentarians

https://www.oromoparliamentarians.org/English/News_Archive/Oromo%20Action%20Plan%20for%20the%20Liberation%20of%20Oromia.htm

The present article is not an original, new text; it consists in the merge of eight articles first published in 2008. The text has been slightly modified, edited and updated. As the series was not completed, I will further expand in forthcoming articles in order to extensively describe the types of actions needed to be undertaken by independent average Oromos in view of the liberation of Oromia and the ultimate destruction of the monstrous colonial tyranny of Abyssinia, the world´s most racist and inhuman state. The present article consists of 21 units, as per below:

1. The Search for Oromo Leadership

2. A New Oromo Leadership: A Global First

3. Weaknesses of the Traditional Political Leadership

4. Identification of the Oromo Nation in 2010

5. Who is the enemy of the Oromos?

6. Local – Regional-level Foes

7. Authentic Oromos and Fabricated Amharas; the Total Opposition

8. Direct and Indirect Colonialism

9. Differentiation among Colonial Rulers

10. Anglo - French Colonial Establishment: Arch-enemy of the Oromo Nation

11. Millions of Oromo Leaders Organized in Independent Groups

12. Present Oromo "Leaderships" and their Inertia

13. Key Figures to Be Considered by All the Oromos

14. Biyya Oromo Independent – Whose Work Is It?

15. Groups of Oromo Liberation Activity – GOLA

16. Ground work

17. GOLA Security – Impenetrability

18. GOLA – Commitment

19. GOLA – Function

20. Basic Directions for GOLA Projects and Endeavours

21. Collection of Information Pertaining to the Oromo Nation

Several theses and dissertations have been written about the religious, political and cultural effects of the American missionary enterprise in the Middle East. This study lists the theses and dissertations which examine the missionary activities of the several American denominations and organizations including Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Pentecostals, Mormons, Quakers and Methodists in the Middle East throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the ‘old’ justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country’s specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no ‘moral’ character, but is simply a necessary condition to prevent sedition.

Through an examination of global climate change models combined with hydrological data on deteriorating water quality in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), we elucidate the ways in which the MENA countries are vulnerable to climate-induced impacts on water resources. Adaptive governance strategies, however, remain a low priority for political leaderships in the MENA region. To date, most MENA governments have concentrated the bulk of their resources on large-scale supply side projects such as desalination, dam construction, inter-basin water transfers, tapping fossil groundwater aquifers, and importing virtual water. Because managing water demand, improving the efficiency of water use, and promoting conservation will be key ingredients in responding to climate-induced impacts on the water sector, we analyze the political, economic, and institutional drivers that have shaped governance responses. While the scholarly literature emphasizes the importance of social capital to adaptive governance, we find that many political leaders and water experts in the MENA rarely engage societal actors in considering water risks. We conclude that the key capacities for adaptive governance to water scarcity in MENA are underdeveloped.

Long satisfied to attempt to dominate pan-Arab media and battle it out with Qatar’s state-owned Al Jazeera television network, Saudi Arabia has now set its hegemonic sights on influencing the media landscape of the non-Arabic speaking greater Middle East.

Disgusted with ISIS, some Kurds turned away from Islam following the fall of Mosul in 2014. Many became atheists, while others sought comfort in Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism, according to converts, was the “original” religion of the Kurds before they embraced Islam. In 2015, two Zoroastrian centers opened in Sulaimani, both of which are recognized by the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. Notably, neither has tried to recreate Zoroastrianism the way it is currently and has been historically practiced in Iran and South Asia. Instead, they have created their own versions of Zoroastrianism, which is nationalist, postmodern, and liberal. Kurdish Zoroastrians argue that the reason Kurds are “backward” is Islam. They seek to rectify the present situation through a Kurdish “authenticated” and “original” form of Zoroastrianism. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork at these two centers, the present article examines this new religious movement in Sulaimani, an important city in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq. It analyses the rise and distinctiveness of Kurdish Zoroastrianism looking at how Zoroastrian Kurds articulate their views on Islam, women’s rights, human rights, and Kurdish independence.

The nephew and successor of Shabaka was even less prudent than his uncle. Following a period of several years of co-regency, Shabataka (as known to the Assyrians) rose to the throne of Thebes and Napata in 706 BCE and ruled until 690 BCE. Probably in order to stabilize the huge but newly merged countries of Kush / Ethiopia (North Sudan) and Kemet (Egypt), he tried to appease Sharrukin (Sargon), Emperor of Assyria.

