Polanyi, Michael

Während auf Deutsch mit „Implizites Wissen“ ein einziges Werk Polanyis vollständig erschienen ist, und Polanyi daran anschließend hauptsächlich lerntheoretisch rezipiert wurde, haben seine Arbeiten in Originalsprache von Anfang an reiche Wirkung in dem Gespräch zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Theologie entfaltet. Um das deutsche Rezeptionsdefizit zu kompensieren, wird in dem Artikel zunächst eine biographische Skizze geboten, bevor eine Erläuterung seiner wissenschaftsphilosophischen Kerngedanken im Kontext seines Gesamtwerkes erfolgt.

To Christians, while knowledge is reasoned, it is importantly revealed. Constructivists seem to propose purely immanent knowing. Could Christians make use of constructivism?
In a Christian perspective, constructivist “normal” can be only what is immanently observed. For example, the team which wrote Women’s Ways of Knowing (1997) had “normal” as the common experiences of the women of the study. Without revelation, without a firm grasp on reality, transcendent norms are not possible.
On the positive side, any advocacy for learning deeper than “just the facts” should gain a hearing. Transformation of life will be a Christian teacher’s deepest desire but teachers can focus too much on objective course contents. One result of not seeing the learner in context is a gap between what teachers think they are achieving and students’ experience. Indeed, Christian resistance to constructivism might be partly a theological reflex: the Holy Spirit is seen to make “dead knowledge” alive. But the way persons develop also deserves attention. Studying cognitive structures can help teachers to understand capabilities of persons at various stages. Helge Kragh cautions, I think rightly, that it is important not to throw the constructivist baby out with the bathwater.

A common theme in Christian school literature is the search for and/or description of the distinctiveness of the Christian school and the Christian school movement.  There is general recognition that the Christian school exists as an alternative to public schools and even non-religious private schools for a variety of historical, philosophical, and practical reasons.  Faith-based schools, that is, religious schools in general, and Christian schools in particular, have a unique place in the United States and Canada, in particular, but even more broadly in Europe.

Dolgozatom célja annak vizsgálata, hogy milyen úton jut el Polányi az egyes megnyilatkozásokban megjelenő személyes tudás-állításoktól a tudományos tudás univerzális voltán keresztül a világ ontológiai struktúrájáig. Az állítások logikájából kiindulva a személyes elköteleződés aktusain keresztül vizsgálom meg azt az utat, amely végül ahhoz vezet el, hogy egy tudományos közösség igaznak hisz el egy olyan leírást, amelyről kezdetben csak egy valaki állította, hogy igaz. Ezt a leírást a közösség a világ igaz leírásának fogja tekinteni, és úgy gondol majd rá, hogy a világ ennek a leírásnak megfelelően létezik. Kiindulópontként az állításokban megjelenő személyes komponenst, illetve az univerzális intenció fogalmát elemzem. Ezek után bemutatom Polányi beszámolóját egy tudományos vitáról és arról a folyamatról, amely egy tudás-állítás személyes elfogadásától a tudományos közösség elfogadásáig vezet. Ezek után bemutatom azt a következtetési lépést, amely ahhoz szükséges, hogy episztelmológiai mezőből az ontológiai mezőre lépjünk. Polányi érvmenetét Stephen Toulmin Th e Uses of Argument című munkájában megjelent érvelési séma alapján elemzem. Toulmin elgondolása szerint az érvelők mindig valamilyen adatból (Data) következtetnek valamilyen állításra (Claim). Ehhez a következtetéshez viszont szükség van arra, hogy valamilyen biztosítékot (Warrant) adjanak a közönség számára. Dolgozatom második felében azt vizsgálom, hogy Polányi milyen érvelési sémákat használ gondolatmenetében, továbbá milyen biztosítékokat ad érvmenete alátámasztására, illetve ezeket a biztosítékokat milyen érvelési sémákhoz lehet kapcsolni.

Review and consideration of Michael Polanyi's theory of knowledge. His relevance to contemporary research in the social sciences is discussed. The article also re-evaluates the importance of fiduciary commitment.

