Stuxnet

Cyber-attacks have become increasingly common in recent years. Capable of shutting down nuclear centrifuges, air defense systems, and electrical grids, cyber-attacks pose a serious threat to national security. As a result, some have suggested that cyber-attacks should be treated as acts of war. Yet the attacks look little like the armed attacks that the law of war has traditionally regulated. This Article examines how existing law may be applied—and adapted and amended—to meet the distinctive challenge posed by cyber-attacks. It begins by clarifying what cyber-attacks are and how they already are regulated by existing bodies of law, including the law of war, international treaties, and domestic criminal law. This review makes clear that existing law effectively addresses only a small fraction of potential cyber-attacks. The law of war, for example, provides a useful framework for only the very small number of cyber-attacks that amount to an armed attack or that take place in the con...

Cyber-attacks are often called non-violent or non-kinetic attacks, but the simple truth is that there is a credible capability to use cyber-attacks to achieve kinetic effects. Kinetic Cyber refers to a class of cyber-attacks that can cause direct or indirect physical damage, injury or death solely though the exploitation of vulnerable information systems and processes. Kinetic cyber-attacks are a real and growing threat that is generally being ignored as unrealistic or alarmist. These types of attacks have been validated experimentally in the laboratory environment, they have been used operationally in the context of espionage and sabotage, and they have been used criminally in a number of attacks throughout the world. While these types of attacks have thus far been statistically insignificant, the rapid growth and integration of cyber physical systems into everything from automobiles to SCADA systems implies a significant kinetic cyber threat in the near future. It is imperative that the security community begin to take these types of threats seriously and address vulnerabilities associated with cyber physical systems and other devices that could be utilized to cause kinetic effects through cyber-attacks.

The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation “Olympic Games” including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, a...

Cyber-deterrence has become a fashionable concept, and there has been a wealth of literature and polemic produced which seeks to simplify it, sell it as an applicable theory and fight for its insertion into national security strategies; most zealously in the United States. It is a grafting of the theory of nuclear deterrence which underpinned and ‘stabilised’ the Cold War. In the modern era of ‘new security challenges’, especially those threats posed through the cyber-domain (cyber-espionage, cyber-warfare, cyber-attacks, computer network exploits/ attacks, hacking and cyber-vandalism, theft of industrial/ state secrets, and so on) deterrence has enjoyed a renaissance.

The argument is that deterrence by punishment as a theory worked under the auspices of the Cold War - when applied to cyber-warfare and the cyber-realm it becomes unfeasible, and in practice its ability to navigate and function within the virtual terrain is restricted. Its linearity and determinism mean that the underpinning assumptions of state-centrism, US/ Western state forms of rationality, and the omniscience implicit in ‘knowing your enemy’ do not, in the cyber-realm, fit (through the plurality of actors, range of targets and space for irrational actions or vandalism or folly) and therefore, centrally, the foundations which allow the theory to operate in reality cannot gain traction or make headway. As such, the theory is stranded.

En ayant recours à Stuxnet, la première arme entièrement composée de codes, afin d’attaquer le programme nucléaire iranien, les Etats-Unis ont ouvert une brèche : celle de l’émergence du cyberespace comme nouvel espace de lutte. En découle inévitablement une modification des concepts traditionnels en matière de sécurité, tant par le retour en force de l’offensive que par les diverses réflexions à apporter aux doctrines de défense.

This article argues that some core tenets of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) can serve as heuristics for a better understanding of what the stakes of cyber-security are, how it operates, and how it fails. Despite the centrality of cyber-incidents in the cyber-security discourse, researchers have yet to understand their link to, and effects on politics. This article closes this gap by combining ANT insights with an empirical examination of a prominent cyber-incident (i.e., Stuxnet). It demonstrates that the disruptive practices of cyber-security caused by malicious software (malware), lie in their ability to actively perform three kinds of space (regions, networks, and fluids), each activating different types of political interventions. The article posits that the fluidity of malware challenges the consistency of networks and the sovereign boundaries set by regions, and paradoxically, leads to a forceful re-enactment of them. In this respect, the conceptualization of fluidity as an overarching threat accounts for multiple policy responses and practices in cyber-security as well as attempts to (re)-establish territoriality and borders in the virtual realm. While this article concentrates on cyber-security, its underlying ambition is to indicate concretely how scholars can profitably engage ANT’s concepts and methodologies

