Monroe C. Beardsley

It might appear that the titular question has already received a widely accepted answer (as indicated by Peter Kivy in 1999): aesthetic expression is an emotional quality of an expressive object, and not the actual expression of its creator’s real feelings. The latter thesis lay at the heart of the so‑called classic expression theory that dominated aesthetic views during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Later, however, that theory was repeatedly subjected to fundamental criticism and gradually replaced by the view cited by Kivy – a view that had also remained essentially binding for around two thousand years: from the times of Plato to the eighteenth century. So at least that element of the dispute over expression seemed to have been resolved. However, in 2003, The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics included an attempt to reinstate a version of classic expression theory, using arguments that were unquestionably persuasive. The aim of the present article is to assess that proposition and to attempt to resolve the renewed dispute between classic expression theory and the still dominant view of aesthetic expression.

Neste capítulo, abordo o tema da definição de arte. Uma definição de arte tenta fornecer uma resposta para a questão “O que é a arte?”, uma questão tipicamente metafísica. De forma geral, uma definição de arte especifica qual é a natureza da arte. Inicialmente, apresento a posição de Weitz, que nega a possibilidade da definição de arte. Em seguida apresento algumas das principais definições propostas como resposta a essa posição, a saber, a definição histórico-semântica de Danto, a definição institucional de Dickie e a definição estética de Beardsley. Na sequência, aponto uma retomada da posição que nega a possibilidade da definição de arte, defendida por Gaut a partir da noção de cluster. E, além disso, mostro uma proposta híbrida de definição de arte, com aspectos estéticos e institucionais, defendida por Davies. Assim, apresento algumas das principais tentativas de responder ao problema da definição de arte, sem tomar uma posição sobre qual delas é a mais satisfatória, apontando continuidades desse debate, a fim de instigar novos estudos.

With regard to the distinction between functional and procedural definitions of art, that has been proposed by Steven Davies, the paper develops a functional account of art that tries to understand works of art as part of a certain kind of reflexive practice. In the first part the definitional proposals of Weitz, Dickie and Beardsley are discussed and their major shortcomings as well as their positive insights are presented. It is argued that Beardsley is on the right track with his functional definition, but determines the function of art in a wrong way. In the second part the papers develops a functional account of art that isn’t relying on the concept of aesthetic experience, but rather relies on the concept of reflexivity that has been developed by Hegel. Questions of an art-specific reflexivity are discussed as well as the problem that works of literature and ready-mades pose for a traditional definition that tries to understand the specifity of artistic reflexivity in terms of sensous materials.

LEA - Lingue e letterature d’Oriente e d’Occidente, n. 5 (2016), pp. 284-311
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13128/LEA-1824-484x-20038

Em 1973 Harold Bloom publicou o livro The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. Uma variação sobre este título poderá ser-nos hoje útil para abordar um outro tipo de ansiedade: o da unidade. Os campos da edição e da interpretação vivem imersos nesse outro tipo de ansie-dade. Tanto a interpretação, preocupada com a intenção do autor, da obra ou do leitor, como a edição, angustiada com as intenções finais do autor e o estabelecimento do copy-text, parecem, por vezes, pouco capazes de se libertarem desse ensejo de unidade e de se adaptarem à existência da multiplicidade. Neste artigo, procuro fazer um novo apelo a uma necessária mudança de paradigma, atendendo, em especial, às novas e libertadoras possibilidades potenciadas pela edição electrónica.

In 1973 Harold Bloom published his book The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. A variation on this title might be useful for us today to refer to another kind of anxiety: the anxiety of unity. The fields of editing and interpretation lie within this other kind of anxiety. Interpretation, concerned with the author’s, the reader’s or the work’s intention, and editing, worried about the author’s final intentions and the setting up of the copy-text, seem, at times, unable to free themselves from the need to attain unity and adapt to the existence of multiplicity. In this article I intend to make a new appeal on behalf of a change of paradigm, addres- sing, especially, the new and liberating possibilities of electronic editing.

This paper proposes a new functionalist way of thinking about post‑modern works of art (broadly conceived) by suspending the typical expectation that works of art serve to impart aesthetic experiences. Using the theories of Rudolf Arnheim, the criterion is switched instead to experience. In this way, the typical shortcoming of functionalism is overcome while restoring what is intuitive about the theory. Thus, against standard functionalist theories that dismiss works like Duchamp's urinal or Warhol's brillo boxes, this paper affirms the ubiquity of this conception of art, which is opened up as experience , because these works enhance our experience of the world. What this revised functionalist theory assumes is that even though works of art do not provide aesthetic experiences exclusively, they are nevertheless bounded as artistic statements. But this boundedness does imply simplicity in any sense.

