Reference of Mental Concepts

Recent experimental research in the field of neurophysiology has led to the discovery of two classes of visuomotor neurons: canonical neurons and mirror neurons. In light of these studies, we propose here an overview of two classical themes in the cognitive science panorama: James Gibson's theory of affordances and Eleanor Rosch's principles of categorization. We discuss how theoretical perspectives and neuroscientific evidence are converging towards the current paradigm of embodied cognition. From this perspective, we discuss the role of action and simulation in cognitive processes, which lead to the perceptual recognition of objects, and actions and to their conceptual categorization.

Theory of mind explanations of how we know other minds are limited in several ways. First, they construe intersubjective relations too narrowly in terms of the specialized cognitive abilities of explaining and predicting another person’s mental states and behaviours. Second, they sometimes draw conclusions about second-person interaction from experiments designed to test third-person observation of another’s behaviour. As a result, the larger claims that are sometimes made for theory of mind, namely that theory of mind is our primary and pervasive means for understanding other persons, go beyond both the phenomenological and the scientific evidence. I argue that the interpretation of ‘primary intersubjectivity’ as merely precursory to theory of mind is inadequate. Rather, primary intersubjectivity, understood as a set of embodied practices and capabilities, is not only primary in a developmental sense, but is the primary way we continue to understand others in second-person interactions.

We propose to read Francis Bacon's doctrine of the idols of the mind as an investigation firmly entrenched in his mental-medicinal concerns and we argue that an important role therein is played by the imagination. Looking at the ways in which the imagination serves to pinpoint several crucial aspects of the idolic mind permits us to signal the explicit or implicit cross-references between what in Bacon's tree of knowledge appear as distinct branches: the various faculties and their arts; the mind, the body, and their league; natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of man. The consequence of this rich picture of the diagnosis of the mind is an equally rich conception of the cure, which comprises both epistemic and physiological aspects. We extract the features of this integrated view out of Bacon's epistemological and medical natural historical writings, which we propose to read in tandem. We also propose a number of sources for Bacon's views on the imagination, whose variety accounts for the multivalent, sometimes elusive, but surely pervasive role of the imagination in the Baconian diagnosis and cure of the mind.

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. 

The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.

Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.

The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning outside the brain or mind (semantic externalism). This, I'll show, doesn't follow. Besides, the intuition itself is misconstrued here. To say the term “water” expressed a thought or concept or belief denoting H2O before its actual discovery around 1750, is to make a claim without real content and be guilty of after-the-fact rationalizing. If anything, Twin Earth undercuts the theory of semantic externalism and its core-notion of rigid designation. A pluralized, descriptivist model of reference, I claim, is a better fit for our scientific data and ordinary intuitions either way.

Research has shown that the brain is constantly making predictions about future events. Theories of prediction in perception, action and learning suggest that the brain serves to reduce the discrepancies between expectation and actual experience, i.e., by reducing the prediction error. Forward models of action and perception propose the generation of a predictive internal representation of the expected sensory outcome, which is matched to the actual sensory feedback. Shared neural representations have been found when experiencing one's own and observing other's actions, rewards, errors, and emotions such as fear and pain. These general principles of the "predictive brain" are well established and have already begun to be applied to social aspects of cognition. The application and relevance of these predictive principles to social cognition are discussed in this article. Evidence is presented to argue that simple non-social cognitive processes can be extended to explain complex cognitive processes required for social interaction, with common neural activity seen for both social and non-social cognitions. A number of studies are included which demonstrate that bottom-up sensory input and top-down expectancies can be modulated by social information. The concept of competing social forward models and a partially distinct category of social prediction errors are introduced. The evolutionary implications of a "social predictive brain" are also mentioned, along with the implications on psychopathology. The review presents a number of testable hypotheses and novel comparisons that aim to stimulate further discussion and integration between currently disparate fields of research, with regard to computational models, behavioral and neurophysiological data. This promotes a relatively new platform for inquiry in social neuroscience with implications in social learning, theory of mind, empathy, the evolution of the social brain, and potential strategies for treating social cognitive deficits.