To cite this paper:
Newton, Nigel (2011) Michael Polanyi’s theory of knowledge, Habermas and interdisciplinary research. Paper submitted in part completion of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Bristol

PLAN
Introduction – Vers une économie politique du sacré
Sanctuaire et « économie religieuse »
      Sacré polythéiste et identité sociale
      L’ « économie religieuse » en question
Le sacré à l’ère prédatrice
      Nature de l’État ancien
      Mode de coopération et rationalité économique
Usages de la monnaie
    La monnaie en fragments
      Avant le Grand Marché
Conclusion - L’histoire économique comme forum

EXTRAIT
Nous procéderons donc en trois temps. En premier lieu, nous évoquerons quelques traits de la logique même des représentations du sacré (« l’économie religieuse ») et la façon dont cette dimension idéologique peut interagir avec la reproduction matérielle de la société. C’est pourquoi, en second lieu, il sera plus aisé de penser le jeu des articulations – au moins dans des cas très particuliers – entre l’économie sacrée et le grand prédateur : l’État. Enfin, en troisième lieu, l’objet de l’investigation se déplacera sur l’interprétation que l’on peut proposer des usages monétaires et financiers suggérés par les textes.

A central feature of neo-liberal thought is the twin claim that firstly, markets are more efficient at resource allocation than centralised government planning, and secondly that central planning leads to infringements on the freedom of individuals.  The first argument is often justified through Hayek’s ‘problem of knowledge’ – the problem of co-ordinating all the diverse knowledge required for central decision-making.  This connection between markets, co-ordination and knowledge has apparently become a deeply-held belief, even on the part of some left-leaning academics (Wainwright, 1994; Hodgson, 1999).  This chapter challenges this connection by suggesting that its history reveals the social and political context for two significant and related intellectual inventions – Hayek’s ‘problem of knowledge’ and Michael Polanyi’s ‘tacit knowledge’. These inventions will both be shown as politically-motivated intellectual devices, as opposed to the reasoned advancement of thought. The story emerged during my research into the relationships between the history of computing and the parallel changes in social, economic and political theory.  One part of that research entailed uncovering exactly how ‘knowledge’ had come to be seen as an entity that could be studied and managed to such an extent that people would start talking about ‘managing knowledge’, and about a ‘knowledge economy’ or a ‘knowledge society’ (see Hull, 2000a,b).

Almost at the same time, the Jesuit scientist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) and the scientist Michael Polanyi (1891-1976) wrote works that addressed the phenomena at the basis of the real world that escape empirical scrutiny. Teilhard, as a paleontologist professionally delving deep in the prehistoric past of human existence, searched for a guiding principle of human reality. Polanyi as a chemist diagnosed that personal satisfaction drives theories in natural sciences. Both came to the conclusion, however diverse, that aiming as such drives the development of human understanding . Consequently, humanity is embedded in an objective teleology, which the individual thinker, as well as human community perform and sustain.

""Tacit knowledge is invoked in a wide range of intellectual inquiries, from traditional academic subjects like psychology, sociology and linguistics to more pragmatically orientated investigations into the nature and transmission of skills and expertise. Notwithstanding its apparent pervasiveness, the notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ is a complex and puzzling one. What is its status as knowledge and what is its relation to explicit knowledge? What does it mean to say that knowledge is tacit? Can it be measured?

Recent years has seen growing interest from philosophers in understanding the nature of tacit knowledge. Philosophers of science have discussed its role in scientific problem solving; philosophers of language have been concerned with the speaker’s relation to grammatical theories; and phenomenologists have attempted to describe the relation of explicit theoretical knowledge to a background understanding of matters that are taken for granted. This book aims to bring unity to these diverse philosophical discussions by clarifying their conceptual underpinnings; to advance a specific account of tacit knowledge that elucidates the importance of the concept for understanding the character of human cognition; and to demonstrate the relevance of the recommended account to those concerned with the communication of expertise.""

A distinctive of private religious schooling is the opportunity to integrate faith and learning in the school curriculum, or perhaps (according to one theological/philosophical construct) it is to recognize how faith is already an integral part of all learning, even all of life.  Were it not for the religious perspective, faith-based schools might look the same as many public and private non-sectarian schools.  The integration of faith and learning is an essential ingredient that makes religious schools what they are.

Claudio Monteverdi's works and certainly his operas originated within the realm of pioneering practitioners. For this reason his music is depending to a great extent of the embodiment of performing conventions. This article discusses the chain of projected ideals on his music since the beginning of its revival.

