Philosophy of Knowledge

http://shcyhome.org/2015/01/chc-episode-4-developmental-thinking/
Episode 4 of CHILDHOOD: History & Critique offers a brief review essay of the 2008 book _A Historical Sociology of Childhood_ and an extended conversation with its author - André Turmel, professor emeritus at Laval University.

CHC is a series of interviews, essays, and happenings in historical studies of childhood presented for the Society for the History of Children and Youth.

È un libro di filosofia della conoscenza che si muove liberamente tra filosofia e letteratura. La luce, intesa come supporto della scrittura (si scrive nella luce, "incidendo" la luce) nonché come metafora della conoscenza stessa, è indagata in quanto categoria filosofica a partire da Platone fino a Goethe, Hegel, C. S. Peirce e Merleau-Ponty. Al tema della luce si affiance quello del principio antropico, altrimenti detto organicismo logico, che vede nell'autocoscienza umana lo strumento ideato dalla natura per pensare se stessa. La formulazione letteraria più precisa e insieme più problematica di tale principio si trova in vari scritti narrativi e saggistici di Italo Calvino.

« Notre héritage du scepticisme n’est précédé d’aucun testament. Par-delà les vicissitudes de l’épistémologie traditionnelle et de l’anti-scepticisme, le spectre du « scepticisme à visage humain » selon Thompson Morgan Clarke, entre contextualisme, perspectivisme, pragmatisme et pyrrhonisme. » in Skepsis, Journal of Skepticism / Skepsis Journal : Revista de Filosofia ISSN 1981-4534, Vol. XI, N°23 " Thompson Clarke's Legacy and Hinge Epistemology", 2021, pp. 122-147.

Three fundamental systems of communication are defined: information, explanation, and imagination. Information is based on analytic distinctions between objects in the world. Explanatory communication provides knowledge through discourse, narration, logic, rhetoric and other forms of systemic elaboration. Intellectual discovery relies on a third system of communication, that of imagination. Rather than distinction or elaboration, imagination is rooted in intuition and analogy. The most powerful medium of the imagination is antonymous insight. The article discusses examples of the latter from warfare, politics, and science.

Postdisciplinarity makes claims on ontological, epistemic, and methodological levels, but it is inevitably a personal philosophical stance. This article represents an existentialist approach to the discourse on postdisciplinarity, offering reflective narratives of three academics. Tomas Pernecky discusses creativity, criticality, freedom, and methodological and epistemic pluralism; Ana María Munar reveals her journey of epistemological awakening; and Brian Wheeller underscores the importance of researchers’ subjective and emotive voice. Jointly, the authors depict postdisciplinarity as an invitation
to conceptual and interpretive eclecticism, critical analysis, and creative problem solving. Key words: Constructionism; Existential; Identity; Knowledge; Subjective; Truth

Introduction to a special issue of the International Journal of Zizek Studies on Zizek and Art.  Four different introductions are presented, each revolving around articulating what we refer to as "arts-based philosophy". Each introduction places the context and contents of the issue in play, but from different points of view. One being to suggest art and philosophy form a necessary parallax, a productive space that gives license to those who wish to resist the performance imperative of philosophy in writing, but remain within its productive engagement with the ideas associated with philosophy (hence our arts-based philosophy and ‘new lines of sight’).  The first introduction might be considered as ‘empirical’ in nature, the second ‘philosophical,’ the third ‘descriptive,’ and last ‘contextual.’  This performance imperative not only includes the format of the International Zizek Studies Conference held in April 2014 itself, but also, here in this space, the academic journal. ‘Philosophical performance,’ i.e. reading written work at conferences, writing theory in traditional formats, adhering to discourse conventions as ‘styles of exposition’ (of which is being performed now in this written introduction), and the motions of thought conditioned by ‘ready-made philosophical events’ needs to be shaken up, turned askew, given new points of view, given parallaxes.  The two co-editors of this special issue were tasked with creating space for proposals by scholars who engage in theory articulated in forms other than writing. That endeavor took seriously two related questions. 1. ‘What are the possibilities for theory today articulated in a form other than writing?” and 2. What needs to ‘happen’ in the formatting of an academic conference to accelerate productive encounters to answer the first question? In short, we wanted to shift the idea of academic conference into new territories by inserting art as a form of philosophical articulation on par with philosophical writing - creating a new ‘line of sight’ for philosophical inquiry. This issue represents a selection of the work presented at the conference that engaged in what we have coined ‘arts-based philosophy.’ Borrowing from literature in qualitative research and art education, we intend to expand upon what is referred to as arts-based research (ABR).

