Halit M Tagma

Learning theories in political science can be difficult for students. The manuscript shares a technique to help students understand how a theory on human characteristics may impact behavior. I use a mini-simulation where two volunteers are asked to enact a gimmick in front of the classroom, demonstrating the theory of human territoriality (Asal et al. 2018). While the volunteers engage in small talk, the instructor points out that they engage with one another at a certain distance and angle that reflects social space. As the exercise progresses, students easily relate to the theory of human territoriality, defined as the symbolic and physical connection to a space considered as one's own. This mini-simulation achieves the following learning objectives that a) theories are very relevant and help explain human behavior, b) the workings of the individual-level of analysis, and c) theories are not universal and have limits in their application across culture, time, and space. This teaching technique requires no preparation time and resources, and students easily comprehend the expected learning outcomes. Having received overwhelmingly positive feedback in evaluations, I share this as a viable technique for teaching theory in general as it helps students comprehend what a theory is supposed to do—that is, to understand, explain, and sometimes predict behavior.

This chapter understands the Iranian nuclear contention as situated in a larger context of global capitalism and disputes the anarchic nature of world poli- tics presented in the chapter. Adopting a structuralist approach, this chapter focuses on the historical forces and class interests at play in the making of the nuclear dispute and in doing so locates the origins of it in a far earlier period in history than the recent decades. The chapter starts by theorizing the development of modern state apparatuses in response to an integrating and hierarchical capitalist economy centered on core and peripheral coun- tries. Accordingly, within global capitalism governments in core countries ful ll the demands of their economic elite, whereas the ruling elite in the periphery help supply the demand for natural resources of core countries. This process includes many polito-economic antagonisms within and across countries that are often, but not always, suppressed or deferred. We then trace the expansion of the world capitalist system through the early twentieth century by the integration of Iran’s supply of energy resources. Going over the domestic politics within Iran during its inclusion in the world economic system, we highlight the antagonisms and repressions in Iran as a re ec- tion of the workings of the world system. The Iranian revolution spelled a potential destabilizing threat to regional monarchies and a symbolic threat to global order not for realpolitik reasons but for overturning the established regional and global hierarchy. The Iranian nuclear dispute is a continuation of the attempt to isolate and punish a pariah through economic sanctions in a global economic order. In this regard, we analyze the JCPOA as an attempt by core country capital to normalize relations by importing cheap energy supplies, exporting consumer goods while at the same time limiting Iranian elite’s attempt to develop a nuclear weapon which would solidify its polito- military status within the system. However, the JCPOA was also opposed by certain ‘fractions of capital’ in wealthy and powerful countries (and their regional allies) who did not want Iranian energy exports to reduce commodity prices, strengthen the theocratic–economic elite, and formalize relations with a pariah revolutionary regime. The chapter concludes by arguing that the con- tinued diplomatic contention over Iran in core countries is a con ict between competing capital interests over core countries’ foreign policy.

International Relations | Middle East Studies "In this important book, Halit M. E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. go beyond previous scholarly efforts to provide important insights and rectifications. Engaging in what they refer to as 'eclectic pluralism,' the authors provide outstanding applications of various theories to the Iranian nuclear program, thus illuminating different and often overlooked aspects of it. The result is a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the challenges and opportunities the United States and other actors in international politics have in their relations with Iran."-AKAN MALICI, Furman University "This book is a superb example of the benefit of using rigorous theoretical perspectives in analyzing 'real-world problems' and serves as a well-argued defense of eclectic pluralism in international relations. The chapters are empirically rich and theoretically sound. This book will not only benefit undergraduate and graduate students but also the educated public who wish to understand the politics and complexity surrounding Iran's nuclear program."-BALKAN DEVLEN, University of Copenhagen "The idea of this book in employing the contending theoretical perspectives is so clever and convenient that the authors skillfully show why the nature of the case itself necessitates the use of different theoretical perspectives to make an objective explanation of the issue. Surely, this book can be used not only as an intellectual contribution to the case and the theories but also as an example/model of how to do further research."-RAMAZAN GÖZEN, Marmara University "Borrowing from Graham Allison's seminal approach, this book proceeds to take multiple different theoretical/analytic 'cuts' upon the Iran case. The result is a rich analysis of the Iranian case and useful insights into Iran's motivations. Courses covering security studies, American foreign policy, IR theories, and proliferation will find this book a valuable addition to the syllabus. This is a very interesting and well-written book on a subject of current and future interest!"-THOMAS PRESTON, Washington State University Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' analyzes the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program and explores the various aspects and dimensions of the international dispute using several academic perspectives, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multilevel games. Halit M. E. Tagma is assistant professor in the department of politics and international affairs at Northern Arizona University. Paul E. Lenze, Jr. is senior lecturer in the department of politics and international affairs at Northern Arizona University. Cover image © Belus/iStock/Getty Images Plus

The concluding chapter asks the question, what have we learned from sev- eral of the chapters? How can we project possible trajectories for the future of Iran’s nuclear program based on each theoretical angle? The chapter appraises theoretical pluralism and analytical eclecticism in political science and IR and argues that scholars would benefit from using multiple perspectives, thereby making their arguments potentially more appealing to area studies scholars, policy-makers, and general readership.