Cet article examine les conceptions de la texture proposées par plusieurs théoriciens (Beardsley, Genette, Eco, Deleuze) et les questionne de près, en les confrontant méditativement au travail d'artistes graphiques (en particulier Kollwitz et Rothko). Beardsley conçoit la texture comme un équivalent de la structure à l'échelle du détail de l'oeuvre. Cela permet de penser en termes formalistes quelque chose qui pouvait apparaître comme un sensible ineffable (ou vaguement approché par un langage métaphorique). Genette reprend la distinction entre structure et texture, et marque que la seconde relève davantage de l'attention. L'appréhension de la texture exige une attention au détail. Mais qu'est-ce que le détail ? Le concept de texture étant transdisciplinaire, il faut se demander si le détail a le même statut dans les différents arts. Nous interrogeons en particulier le rapport entre signification et détail en littérature et en peinture (ou dessin). Cela nous amène à considérer des « formes » texturales asignifiantes et à préférer le terme infrastructurel à microstructurel pour caractériser leur statut. L'infrastructurel dans son rapport à l'asignifiant, c'est ce qu'Eco ne nous paraît pas avoir su déceler, parce que son approche (la sémiologie structurale) ne le permet pas. La conception deleuzo-guattarienne de l'asignifiance nous permet-elle en revanche d'approcher convenablement la texture et son étrange communication ?

This article examines the conceptions of texture proposed by several theorists (Beardsley, Genette, Eco, Deleuze) and questions them closely, confronting them with the work of graphic artists (in particular Kollwitz and Rothko). Beardsley conceives of texture as equivalent to structure on a smaller scale. It enables one to think in formalist terms about something that could appear as an ineffable sense object. Genette builds on the distinction between structure and texture, and shows that the second is more a matter of attention. The apprehension of texture demands close attention to detail. But what is detail ? The concept of texture being transdisciplinary, it is necessary to ask whether detail has the same status in different arts. I interrogate in particular the relationship between signification and detail in literature and in painting (or drawing). This brings me to consider asignifying textural « forms », and to prefer infrastructural to microstructural as a term to characterize their status. Because of his approach (structural semiology), Eco did not elaborate a theory of infrastructural forms with asignifying qualities. In contrast, does the concept of asignifying signs developed by Deleuze and Guattari allow us to appropriately approach texture and its strange form of communication ?

The unchanging destiny for all the theories of metaphor is, that none of them are untouchable. In other words, it is quite natural that polarizations appear as long as the basic reflex in the process of the next theory is to handle, collect, or distribute the previous ones. Metaphor continues to change with the parts that are still unclear under the roof of philosophy as a concept discussed over about two thousand years. In this sense, the most dangerous thing is to try to determine “fixed rules” in a non-stationary discipline. Therefore, metaphor is either the center of many things (in a positive sense) or a secondary problem, especially for the style. Considering that the types of meaning in the Middle Ages were “semantic meaning, allegorical meaning, metaphorical meaning, mystical meaning”, the basic role of metaphor is to represent the opposite of the “real”. So in the process of cognition, it is possible to view the metaphor as a rhetorical element that distorts the truth, pulls away the intention of the speaking person in taking metaphor seriously, ist best to be analyzed inside the concept of “absurdity”. Treating the absurdity in the context of metaphor theories or the idea that absurdity is a metaphorical structure will undoubtedly facilitate the analysis of the term. I have tried to emphasize the element of the paradox in the basis of absurdity with Beardsley, Strub and Ricoeur. Nevertheless, since the theoretical explanation will remain vague, I have made several applications and used the story "Under the Light of the Night Lights" by Kamuran Şipal, which in my opinion corresponds to the theme. As a result of the explanation, it will be seen that the computed is actually not a category error, but an absurd sentence. Therefore the metaphor is not a "calculable category error", but a "calculable absurdity".

This chapter explores the use, purpose, and definition of the concept of aesthetic autonomy in analytical philosophy of music and New Musicology. I start by sketching the genesis, methodology, and development of analytical philosophy of art, the history of which has not been investigated systematically. Here, I show how early analytical philosophy of art warmed to aesthetics in general only very slowly, as it was commonly regarded as unscientific, speculative, and thus not subject to analysis up to the 1950s and 1960s. I then proceed to analyse the relations between aesthetic autonomy and music as well as three more specific notions of autonomy: the autonomy of the work from its historical setting, the autonomy of aesthetic experience, and the autonomy of musical expression. The first-named aspect is discussed by sketching the debate arising from Monroe Beardsley's and William Wimsatt's "The Intentional Fallacy," which continues to influence modern discourse on the role of authorial intention in aesthetics. This leads to the second question, the question of aesthetic autonomy, examined by reconstructing the exchange between Monroe Beardsley and John Dickie, who discussed this concept publicly over several decades. I then turn to the broad set of problems associated with autonomy, formalism, and expression in analytical philosophy of music since the early 1980s and
competing concepts of emotivism: arousal, expression, portrayal, the "contour theory" by Stephen Davies and Peter Kivy, as well as modern notions of a musical persona. Finally, I discuss musical autonomy in terms of the paradigm shift ushered in by New Musicology and its critique of formal analysis and positivism. In a final step, I try to show that traditional and New Musicology are compatible when considered as perspectivist approaches to music, applying to distinct sets of questions and thus presenting complementary rather than irreconcilable methodologies.