On November 4th, 2019, Hans-Georg Moeller delivered a presentation on systems theory at the Law School of the University of São Paulo and was interviewed about Niklas Luhmann’s theory of society, with emphasis on issues such as law, politics, and the history of philosophy. Professor Moeller is the author of important books such as Luhmann explained: From souls to systems (Moeller, 2006) and The radical Luhmann (Moeller, 2011), the latter also translated to Japanese and Italian. He also works on Chinese philosophy and is currently Full Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies in the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Macau, China.
Throughout the interview, professor Moeller situated Luhmann in the philosophical tradition of German idealism and presented the shift to second-order observation as a crucial aspect of contemporary society, in religion and politics, science, economy and law. The interview was conducted partly in writing and partly in the form of a recorded and transcribed debate

Descartes arrives at his ‘Clearly and Distinctly’ rule in the Third Meditation, considering it to be a sufficient criterion of truth. However, in my opinion, this viewpoint has a number of flaws. In this essay I argue that ‘Clearly and Distinctly’ rule is subjective and lacks clarity and distinctness criteria.

The Immanuel Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic is the science of the a priori principles of senses. The Transcendental Aesthetic shows the difference between the a priori and a posteriori representation and a priori and a posteriori perception in the field of Theory of Knowledge. The main question of this article is: How is possible the concept of space like a priori representation only as essence of senses, but not for “res per se” or “ding an sich” on it’s own nature?

La seguente analisi, nata in contesto universitario, prende le mosse dalla celeberrima riflessione di Popper sulla televisione cercando di contestualizzarla all'interno della sua teorizzazione epistemologica e della torsione evoluzionistica che questa ha assunto nel pensiero popperiano. Indagandone anche l'imprescindibile ricaduta politica, emerge la stingente attualità del messaggio di Popper, applicabile oggi alla questione del ruolo dei nuovi media, i social media, nelle democrazie, e del pericolo che queste corrono, e di come il tema sia imprescindibile per definirne statuto e limiti. e, soprattutto, cosa ragionevolmente (e qui vi è tutta la questione di cosa sia scienza)  possiamo fare per per salvarle.

Comment peut-on critiquer la vérité, toute vérité, sans par là même tomber dans sa propre critique ?
En effet, dire qu’« il n’y a pas de vérité », ou dire que « la vérité est relative », cela fait que ces propositions elles-mêmes ne peuvent être vraies, ou sont du moins relatives.
Mais le problème inverse se pose tout autant : comment peut-on fonder une vérité ? Le fondement doit lui-même être vrai, et pour cela avoir lui-même un fondement, répondre à des critères ayant un fondement, etc., à l’infini. Il faudrait une vérité première, indiscutable, certaine, universellement reconnue, or il n’y a rien de cet ordre. Et même si quelque chose de cet ordre existait, il faudrait encore dire que « ce qui est universellement reconnu est vrai », fonder cette vérité, définir ce qui est « universel » ou pas, etc., encore à l’infini.
Le problème de la vérité semble, quelle que soit la façon dont on l’appréhende, insoluble.
Mais justement, cette insolubilité, n’est-elle pas sa vérité ?

This paper is a study on the project of  ‘Islamization of Knowledge’ as articulated by the ‘International Institute of Islamic Thought’, its evolution and responses to it by some of the important Muslim scholars of our time. An attempt to critically analyze the movement of Islamization is not undertaken here. But at the same time, an attempt to understand the future projections for this important intellectual movement is taken up in a modest manner as a conclusion of this paper.

