Wu-Wei

If I should pick three thinkers that influenced me the most, I would name Nietzsche, Robert Greene (self-help book writer), and Lao Tzu. Although most portions of the text written by my third picked thinker are shrouded in ambiguity, I personally believe that his Tao philosophy is so grand and deep that it even embraces the other two respectable writers. I personally concede, though, that I do not have high regards for China as a nation. Nevertheless, the profundity of the Tao Te Ching was sufficient to grab my attention, which led to creation of this blog. I was born and raised in a country that has a high regard for Confucianism. Although I was not familiar with the name of Confucius when I was young, I can see now that part of my value system was greatly influenced by him. However, I personally conclude that there is a reason why his philosophy is eclipsed by Lao Tzu. I wish to discuss the content of the Tao Te Ching in detail chapter by chapter. Thanks.

The Etymology of The "Wu  Wei"  无 & 为 4
Laozi's Wu-wei as a tool for Social-economic Principles Based on Laoism 8
Wu-wei Has Its Origin in Humanism and Humanitarianism 9
Wu-wei Philosophy in Political Activism Vs Libertarianism for  Political activities 12
Libertarianism Delimited by Activities of Shortsighted Political Bash, e.g. Machiavellism? 14
The Only Time wu-wei Was Practiced Right in Politics was During 2nd Century BC:
      "wei wu wei"为无为 in The Chinese History:  Wen-Jing Adminstrations文景之治 19

In order to palpate how social change happens Michel Foucault deployed the term dispositif (most frequently translated into English as “apparatus”), to emphasize the power differential intrinsic in the networked relations of social actors. According to Foucault the eighteenth century Physiocrats are the exemplars to whom we must look if we are to understand how the shift from monarchy to democracy could happen. Foucault tells us that what the Physiocrats advanced was an apparatus (dispositif) for adjusting materials in response to scarcity. Who were the Physiocrats? The leading figure of the Physiocrat movement, François Quesnay saw himself—and insisted his pupils also refer to him—as “the Confucius of Europe.” The Marquis de Mirabeau even referred to Quesnay’s Tableau économique as the Physiocrat’s Yijing 易經. I am obligated to note that Foucault chose not to pursue this Sinophilia in the origin of our contemporary dispositif. Rather, he points to Louis-Paul Abeille’s Lettre d’un negociant sur la nature du commerce des grains (1763) as representative of the “pivotal position in the economic thought of that time.” We can speculate as to why Foucault chose not pursue the Sinophilic tendencies, but it is staggering to see that at precisely the moment where Foucault sees a pivotal shift in Occidental political-economic thought there was an equally important report written in China titled “A Memorial on Grain Prices, the Grain Trade, and Government-Controlled Brokerages,” (1763) written by Yang Yingju. Was it simple serendipity that Abeille and Yang wrote these reports at the same moment? Here I will present a small introduction to the Chinese philosophical roots of the development of laissez-faire capitalism. Or perhaps I should say that it is an introduction to a misreading of Chinese philosophy.

Can the principle of wu-wei (‘non-action’) be applied in a meaningful sense to economic, political and social life?

The ancient Daoist concept of non-action, rejecting deliberate actions. Taken from the Daodejing - with commentary on how a ruler is to conduct themselves in accordance with the dao and how they should interact with their political interior.

Scholars working in philosophy of action still struggle with the freedom/determinism dichotomy that stretches back to Hellenist philosophy and the metaphysics that gave rise to it. Although that metaphysics has been repudiated in current philosophy of mind and cognitive science, the dichotomy still haunts these fields. As such, action is understood as distinct from movement, or motion. In early China, under a very different metaphysical paradigm, no such distinction is made. Instead, a notion of self-caused movement, or spontaneity, is elaborated. In this article a general conception of spontaneity from early Daoism is explained, detailing its constituent aspects. Similar notions appeared from time to time in Western philosophy, and these instances are pursued, exploring how their instantiations differed from Daoist spontaneity and why. Based on these approximate examples of spontaneity and on early Daoist spontaneity, new criteria are postulated for a plausible theory of action that dispenses with presuppositions that eventuate in a freedom/determinism dichotomy, and instead the possibility is offered of a general model of action that can be applied smoothly across current philosophical and cognitive scientific subdisciplines.

Positioned itself in the stance of critical posthumanism, this essay examines the virtual corporeality in Markus Selg and Susanne Kennedy's VR performance I AM (VR). By introducing Zhuangzi's idea of Tenuous self (虛我) and Jean-Luc Nancy's take on the liminal body, this essay asks how do we consider the physical form of the body, assembled in reality-reality within the immersive sharing and exchanging process of virtual-reality? What kind of transformation that the body might experience when it immerses into that otherworldly reality? I Am (VR), as an embodied performative happening of both artistic research and practice of virtual reality, provides insightful perspective in searching for possible answers. Taking this analysis as a departure point, this essay further investigates the possible entanglements between the ‘I’ and the ‘VR'.

