Nuclear Policy

This paper argues that the practice and performance of nuclear deterrence can never be fully representative or democratic due to the particular pressures placed on leaders by the nuclear condition. For nuclear deterrence to be effective – and for nuclear weapons to have any political value – a leader must always convince both their electorate as well as any possible foe, that they are willing to use nuclear weapons in extremis, irrespective of whether this is their true position. In any nuclear-armed state, where politicians privately believe that using nuclear weapons is always wrong, but publicly stress that possessing nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent is right, they are forced to act dishonestly. These tensions are particularly acute in the UK context given the reliance on just one form of nuclear weapons system for deterrence and the concurrent requirement to pre-delegate secret orders through a " letter of last resort ". The consequences for democratic nuclear-armed states are troubling; for public morality, the personal integrity of democratic leaders, and for true democratic accountability. The paper concludes that public criticism of political leaders, and citizen voting choices, ought to take account of the problem of transparency posed by policies of nuclear deterrence.

The purpose of this essay is to explain why Britain decided to acquire nuclear weapons. Hence, the argument exposed is that the main reason for the decision to create a nuclear bomb was the preservation of Britain’s international prestige aligned with their domestic politics, since UK’s great power position was threatened by the nuclear arm race during War World II and early Cold War.

In answer to the question "Why do states build or refrain from building nuclear weapons?," different assumptions lead us to different theoretical frameworks. So there are many different and even contradictory assumptions and theoretical frameworks on nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, a situation that makes comparative analysis meaningful. The article reviews the major debates and theories of nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation first, and then explains an alternative theoretical framework. In fact, the author tries to present a comprehensive image of nuclearisation and nonnuclearisation debates and theories on one hand, and a new theoretical framework on the other hand. "Strategic Identity" as the new framework of this research criticises the ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of nuclearisation debates and theories, and presents a new approach based on a mixture of internal, regional and international elements on one side, and incentives, processes and outcomes of both proliferation and nonproliferation on the other. Introduction Comparative analysis of nuclear policies does not have long precedence, but as Sagan believes, "there is now a large literature on nuclear decision-making inside the states that have developed nuclear weapons and a smaller, but still significant, set of case studies of states' decisions to refrain from developing nuclear weapons." 1 With the explosion of the first nuclear bomb in 1945, some scholars in International Relations and strategic studies starting paying specific attention to this new phenomenon and opened up study of the issue. And from then on comparative analysis of nuclear policies has acquired a rich body of literature. The theoretical debate over how nuclear proliferation should be explained, and whether future nuclear proliferation can be predicted or not, has been given fresh impetus since the end of the Second World War, and "Realist" explanations of nuclear proliferation have dominated thinking about nuclear weapons since the 1950s. 2 The domination of Realist explanations has been so powerful that one scholar has argued, "The history of nuclear proliferation is a strategic chain reaction based on the realist logic of threat perception, spun off by an initial threat perception." 3 Notwithstanding, other scholars believe that there are two broad theoretical camps on the questions related to the causes of nuclear proliferation. The first camp takes the Realist view that states acquire nuclear weapons because of their security demands, and the second camp takes the Idealist (Liberalist) view that states obtain nuclear weapons because they "learn to stop worrying and love the bomb." 4

Der im Titel dieser Arbeit genannte Spruch wurde im März 2011 zum Motto der deutschen Anti-Atomkraft-Bewegung. Nach den Unfällen von Three Mile Island (1979) und Tschernobyl (1986) hat die (immer noch andauernde) Reaktorkatastrophe von Fukushima das Risiko eines größten anzunehmenden Unfalls (GAU) erneut manifestiert und damit die Krise der Atompolitik dramatisch verschärft: Nun sehen sich die Atomkraftgegner abermals in ihrer Einschätzung der Atomkraft als Hochrisikotechnologie bestätigt, die selbst in einem technologisch so hoch entwickelten Land wie Japan nicht beherrschbar scheint. Manche Länder haben eine Atomausstiegs-Entscheidung nach Fukushima getroffen oder wurden in ihrer Ablehnung der Atomkraft bestätigt; andere wiederum sind in ihren nuklearen Ambitionen zumindest gedämpft, und wieder andere betreiben business as usual.
Es stellt sich die Frage, warum die Nachbarn Frankreich und Deutschland, die ihre Politiken in anderen Bereichen zunehmend koordinieren,  mit diesem Risiko so unterschiedlich umgehen; warum die deutsche Regierung Maßnahmen ergreift, die in absehbarer Zeit zur Beendigung der Atomkraftnutzung führen, die französische sie jedoch lediglich einhegen will. Betrachtet man die energiepolitischen Reaktionen beider Länder auf Fukushima oberflächlich, so scheint die Sache klar zu sein: Frankreich zeigt sich durch die Reaktorkatastrophe wenig beeindruckt, Deutschland dafür um so mehr; Frankreich betreibt unbeirrt seine Atomkraftwerke weiter, während Deutschland sie in einer panischen Reaktion abschaltet. Die vorliegende Arbeit geht ins Detail und versucht, unter Rückgriff auf die Theoriansätze "Pfadabhängigkeit" (Paul Pierson) und "Multiple Streams Framework" (John Kingdon) ein differenzierteres Bild der atom- und energiepolitischen Entwicklungen zu zeichnen.