This volume continues the discussion initiated in Part 1 of "Logical Forms" and deals with issues of language, logic, proof, and knowledge. I list the chapter titles:
13. Language, meaning, and reference.
14. Syntax and semantics.
15 Grammar and logical form.
16. Propositional logic.
17. Predicate logic.
18. Grammar and logical truth.
19. Proof and logical deduction.
20. Proof and proving.
21. Proof and truth.
22. The tyranny of belief.
23. Ockham's razor.
24. Knowledge and justification.
25. Logic and knowledge.
Epilogue. Plato, Zeno, Parmenides, and Frege.

A translation to Portuguese of chapter 25--Lógica e conhecimento--was published in 2007 and I added the pdf in TRANSLATIONS.

This article intends to describe the central themes of Millán-Puelles' thought. The fundamental intuitions of his youth remain over the course of his life and mark a line of creative and personal thinking between Phenomenology and classical philosophy, mainly Thomism. He elaborates a metaphysics of knowledge with a vigorous defence of spontaneous realism. His defence of the real leads him to grant special importance to the study of the unreal. Likewise, he is interested in practical problems, which in his view are intimately linked with metaphysical ones.

1. Realitate, fenomene și teorii științifice (20);
2. Aspecte inedite în cunoașterea științifică a lumii fizice (25);
a. Ordine şi simetrii în Univers (25);
b. Rațiunea omului și ordinea naturii (30);
(i) Noduri în natură și în matematică (32);
(ii) Creațiile minții omenești și structurile lumii fizice (37);
(iii) Ordine în haos (39);
c. Omul, natura și preferința pentru frumusețe (45);
d. Posibile răspunsuri (48);
3. Limbajul (52);
4. Realitate și reprezentare (54);
5. Concluzii (57).

The quest to provide a fundamental understanding and explanation of reality is an ambitious one. Perhaps it is too ambitious. The possible restrictions for such an enterprise to be successful must be inquired in order to determine the issue. Section 1 explores one’s understanding in reaching (scientific) conclusions: to what extent does a successful account testify to understanding? Section 2 focuses on the other side of such an account: does it provide an explanation in a more fundamental sense than pointing out causes of phenomena, or is it restricted to such a task? A critical stance vis-à-vis the (scientific) enterprise of unearthing reality’s structure remains necessary in order not to confuse a consistent and productive theory with one that demonstrates an understanding and explanation in the sense of this article.

Alain CONTAT, «Un’analisi del segno linguistico nella prospettiva di san Tommaso d’Aquino», in Alain CONTAT (ED.), Miscellanea in onore di Marco Arosio, [Ricerche di storia della filosofia e teologia medioevali, 6], If Press – Ateneo Pontifio Regina Apostolorum, Roma 2017, pp. 173-206.

Dans cette étude, nous entendons analyser le triangle sémiotique aristotélicien à la lumière des écrits et surtout des principes de saint Thomas d’Aquin. Notre propos s’articule en trois parties. Dans la première, nous problématisons le célèbre passage du Peri Hermeneias 16 a 3-8, en soulevant huit apories au sujet du signe linguistique et des instances en lesquelles il s’inscrit, puis nous dressons l’inventaire de quelques lieux thomasiens particulièrement intéressants à cet égard. Dans la deuxième partie, nous discutons trois préalables nécessaires à l’analyse du signe linguistique, soit : 1. la typologie de la relation, en vue de clarifier les rapports entre le signifiant et le signifié mental, puis entre celui-ci et l’objet extra-mental ; 2. la notion d’instrument, afin de déterminer le rôle exact du signifiant oral ou écrit dans la compréhension de sa signification ; 3. les types de sensibles et de synthèses sensorielles, pour expliciter les phases de l’interprétation du signe perçu. Pour finir, nous résolvons dans la troisième partie les apories exposées dans la première, et nous concluons nos investigations par une définition analytique di signe linguistique. En même temps que nous reconstruisons, au long de ce travail, la sémiotique fondamentale de Thomas d’Aquin, nous montrons en quoi elle diffère de celle de Ferdinand de Saussure.