认 知科学对 人类大脑和行为的研究，能有助我们更细致精妙地了解 早期中国思想中
“无为”这个常见的人类行为。早期中国典籍中对“无为”的含蓄描述，亦同时可以令我们更 明白当代认知心理学在理论上、预设上的限制，以及可行的出路。本文将沿着上述的两个方向发挥。文章的第一部分，根据 《庄子》里与“无 为 ”行为有关的主要篇章，为“无为”的内容分类。“无为”可分为 “完整性 ”（wholeness） 和“流畅性”（fluency） 两大范 畴，当中“完整性”可细分作“集中”（collection） 和 “排除”（shedding）， “流畅性”则可细分作 “回应性”（responsiveness） 和 “轻易”（ease）。 本文的 主要预设是，《庄子》里描述的“无为 ”（甚至是其他典籍里的相关描述）是一种不受文化制约的人类行为。订立一套准确的分类方法，有助我们借此审视当代心 理学和认知科学的 文献中， 曾述及的类似行为。本文继而在已订立的分类方法上，与齐 克森米哈里（Csikszentmihalyi） 的“自 成目的体验 ”（autotelic experience） 观念相互比较，而“自 成目的体验 ” 观 念乃可通 向当代认知科学研究的桥梁。本文第三部分引用了不少 科学研究，以解释“无为”行为的各个面向。最后，本文对汉学研究如何可为推动认知科学和当代哲学发展作出贡献， 提出了建议。

link: http://purl.stanford.edu/ms571wr3930

ABSTRACT:

Ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism purports to offer philosophical therapy: Philosophical dogmatism is a disease which perpetuates disturbance. Pyrrhonism is a cure which brings tranquility. Through—or in—suspension of judgment, the Pyrrhonist claims to come to overcome the problems of the dogmatists, and live well just in accordance with appearances.

But perhaps Pyrrhonism is bunk: Its professed end of freedom from disturbance—ataraxia—appears insubstantial. The professed means of the attainment of this Pyrrhonian tranquility—suspension of belief—appears degenerate, if not impossible.
For example, it seems we could not live rational human lives without believing.

To explore these complaints, this work attempts, first, to construct Pyrrhonism as a pedagogy towards a radical skepticism in which the thinker may experience appearance unadulterated by dogma. And second, it attempts to bring us to undergo the pedagogy we construct. We attempt the latter, because if the Pyrrhonist is a radical skeptic, she has no theory whose factual correctness could overcome the complaints against it. Then, to appreciate the viability of Pyrrhonism, we would not look for its superior capacity to produce facts, but for its therapeutic power to produce unadulterated appearance.

In this effort at constructing an ancient skeptical pedagogy for the sake of undergoing it, we come to produce a Cartesian meditation. For example, we try, along with the Pyrrhonist, to subtract belief in the propositions of material perception and mathematical intuition for the sake of revealing appearance.

Since it seems that the Pyrrhonist could not put forward a pedagogy dogmatically, we try to be charitable, and see if we can construct, first, the Pyrrhonian pedagogy through ad hominem analysis of dogmatism, and, second, ad hominem analysis as unavoidable in rational interaction.

In the present work, the particular Pyrrhonian ad hominem analysis for a skeptical pedagogy is of Platonism: We attempt to construct Pyrrhonian suspension as a final movement in Platonic ascent towards vision. We analyze the Republic for a conception of the completion of Platonic ascent in contemplative and practical ataraxia. We go on to take seriously Socrates' suggestion in the Republic's Line and Cave that the philosopher, towards the end of her science, is given to apophasis.

In going on to examine such apophasis, we take as our exemplar the Neoplatonic remarks about the One in Plotinus' Ennead 5.3. In accordance with the pedagogy of the Republic, we pursue ascent through material and mathematical subtraction towards the principle. And in the end, we pursue analogy between Plotinian vision of the One in subtraction, and Pyrrhonian vision of appearances in suspension of belief.

The Pyrrhonists suffer an appearance of the shortcoming of language: Propositional thought appears temporally extended, but the thing we would affirm in believing it would, it seems, have to be entirely present. Likewise, for Plotinus, in the end, vision of the unified principle comes by way of a subtraction in the face of the problem of capturing simplicity in extended thought.

The Pyrrhonist claims that we may bring against our present certainty the consideration that we have come to change our minds about things we once thought obvious. Then, we should be open to the possibility that we come to disagree with ourselves in the future. Consideration of this should be enough to bring us to suspension. We pursue such skeptical consideration, and by this, understanding of how the Pyrrhonist, in subtractive vision, may act calmly and, though in suspension, still from rational activity.

We try to limn the Pyrrhonist as engaged in such activity through the Aenesidemean expression of both her lack of belief, and her lack of belief that she lacks belief, as she formulates, for the sake of subtraction towards appearance, what appear to be propositions, both in favor of the necessity and against the possibility of the proposition.

In this effort at subtraction through equipollence and suspension, we pursue appearance as it might reveal itself to the Pyrrhonist as ground in a reconstruction she might give of her practical activity of expressing herself in dialectic in this way. In turn, by pursuit of this appearance, we try to see how the Pyrrhonist's pedagogical—and so practical—activity of thinking, and speaking, and laying in the balance one thing against the other under norms against hypothesis, regress, and circularity, as well as her analysis of this activity, may be rational, in ease afforded by honesty, and yet without belief.