After commending Moleski for his excellent study, I focus attention on three areas that merit further clarification: (a) that Polanyi's quest for public recognition was legitimate and not the effect of a runaway vanity, (b) that Kuhn's straining to define his dependence upon Polanyi was blocked by the unspecifiability clouding the discovery process and by his (mistaken) notion that Polanyi appealed to ESP to explain the dynamics of discovery, and (c) that Kuhn's success in gaining public recognition for his paradigm shift is understandable (just as is Polanyi's relative failure). In the end, I list five areas wherein Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions could be substantially improved by joining forces with Polanyi.

Aaron Milavec, "Public Recognition, Vanity, and the Quest for Truth: Reflections on 'Polanyi vs. Kuhn'" Tradition & Discovery 33/2 (2006-2007) 37-47.

The purpose of this study is to explore the distinctiveness of the Christian school, specifically as expressed in the phrase, “the integration of faith and learning (IFL),” and to investigate how experienced teachers understand this expression and how they actually see faith integrated in practice.  A multiple case study was conducted using interview methodology.  Twenty-eight K-12 teachers participated from eleven Christian schools affiliated with five Christian school associations.  Data included participants’ perceptions about what evidence there is that faith is integrated with learning at their school.  Participants were asked to report evidence of faith being integral in the life of the school in general, in school and curricular documents, in the classroom environment, and in instruction.  In addition, participants were asked about religious neutrality, the idea of the sacred and secular in the curriculum, and whether faith is explicitly or implicit integrated in the curriculum.  Theoretical constructs based on the philosophies of 19th century Dutch neocalvinism and 20th century reformed epistemology informed the study, and a framework of curricular integration adapted from recent work in multicultural education served to structure the analysis and discussion.

This article has two parts.  In the first, the author discloses a series of romantic letters to Polanyi which he discovered in the Joseph Regenstein Library.  Using the content of the letters themselves and the memoires of the woman who wrote them, he discloses the special character of the Sewell-Polanyi connection.  In the second part, he takes the revelations within the letters and applies them to some outstanding issues in Polanyi research: the humanity of Polanyi, romantic love as a way of knowing, and the irresolvable debates concerning Polanyi's understanding of religion.

Given the delicacy of this topic and concern for Mrs. Magda Polanyi, the editors of TAD decided not to publish this article.  I am including it here because it reveals something very significant in the life of Michael Polanyi that has a bearing upon, among other things, how differently Polanyi views on religion have been interpreted by those who knew him and worked with him.

The purpose of this study is to explore the distinctiveness of the Christian school, specifically as expressed in the phrase, “the integration of faith and learning (IFL),” and to investigate how experienced teachers understand this expression and how they actually see faith integrated in practice.  The goal is to contribute toward a vision of what it means to integrate faith in the process of teaching and learning in religious schools and how IFL is practiced.

Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton’s
Tacit Knowledge is an attempt to find a place for
tacit knowledge as “knowledge” within the limits of analytic epistemology. They do so by reference to Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the term “way” and by the McDowell-like claim that reference to the tacitly rooted “way” of doing something exhausts the knowledge aspect of tacit knowledge, which preserves the notion of tacit knowledge, while excluding most of Michael Polanyi’s examples, and rendering Hubert Dreyfus’s and John Searle’s accounts irrelevant. This is more a redefinition of terms than an account of tacit knowledge.

The development and maintenance of organized cooperative work practices require, as an integral feature, what can loosely be termed ‘didactic practices’ or ‘mutual learning’ (giving and receiving instruction, advice, direction, guidance, recommendation, etc.). However, such didactic practices have not been investigated systematically in CSCW. Michael Polanyi’s notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ vs. ‘explicit knowledge’, which plays a key role in the area of Knowledge Management, would seem to offer an obvious framework for investigating didactic practices in CSCW. But as argued in this article, the notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ is a conceptual muddle that mystifies the very concept of practical knowledge. The article examines the historical context in which the notion of ‘tacit knowledge’ was devised, the purpose for which it was formulated, its original articulation, and the perplexing ways in which it has been appropriated in Knowledge Management. In an attempt to gain firm ground for our research, the article towards the end offers a general analysis of the concept of ‘knowledge’, informed by the work of Gilbert Ryle and Alan White. Overall, the article argues that a framework based on the notion of ‘tacit knowledge’, or on similar conceptions devoted to categorizations of kinds of knowledge, impairs the for CSCW essential focus on actual work practices: instead of focusing on forms of symbolism, what is required is to focus on uncovering the logics of actual didactic practices in cooperative work.

