Roman cavalry

Abstract
Heavy cavalry formation, introduced by the Sarmatian tribes during the first centuries C.E., can be rightfully considered their most ingenious invention, which subsequently had a great influence on the formation of medieval knighthood (Cardini 1981; Russian translation Cardini 1987). This cavalry was later named "cataphracts" (from the Greek kataphraktos, mailed). The term is borrowed from classical tradition and, in general, it reflects the fact that that the issues of Sarmatians' defensive armament are studied more extensively than others in modern literature. In the present article, less-studied elements of Sarmatian military techniques and tactics are explored: the way of using the main weapon of the cataphracts—a lance [contus] and their horse-riding posture in a battle. We have used the two most informative groups of sources—written sources and drawings. The chronological framework for the article is the first and second centuries.

Ma thèse de doctorat porte sur le combat de cavalerie dans le monde romain du Ier siècle a.C. au VIe siècle p.C. Il s’agit d’un travail de synthèse, traitant de la doctrine d’emploi de la cavalerie aux époques tardo-républicaine, impériale et proto-byzantine. Les questions organisationnelles et stratégiques sont abordées, mais la focale est surtout mise sur la tactique et la physionomie du combat. L’objectif de cette recherche est de rendre compte de l’évolution de l’art de la guerre durant la fin de l’Antiquité en analysant spécifiquement les enjeux liés au développement et à l’utilisation de la cavalerie. L’importance croissante des troupes montées dans la stratégie impériale marque en effet une rupture importante dans l’histoire de l’armée romaine. Au primat des guerres offensives, de la bataille rangée et de l’infanterie lourde succède progressivement celui de la temporisation, de la guérilla frontalière et des cavaliers-archers. Ces changements, qui n’ont jamais fait l’objet d’une analyse approfondie, sont ici situés dans le temps long de l’Antiquité romaine. Le dialogue des sources narratives, techniques, figurées et archéologiques permet de dégager un schéma évolutif cohérent, un « développement organique des formes de combat » (Hans Delbrück) que je réinscris dans le contexte plus large de l’évolution de la culture militaire impériale, en attachant une importance particulière au rapport des Romains à la guerre et à leur perception idéale des rôles respectifs de l’infanterie et de la cavalerie.

Prix André Corvisier 2018 : http://www.icmh-cihm.org/en/51-the-winner-of-the-2018-corvisier-prize-announced

The paper/slide show/presentation describes and analyses Julius Caesar's Munda campaign in 45 BC and assesses what military (combined/joins arms strategy and tactics, logistics etc.) and other means (e.g. intelligence, disinformation and propaganda) he used to achieve his goals.  It also shows how his enemies managed to fool him while also demonstrating his resourceful and inventive responses to these.  For example, the presentation shows how Caesar was able to overcome the advantages his enemies had by adapting his battle formation to the situation at the battle of Munda.  This campaign also shows how Caesar conducted his joint and combined arms campaign when he had the advantage both in cavalry and navy, the arms in which he had previously been deficient when facing the Pompeians.  This paper forms a part of a much larger study Caesar's career parts of which have already been posted on this site (Sabis, Caesar vs. Pompey) as advertisements of my forthcoming books, and (together with the other Caesarian material on this site) it shows how many of the previously held assumptions like the complete abandonment of the citizen cavalry after Marius are utterly false.

De nombreux travaux ont montré l’importance du lien existant entre combat de cavalerie et culture aristocratique dans les sociétés du monde méditerranéen classique. À Athènes comme à Rome, hippeis et equites se définissent fondamentalement par la possession d’une monture qui les distingue dans la bataille du reste du corps civique. Cette valorisation archaïque du cavalier a évolué en lien avec la place croissante occupée par l’infanterie lourde dans l’art de la guerre. Alors que dans la Grèce de la fin du Ve siècle, l’image du cavalier correspond déjà à celle de l’« autre guerrier », c’est-à-dire de l’hippotoxotês scythe, véritable antithèse de l’hoplite, l’abandon du service militaire des jeunes aristocrates dans la cavalerie légionnaire à la fin de la période républicaine entraîne une évolution similaire dans le monde romain. Sous la plume des poètes augustéens, le cavalier par excellence, c’est avant tout le barbarus eques, refusant le combat régulier, la rencontre frontale caractéristique du iustum proelium. Ce qui était une figure emblématique et centrale de l’art tyrrhénien à l’époque archaïque renvoie désormais de manière privilégiée à l’altérité. Plus que jamais, l’identité militaire romaine s’incarne dans la figure du fantassin lourd qu’est le légionnaire. On assiste donc à la transposition d’un marqueur identitaire, correspondant initialement à une différenciation de nature sociale, dans le champ du discours opposant civilisation et barbarie, avec l’adaptation d’un certain nombre de lieux communs qui servaient auparavant à dénigrer les valeurs aristocratiques : la truphê et l’individualisme des antiques chevaliers deviennent ainsi l’orgueil et l’indiscipline des cavaliers barbares.