In questo studio, intendiamo analizzare il triangolo semiotico aristotelico, alla luce degli scritti e soprattutto dei principi di san Tommaso d’Aquino. Il nostro discorso si articola in tre parti. Nella prima, problematizziamo il celebre brano del Peri Hemeneias 16 a 3-8, sollevando otto aporie a proposito del segno linguistico e della rete di rapporti in cui esso si iscrive, poi facciamo un breve inventario dei luogi tommasiani maggiormente rilevanti al riguardo. Nella seconda parte, discutiamo tre preliminari necessari per l’analisi del segno linguistico, cioè: 1. la tipologia della relazione, al fine di chiarire i rapporti fra il significante ed il significanto mentale, poi fra questo ultimo e l’oggetto extra-mentale; 2. la nozione di strumento, in vista di determinare il ruolo esatto del significante orale o scritto nella comprensione della sua significazione; 3. i tipi di sensibili e di sintesi sensoriali, per esplicitare la fasi dell’interpretazione del segno percepito. Per finire, risolviamo nella terza parte le aporie esposte nella prima, e concludiamo le nostre investigazioni con una definizione analitica del segno linguistico. Mentre ricostruiamo, nel corso di questo lavoro, la semiotica fondamentale di Tommaso d’Aquino, mostriamo in quale modo essa differisce da quella di Ferdinand de Saussure.

This article seeks to contribute to the analysis of the philosophical excursus of Plato’s Seventh Letter and, in particular, to the conditions and assumptions that the author of the Letter considers necessary for the attainment of intellectual
knowledge; knowledge, which is metaphorically presented with the famous image of the spark (ἐξαφθέν φῶς), like a sudden light springing forth from within the soul and feeding upon itself. Some introductory questions are examined in the first part of the study, while the problem of the conditions of intellectual knowledge is addressed in the second part. The article concludes by exploring the question of the objective dimension of knowledge: what does Plato propose in the Seventh Letter?

This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one can be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important methods are concerned.

Autor u radu daje jedno moguće čitanje prvog određenja znanja u dijalogu Teetet, određenja znanja kao opažanja, zadržavajući se na Platonovoj kritici Protagorinog učenja sa ci-ljem da pokaže dve stvari. Prvo, da je kritika Protagorinog učenja kritika određenog shvatanja čulnog opažanja ali ne i Platonova kritika čulnog opažanja kao znanja. Drugo, da je logika po-bijanja Protagorinog učenja potpuno podudarna logici poslednja dva ispitivanja pretpostavke " jedno nije " u dijaloga Parmenid.

La vision par ordinateur regroupe des techniques de traitement et de reconnaissance d'images, récemment popularisées par les succès de l'apprentissage profond. Ce travail est une enquête sur les conditions de possibilité de la formation d'énoncés à partir du visible, dans ces techniques. Par une lecture approfondie de travaux de recherche scientifique, nous montrons que c'est le texte scientifique qui tisse un rapport entre l'énoncé et l'objet ; que l'objectivité n'est possible que par le texte, et que le visible n'est pas déterminé avant le texte ; que la vision par ordinateur prend place dans un système de vision par lequel elle participe de la production du visible.

Il racconto autobiografico di Platone nell'Epistola 7 si coniuga in questo capitolo a una indagine in merito alle modalità di conoscenza filosofica. Il contesto dialogico viene inteso come dimensione essenziale per la generazione della verità che si manifesta in ognuno grazie al confronto con l'altro e a una vita vissuta in comunità. Il capitolo presenta anche in dettaglio il metodo del dialogo socratico contemporaneo e propone delle significative innovazioni in seno al metodo del “dialogo socratico integrale”, così chiamato dall'autrice per evidenziare la compresenza della dimensione corporea, emotiva, mentale e spirituale in una modalità dialogica rinnovata.