Schwartau (1994) defined information warfare as the application of information and communication technologies to compromise or access an adversary’s technological infrastructure.  The purpose is to control, disrupt, disable or access it to obtain relevant details and information on the target’s resources, proprietary information, or military plans.  Taddeo (2016) identified some of the most notable examples such as the distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) initiated during the 2010 Burma elections, the Stuxnet virus that affected the Iranian nuclear facilities, and the Wanna Cry ransomware cryptoattack of 2017 that affected computers running Microsoft-which is an awful lot of computers. Keep in mind, these are the ones that we are aware of because of the wide press coverage received.
Taddeo (2016) declared that in 2010, information warfare was officially listed among the several different domains whereby war could be waged.  It ranks fifth behind the traditional military constructs of land, sea, air, and space.  Why would it be that important would you ask? Well, if you pay attention to current events, you will see that the cyber domain is getting more airtime than any other battle.  The powers that be have figured out that having the capability to manipulate, disrupt, destroy or otherwise control the enemy’s (e.g. civilian or military) technological infrastructure is huge.  It has become a weapon that is  just as if not more decisive that conducting a land campaign and may have even more influence on conflict resolution.

On June 17th, 2010, security researchers at a small Belarusian firm known as VirusBlockAda identified malicious software (malware) that infected USB memory sticks.1 In the months that followed, there was a flurry of activity in the computer security community – revealing that this discovery identified only one component of a new computer worm2 known as Stuxnet. This software was designed to specifically target industrial equipment. Once it was revealed that the majority of infections were discovered in Iran,3 along with an unexplained decommissioning of centrifuges at the Iranian fuel enrichment plant (FEP) at Natanz,4 many in the media speculated that the ultimate goal of Stuxnet was to target Iranian nuclear facilities. In November of 2010, some of these suspicions were validated when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publically acknowledged that a computer worm created problems for a “limited number of our [nuclear] centrifuges.” 5 Reputable experts in the computer security community have already labeled Stuxnet as “unprecedented,”6 an “evolutionary leap,”7 and “the type of threat we hope to never see again."8
In this paper, I argue that this malicious software represents a revolution in military affairs (RMA)9 in the virtual realm – that is Stuxnet fundamentally changes the nature of cyber warfare. There are four reasons to this claim: (1) Stuxnet represents the first case in which industrial equipment was targeted with a cyber-weapon, (2) there is evidence that the worm was successful in its targeting of such equipment, (3) it represents a significant advance in the development of malicious software, and (4) Stuxnet has shown that several common assumptions about cyber-security are not always valid. In this paper I examine these four points as well as explore the future implications of the Stuxnet RMA.

Today, our entire modern way of life, from communication to commerce to
conflict, fundamentally depends on the Internet. Technological advances have
profoundly impacted everyday life by introducing creative inventions that were once
confined to the realm of science fiction and are now common use. The exponential
growth of cyberspace has also changed the dynamics of the joint operating environment.
The modern threat environment is a world that is less contained by boundaries and one
that allows a shadow war, known as cyber warfare, to occur. Adversaries of the United
States and allies are using the cyberspace domain as a platform for warfare where rule of
law is abstract and limitations are mostly self-imposed. While there are technically no
“rules of engagement” for cyberspace, the United States has self-imposed restrictions that
make it more difficult to conduct discrete levels of cyber operations. This form of
warfare is currently working for our adversaries because they don’t limit themselves,
much less allow someone else to limit them.
The ARSOF Operating Concept calls for the use of the cyber domain to facilitate
surgical strikes and intelligence operations (Cleveland 2014, 27). Rapidly defining
capabilities, methodologies, and authorities (without containing out-of-the-box thinking
is a way to show what cyber warfare is. Another way to define cyber operations is by
showing a reflection of current cyber operations, that is, by giving some empirical
examples. These can be seen in the recent events in Crimea and the operationalization of
the Stuxnet virus in Iran. Hybrid warfare is the use of political, economic, technological,
and informational tools that together make up the phenomenon of social infrastructure.
One particular element of this type of event – human political protest - is now known to
be a very important component in what we are learning about hybrid warfare. This is
supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions
of informational conflict, combined arms tactics, cyber operations and the actions of
Special Operations Forces. I intend to explain how SOF can employ technological
advances in cyber tools and networked social media to coerce, disrupt, or deter
adversaries. This information will be of particular use to the SOF community. In an
increasingly globalized and interconnected world, Special Operations must recognize,
learn, adapt, understand and examine new and innovative ways to modernize irregular
warfare fighting capabilities.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo compreender de que modo a temática da ciberguerra pode vir a modificar o nosso quotidiano e as ações do Estado para prevenir inconvenientes que esta possa vir a causa, não só na esfera pessoas, como comercial, organizacional e estatal. De modo a conseguir compreender melhor esta temática será necessário procurar entender a visão dos Estados no que toca ao futuro da ciberguerra.
O trabalho terá essencialmente como um grande ponto de referência: 2010 - O ano em que foi colocado em prática o vírus Stuxnet e graças a ele, o que mudou nas relações entre os países. Além disso é necessário fazer alusão à cibersegurança, pois é nela que as organizações internacionais e os Estados (em especial os Estados Unidos) estão empenhados. As consequências de um ciberataque poderão ser desastrosas, mas serão elas, atualmente, possíveis?