The importance of China’s policy toward Iran’s Nuclear Program has gradually increased because of China’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the increase of interest areas in the Middle East, and being one of the biggest challenging countries to the global position of the US. Besides, an active diplomacy of China in the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA), the increase in interest areas in the international system, and rise of its political position shows that China pursues a more active diplomacy. While China defends the nuclear program of Iran for the use of civilian purposes, it also prioritizes the regime of the continuation of nuclear weapons. China also aims to improve its mutual relationship with Iran, which is subject to international sanctions, in the field of energy and economy. On the other hand, it not only aims to protect the image of “responsible great power”, but also continue its positive relationship with the US. After unilaterally the withdrawal of the USA from the JCPOA, China’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program based on the balance between national interests and the image of “responsible great power” has gained much more importance. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the parameters of China’s changing position in international system, the relationship between China and the US, national interests at the level of local /global and the image of “responsible great power” on China’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program. This article argues that China’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program is determined by the balance between national interests and the image of “responsible great power” of the rising actor. China’s relationship with Iran remains limited because China prioritizes the relationship with the US, and aims to protect the image of “responsible great power”.

Öz
Çin’in Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi’nin (BMGK) daimî üyesi olması,
Ortadoğu’da çıkar alanlarının artması ve uluslararası sistemin mevcut başat aktörü ABD’nin küresel konumuna en büyük meydan okuyucu ülkelerden birisi olması nedeniyle İran Nükleer Programı’na yönelik politikasının önemi gün geçtikçe artmaktadır. Ayrıca Çin’in “Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı Antlaşması” (KOEP) sürecindeki politikası, uluslararası sistemde çıkar alanlarının artması ve siyasi konumunun yükselmesi ile daha aktif bir diplomasi izlediğinin ve izleyeceğinin işaretidir. Çin, sivil amaçlı nükleer programın İran’ın hakkı olduğunu savunurken, aynı zamanda nükleer silahların yayılmasının önlenmesi rejiminin sürdürülmesine önem vermektedir. Ayrıca uluslararası yaptırımlara maruz kalan İran ile ikili enerji ve ekonomik ilişkilerini geliştirmek isterken, diğer yandan da hem “sorumlu büyük güç” imajını hem de ABD ile ilişkilerini korumak istemektedir. ABD’nin
KOEP’den tek taraflı olarak çekilmesinden sonra, Çin’in ulusal çıkarları ile sorumlu büyük güç imajı arasında nasıl bir denge sağlayacağı daha fazla önem kazanmıştır. Bu çalışmada, Çin’in İran Nükleer Programı politikasında uluslararası sistemdeki değişen konumunun, Çin-ABD ilişkilerinin, bölgesel/küresel düzeydeki ulusal çıkarlarının ve “sorumlu büyük güç” imajı parametrelerinin etkileşimi sonucunda nasıl belirlendiği analiz edilmektedir. Bu makale, Çin’in İran Nükleer Politikasını ulusal çıkarları ve yükselen aktörün “sorumlu büyük güç” imajı arasındaki dengeyi gözeterek belirlediğini savunmaktadır. Çin’in ABD ile ilişkilerini daha öncelikli görmesi ve “sorumlu büyük güç” imajının zarar görmemesi için İran ile ilişkileri sınırlı kalmaktadır

Existing accounts of India’s relationship with the global nuclear non-proliferation regime have almost exclusively focused on the drivers of security and interests as they function at the level of the Indian state. This chapter argues that the key to understanding India’s engagement with the non-proliferation regime is an appreciation of salient international norms enshrined within and beyond the NPT, India’s response to these norms, and India's own historical efforts at normative innovation. The chapter’s main conclusion is that New Delhi’s search for international status as a nuclear responsible, in particular, has served to validate and strengthen several key norms of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, despite India’s complicated position vis-à-vis the regime. India remains, however, far from functioning as a manager or norm-setter within the regime.