Over the years, many pieces of horse gear have been recovered from Roman military sites along the Lower Rhine. These finds can offer insight into the composition of the Roman army operating in Germania inferior. This army was, especially during the 1st century AD, highly mobile and consisted of various units, but which units precisely is
not clear. The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether previous attributions with respect to some items of horse gear still hold true and to examine whether more items can be added to this list. Two published case studies serve as starting points: the so-called ring bits recovered at Krefeld-Gellep in Germany, and a diverse set of riding spurs found
at Nijmegen-Kops Plateau in the Netherlands. They constitute the starting point for an investigation of early Imperial cavalry equipment from the Lower Rhine region.

Abstract. - In 55 B.C., during the Gallic Wars, Caesar slaughtered the Usipetes and Tencteri at the confluence of the Meuse river and the Rhine river. That offensive has long been seen as a war crime. More recently, it has increasingly been described as a genocide. However, after studying the criticisms expressed in ancient sources, that definition seems inappropriate: accusations are of a different kind. This article therefore aims at a better understanding of the very meaning of that violence and its features. A historical approach inspired by sociological methods renews former viewpoints. For instance, not only Caesar’s, but also Plutarch's, Appian's and Cassius Dio’s writings are detailed enough to examine the way violence progressively bursts. They also allow to assess the key-role of the cavalry. Consequently, one has to reassess Caesar’s part in ordering the slaughter initiative. There seems indeed to be a gap between the account of the facts, overestimated by the controversy, and Caesar’s real part.

Résumé. - En 55 avant J.-C., lors de la guerre des Gaules, César massacre les Usipètes et les Tenctères au confluent de la Meuse et du Rhin. Cette offensive est depuis longtemps appréhendée comme un crime de guerre. Plus récemment, elle est de plus en plus souvent qualifiée de génocide. Toutefois, après examen des critiques rapportées par les sources antiques, cette désignation semble inadéquate : les dénonciations ne se situent pas sur ce registre. Cette étude a donc pour ambition de mieux évaluer le sens de cette violence et ses caractéristiques. Une approche historique inspirée des méthodes de la sociologie renouvelle les anciennes perspectives. Ainsi, les textes de César lui-même, mais également de Plutarque, Appien ou Dion Cassius, sont suffisamment détaillés pour analyser la progressivité avec laquelle la violence est engendrée. Ils permettent également de mesurer le poids décisif des réactions de la cavalerie. Dès lors, la place de César dans l’initiative du massacre doit être reconsidérée. Il existe notamment un décalage entre le récit, gonflé par la polémique, et le véritable rôle de César.

Mots-clés.- armée romaine, république romaine, guerre romaine, violence, génocide, massacre, cavalerie, César, Germains, Guerre des Gaules, Bellum Gallicum

Key-words. - Roman army, Roman Republic, Roman warfare, violence, genocide, slaughter, cavalry, Caesar, Germans, Gallic Wars, Bellum Gallicum

Cet article propose une étude de l’image du cavalier dans les sources de l’Empire romain tardif. Il s’agit principalement d’une réfutation des analyses d’A. Kaldellis portant sur la préface de l’Histoire des guerres de Justinien. Contrairement à l’historien américain, je soutiens que la plupart des auteurs de l’époque, dont Procope de Césarée, étaient favorables à l’essor de la cavalerie dans l’armée romaine. Ce constat témoigne d’une importante évolution des mentalités romaines face à la guerre. En effet, alors que les Romains du Haut-Empire attachaient, sur le plan symbolique, une importance majeure au fantassin légionnaire, le combattant monté gagne en visibilité dans les sources dès la fin du IIIe siècle. Ce changement est lié à l’institutionnalisation de la grande guérilla comme doctrine de défense de l’Empire romain et à l’intégration de tactiques militaires « barbares ». Il s’accompagne d’un renouvellement du discours officiel sur l’archerie montée, activité autrefois dépréciée par les auteurs classiques.