Embodied social cognition (ESC) aims to explicate how our embodiment shapes our knowledge of others, and in what this knowledge of others consists. Although there is much diversity amongst ESC accounts, common to all these accounts is the idea that our normal everyday interactions consist in non-mentalistic embodied engagements. In recent years, several theorists have developed and defended innovative and controversial accounts of ESC. These accounts challenge, and offer deflationary alternatives to, the standard cognitivist accounts of social cognition. As ESC accounts grow in number and prominence, the time has come for a dedicated, sustained debate on ESC and its most controversial and innovative elements. The goal of this special issue is to host such a debate with the aim of bringing clarity to the discussion of social cognition.

To understand the development of infant comprehension of visual obstructions and perspective-taking, this study tested the ability of N= 28 infants at 14, 16, and 18 months to adapt attention-sharing to visual constraints. An experimental task investigated how infants modify gaze following behaviors when an adult's line of sight is obstructed by a barrier. From 14 to 18 months, infants gradually learned to modify their search behavior when an adult looked toward a referent hidden behind a barrier from the infant's perspective. This ...

Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.

In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.

In spite of the merits of Gallotti and Frith’s we-mode proposal of social cognition, they attempt to separate social knowing from the dynamics of social interaction in order to focus on the individual mechanisms of social cognition. We argue that this approach leads to important shortcomings: 1) it imposes an implausible dichotomy between social and non-social interaction; 2) it is circular in that it simultaneously presupposes and tries to be explanatory of social skills and does not provide a developmental story for the representational capacities underlying the we-mode; 3) it does not really go beyond a notion of ‘mirror mechanism for mental states’ as it remains vague about its embodied versus representational nature.

В 1994 году в Институте языкознания РАН под руководством Н.Д. Арутюновой проходила конференция «Язык и время». На заключительном заседании, после подведения итогов конференции, один из участников, воспользовавшись паузой, обратился к аудитории с вопросом: «Так может кто-нибудь просто и коротко объяснить: Что такое Время?». Воцарившуюся на несколько секунд тишину, вдруг нарушила Татьяна Вячеславовна Булыгина:
«Время ― это наша концептуализация происходящих в мире изменений».
Это определение до сих пор кажется мне лучшим. В данной статье я хотел бы: 1) описать структуру концепта «Время» как специфическую концептуализацию «про- исходящих в мире изменений», и 2) объяснить общее значение прилагательного Ста- рый Х как концептуализацию цикла «жизни» объекта Х и указание на последнюю, «предсмертную» фазу его существования.

Intention recognition is ubiquitous in most social interactions among humans and other primates. Despite this, the role of intention recognition in the emergence of cooperative actions remains elusive. Resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory, herein we describe a computational model showing how intention recognition co-evolves with cooperation in populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping some individuals with the capacity of assessing the intentions of others in the course of a prototypical dilemma of cooperation – the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma –, we show how intention recognition is favored by natural selection, opening a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive. We introduce a new strategy (IR) that is able to assign an intention to the actions of opponents, on the basis of an acquired corpus consisting of possible plans achieving that intention, as well as to then make decisions on the basis of such recognized intentions. The success of IR is grounded on the unshameful exploitation of unconditional cooperators whilst remaining robust against unconditional defectors. In addition, we show how intention recognizers do indeed prevail against the most famous successful strategies of iterated dilemmas of cooperation, even in the presence of errors and reduction of fitness associated with a small cognitive cost for performing intention recognition.

Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate between the Theory Theory (TT) and the Simulation Theory (ST). The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in ST. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over TT. In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for ST. My view is that on an appropriate construal of their function, mirror neurons do not operate like simulation theorists claim. In fact, mirror neurons are more appropriately understood as one element in an information-rich mindreading process. As such, mirror neurons fit in better with some sort of TT account of mindreading. I defend a positive account, the Model TT, which better explains the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.