Monroe Beardsley apresenta uma definição estética de arte em “An
Aesthetic Definition of Art” (1983), defendendo a ligação necessária entre arte e
estética. Beardsley propõe que uma obra de arte é algo feito com a intenção de ter
a capacidade de satisfazer um interesse estético. Noël Carroll alega que existem
obras de arte criadas sem intenções estéticas e que algumas obras não possuem a
capacidade de proporcionar experiências estéticas. Além disso, Carroll argumenta
que existem obras cujo estatuto de arte é anterior à apreciação destas obras como
arte. Este artigo pretende apresentar a definição estética de arte de Beardsley e
analisar como as objeções a ela podem ser respondidas.

Bezüglich der Metapher und der Anwendung der Metapherntheorien findet ein begriffliches Chaos nicht nur in der westlichen Literatur statt, sondern sorgt auch vor allem in der türkischen Literatur für Probleme. Die hier abgeschlossene Arbeit besteht aus insgesamt drei Büchern, die als Liber Primus (LP), Liber Secundus (LS) und Liber Tertius (LT) betitelt sind. Alle drei Bücher können von Forschern separat bewertet werden. So beinhaltet das erste Buch die Historie des belâgat, sowie die Geschichte der Antiken Rhetorik. Analysierende Gegenüberstellung von Rhetorik und belâgat sind ebenfalls Teil dieses Abschnittes. Dieser einleitende Abschnitt beabsichtigt dem Leser sowohl einen Überblick über den historischen Verlauf der Rhetorik und des belâgat in der Wissenschaftsforschung zu verleihen als auch dem Leser das Verständnis des zweiten Buches zu erleichtern. Das zweite Buch involviert Begriffe des belâgat, Theorien und dessen Figuren. Begriffe und Theorien zur Metapher sind ebenfalls Untersuchungsinhalte des zweiten Buches. Hier konzentriert sich die Arbeit vorerst auf Bedeutungsinhalte der entsprechenden Termini im Deutschen wie im Türkischen und deren Funktion in der Redekunst. Hauptziel in diesem Abschnitt ist die Suche nach einer begrifflichen Äguivalenz zum Begriff der Metapher im Türkischen durch Vergleich von Rhetorik und belâgat. Die Analyse des Begriffschaos ist Inhalt des dritten Buches (Liber Tertius). Durch Diagramme, die in unterschiedliche Bedeutungs- und Funktionsfelder unterteilt sind, werden potenzielle Verteilungen der Figuren des mecâz in Bezug auf die Metapher angezeigt. Dabei wird der Versuch gebracht, die im zweiten Buch angesprochenen Begriffe im Einzelnen zu analysieren. Durch vergleichende Bewertungsschritte dieser Begriffe werden mithilfe der Diagrammtechnik die Termini im Einzelnen und im Vergleich miteinander systematisiert. So kann das Buch Liber Tertius auch als bewertende Schlussfolgerung der Arbeit gesehen werden.

Evaluating a story within the framework of the “absurdity theory” of metaphor requires questioning the text in comparison to reality and evaluating the position it has taken within the framework of its own system versus reality. The metaphorical process which begins with a socially consensus on the meaning of a word – a word means the same for all individuals of a society –continues with “logical contrast” and “inner contradiction”. Subjects like the definition of metaphor, compatibility, randomness and time are always causing a opposition inside of absurdity. The theory of absurdity in this regard is in a conflict with reality and perception of reality. Thus, stories that include “dream” and “imagination” are very appropriate for explaining this theory. In the story “The Forgotten” by Oğuz Atay, both levels were positioned one above the other, along with the continuity they create within. In emphasizing the differences between bending, breaking, knotting, and reshaping reality, we would have mentioned an important conceptual chaos in explaining the concept of “absurdity.”