While the way in which the State makes decisions regarding matters of public policy cannot be reduced to a simple universal explanation, it is, however, important to try to grasp why certain matters are of sufficient concern to be dealt with by the governmental apparatus. In an analysis of the more than 38-year history of the fully State-owned CAREM (Central Argentina de Elementos Modulares) nuclear power reactor, I use the advocacy coalition framework and the political contexts in which it advanced to examine the beliefs held by the actors that shaped the progress of the project throughout its chronology. Originally conceptualized in the 1970’s as part of a military program for naval propulsion, the reactor was presented as a civilian project in 1984 and went through ups and downs in its development until the 2006 Argentinian Nuclear Plan from which it derives its budget today. I argue that it was the dual-use possibility of nuclear technology (civilian and military) which allowed the project to advance through different regimes, democratic administrations and economic policies.

The objectives ofpublic consultation can clash with other policy objectives, partly because the norms underpinning public consultation clash with other institutional norms within
the policy process. This phenomenon is evident in the case of selecting a site for a low level nuclear waste disposal facility in Australia. This case shows how the results of
consultation processes are moulded bv the process design, which in turn is constrained by a range of policy process norms to which governments adhere. The case confirms some
recent critiques of participatory practices. It also suggests that reconciling potentially competing policy process norms will be an important exercise in institutional design if elected representatives wish to mitigate citizens’ alienation from their governments.

Apresentação
A ABDAN vem há vários anos promovendo a geração nucleoelétrica no País, mas até o momento apenas duas usinas foram construídas e uma se encontra em construção.
Em comparação com outros países em desenvolvimento, como a Coréia do Sul, China e Índia, o ritmo brasileiro está aquém do que seria desejável. Construir uma usina a cada quinze anos não gera capacitação dos recursos humanos nem da indústria local.
Com as vastas reservas de urânio e conhecimento total do processo da fabricação do combustível nuclear, o Brasil deveria estar muito a frente da situação atual.
O que sempre faltou foram recursos financeiros para viabilizar um Programa contínuo, pelo governo não ter tido uma atitude positiva para a verdadeira implantação do Programa Nuclear Brasileiro.
O estudo que fizemos mostra que o próximo governo pode e deve assumir uma ação proativa no setor.

Paper presented at an international seminar on Global Governance, Nuclear Policies and the Insertion of Brazil, hosted by the Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
3-4 September 2015

Anti-nuclear civil society activism starting with peace advocacy is considered
to be a process consisting of strategic actions and civic engagement in the
decision-making process. This research examines what made civil society in
Aotearoa New Zealand successful between the mid-1960s and 1980s with a
particular focus on their action repertoire through a goal-oriented approach.
This study highlights the importance of civil society engagement in activism
while identifying the relationship between maximized tactics, strategies and
political environment in the anti-nuclear struggle in New Zealand.
To gain an accurate analysis of success in New Zealand’s anti-nuclear debate,
this research focuses on the extent to which anti-nuclear actors have been able
to achieve their objectives and the degree to which influential activities have
effectively been involved in the process. The results reveal that the political
actors and civil society actively participating in the policy-shaping process
and their involvement signified strong anti-nuclear advocacy under the peace
and security narratives.

Since the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review the United States has made significant strides towards a reduction of its nuclear arsenal. The rationale behind these reductions has been a mixture of a renewed focus on the future disarmament, and a growing recognition that the context for your strategic turn just changed. The practical result has been an approximately 85% reduction of the US nuclear weapons stockpile from its mid-Cold War peak. The problem however is a continuing reliance on the psychology of the period, namely the perceived need for a nuclear triad. This analysis will argue that while the reduction of stockpiled warheads is a significant step forward, the United States must begin reconsidering the practical need for a continuation of the nuclear triad. Given the strategic and tactical superiority of SLBM's, advancements in ABM technologies, and changes in the international threat environment, the financial and material requirements associated with maintaining the US nuclear triad are no longer justified by the strategic advantages that it offers. Thus, the United States should now begin engaging both the policies and structural mechanisms associated with an alternative framework for strategic deterrence.