But assuredly, Shebitqu failed to accurately evaluate the formidable military might of Assyria that controlled the entire Asiatic part of the Middle East from today´s Turkey´s western confines to the central Iranian plateau, and from Caucasus to Yathribu (today´s Madina in Arabia) and the Persian Gulf. In Shebitqu´s days, the ancient state of Israel (of the ten Hebrew tribes) had disappeared and its entire population (all the Israelites) had been taken to exile in Assyria´s northeastern confines; only the tiny southern Hebrew state of Judah (of the two tribes) had managed to survive around Jerusalem. Damascus and many other Aramaean states had also disappeared, being annexed by Assyria, similarly with the Neo-Hittite states, Urartu, Babylonia, and many minor states in the area of the Zagros mountains and the Iranian plateau.

To avoid an imminent Assyrian attack, Shebitqu extradited Iamanni of Asfdod, the Palestinian king, to Sharrukin of Assyria (722 – 705).
First published on 25th March 2010 in AfroArticles, Buzzle, and American Chronicle
Republished in the portal of the Oromo Parliamentarians:
https://www.oromoparliamentarians.org/English/Facts%20about%20Oromo/Kushatic%20-Oromo%20%20Palestinians.htm

First published on 30th December 2020 here:
https://megalommatis.wordpress.com/2020/12/30/oromo-history-and-african-christianity-nobatia-makuria-and-alodia-the-cushitic-christian-kingdoms-of-ethiopia-in-sudan-axum-agaw-and-pseudo-solomonic-abyssinia/

This article is mainly written as an introductory information for every Oromo, Afar, Sidama, Ogadeni, Hadiya, Berta, Agaw, Anuak, Nuer, Kaffa, Kmabata, Shekacho, Gedeo and other Eastern African whose nation has been subjugated, persecuted and oppressed within the tyrannical colonial state of Amhara & Tigray-led Abyssinia (i.e. Fake Ethiopia). Abyssinia has no historical right to the fair name of Ethiopia which is the term by which Ancient Greeks and Romans denoted the kingdom and the nation immediately south of the Egyptian border, i.e. Cush (today's Sudan). Many among the aforementioned oppressed nations of Abyssinia are of Cushitic ancestry and originate from the northern part of today's Sudan.

What follows is not a proper and concise historical presentation; it is only my recent exchange of messages and emails with an Oromo scholar, who happens to be a faithful Waaqeffatta, i.e. one of the followers of Waaqeffannaa, which has been the traditional monotheistic religion of the Oromos, Eastern Africa's greatest and most ancient Cushitic nation. As he asked me few points about the diffusion and the survival of Christianity in Eastern Africa, I felt obliged to prepare a brief diagram and add a few links for any Oromo to make his own search. All Oromos must learn about the History of Christianity in Egypt, Sudan (i.e. the only true, historical Ethiopia), and Axumite Abyssinia, so that they don't fall victims of colonial forgeries diffused by the French, the English and the Americans or of pseudo-historical narratives of the ominous Abyssinian debteras. 

Whereas there was Christian continuity in Sudan (Ethiopia) until the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th, there was Christian disruption and discontinuity in Abyssinia. Axum collapsed in the 7th c. due to the early Islamic expansion. Agaw Christianity is Cushitic, brief, and totally unrelated to Axum, as the Agaw kingdom rose to power no less than 500 years after the dismantlement of Axum. And the rise of the Amhara pseudo-Christian bogus-kingdom (in the 2nd half of the 13th c.) does not consist in continuity but complete disruption from the Agaw dynasty. Based on a forged trash named 'Kebra Negast', the Amhara pseudo-kingdom represents the most ludicrous invention of the World History: the fabrication of the otherwise nonexistent 'Solomonic' dynasty. In other words, Axum has nothing to do with Lalibela, Lalibela has nothing to do with Gondar, and Gondar is not Christian, but Satanic.

The period from 9th to 13th century saw unification of the Maghrib for the first time. This was also the time when the Maghrib dominated the West Mediterranean. A crucial characteristic of this unification was that the unification happened in the name of a religious idea. Till now, no orthodox doctrine had yet taken shape so in the meanwhile all Islamic doctrines like Kharijism, Zaydism, Shi'ism, Malikite militantism, Almohadism were tried. This part of history is often interpreted as serious of religious movements which is generalization on part of historians because this undermines the political aspect of the movement. (Abdullah Lauroi).  By the 10th c the process of islamisation was completed in the Maghrib. The establishment of the Arab rule in the Maghrib only marks the beginning of this process and the Arabs cannot be credited with this task.