Building on the domestic politics approach of the previous chapter, chapter 6 argues that a two-level game approach might best capture the politics leading to the resolution of the ‘crisis’ which starts in the second term of the Obama administration. Originally proposed by Robert Putnam, a two-level game approach focuses on political leaders, who while trying to reach international agreements, have to face shifting and opposing domestic coalitions. This approach calls attention to an international agreement that must be struck on two levels: domestic and international. This chapter argues that the last two years of the ‘crisis’ and its resolution can best be understood through this perspective.
In 2013, the Sultan of Oman was used as an intermediary to send messages between the Obama administration and Supreme Leader Khamenei. In March 2013, a secret meeting took place between the diplomats of both sides acting at the behest of Obama and Khamenei.
Both leaders were aware that they had a four-year window of opportunity for a successful resolution, which is why on numerous occasions the U.S. president had called for an extension of numerous deadlines to finalize a deal. Obama and Khamenei came to witness various interests and oppositions in their domestic audiences that did not desire a resolution of the conflict. Even an optimum resolution would be lauded as “too much compromise” on each side’s domestic audience. Khamenei was balancing pressures and changes both externally from abroad, as well as internal forces from domestic factions. In other words, his changing position and public statements could best be read as an effort to simultaneously respond to heterogeneous pressures from outside as well as inside the regime. For example, on the interna- tional dimension, in front of the public, Foreign Minister Zarif (along with President Rouhani) and the supreme leader were playing the role of the ‘good cop’ and the ‘bad cop,’ respectively. Toward the international arena this good-cop/bad-cop strategy aimed to acquire concessions, such as an immedi- ate lifting of all sanctions (Erdbrink and Sanger 2015; Irish and Mohammed 2015), while at the same time avoiding any confrontation or appearance of hostility. This is the external dimension of Khamenei’s two-level game. On the internal dimension, Khamenei could not afford to be regarded as being too conciliatory toward the West for fear of rivals such as Rafsanjani and the hardliners.
Comparatively, President Obama was more limited in his ability to con- trol the domestic interests and audiences given the democratic nature of the regime and the fact that Congress was now under the majority of the opposition Republicans. Domestic Republican opposition in the United States accused Obama of creating a power vacuum in the Middle East and allowing Iranian expansionism (Rubin 2015). For example, Tom Cotton, the Arkansas senator, recruited forty-seven Republican senators to sign a let- ter addressed to Tehran arguing that an agreement could be revoked by an incoming administration (Baker 2015). Although there were great challenges, the international deal was finally reached by extensive diplomatic bargaining and domestic maneuvering. This domestic maneuvering was done by both the U.S. and Iran given Obama and Khamanei’s knowledge of the other actors’ positioning during negotiations, which is the third level game.

This chapter contextualizes Iran’s nuclear dispute by offering a neoliberal institutional perspective. The reason why Iran’s nuclear program was a contention is because it was considered a violation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Iranian nuclear program builds up to a ‘crisis’ precisely because the powerful states who put the nonproliferation regime in effect wanted it to remain intact, and to do so, they saw it best to punish what they saw as a violation of this international regime. The maintainers of this regime, mainly the United States and members of the UN Security Council, the IAEA, and European states, aimed to punish Tehran by imposing costs on its perceived violation and thereby maintain and uphold the nonproliferation regime. The chapter reviews several of the international sanctions imposed on Iran and Tehran’s efforts to bypass them. The literature on the effectiveness of international sanctions is divided, where some argue for its success in changing the behavior of target countries and others disagreeing (Baldwin 1999; Pape 1998). The chapter concludes by arguing that although the international sanctions did not immediately impact the behavior of a target state (as Iran found new means of exchange), however, sanctions did increase costs domestically
for Tehran to reconsider its stance.

This chapter introduces the history of Iran’s nuclear program by breaking it down into three separable historical phases. The preliminary phase of Iran’s nuclear activities started during the early Shah period where the administra- tion reached several nuclear contracts with French and Canadian companies, dealt with a friendly Washington, and sent its first batch of students to uni- versities in the United States, such as MIT, to become the future nuclear scientists of Iran. The second phase of Iran’s nuclear program can be referred to as a period of stagnation, where after the Islamic revolution the regime was isolated, lost its access to international funds and technology, and was dead- locked in a bitter war of attrition with Iraq. The third phase of Iran’s nuclear program is with the renewed interest of Tehran in constructing clandestine nuclear sites that were exposed to the international community by a group of Iranian dissidents in 2002. This chapter serves as a historical introduction and background to Iran’s nuclear program with emphasis on key turning points, actors, and events.