The main aim of this article is to present and defend a thesis
according to which conceptual representations of some types of mental states are encoded in the same neural structures that underlie the first-personal experience of those states. To support this proposal here, I will put forth a novel account of the cognitive function played by ‘shared representations’ of emotions and bodily sensations, i.e. neural structures that are active when one experiences a mental state of a certain type as well as when one observes someone else experiencing a state of the same type. I will argue that shared representations in fact constitute vehicles of certain mental state concepts (more precisely, concepts of specific types of emotions and somatosensory states). The main line of arguing for this will consist in showing that shared representations exhibit specific, ‘conceptual’ functional properties: (1) causal effect on forming metacognitive judgments, (2) cognitive penetrability, (3) diversity of input types.

""Classical ways of viewing the relation of consciousness to the brain and physical world make it difficult to see how consciousness can be a subject of scientific study. In contrast to physical events, it seems to be private, subjective, and viewable only from a subject's first-person perspective. But much of psychology does investigate human experience, which suggests that classical ways of viewing these relations must be wrong. An alternative, Reflexive model is outlined along with it's consequences for methodology. Within this model the external phenomenal world is viewed as part-of consciousness, rather than apart-from it. Observed events are only "public" in the sense of "private experience shared." Scientific observations are only "objective" in the sense of "intersubjective." Observed phenomena are only "repeatable" in the sense that they are sufficiently similar to be taken for "tokens" of the same event "type." This closes the gap between physical and psychological phenomena. Indeed, events out-there in the world can often be regarded as either physical or psychological depending on the network of relationships under consideration.

However, studying the experience of other human beings raises further complications. A subject (S) and an experimenter (E) may have symmetrical access to events out-there in the world, but their access to events within the subject's body or brain is asymmetrical (E's third-person perspective vs. S's first-person perspective). Insofar as E and S each have partial access to such events their perspectives are complementary. Access to S's experience is also asymmetrical, but in this case S has exclusive access whereas E can only infer its existence. This has not prevented the systematic investigation of experience, including quantification within psychophysics, psychometrics, and so on. Systematic investigation merely requires that experiences be potentially shared, intersubjective and repeatable. In this the conditions for a science of consciousness are no different to a science of physics."

Note added for 2012 Academia.edu upload: This paper, presented at a Ciba Foundation Symposiumin 2002 was the first time the epistemological implications of reflexive monism for a science of consciousness were presented to a group of internationally recognised scholars on consciousness, including John Searle, Dan Dennett, Thomas Nagel, Sydney Shoemaker, Colin McGinn, Michael Lockwood, Margaret Boden, Bernie Baars, Peter Fenwick, Michael Gazzaniga, Jeffrey Gray, Stevan Harnad, Marcel Kinsbourne, Nick Humphrey, John Kihlstrom, Ben Libet, Tony Marcel, Jerome Singer, Robert Van Gulick, Howard Shevrin, and Pat Wall. The discussion that follows the paper is of particular historical interest, much of it focusing on the how to interpret the projected nature (or out-thereness) of much of the phenomenal world. Over the following decade, various participants accepted the importance of the out-thereness of the phenomenal world (e.g. Libet, Gray, and Humphrey) along with other theorists such as Lehar, Revonsuo, Hoche, and Tye. However, whether phenomena that seem to be out in the world are really in the brain continued to be a source of contention.

The mechanisms of emergence and evolution of cooperation in populations of abstract individuals with diverse behavioural strategies in co-presence have been undergoing mathematical study via Evolutionary Game Theory, inspired in part on Evolutionary Psychology. Their systematic study resorts as well to implementation and simulation techniques, thus enabling the study of aforesaid mechanisms under a variety of conditions, parameters, and alternative virtual games. The theoretical and experimental results have continually been surprising, rewarding, and promising. Recently, in our own work we have initiated the introduction, in such groups of individuals, of cognitive abilities inspired on techniques and theories of Artificial Intelligence, namely those pertaining to both Intention Recognition and to Commitment (separately and jointly), encompassing errors in decision-making and communication noise. As a result, both the emergence and stability of coop- eration become reinforced comparatively to the absence of such cognitive abilities. This holds separately for Intention Recognition and for Commitment, and even more when they are engaged jointly. The present paper aims to sensitize the reader to these Evolutionary Game Theory based studies and issues, which are accruing in importance for the modelling of minds with machines, with impact on our understanding of the evolution of mutual tolerance and cooperation. In doing so, it also provides a coherent bird’s-eye view of our own varied recent work, whose more technical details and results are spread throughout a number of well recognized publishing venues, and to which we refer the reader for a fuller support of our claims where felt necessary.