Bunsen’in Heidelberg’te bir laboratuvarı vardır zamanında. Bir arkadaşı ziyaretine gelir. Bunsen ciddi bir ifade ile test tüplerinin ve gaz beki’nin önünde, kapalı bir tencereyi hafifçe sağa sola çekmektedir. Arkadaşı selam verip yanına yaklaşır, merakla ne yaptığını sorar: “Asit- su testi mi yapıyorsun?” Kaşlarını kaldırır Bunsen. “Mineral bazlı bir sıvı?” Yine kaşlarını kaldırır. “Bitki özü esaslı bir deney?” Sağa sola sallar kafasını, “hayır” der Bunsen. Arkadaşı iki tur atar laboratuvarda: “Peki… O halde bir aleti sterilize ediyorsun?” Bunsen tebessüm eder: “Tutturamadın yine...” Arkadaşı pes eder: “O zaman eminim... Tüm dünyayı yerinden oynatacak bir icat peşindesin?” Bunsen tencereyi ocaktan çeker. Yavaşça kapağını açar; birkaç sosis görünür buhar içinde. “Acıktım, sosis pişiriyorum” der.
En mühim metafor teorilerinden olan, Beardsley ve Henle merkezli olarak tetkikine çalıştığımız “Absürtlük Teorisi” hususi bir terminolojiye sahip olduğu için diğer teoriler ile bağlantılı olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu minvalde “Absürtlüğün Konumu” ile izahata başlanmıştır ki bu başlık delâletten, “yalan yanlış”a; poetik çıkmazdan Sisypos’a kadar kavramın klasik idrakini de muhtevidir. Ardından Beardsley’in izahına geçilmiştir. Bilhassa “sözlü muhalefet” ekseninde yapılan analizler “genişlemiş, içeriksel ve çağrışımsal anlam” ile “bükülme” kavramları kullanılarak detaylandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Henle ise bu teorinin temsilcisi olmasa da muhalif tavrı yahut kendisine yöneltilen eleştiriler ile “hesaplanabilir absürtlük”ün mimarlarından sayılabilir.
Metafor teorileri kapsamında yazdığımız bu dördüncü kitap ile (1.Lacan’ın Metafor Anlayışı, 2.Cicero ve Hegel’in Metafor Anlayışları, 3. Richards ve Black’in Metafor Anlayışları) tahminler yürütmek yerine kaynamakta olan tencerenin kapağını aralamayı ve pişmekte olan ne varsa ikram etmeyi amaçlamaktayız.

Para incluir a variada produção artística do século XX, alguns filósofos negam que haja qualquer condição estética que algo deva satisfazer para ser arte. Mas será que é preciso abandonar condições estéticas para se definir arte, a fim de que, assim, se possa incluir casos como os ready-mades de Duchamp e da Arte Conceitual como casos de arte? As principais objeções às definições estéticas de arte centram-se no argumento de que elas excluem esses casos como casos de arte e que esses seriam, portanto, contraexemplos às definições estéticas de arte. Neste artigo, pretendo mostrar que a definição estética de Monroe Beardsley pode responder à objeção da arte “não-estética” de Timothy Binkley, uma vez que a base para esta objeção é uma concepção puramente perceptual da experiência estética.

Autonomist concepts of art have repeatedly been criticized for being unable to satisfactorily elucidate the value art has for us. Nonetheless, the autonomy aesthetic currently enjoys growing popularity again. This has to do with the fact that the autonomy aesthetic lives on in art theories that decidedly oppose it, especially art theories that strengthen the concept of function. This lecture shows that one does not escape the problems of autonomism by a) assigning to art the particular function of enabling aesthetic experiences and thus b) describing this experience as one worthwhile having for its own sake. A glance at Monroe C. Beardsley’s functiona¬listic definition of art shows that the value of aesthetic experiences must rather be determined with a view to the relationships that exist between aesthetic experiences and other, non-artistic experiences.

Autonomieästhetischen Konzeptionen von Kunst ist immer wieder der Vorwurf gemacht worden, dass sie den Wert, den Kunst für uns hat, nicht zufriedenstellend erläutern können. Gleichwohl erfreut sich die Autonomieästhetik derzeit wieder größerer Beliebtheit. Das hängt auch damit zusammen, dass die Autonomieästhetik in Kunsttheorien weiterlebt, die sich dezidiert gegen sie wenden. Das gilt auch für Kunsttheorien, die den Begriff der Funktion stark machen. Der Vortrag zeigt, dass man den Problemen des Autonomismus nicht entkommt, wenn man Kunst a) die besondere Funktion zuschreibt, ästhetische Erfahrungen zu ermöglichen und man diese Erfahrung b) als eine Erfahrung beschreibt, die es lohnt um ihrer selbst willen zu machen. Ein Blick auf Monroe C. Beardsleys funktionalistische Definition von Kunst zeigt, dass man den Wert ästhetischer Erfahrungen vielmehr wesentlich mit Blick auf die Beziehungen bestimmen muss, die zwischen ästhetischen Erfahrungen und sonstigen nicht-künstlerischen Erfahrungen bestehen.