The epistemic and aesthetic dimensions of taste are always inscribed in conceptions of the social order that the discourse on taste simultaneously enacts and rationalizes, while veiling the logics of difference and power it thereby affirms and reproduces. This article illustrates the entanglement of social and intellectual hierarchies that anchors the resolution of the problem of taste in the mechanisms of social distinction and erasure. It does so by examining four socio-epistemic configurations in the history of Western knowledge. The first vignette contextualizes the original devaluation of taste in the competition between the Socratic philosophers and epistemic labourers whose elevation of taste disrupted the Athenian aristocratic order. The second vignette explores the entanglement of humoural theory with the racial and religious orders of the premodern age, as imperial encounters threatened European identity brought into contact with the tastes of others. The third vignette examines how the epistemic status of gustatory taste became anchored in the hierarchy of cultural taste within British empirical philosophy. Finally, the paper tracks new forms of social distinction in the resistance to the globalization of food systems and to the democratization of culinary tastes, as manifested in the constitution of an exclusivist 'standard of taste' for wine appreciation.

This paper explores Pragmatism’s potential for transcending the antagonism between positivism and post-positivism, through the work of Morton Kaplan, who combines a Pragmatist theory of knowledge with a systems theory of world politics. A reconstruction of Kaplan’s synoptic philosophy shows how Pragmatism can help us move beyond the dual fallacy of truth as correspondence and truth as self-consciousness, to a non-foundationalist epistemology that acknowledges the historicity of knowing without annihilating the realism of the common world we live in. Moving from the realm of knowledge to the realm of judgment, this paper also reconstructs Kaplan’s moral analysis, thereby revealing its significance for IR’s renewed concern for the problems of values and reflexivity.

The main work of the Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) is the book Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (1957). In this book, Lonergan presents his version of Aquinas' philosophy of knowing from a contemporary perspective. His task is to understand 'what is to understand' and he focuses primarily in the knowing and secondly in the known. He begins the study on insight considering the 'dramatic instance' illustrated by Archimedes rushing naked from the Baths crying 'Eureka!'. With this instance, Lonergan gives to the reader " an insight on insight " and introduces the characterization of this important concept. The aim of this paper is to make some considerations on Lonergan's philosophy of knowing and to provide other examples of well-registered insights from history.

Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition presents a reading of Thomas Aquinas’ claim that “being” is the first object of the human intellect. Blending the insights of both the early Thomistic tradition (c.1380—1637AD) and the Leonine Thomistic revival (1879—present), Brian Kemple examines how this claim of Aquinas has been traditionally understood, and what is lacking in that understanding.

While the recent tradition has emphasized the primacy of the real (so-called ens reale) in human recognition of the primum cognitum, Kemple argues that this misinterprets Aquinas, thereby closing off Thomistic philosophy to the broader perspective needed to face the philosophical challenges of today, and proposes an alternative interpretation with dramatic epistemological and metaphysical consequences.

In light of recent discussions of cognitive and ethical dilemmas related to International Relations (IR) scholarship, this paper proposes to engage the “problem of values” in IR as a composite question whose cognitive treatment requires the objectivation of the more profoundly institutional and social processes that subtend its emergence and evolution within the discipline. This analysis is hereby offered as an exercise in reflexive scholarship. Insofar as the question of values constitutes a defining cognitive and moral concern for reflexive knowledge itself, the paper also points to the need for its reformulation within an epistemic framework that is capable of moving beyond reflexivity to reflexivism proper, understood as a systematic socio-cognitive practice of reflexivity.

This article discusses the articulation between faith and reason, the scientific nature of philosophy and theology, and their proper subject matter, as understood by Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas, and attempts to outline their agreements and disagreements on the above.

Corijn van Mazijk, University of Groningen / KU Leuven - Please cite only from the original version.

Abstract: This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant’s first Critique and Husserl’s later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have non-conceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant’s philosophy, I turn to Husserl’s later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.