This original and timely monograph describes a unique self-contained excursion that reveals to the readers the roles of two basic cognitive abilities, i.e. intention recognition and arranging commitments, in the evolution of cooperative behavior. This book analyses intention recognition, an important ability that helps agents predict others’ behavior, in its artificial intelligence and evolutionary computational modeling aspects, and proposes a novel intention recognition method. Furthermore, the book presents a new framework for intention-based decision making and illustrates several ways in which an ability to recognize intentions of others can enhance a decision making process. By employing the new intention recognition method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this book introduces computational models demonstrating that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation within populations of self-regarding agents. Finally, the book describes how commitment provides a pathway to the evolution of cooperative behavior, and how it further empowers intention recognition, thereby leading to a combined improved strategy.

Wittgenstein has shown that that life, in the sense that applies in the first place to human beings, is inherently linguistic. In this paper, I ask what is involved in language, given that it is thus essential to life, answering that language – or concepts – must be both alive and the ground for life. This is explicated by a Wittgensteinian series of entailments of features. According to the first feature, concepts are not intentional engagements. The second feature brings life back to concepts by describing them as inflectible: Attitudes, actions, conversations and other engagements inflect concepts, i.e. concepts take their particular characters in our actual engagements. However, inflections themselves would be reified together with the life they ground unless they could preserve the openness of concepts: hence the third feature of re-inflectibility. Finally, the openness of language must be revealed in actual life. This entails the possibility of conceptual ambivalence.

It has been proposed that language and action representational systems overlap when the tasks used to assess them involve the same stimuli and require abilities acquired at similarly early developmental stage. We matched variables at task and stimulus level to test this hypothesis in a group of 12 left-damaged patients (and 17 controls). At the patients' group level, we replicated previously reported correlations between linguistic and nonlinguistic tasks. When performances were analysed individually, however, double dissociations were observed between the ability to imitate pantomimes and the ability to produce and comprehend the corresponding action verbs, as well as between the ability to use tools and the ability to comprehend the corresponding tool nouns. These findings suggest that processing action words is independent of the ability to produce the associated object-directed actions. Double dissociations were also found between the ability to comprehend action verbs and the ability to comprehend tool nouns. Moreover, action and tool naming showed differential effects of age of acquisition, suggesting that the two word categories meet the lexical organization by word class (nouns and verbs), even when related to identical action concept. Dissociations at behavioural level are supported by anatomical dissociations shown in the analysis of patients' lesions.

Social cognition is the capacity to understand and interact with others. The mainstream account of social cognition is mindreading, the view that we humans understanding others by interpreting their behavior in terms of mental states. Recently theorists from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience have challenged the mindreading account, arguing for a more deflationary account of social cognition. In this paper I examine a deflationary account of social cognition, embodied simulation, which is inspired by recent neuroscientific findings. I argue that embodied simulation fails to present an adequate alternative to mindreading accounts of social cognition. I defend a philosophically and empirically plausible two-systems account of social cognition, which holds that even very young children are capable of mindreading.

This paper is concerned with the problem of self-identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self-identification and in agency- ascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution.