This chapter understands the Iranian nuclear contention as situated in a larger context of global capitalism and disputes the anarchic nature of world politics presented in the chapter. Adopting a structuralist approach, this chapter focuses on the historical forces and class interests at play in the making of the nuclear dispute and in doing so locates the origins of it in a far earlier period in history than the recent decades. The chapter starts by theorizing the development of modern state apparatuses in response to an integrating and hierarchical capitalist economy centered on core and peripheral countries. Accordingly, within global capitalism governments in core countries fulfill the demands of their economic elite, whereas the ruling elite in the periphery help supply the demand for natural resources of core countries. This process includes many polito-economic antagonisms within and across countries that are often, but not always, suppressed or deferred. We then trace the expansion of the world capitalist system through the early twentieth century by the integration of Iran’s supply of energy resources. Going over the domestic politics within Iran during its inclusion in the world economic system, we highlight the antagonisms and repressions in Iran as a reflection of the workings of the world system. The Iranian revolution spelled a potential destabilizing threat to regional monarchies and a symbolic threat to global order not for realpolitik reasons but for overturning the established regional and global hierarchy. The Iranian nuclear dispute is a continuation of the attempt to isolate and punish a pariah through economic sanctions in a global economic order. In this regard, we analyze the JCPOA as an attempt by core country capital to normalize relations by importing cheap energy supplies, exporting consumer goods while at the same time limiting Iranian elite’s attempt to develop a nuclear weapon which would solidify its politomilitary status within the system. However, the JCPOA was also opposed by certain ‘fractions of capital’ in wealthy and powerful countries (and their regional allies) who did not want Iranian energy exports to reduce commodity prices, strengthen the theocratic–economic elite, and formalize relations with a pariah revolutionary regime. The chapter concludes by arguing that the continued diplomatic contention over Iran in core countries is a conflict between
competing capital interests over core countries’ foreign policy

This chapter focuses on the security challenges and perceptions that Iran was facing during the early 2000s. Being isolated by the international community, and with a weakened rival Iraq to its West, Iran did not appear to have an immediate security concern, which from a security perspective would neces- sitate a clandestine nuclear program. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan in bring- ing down the Taliban regime. The ‘axis of evil’ speech escalated the hostility between Iran and the United States. Iran’s Eastern neighbor Afghanistan and Western neighbor Iraq were both occupied by the United States who were referring to Iran as a part of an axis of evil. Given this geostrategic setting, this chapter explores whether or not Iran’s nuclear program was put in effect with possible security concerns.
The chapter advances two Realist hypotheses—one defensive, the other offensive. From a defensive Realist perspective, the regional and structural conditions in Iran’s region increase its threat perception and, therefore, Tehran understands that it must increase its military capabilities. The con- tention surrounding Iran’s nuclear program is not solely due to Tehran itself and the defensive Realist hypothesis only partially explains the escalation of Iran’s nuclear program into a ‘crisis’.
From an offensive Realist perspective, the United States as the sole regional hegemon in the international system wants to prevent the rise of another regional hegemon in the international system by offshore balanc- ing, which means allying with regional states to curb the rise of a potential hegemon in the Middle East. Interestingly, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused a dramatic change in the balance of power in the Middle East. The region was suddenly transformed from a tripolarity (Iraq–Iran–Saudi Arabia) to an evolving bipolar regional order with the elimination of Iraq as a stakeholder. Iran was not only relieved of a historic rival that fought a bitter war in the 1980s, but also now had an opportunity to  ll in the “power vacuum” and use its in uence among the Shiite population of Iraq to expand its in uence. Given this regional bipolarity, the offensive Realist perspective we advance argues that the United States is allying with anti-Iranian factions and states within the region to prevent Iranian hegemony. An Iranian nuclear capability would dramatically increase Tehran’s position in the strategic situ- ation. Consequently, the United States is using its military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities to offshore balance and prevent a possible nuclear Iran that would change the balance of power in the region.

The manuscript offers a novel perspective on the domestic sources of foreign policy for a smaller ally in alliance politics, which is applied to an untheorized actor in one of the most widely studied cases in the field of foreign policy analysis—the Cuban missile crisis. In doing so, the manuscript integrates domestic politics, geopolitics, and elite bargaining through an empirical and historical investigation. The study is the result of archival work, elite interviews, and the triangulation of those findings with secondary literature. The findings suggest that although conventional analysis point out that the Cuban crisis was resolved by the superpowers’ secret deal to remove missiles in Cuba and Turkey, a smaller ally’s strategic silence was important for the resolution of the crisis. The manuscript problematizes this crisis' Western-centric ending by advancing the concept of strategic silence, which I define as an actor’s intentional policy to overlook a development against its interests when the cost of revealing the awareness outweighs the benefits. The manuscript advances that Turkey was extremely likely to be aware of such a secret-swap-deal and Ankara attempted to convince Washington not to make a swap agreement. However, once the crisis was resolved Ankara remained strategically silent due to a set of reasons: a) to uphold the image of an intact NATO and maintain an untarnished image of U.S. commitment to its security interests, b) to protect the domestic legitimacy of a fragile coalition government, and c) to extract U.S. foreign economic and military assistance. Accordingly, this peripheral perspective problematizes the conventional narrative of the end of the crisis and offers space for foreign policy analysis beyond North America. The argument corroborates with empirical evidence to advance our understanding of alliance politics and the role of domestic politics in the conduct of foreign policy.