This article aims to provide a balanced picture of the phenomenon of cyberwar. It will show how and why the meaning  of “cyberwar” has evolved from the narrow conception referring exclusively to military interaction to its broad meaning, which has become detached from “war” and encompasses almost every activity linked to the aggressive use of computers. In particular, it will distinguish between different forms of cyber conflict in order to lay the ground for a levelheaded threat assessment

Devletler için siber saldırılar gün geçtikçe güvenlik sorunu üreten bir alan olmaktadır. Askeri sistemlerin, ekonomik sistemlerin ve devlet enformasyon sistemlerini devre dışı bırakma ya da kontrolü ele geçirme yeteneklerine sahip olan siber saldırılar ulusal ve uluslararası güvenlik sorunları üretmektedir. Siber saldırıların diğer geleneksel silahlı saldırılar gibi değerlendirilip değerlendirilmeyeceği hususu, bilim adamlarının ana tartışma konularından biri olmuştur. Bu çalışma, “kuvvet kullanma” hukukuna ilişkin hali hazırdaki uluslararası hukuk kurallarının siber saldırılara nasıl uygulanabileceğini incelemektedir. İran’a yönelik Stuxnet virüsü siber saldırısı örnek olay analizi olarak incelenmiştir.

The new technologies that are being deployed in conflicts are having negative ramifications as it endangers civil populations and might disrupt the social order. Conflict is changing, but some traits are remaining the same ex. policies and ambitions, rivalries and resources and grievances. The technologies can multiply conflict casualties, it also can reinforce and strengthen chaos and fear. Conflict can become much worse.
The purpose of the conflict analysis is to explain the Operation Olympic Games (a.k.a. Stuxnet), being a unique case study that emphasises the changing nature of warfare that includes the operationalization of cyber-attacks. Operation Olympic Games was developed and deployed by the US and Israel. It consisted of a few layers of viruses and cyber-attacks against the Iran’s nuclear plant called Natanz. The analysis will dive into the actors, dynamics, collateral effects and causes of the cyber conflict.
Currently, conflicts are moving from conventional to non-conventional type or hybrid, where states and non-states actors deploy a complexity of operations that include emerging technologies in order to achieve military and political goals. Cyber-attacks, especially the Operation Olympic Games exposes our loose understanding about what a conflict is and what are the emerging means of war used by state and non-state actors.
The under-explored unconventional methods of war lead to a wide usage without specific regulations of such activities, including the lack of accountability and attribution. The unregulated space of connection between emerging technology and conflict leads to the status-quo where states have an interest in maintaining or tolerating ... this type of activity.

With the 2016 US Presidential Election, the question of cyber-security entered the mainstream and set the focus on how nations and other entities use cyber-space as an extension of their "real-world" agendas. This question is by no means new, yet it has remained somewhat overlooked, perhaps, not in small part due to the dynamism, complexity and technicality of the subject, acting as gatekeepers for novices. That being said, a certain level of understanding about cyber-security could be reached through combining approaches from other fields, international relations, political science, security studies to name a few, in order to see the "big picture" and how the geostrategic ambitions of actors could be reflected in cyber-space. Furthermore, in the near future, technology will continue to become a more and more integral part of our everyday lives, so awareness of the possible threats and mindfulness of our actions are key to mitigating the possible dangers that our societies might face.