This paper examines the Roman emperor Gallienus (r. 253-68) and his handling of the Crisis of the Third Century. Using both ancient and modern sources, Rome's third century crisis is detailed and Gallienus' actions during his reign are stated. I then list and discuss the many policies implemented by Gallienus and how they influenced the struggling empire. It is argued that he is responsible for the survival and eventual recovery of the state through his own actions and policies enacted. Even though the Crisis of the Third Century peaked during the reign of Gallienus as the empire teetered on collapse, this happened as a number of crises all occurred simultaneously and Gallienus is wrongfully scapegoated for this. I examine and explain the hostility primary sources have towards Gallienus and how they paint an inaccurate image of the emperor. I argue Gallienus was one of the most qualified Roman emperors and that despite the accumulation of crises during his reign, Gallienus was a highly successful emperor.

I argue here that the notion of Greek, Macedonian, and Hellenistic use of a cavalry triangular wedge (embolon) may be an invention of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius in his Technê Taktikê, which subsequent tactical treatises (Asclepiodotus, Aelian, Arrian) perpetuated in various ways. Though an embolon is used to describe cavalry formations at both Mantineia (362 B.C.) and Gaugamela (331 B.C.), the formations are best interpreted as assault columns of tetragonal units deployed narrowly one behind another with flat fronts instead of the apex of a wedge; the word embolon is used metaphorically and would be better translated “ram” than “wedge”.

At the Fourth Roman Military Equipment Conference in Newcastle in 1987, I first explored the reconstruction of Roman cavalry harness, attempting to harmonise the evidence from sculptural representations and archaeological excavation. Much has been learned since then, and this paper attempts to review how some of the principles expounded back then can be extended to other periods beyond the 1st century AD, as well as looking at new directions in which the evidence can take us. Salvatore Ortisi's important work on the horse harness from the Bay of Naples sites is an important first step in a detailed consideration of the relationship between civil and military harness, but the evidence can be teased out to provide a much richer and nuanced impression of what we can and cannot say about cavalry equipment. Moreover, hints of ethnic specificity can be pursued to provide interesting sidelights on the similarities and differences between cavalry units serving within the Roman army. With the upcoming exhibition Hadrian's Cavalry being hosted at multiple venues along Hadrian's Wall in 2017, cavalry equipment in all its forms is going to make headlines. It is time to show an enthusiastic potential audience just how much we know, but also where the challenges lie for the future study of Roman cavalry equipment.

Il s’agira de s’interroger sur la pratique de la décollation dans l’armée du Principat en insistant sur l’influence des auxiliaires celtes au début de l’époque impériale. S’il est vrai que les Romains étaient les héritiers d’une ancienne tradition de chasse aux têtes, Strabon affirme que ce type de violence fut interdit après la conquête des Gaules, en relation avec l’horreur que suscitaient les pratiques sacrificielles des Celtes. Pourtant, des têtes coupées apparaissent en nombre sur les reliefs triomphaux de l’époque antonine et sur les stèles funéraires de cavaliers d’ailes. Comment expliquer la résurgence de cette coutume tombée en désuétude dans le monde romain dès IIe siècle av. n. è. ? On postulera que la revalorisation de la chasse aux têtes est liée à l’incorporation des auxiliaires d’Europe occidentale dans l’armée régulière du Principat. Sans pour autant verser dans la caricature du barbare sanguinaire, de nombreux indices prouvent que les chasseurs de têtes impériaux étaient majoritairement issus de ces unités et pratiquaient leur art suivant des modalités qui étaient étrangères aux traditions militaires italiques. On évoquera en particulier la découverte de plusieurs dépôts de crânes votifs en Gaule et en Bretagne datés d’après la conquête romaine. Ces trophées qui étaient offerts à des divinités montrent que les coutumes celtes de l’âge du fer n’avaient pas été complètement abandonnées à l’époque. A tel point que les autorités impériales durent finalement se résoudre à accepter cet état de fait en régulant la pratique de la décollation dans les provinces frontalières et en lui attribuant un sens positif, lié à la mise en scène de la lutte de la civilisation contre la barbarie. Ces conclusions nous amènerons à réexaminer la question de l’origine et de la fonction des casques à visages qui étaient utilisés par les cavaliers romains. Longtemps perçus comme des équipements d’origine thrace, il semble en réalité que ces artefacts soient à relier au monde celtique. Ils révéleraient toute l’importance que les peuples d’Europe occidentale accordaient à la tête, considérée par eux comme le siège de l’âme humaine.