The mechanisms of emergence and evolution of cooperation in populations of abstract individuals with diverse behavioural strategies in co-presence have been undergoing mathematical study via Evolutionary Game Theory, inspired in part on Evolutionary Psychology. Their systematic study resorts as well to implementation and simulation techniques, thus enabling the study of aforesaid mechanisms under a variety of conditions, parameters, and alternative virtual games. The theoretical and experimental results have continually been surprising, rewarding, and promising. Recently, in our own work we have initiated the introduction, in such groups of individuals, of cognitive abilities inspired on techniques and theories of Artificial Intelligence, namely those pertaining to both Intention Recognition and to Commitment (separately and jointly), encompassing errors in decision-making and communication noise. As a result, both the emergence and stability of cooperation become reinforced compara...

"The aim of this study was to bring to the surface the strategic use of imitative processes in the context of a 2-route model: (a) direct imitation, used in reproducing new, meaningless actions, and (b) imitation based on stored semantic knowledge of familiar meaningful actions. Three experiments were carried out with healthy participants who reproduced meaningful and meaningless actions within an established time limit. The study investigated 3 factors that could potentially affect the selection of processes used for imitation: (a) the composition of the experimental list (blocked or mixed presentation), (b) the presence-absence of instructions (Experiments 1 and 2), and (c) the relative proportions of the stimuli (Experiment 3). Overall, the results suggest that each of these factors influences the selection of imitative strategies in healthy individuals with temporarily reduced capacities, as happens in the case of brain-damaged patients.

Copyright 2004 APA."

Previous studies have suggested that imitators can reproduce known gestures shown by a model using a semantic, indirect route, and novel gestures using a sublexical, direct route. In the present study we aimed at testing the validity of such a dual-route model of action imitation. Patients with either left-brain damage (LBD) or right-brain damage (RBD) were tested on an action imitation task. Actions were either meaningful (n = 20) or meaningless (n = 20), and were presented in an intermingled list and, on a different day, in separate lists. We predicted that, in the mixed condition, patients would use a direct route to imitate meaningful and meaningless actions, as it allows the imitation of both action types. In the blocked condition, patients were expected to select the semantic route for meaningful actions and the direct route for meaningless actions. As hypothesized, none of the 32 patients showed dissociations between imitation of meaningful and meaningless actions in the mixed presentation. In contrast, eight patients showed a dissociation between imitation of meaningful actions and imitation of meaningless actions in the blocked presentation. Moreover, two of these patients showed a classical double dissociation between the imitation of the two action types. Results were interpreted in support of the validity of a dual-route model for explaining action imitation. We argue that the decrease in imitation of meaningful actions, relative to meaningless actions, is caused by a damage of the semantic route, and that the decline in imitation of meaningless actions, relative to meaningful actions, is produced by a breakdown of the direct route. The brain areas that were lesioned in all six LBD patients who showed a dissociation were in the superior temporal gyrus and the angular gyrus, whereas the two RBD subjects had common lesions of the pallidum and of the putamen. The brain structures affected in our patients with selective apraxia are consistent with those reported before in other neuropsychological reports. They are also in agreement with areas found activated in imaging studies in which the neural mechanisms underlying imitation were examined.

Naturalistic observations of infant/caregiver social attention have yielded rich information about human social development. However, observational data are expensive, laborious, and reliant on fallible human coders. We model interactions between caregivers and infants using a three dimensional simulation environment in order to gain greater insight into the development of infant attention sharing, specifically gaze following. Most models of infant cognition have been only abstractly linked to the detail of a real life environment and ...

Gaze following, the ability to redirect one’s visual at- tention to look at what another person is seeing, is foundational for imitation, word learning, and theory-of-mind. Previous theories have suggested that the development of gaze following in human infants is the product of a basic gaze following mechanism, plus the gradual incorporation of several distinct new mechanisms that im- prove the skill, such as spatial inference, and the ability to use eye direction information as well as head direction. In this paper, we offer an alternative explanation based on a single learning mecha- nism. From a starting state with no knowledge of the implications of another organism’s gaze direction, our model learns to follow gaze by being placed in a simulated environment where an adult caregiver looks around at objects. Our infant model matches the development of gaze following in human infants as measured in key experiments that we replicate and analyze in detail.