Despite the fact that the DPRK has not yet resumed nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests, it is obvious that the country has not given up its nuclear ambitions. On the contrary, North Korea demonstrates its intent to further boost its nuclear capabilities. It is evidenced by the multiple tests and demonstrations of new and previously tested weapons systems since last year, a series of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Central Military Commission meetings presided by Kim Jong Un and finally, by the recent military parade. New strategic capabilities demonstrated during the parade cannot be considered proven until they are tested. However, given North Korea's rapid progress in previous years and strong incentive to develop its nuclear forces, a resumption of tests is only a matter of time. This progress in the nuclear and missile realm would be impossible without proper strategic planning and a clear vision of the role of nuclear weapons. The present article analyzes some of the peculiar features and new trends of North Korean nuclear doctrine and strategy.

The India–Canada relationship has witnessed a number of highs and lows despite the two nations sharing common political views. This is perhaps best seen in the civil nuclear cooperation shared between the two. It is interesting to note that the relation between the two nations fractured twice due to nuclear issues

India’s tryst with global nuclear regimes unswerving or chequered is a matter of protracted debate. While many Western scholars point to India’s defiant behaviour, Indian scholars trumpet New Delhi’s unambiguous non-proliferation record and disarmament pledge. Amidst this dyadic narrative, India manoeuvres to be an insider of the global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regimes. How quick and what value it would add to these regimes as member is a matter of conjecture; but its rendezvous with the global nuclear regimes would turn a full circle the day it would gate-crash the hitherto developed countries’ privileged nuclear cohorts.

La Estrategia Europea de la Seguridad Energética estudia las deficiencias en la Seguridad Energética europea y recomienda medidas para solucionar la seguridad del suministro energético, entre las que se encuentra el mantenimiento de la energía nuclear en la matriz energética de los países de la UE. La energía nuclear tiene una fuerte presencia histórica en la Europa occidental y su desarrollo y mantenimiento está regulado de forma comunitaria por la diversos órganos de la Unión así como dirigido por la Política Energética Europea. Los principios rectores de esta política energética pueden ser sintetizados en los principios de la autonomía estratégica y la lucha contra el cambio climático, fines para los cuales la energía nuclear puede tener un papel importante.

The European Energy Security Strategy studies the deficiencies in European Energy Security and recommends measures in order to improve security in European energy supply. One of this is the continuance of the presence of nuclear energy in the energy mix of the Member States. Nuclear energy has a strong historical presence in Western Europe, and its development and preservation is regulated by different bodies of the EU as well as European Energy Policy. The governing principles can be summarised in the principles of Autonomic Strategy and and the fight against climate change, for which nuclear energy can have an important role.

O objetivo desse artigo é apresentar a trajetória da política externa brasileira no campo nuclear entre os anos de 1964 e 1985, que foram vivenciados pela ditadura militar. Com isso, o foco do estudo foi a análise das estratégias adotadas pelo regime brasileiro em torno dessa temática, já que este foi um período de grandes acordos e tensões para o país no âmbito atômico.

El presente trabajo busca analizar la evolución de la relación nuclear entre Argentina y Brasil, durante el período 1946-1999, tomando como marco referencial el modelo de Equilibrios Puntuados presentado por Baumgartner y Jones 2009 [1993] y True et al (2007). Al tomar como base dicho modelo, se verifica que la relación nuclear entre las dos potencias del Cono Sur transita un camino de acercamiento sostenido desde un equilibrio de competencia y rivalidad duradera hacia equilibrios de cada vez mayor cooperación, aunque el camino de acercamiento no se realiza de manera gradual y constante sino a partir de puntos críticos que cambian el esquema de relacionamiento nuclear ensayado hasta ese entonces. Asimismo, este trabajo estudia un conjunto de variables que determinaron la opción por la cooperación en materia nuclear, a saber: el tipo de régimen; la distancia ideológica de las élites gobernantes y el modelo de desarrollo impulsado por cada una de ellas; la competencia geopolítica entre los dos actores; la relación de la distribución de capacidades materiales entre Argentina y Brasil; y el rol del hegemón internacional (EE.UU.), tanto a nivel bilateral con Argentina y con Brasil, como a nivel global (en el sistema de no proliferación internacional).