This paper explores the origins of the horse games (hippika gymnasia) of the Roman imperial army. It argues that the equestrian displays lengthily described by Arrian in his tactical treatise were borrowed from the Gallic and Iberian Celts, who formed the most important part of the Roman auxiliary cavalry at the end of the Republic and at the beginning of the Principate. Mask helmets were worn by the most renowned horsemen during these games. The first examples of such masks in Roman context can be found on triumphal representations celebrating victories over Celtiberian or Gallic foes. The evidence suggests that they were initially made of organic materials, like the over-modelled or plastered skull masks that could adorn public monuments in pre-Roman Gaul. From the end of the 1st century BC onward, they began to adopt the form of full metal helmets and were progressively adapted to the Greco-Roman taste. The idea that the hippika gymnasia were borrowed from the Roman equestrian parade called the lusus Troiae and that mask helmets were part of an old Italic tradition should, therefore, be abandoned.

A select group of 1st-century AD 'Totenmahl' tombstones shows Roman auxiliary cavalry horses being long-reined. These same stones also provide the main sculptural evidence for the use of saddle plates. This paper begins by examining one set of privately owned horse harness and then broadens its focus to consider the wider implications of long-reining amongst Roman cavalry.

Original Spanish version of my chapter concerning the battle of Strasburg, a main military event concerning the Fourth Century in the West, key to the knowledge of Julian, the Late Roman Legions and overall Empire during Constantinian period.

This paper examines the Roman emperor Gallienus (r. 253-68) and his handling of the Crisis of the Third Century. Using both ancient and modern sources, Rome's third century crisis is detailed and Gallienus' actions during his reign are stated. I then list and discuss the many policies implemented by Gallienus and how they influenced the struggling empire. It is argued that he is responsible for the survival and eventual recovery of the state through his own actions and policies enacted. Even though the Crisis of the Third Century peaked during the reign of Gallienus as the empire teetered on collapse, this happened as a number of crises all occurred simultaneously and Gallienus is wrongfully scapegoated for this. I examine and explain the hostility primary sources have towards Gallienus and how they paint an inaccurate image of the emperor. I argue Gallienus was one of the most qualified Roman emperors and that despite the accumulation of crises during his reign, Gallienus was a highly successful emperor.

This article elaborates on one of the episodes of Constantine the Great’s italian campaign in year 312 – battle of Augusta Taurinorum. In this clash of arms legions of the augustus of the West defeated part of forces of usurper Maxentius – those responsible for defence of western Italy. Although Constantine’s army destroyed only part of Maxentius army,after the battle of Augusta Taurinorum, augustus of the West enjoyed constant military success which found its finale at Battle of Milvian Bridge. In this battle Maxentius died on the battlefield and Constatine reached full authority over western part of Roman Empire.

The last two decades seen a vast growth in the field of battle dynamics studies. The variety of themes examined in this research consists of topics such as the role of the general, the importance of battle formations, the effect of the weapon types, and more; in addition, there were even psychological attempts conducted to inspect the mentality of the individuals on the battlefield. This thesis aims to examine another aspect under the framework of the ancient battle studies, one which has not been studied ere: battles between Roman legions.
The Roman civil wars have provided a generous number of battles in which the legions have stood one against the other. Therefore, regarding the Roman armies’ similar fighting techniques and identical weapons, it would by all means be provoking to probe these armies' – which are considered as the most successful in the classical world - warfare in frontal combats between themselves. The themes under examination shall be as followed: the factors which have decided the final faith of the battles; the extent of the legions’ identicalness to each other; the variables that distinguished between the different legions; the conclusions able to be drawn from the rising findings and their contribution to the modern military history research. These conclusions will be exceptionally important to today's great number of studies due to the fact, as aforesaid, that up until now no research has inspected the framework examined in this thesis; the battles between legions are usually being inserted into the general frame of combats in the Roman world.
We shall recognize the ability of these battles to reflect the general traits of the combats of the period; but more importantly, we shall realize what characteristics were unique to them, hence the characteristics which cannot be referred to as typical. There cannot be any doubt that when the legions fought one another with similar weapons and battle techniques, these confrontations carried unique characteristics that would be absent in combats against a non Roman foe.

Die Reiter - Attribute des fruehromischen Adels - Die Phalerae - Der Goldring als Kennzeichen des Reiterprivilegs - Die Trabea - Der Calceus Patricius - Der Purpustreifen der Tunika - Rueckblick auf die Ergebnisse - Die politische Rolle und die Entwicklung der Adelsreiterei - Domi - Militiae - Die aelteste Reiterei - Die Verdoppelung der Staatspferdnahber - Die Achtzehn Reitercenturien der sogenannten Servianischen Reform - Das Ansehen der alten Reiterei.