This brief overview will attempt to provide the necessary basis upon which further knowledge could be built, looking at the rules and actors of cyber-space. These segments, along with how future developments would affect the sector cannot be done justice in such a limited format, so this text should be viewed as a roadmap to where the main debates in the field lie.

Executive Summary
The Hybrid War embodies a number of conflicts that occurred in the last two decades. The central hypothesis is that the relationship between security and technology has accelerated the transition from traditional kinds of conflict to contemporary hybrid warfare. The variables that I use as keywords throughout this (threat, media, actors, and Technology) will verify the veracity of this hypothesis.
They are:
A. the forces at work: They are the first element of distinction. It is conventional actors (states) and non-conventional actors (terrorists, secessionist forces). In Hybrid War, the conventional actors in the field only send forces with a high degree of specialisation (elite bodies created ad hoc for specific missions). This is demonstrated by the case of Unit 8200 IDF (Israeli Defense Force);
B. the means used;
C. the threat is the third variable. There is much research about Hybrid War because the forces are totally different than the traditional protagonists of the conflict. Through the example of the War on Terrorism (GWOT) is called "Network-centric warfare" because no conventional force field is a "network" (network) groups, financiers and military forces;
D. technology is the fourth variable. The data show that, together with technological progress, the war industry has caused the shift from traditional conflict to the hybrid. In particular, the focus on the war industry technology has introduced the "cyberspace" and therefore the "cyberwarfare".
you must refer to the Liberal School, whose authors have studied, since the first half of the nineties of the last century, the relationship between economic interdependence, security, and technology to place the "War Hybrid" in the discipline of International Relations.
Given the above assumptions, there are three real examples, which fall under the "hybrid" conflicts category, to analyse: the case of Stuxnet, to highlight the relationship between Hybrid War and war information (or cyber warfare), the case of Ukraine as a hybrid conflict in toto and finally the case of Venezuela as an example of the relationship between Hybrid War and Diplomacy. Taken together, the three cases want to explain the dynamics of the new conflicts that fall under the category of War Hybrid.
In conclusion, I identify two trends:
- General trend: the relationship between security and technology revealed that the conflicts will become increasingly complex and, with them, the responses of States increasingly rely on technology and the subsequent specialization of the armed forces.
- Trend about the European Union: Although the idea of a European army (and therefore of the European special forces) have not yet taken hold, the European Commission launched a minimum level of CPI (Critical Infrastructure Protection) and Resilience that Member States should respect. I consider these measures as the only advancement concerning the EU response Hybrid War.

As states continue to explore and prepare for war in the cyber-domain, these new weapons are still yet to find their place among larger strategy in conflict.  This paper analyzes Operations Orchard and Olympic Games, the two most prominent examples of state-lead cyber attacks to date, to determine the proper place of cyber-warfare in the context of interstate conflict.  As these examples demonstrate, cyber-warfare can only exist either as a complement to conventional warfare, or as a state of perpetual warfare below the threshold of conventional war.  This creates a state of bounded chaos in which cyber-war serves as a bottom tier of conflict below the thresholds of conventional and nuclear warfare.

O tema deste trabalho envolve um case de política externa estadunidense atrelada a uma política de defesa cibernética audaciosa, no que tange ao programa nuclear iraniano. Mais precisamente, analisam-se os impactos estratégicos trazidos pelo verme de computador Stuxnet, à luz da Análise de Política Externa.Palavras-chave: Defesa cibernética; análise de política externa; Stuxnet; Estados Unidos da América.

Information and communication technology changed the way we live, learn and even fight. Information is not only
a military supplementary means anymore, but a target itself. Computer network attacks (CNAs) are able to make
widespread destruction and human injury in reality. But the question is whether CNAs conducted by one State against
another can be the subject of international humanitarian law. This paper seeks to address the legal situation of CNAs
which are not operated in the context of a current ongoing combat.