The goal of this research is to explore the meaning and practice of the integration of faith and learning (IFL) in the context of the Christian school.  This research was accomplished following a multiple case study method.  The phenomenon being studied was “the integration of faith and learning.”  This phenomenon was explored as it was manifested in individual cases, namely, in participants who were K-12 teachers in Christian day schools.  Each new case was treated as a replication of the study.  Data were gathered primarily through interviews with teacher participants.  In addition, I toured and photographed school facilities and classrooms, observed student interaction, hall and classroom displays, bulletin boards, and noted especially visual and artifact evidence for the integration of faith and learning.  I also read school and school association literature, especially mission and vision statements, and school and association web sites.  Interviews followed a structured question format and the interview questions were based upon these research questions:
1) What are the distinctive qualities of the Christian School?
2) What does the expression, “the integration of faith and learning” mean to the Christian school teacher?
3) How does a Christian school teacher integrate faith in the classroom? Or How does a Christian school teacher practice IFL?

The phenomenology of typification, as developed by Alfred Schutz, provides a way of demystifying two persistent “mysteries” of psychiatric diagnosis: rapid diagnosis and the praecox feeling.  The criteria of psychiatric disorders which are contained in classification manuals, such as DSM-III, are shown to presuppose in psychiatrists the pre-conceptual ability to typify these disorders.  When employed within the “critical attitude” described by Husserl, these pre-conceptual skills are fully scientific.

"This is a comment on Tihamér Margitay’s “From Epistemology to Ontology,” where he criticizes Polanyi’s claim that there is a systematic correspondence between the levels of ontology and the levels of tacit knowing. Margitay contends that Polanyi supports this correspondence by appealing to a “purely ontological argument,” one which concludes that it is impossible to reduce machines to a singular, chemical-physical type,
and criticizes this claim by pointing to industrial standards (machines that do reduce to singular physicalchemical type). I respond to Margitay’s claim by distinguishing two different “purely ontological arguments” in Polanyi’s thought (one relying on the multi-realizability of a machine in different physical-chemical types, the other pointing to the inability of a purely physical-chemical ontology to account for the artificial shaping and functioning of machines). With these two arguments clarified, Margitay’s criticism by appealing to industrial standards loses much of its initial force. "

An individual who has the ability to focus and
learn quickly is at a distinct competitive advantage over those
who do not. As difficult as it may be to accelerate an individual’s
learning rate, it is even more complicated to accelerate the
learning rate of a group. Knowledge management has devoted a
great amount of study and research into learning efficiency. In
theory, managing knowledge behaviors greatly affects
knowledge management. However in practice, knowledge is
difficult to manage directly. The structure of a working team
represents a miniature social system as well as an internal
collaboration network. Differing teamwork structures conduct
different knowledge behaviors. Social influence theories suggest
that different social proximities evoke distinguishing contagion
effects. This study applies a social network perspective to
explore the knowledge behaviors of computer software
developers. Our findings show that controlling network
redundancies can effectively enhance knowledge diffusion
efficiency. Furthermore, if a team fails to manage knowledge
diffusion, it will potentially offset any competitive advantages
that might be gained via upgrading technology. Based on our
findings, this study suggests a new approach for implementing
knowledge management and R&D strategic planning.

This paper assesses a recent criticism of Michael Polanyi’s account of the origin of complex entities by Alicia Juarrero. According to Juarrero, Polanyi took higher-level complex entities like machines and organisms to come into existence through the imposition of external, top-down forces. This paper argues that while Polanyi took the emergence of machines to come about in such a way, Polanyi’s reading of 19th and early 20th experimental embryology indicates his position is more sophisticated. Polanyi appears to have thought a synthesis was possible between reductive-mechanical and holistic-vitalistic approaches. While I argue that this synthesis is unclear, it suggests that Polanyi conceived of the emergence of organisms as internal, complex, and non-deterministic.