Palabras Clave
Política Exterior Argentina – Política Exterior Brasileña – Desarrollo Nuclear – No Proliferación - Cooperación Nuclear – Teoría de Equilibrios Puntuados

Japan's basic nuclear policy isto reprocess spent fuel and to effectively use the recovered plutonium and uranium.MOX fuel utilization in LWRsispromotedin 16-18 reactors by FY2015. Commercial operation of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is planned to start in 2012. Prototype reactor “Monju” restarted operation in May 2010. From FY 2007, Fast Reactor Cycle Technology Development Project (FaCT project) started which focuses more toward the commercialization stage FBR cycle. Basic scenario of Japan's R&D aims for realization of demonstrationFBR by around 2025 and introducing commercial FBRs before 2050. Smooth transition fromLWR fuel cycle to FBR one is an important point.Fornuclear fuel cycle which requires long termR&D, human resources development and keeping isvitally important.

The Preamble of the treaty text could be viewed as an expression
of the desire of the NWS to create conditions for effective arms control. As
directed by the Preamble, the NPT parties, especially the P-5, could
be viewed as having the responsibility to “…ease international tensions
by strengthening the trust between them, such that cessation of nuclear
weapons can be brought about.

Gagasan pengembangan teknologi energi nuklilr sudah dilakukan Jepang sejak 1954. Gempa bumi yang terjadi pada Maret 2011 menyebabkan meledaknya 3 reaktor di Fukushima Daiichi. Ledakan tersebut membuat kawasan di sekitar Fukushima dalam radius 300 kilometer terkontaminasi zat radioaktif. Perdebatan antara kelompok pronuklir dan kelompok antinuklir sangatlah alot. Sebagaian pihak menganggap bahwa dengan tidak menggunakan nuklir, maka insiden Fukushima Daiichi tidak akan terulang. Sebagian lagi tetap mendukung penggunaan energi nuklir dengan peningkatan program keamanan. Pergantian partai yang menang saat pemilu membuat kebijakan mengenai penggunaan energi nuklir mengalami revisi beberapa kali. Tulisan ini akan membahas mengenai perubahan kebijakan mengenai penggunaan nuklir serta memetakan aktornya.

Este artigo examina a política nuclear das administrações de Richard Nixon e Gerald Ford, por meio da análise de fontes primárias e secundárias sobre principais fatores internacionais e domésticos que as influenciaram. Argumenta-se que as diretrizes de longo prazo da política nuclear americana foram desenvolvidas nesse período, entre 1969 e 1977. Essas diretrizes podem ser divididas em três pontos principais. O primeiro é a plurilateralização do regime de não-proliferação nuclear e restrição do fornecimento de tecnologia de dual. Isso significou encontrar alternativas para instituições multilaterais existentes, por meio de negociações bilaterais de desarmamento com a URSS e por meio da criação de arranjos plurilaterais, como o GSN. O segundo ponto foi o compartilhamento da gestão da ordem internacional com poderes regionais, de modo a criar equilíbrio de poder favorável aos EUA. A última diretriz foi o aumento da competitividade das empresas americanas via privatização do setor nuclear. Este último ponto foi viabilizado na administração da Ford, dado o fracasso da iniciativa inicial de Nixon, e levou à consolidação de estrutura burocrática capaz de evitar mudanças drásticas na política de seguridade nuclear.