A command control system refers to a general control system, of a production system, of a process, or of another type of dynamic system, wherein the control elements are not centralized, but are distributed throughout the system; and each component or sub- system is controlled by one or more controllers. DCS (Distributed Control System) is a computerized control system used to control the production line in the industry. The entire controller system is connected via networks communication and monitoring. DCS is a very broad term used in various industries, to monitor and control distributed equipment. Nowadays, there are generally an information system upstream command control systems. To ensure the security of a system, we must secure the weakest link of this system. Thus, a flaw in the information system can lead to a multitude of command control system vulnerabilities.
This is considered as a real threat to the states [1] and can lead to disasters [2]. A multitude of vulnerabilities currently affects these systems. These vulnerabilities are exploited for various reasons such as cybercrime, industrial espionage or other. The objective of our work is to analyze the workings of Stuxnet and to propose countermeasures to strengthen the security of command control systems.

https://sites.google.com/site/ijcsis/

"Elevated age in cyber warfare
Malware has become focused
SCADA Systems (Stuxnet)
Malware performs Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE)
Conficker (Millions still infected)
Ransomeware
Data is being held hostage
The advanced capability of the threat has increased the risk.
Understanding the risk allows employment of defensive measures to mitigate the risk – “Risk will always be present”"

Este artigo argumenta sobre a emergência da ciberguerra como nova forma de conflito internacional. É feita uma introdução à temática da guerra no ciberespaço, seguida de uma contextualização histórica que abrange o nascimento da ARPAnet1 e a sua evolução até à Internet que conhecemos hoje.
São analisados dois exemplos reais e paradigmáticos desta realidade: os ciberataques à República da Estónia e o ciberataque à central de produção de material nuclear de Natanz, no Irão, executado pelo Stuxnet2.
São, ainda, argumentadas questões que demonstram que as ICT 3 estão a fornecer às sociedades novas ferramentas para práticas antigas e a possibilitar a distribuição de poder (empowerment) pelos novos intervenientes desta emergente forma de guerra, seguidas da conclusão.

This article is dedicated to the emergence of the cyber war as a new form of international conflict. The topic of cyberspace war is introduced, followed by an historical background covering the birth and evolution of DARPA’s ARPAnet to the Internet we know today.
Two paradigmatic and real examples of this new reality: the cyber attacks to the Republic of Estonia and the cyber attacks to Iran’s Natanz nuclear material production facility, executed by Stuxnet, are analysed.
The issues about ICT allowing the use of new tools to perform old practices and the distribution of power (empowerment) among new actors in this emerging way of war, are also discussed, followed by the conclusion.

Günümüzde büyük bir ironi olarak nükleer silahlara sahip olan ülke sayısı 10’u geçmiyorken, siber silahlara sahip ülke sayısı kesin olarak bilinmemekte ve siber silahlara sahip olan ülke sayısının nükleer silahlara sahip olan ülke sayısından çok daha fazla olduğu ileri sürülmektedir

Özet

Bilgisayar ve internet kullanımı, bilişim teknolojilerinin gelişmesiyle tüm dünyada yaygınlaşarak artmıştır. Bu artan kullanım insanlara birçok açıdan kolaylık sağlasa da, bir siber dünya sistemi yaratmıştır. Bu sistem, güvenlik açısından tehlike arz etmektedir. Bu tehlike “güvenlik açığı” kavramı ile açıklanmış olup, bu tehlikenin en aza indirgenmesi bütün insanlar ve devletler için bir mecburiyet haline gelmiştir. Bu bağlamda, “siber güvenlik” kavramı ön plana çıkartılarak uluslararası düzeyde bu açığın kötüye kullanılması hukuki yollarla da engellenmiştir. Ancak bu güvenlik duvarı, siber boyutun saldırı ve savunma sistemi olarak kullanılmasıyla aşılmak istenmiş ve hatta virüs gibi yazılımlarla aşılmıştır. Siber saldırıların askeri strateji olarak ele alınmasıyla birlikte “siber savaş” kavramı ortaya çıkmıştır.
Bu çalışmada öncelikle siber güvenlik, siber savaş, siber saldırı ve siber güç gibi kavramlar açıklanarak kavramsal çerçeve çizilmiş, sonrasında STUXNET saldırısının ayrıntıları incelenmiştir. Bu makalede, İran’ın nükleer yakıt zenginleştirme tesislerindeki güvenlik açığının görülerek STUXNET adlı virüsle bu açıktan nasıl sızıldığı ve bu durumun beraberinde getirdiği sonuçlar değerlendirilmektedir. Araştırma, siber faaliyetlerin ülkeler arasında nasıl bir tehlikeye yol açtığı sorusundan yola çıkarak, bu sorunun cevabını ikili ülke ilişkileri ve “siber güç” kavramı bağlamında incelemektedir. Çalışma, STUXNET saldırısının evrensel siber güvenlik kurallarına ve Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesi Antlaşması’na uygunluğunun analiziyle açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