Theologie und Naturwissenschaften, sind das nicht Gegensätze? So erscheinen sie zwar in der medialen Öffentlichkeit, besonders die Fälle Galilei und Darwin werden dann genannt, um daran das Rückzugsgefecht der Kirche gegenüber einer triumphierenden Wissenschaft zu illustrieren. Andreas Losch stellt den Konflikt jedoch als einen modernen Mythos dar. Er präsentiert den Ansatz des Cambridger Physikers und Priesters John C. Polkinghorne, der von einer Übereinstimmung der Disziplinen ausgeht. Welche Alternativen gibt es jenseits der Konflikte außerdem? Dazu stellt Losch die übersichtliche Einteilung Ian G. Barbours vor, der als Verhältnisbestimmungen von Theologie und Naturwissenschaften neben dem Konflikt auch ein unabhängiges Nebeneinander, einen Dialog oder eine Integration der beiden Disziplinen für möglich hält. Andreas Losch bleibt nicht bei einer bloßen Wiedergabe Barbours stehen, sondern fragt, worauf seine Überlegungen beruhen. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass ein sogenannter »Kritischer Realismus« die Grundlage dafür darstellt. Der Autor fragt nach der jeweiligen Definition und Bedeutung des kritischen Realismus in Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Theologie. Anschließend stellt Losch zwei prominente deutschsprachige Ansätze zum Dialog zwischen Theologie und Naturwissenschaften dar und vergleicht sie mit dem angelsächsischen Modell auf Basis dieses Kritischen Realismus: die Zeittheorie des Physikers A.M.K Müller und das Gestaltkreiskonzept des Arztphilosophen Viktor von Weizsäcker. Das Fazit am Schluss der Arbeit integriert die verschiedenen Modelle in einem originellen Vorschlag für das Gespräch der Disziplinen. Zwei Exkurse bieten zusätzliche Analysen der Überlegungen des Theologen Jürgen Hübner und des Wissenschaftsphilosophen Michael Polanyi zum Thema.

Abstract included on first page of text.

Aaron Milavec, "'If I Join Forces with Mr. Kuhn. . .': Polanyi and Kuhn as Mutually Supportive and Corrective," Polanyiana (Budapest) 3/1 (1993) 56-74. Reprinted in Richard Gelwick, ed., From Polanyi to the 21st Century (Proceedings of a Centennial Conference, Kent State University, The Polanyi Society, 1997) 224-259.

Admittedly, religious conversion commits our whole person and changes our whole being in a way that an expansion of natural knowledge does not do. But once the dynamics of knowing are recognized as the dominant principle of knowledge, the difference appears only as one of degree (Polanyi 1958:244).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Alfred North Whitehead describes the sixteenth century as racked by two great and very different revolutionary movements. The first was the Reformation, which was "a popular uprising [that] for a century and a half drenched Europe in blood" (Whitehead:10). The second was "the beginnings of the scientific movement [that] were confined to a minority of the intellectual elite" (10). Whitehead describes this second movement as more decisive since it was "the quiet commencement of the most intimate change in outlook which the human race has yet encountered" (10). Then he quickly adds a pious footnote: "Since a babe was born in a manger, it may be doubted whether so great a thing has happened with so little stir" (10). The ideal of arriving at the truth and committing oneself thereto plays itself out within every sector of societal life. How this truth is to be arrived at, however, is another matter. Following in the footsteps of the Enlightenment, the prevailing assumption has been that truth can only be arrived at when the inquiring mind is set free from the restraints of tradition so that an impartial examination of the evidence can sift out the enduring truths from among the confusing diversity of unexamined opinions and dogmatic illusions. Arising out of the ferment of the Enlightenment, the scientific method has claimed that objective and impartial truths can be arrived at and accredited within a community of inquirers without any application of coercion or authoritarian restraint. Denominations of religion, schools of philosophy, and the varieties of healing therapies cannot claim comparable methods or results. In consequence, the scientific method has gained an exemplary status within modern culture. In the years following Thomas Kuhn's immensely popular, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, those in the humanities have made accelerated attempts to mimic what they understand to be the scientific method for they have been persuaded that "scientific knowledge rests on the bedrock of empirical testability" (Hunt 1991:197) and that the scientific method provides "the most, if not the only, objective mode of pursuing knowledge" (Hunt 1991:200).

Aaron Milavec, "Polanyi's Epistemology and Sociology of Science as Accounting for How Faith and Discovery Perform Embodied Heuristic Functions that Enable the Advancement of Science and Theology," Process Perspectives 27/1 (Spring 2004)

Abstract presented on the first page of the article.