Turkey has been working in the political field for fifty-two years on nuclear technology to take place in the country's energy percentage. As a result of this effort, the Republic of Turkey reached its first actual action in April 2018. Following the signing of " The Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation on the Establishment and Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant on Akkuyu Site between Government of Turkish Republic and the Russian Federation on 12 May 2010", the foundation of the plant was laid in Ankara with the joint participation of Erdogan-Putin. In addition to the importance of Turkey's changing energy parameters, this synergy has also presented an important picture for diplomacy. Turkey's actual mobility in the nuclear energy adventure has also taken place in the World Press as well as in the Turkish and Russian local media. The important and main reason for this is that nuclear energy is a parameter of foreign policy rather than domestic policy anymore in the global world. The controversial world of nuclear energy, shaped by eco-modernists, pragmatists, supporters and opponent ideologies, has created a new order that the nuclear's "electrification" quality in the second place. Nuclear energy comes to the agenda in international conflicts rather than taking it as a need so this situation has delayed and prevented the use of nuclear energy in Turkey for years. However, it is also inevitable for Turkey to include the advantages of nuclear energy in its country, such as every country that increases its development momentum. In addition to the numerous advantages of nuclear energy in the electricity generation, it maintains its political appeal. Turkey sees nuclear energy as an important alternative to reducing energy imports and diversifying energy resources as a foreign-dependent country on energy. In this way, Turkey aims to provide energy supply security, while also gaining momentum in the way of sustainability and development. As a result of the global technology age, the increasing energy need has increased the electricity production of countries and therefore the use of resources. In this context, the energy sources in geological location do not supply the current energy needs causes high-rate exports in Turkey. Limited production from domestic sources and energy security risk brought by high export rates have led to the diversification of resources and a highly efficient production solution. We know that only a little amount of Uranium produces a great amount of clean energy so much fewer carbon emissions and environmentalism. Turkey plans to add 4800 MW to the existing installed electricity power in the Akkuyu where it started construction via nuclear technology transfer from ROSATOM, Russia. This is a sufficient amount of energy for the uninterrupted lighting of 500,000 apartment buildings for 60 years. It also means that the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) will be able to supply Istanbul's electricity demand alone. Beside this high-energy production quality, the NPP tenders sustainability with 60-year operating life design. The Akkuyu power plant, which is expected to be the twin of the Novo Voronej NPP in Russia, promises a lot to Turkey and opens a door to the development of nuclear technology. In Turkey's last 15 years of development, the energy sector has always been important. The Turkish Government aims to become a regional power in the Middle East. The essential aim concerns the energy sector and policy. The strategic future goal requires some professional decision making to be achieved and nuclear power is, thus, a very important step toward the realization of the Turkish objective. Ebrar ÖZEL /Ankara

From 2005 up until the end of the Joint Plan of Action’s first phase in July 2014, the United States sought to exploit Iran’s economically interdependent foreign ties in order to eradicate the perceived Iranian nuclear threat. This article analyzes the developments that took place in this time frame to assess and establish the effectiveness of this economic policy to achieve its security aim. By positing the argument in the context of the economic interdependence–security literature, this article contributes to the debate and policy discussions concerned with this political economy approach, and highlights the importance of economic and political interests when considering this relationship. By using the U.S.–Iran case study, this article emphasizes that unilateral actions to economically isolate a state are becoming increasingly impotent. Therefore, for such an economic isolation policy to work, it must be adopted on a multilateral if not universal level. Only then can the economic incentive for the targeted state be used to induce the desired security aims. This article also provides a commentary on how its conclusions match up to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

At a time when momentous changes are taking place in the Middle East, this volume provides a timely and critical assessment of the European Union (EU) foreign policy towards the region. The book collects revised and updated versions of the papers presented at the third Academic Forum on European Security, which took place at the Institute for European Studies (IHEE) in Strasbourg on March 30-31, 2010. The subtitle «the hour of the EU» was chosen to emphasize the moment of opportunity for the EU to actively influence a peaceful resolution of the major crises affecting the Middle East. Accordingly, contributions to this volume show the potential and the limits of the EU’s normative and soft-power-based diplomatic toolbox in trasforming its neighbourhood, focusing on four macro-areas: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rise of Iran as a regional (and perhaps nuclear) power, the EU’s engagement in democracy promotion and EU-Turkey relations. Overall, this book aims at providing the reader willing to learn more about EU foreign policy’s achievements and weaknesses with a close-up on those four critical areas.

`Although land based nuclear weapons have been most commonly referenced to in the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear strategy the potential, albeit not yet fully realised, utility of the Korean Peoples' Navy (KPN) submarine force as a means for delivery of nuclear weapons appears an increasingly promising option for DPRK political and military elites. A movement towards submarine launched nuclear weapons would be greatly to the DPRK's military and strategic advantage because of the increased accuracy, and hence lethality, as well as secrecy surrounding their capabilities and launch points. The latter issue crucial in the context of the comparative challenges for US and ROK forces in tracking submerged submarines as opposed to fixed land based missile sites or mobile launchers.'