The Internet threats can affect anyone and even cause tremendous financial damage to organizations or even countries, while the mitigation of such threats can be very difficult, considering the highly sophisticated nature of attacks that can be created not necessarily by regular hackers for profitability purposes, but by countries for satisfaction of national interests. A cyber-attack can be initiated against critical entities, which could have a Cascadian effect on a variety of its internal and external elements, due to the complexity of such entities and their interconnectivity. The constantly emerging threats result in an inability to produce a universal security solution. The Complex Adaptive systems can help to better identify the relationships between different systems in highly complex infrastructures, while the Game Theory can help to dig into the essence of relationships with and motives of potential attackers, in order to better understand how to protect against them and to address the security more efficiently.

The potential for cyberwarfare is vast and is of concern to all nations, and national security defence. It appears that many countries are actively trying to protect their computer networks, whilst looking for ways that might bring down the networks of other countries, although this is not officially acknowledged. Bringing down another nations computer networks could give the attacking national intelligence and control. These kinds of interactions are now a part of the way in which international relations are played out, and the internet is also a place in which international relations are contested. As such the internet plays a role in the visualisation and articulation of international relations both officially and unofficially, via official pronouncements and the activities of private citizens. What makes the internet different to other media forms is that the internet also represents a space in which international relations are contested in terms of cyber attacks and information...

A profound degree of consternation exists within the private and public realm because of the lack of a defined line that is being crossed that warrants a nation-supported military response. For example, the attack and destruction of the technological infrastructure of a hospital could injure or kill both civilian and military, but existing laws have not address issues such as these.  Damjanović (2017) concluded that instead of weapons and traditional warfare methodologies, information warfare could be the center of gravity of evolving military doctrines.  Most developed countries embrace this concept. The blurred lines that are associated with information warfare crimes could also warrant adjustment to the methods utilized to protect commercial interests.

Resumo
Este artigo debate o tema da apropriação da tecnologia na ciberguerra e está organizado em três partes. Na primeira, temos a introdução ao tema das TIC1 e novos media e a sua explosão na década de 90. Numa segunda parte, fazemos a contextualização histórica do media caneta USB, apresentando a sua evolução tecnológica, origens, motivações e objectivos por detrás da sua invenção, finalizando com um conjunto de vantagens e desvantagens decorrentes da sua utilização. Na terceira parte, introduzimos a análise crítica à questão da apropriação. A apropriação da caneta USB é o resultado de determinismo tecnológico ou social? Existiu social shaping of technology ou technological impact on society? O determinismo permite uma análise crítica ao problema da apropriação tecnológica? Nesta análise, tentamos demonstrar como os ideais deterministas limitam o pensamento crítico e como o construcionismo e a filosofia da tecnologia se complementam na teorização desta apropriação.

Abstract
This article discusses appropriation of technology in cyber war and is organised in three parts. In the first one, the topic of ICT2 and new media and its explosion in the 1990s is introduced. In the second part, the historical contextualisation of the USB pen media is offered, presenting its technological evolution, origins, motivations and the objectives behind its invention, concluding with the advantages and disadvantages of its use. The third part is a critical analysis to the topic of appropriation. Is the appropriation of the USB pen a result of technological or sociological determinism? Was it social shaping of technology or technological impact on society? Does determinism allow a critical analysis of appropriation of technology? This analysis tries to demonstrate how deterministic ideas limit critical thought and how constructionism and the philosophy of technology complement each other in the theorisation of this appropriation.