Aaron Milavec,  "Religious Pedagogy from Tender to Twilight Years: Parenting, Mentoring, and Pioneering Discoveries by Religious Masters as Viewed from within Polanyi's Sociology and Epistemology of Science," Tradition and Discovery 23/2 (1997) 15-36.

In the year 1208, Francis of Assisi and his band of followers could look up into the sky at twilight and marvel at the fact that as God was putting away the sun into its place of rest under the sea while his angels were, at the same time, lighting distant bonfires as beacons whereby night travelers and sailors could steer their course. In the eyes of Francis and his contemporaries, " brother sun " and " sister moon " were continually being assigned their rightful places by a host of spiritual beings who served man's interests humbly, faithfully, and without reward. This was the spiritual lesson Francis learned from his astronomical observations. In our own day, the vision of Francis is reserved to a small minority of simple souls and poets. Modern astronomy, armed with the Newtonian laws of gravitation looks up into the evening sky and senses that the massive satellite that we call " earth " is turning its face away from our local star that we have traditionally called " our sun. " As the ambient light decreases, the iris of every animal and human eye gradually enlarges to admit more light and to take notice that the cold and impersonal cosmic void surrounding our earth-satellite is littered with billions of massive stars that have been randomly flung into their respective places by a Big Bang that erupted ten billion years ago. Each of these massive fireballs in the night sky are in various phases of being born, maturing, or dying out—all according to the impersonal laws of nuclear physics and celestial mechanics. As in the case of our own star, not a single one of them ever gives a fleeting nod to the prayers of our saints or to the telemetric data being gathered by our space probes. The lesson learned from these observations is that we are utterly alone in a universe that takes no notice of whether we laugh or cry, get sick or die.

Aaron Milavec, "Polanyi's 'Cosmic Field'--Prophetic Faith or Religious Folly?" Personal Knowledge at 50 [Years] Conference (juried conference paper followed by publication: Chicago, 13-15 June 2008)

This study deals with the known fact that the same bible gives rise to diverse and sometimes incompatible doctrines and practices.  The epistemology and sociology of Michael Polanyi is used to analyze how this situation arises and what we need to do about it.

Aaron Milavec [written when my legal name was Donald A. Milavec] "The Bible as Inspiring and Authorizing Incompatible Doctrines and Practices," Église et théologie 7 (1976) 189-218.

This paper looks at Wittgenstein's criticism of metaphysical philosophy and its possible reconstitution through Polanyi's epistemology of tacit knowing. The two approaches are contrasted in the end in response to the question "What is the meaning of life?" What I plan to do here is to address the question of the possibility of there being sense to metaphysical philosophy. There is one key point upon which any metaphysical edifice turns: the notion of essence. If this notion is destroyed, then no metaphysics can stand. If it can be sustained in some manner, then the possibility of metaphysics remains. Essence appears to be the base level for developing standards of judgment that stand apart from us. Once we name essences, we can arrange them in propositions to describe states of affairs, and further, we can arrange our propositions into general philosophical pictures. Undermining essences will undermine the push towards unity at each of these levels. The beauty of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work is that it displays elegantly the collapse of metaphysical philosophy through a sustained attack on the notion of essence. The beauty of Michael Polanyi's epistemology is that it can show the seductive power of traditional conceptions of essence as it provides a new understanding of what essence might amount to. I will first display the strategy Wittgenstein employs in criticizing metaphysical philosophy in the Philosophical Investigations 1 ; I will discuss briefly Polanyi's conception of "tacit knowledge"; I will then exhibit how Polanyi not only counters the move Wittgenstein makes in order to reformulate a notion of "essence," but shows why Wittgenstein's criticisms work so well in the first place. Wittgenstein's Attack on Metaphysical Philosophy The explicit targets of Wittgenstein's attack are Plato, Augustine, Frege, Russell, and his earlier self. It is helpful here, however, to blanch out some of the subtler distinctions and more specific critiques 2 for a general sense of the metaphysical view Wittgenstein undermines: the Platonic picture which sets the ground for a "correspondence" conception of truth. 3 As sophisticated as the theories and counter-theories of various philosophers became, Classical or Modern, they relied on a conception of truth that Wittgenstein reads back into the dialogues of Plato and leads, ultimately, to a metaphysics that could undergird a positivist's view of science. 4 This correspondence theory manifests itself in various ways throughout the tradition of philosophy. This