The purpose of the article is to analyse Operation "Olympic Games" including, in particular, to indicate the political background to the activities aimed at preventing the development of Iran's nuclear programme, and to examine the preparation and conduct of the operation, the involvement of the US and Israeli intelligence services, and the use of intelligence methods and sources. An equally important objective is to indicate the real consequences of the cyberattack with the Stuxnet virus. In the research process, a critical analysis of literature in the field of Intelligence Studies and source materials (including legal acts, strategies, reports, and other official studies of the entities forming the US Intelligence Community) was carried out. The example of Operation Olympics Games shows that complex cyber-sabotage operations resulting in the destruction of critical infrastructure on a large scale require the involvement of numerous state resources and advanced cyber activities, and the use of many different methods and intelligence sources. Thus, strong states with well-developed intelligence capabilities are much more capable of effectively using cyber-sabotage on a large scale.

... on-iran. html, quoting the semi-official Mehr News Agency; 'Iran Identifies Sources of Stuxnet Virus in its Computers', Radio Samaneh/Payvand.com, 21 October 2010, http://www.payvand. com/news/10/oct/1169.html. 20 Gautham ...

El 17 de Junio de 2010, investigadores de seguridad en una pequeña empresa belarusa conocida como VirusBlockAda identificó un software malicioso (malware) que infectó memorias USB.  En los meses siguientes, hubo una oleada de actividades en la comunidad de seguridad informática—revelando que este descubrimiento identificaba solamente un componente de un nuevo gusano informático conocido como Stuxnet. Este software fue diseñado específicamente para afectar equipo industrial. Una vez que se reveló que la mayoría de las infecciones fueron descubiertas en Irán, junto con un inexplicable retiro del servicio de centrífugas en la planta de enriquecimiento de combustible (FEP, por su siglas en inglés)  iraní en Natanz, muchos en los medios de comunicación especularon que la meta final de Sutxnet  era atacar las instalaciones nucleares iraníes. En noviembre de 2010, algunas de esas sospechas fueron confirmadas cuando el presidente iraní, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, aceptó públicamente que un gusano informático había creado problemas para una “cifra limitada de nuestras centrífugas nucleares”.  Expertos acreditados en la comunidad de seguridad informática ya han catalogado al  Stuxnet  como “sin precedentes”, un “salto evolutivo“, y el “tipo de amenaza que esperamos nunca más ver nuevamente”. En este artículo, yo sostengo que este software malicioso representa una revolución de asuntos militares (RMA, por sus siglas en inglés)  en el ámbito virtual—o sea, que Stuxnet básicamente cambia la naturaleza de la ciberguerra. Hay cuatro razones para sustentar lo anterior: (1)  Stuxnet representa el primer caso en el que equipo industrial es atacado con un arma cibernética, (2) hay pruebas que el gusano tuvo éxito en su ataque de dicho equipo, (3) esto representa un adelanto significativo en el desarrollo de software maliciosos y (4) Stuxnet ha mostrado que varias suposiciones comunes acerca de la seguridad cibernética no siempre son válidas. En este artículo analizo estos cuatro puntos al igual que exploro las implicaciones futuras del Stuxnet RMA.

Stuxnet is arguably the world’s best known piece of Industrial Control System malware that was apparently used to sabotage nuclear plant equipment at Iran’s Natanz facility. The malware did damage to a lot of critical equipment in that facility. It did not just stay inside Natanz however, it spread everywhere and within a couple of years was found on hundreds of other Siemens control systems in Asia, Europe and elsewhere. After the code was put online, it quickly got cloned and used in other similar ICS malware. This paper details a method to detect such malware using Functional Safety.

Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach, written by experts on the front lines, gives you an insider's look into the world of cyber-warfare through the use of recent case studies. The book examines the issues related to cyber warfare not only from a computer science perspective but from military, sociological, and scientific perspectives as well. You'll learn how cyber-warfare has been performed in the past as well as why various actors rely on this new means of warfare and what steps can be taken to prevent it.

Güvenlik çalışmaları bir devletin olmazsa olmazıdır. Zira devletlerin asıl görevi insanlarını korumaktır. Küreselleşmeyle birlikte dünyada " sınır " diye tanımlanan kırmızı çizgiler her geçen gün daha da geçirgen hale gelirken internet dediğimiz teknolojik araç bu durumu tetikleyen faktörlerin başında yer almaktadır.