Thaumàzein

The essay focuses on the theme of the essence of philosophy through the short essay by Martin Heidegger What is philosophy? Following the text and reconstructing its argumentation, the nodal passages of speculation are highlighted, from the anti-historiographic attitude, to the origin and historical-conceptual development of the word philosophy, to the experience of wonder connected to the philosophical disposition, to the link between thought and poetry. In conclusion, the essential cues on the essence of philosophy, that the essay gives us, are examined in depth.

Key words: Heidegger, essence of philosophy, thàumazein, philosophical attitude, thought and poetry.

Ciò che è massimamente evidente è al centro della nostra esistenza ma, per quante volte gli si passi accanto, rimane invisibile. E così anche il filosofo, che pure intuisce la sua importanza, assume spesso la postura interrogativa:  come i due discepoli nella Cena di Emmaus di Tintoretto, la cerca nella direzione sbagliata e, non trovandola, non arriva alla meraviglia «vertiginosa», ma alla Grundfrage  con cui Heidegger chiude la celebre prolusione Che cos’è Metafisica? «Perché c’è in generale l’essente e non piuttosto il Nulla?». Ma se domando, e sono alla ricerca di una risposta, è perché ancora non vedo. E non vedo in quanto, esattamente come i due discepoli nella Cena di Emmaus di Tintoretto, sono ancora girato dalla parte sbagliata: la mia postura, mancando di periagoge, è ancora autoreferenziale. La domanda «Perché c’è in generale l’essente e non piuttosto il Nulla?» si trasforma così nel vicolo cieco della filosofia novecentesca, in quanto l’atteggiamento interrogante che la sorregge cerca dalla parte sbagliata, avendo già in mente quello che pensa di trovare, e non trovandolo non vede che il nulla. Se invece compio il movimento della periagoge e mi vivo come una sorpresa, allora sento la scossa della meraviglia. Ma sentendo la scossa della meraviglia di certo non interrogo, ma piuttosto, colto da  vertigini, esclamo: «esisto!». E sperimentando questo «esisto!» al di fuori della prospettiva autoreferenziale dell’ego, lo colgo come una positività gratuita che s’impone da sé senza bisogno di essere dedotta cartesianamente dal mio «cogito»: si presenta come una sorpresa assolutamente gratuita che trascende ogni principio di giustificazione e ogni fondamento della ragione.

Resumo: Trata-se da difícil questão do sentido em que, a partir de Heidegger, pode ser pensada uma superação da metafísica. O pano de fundo é a atualidade e a onipresença do seu acabamento técnico. A preocupação central é o problema do possível modo de ser – ou de sobreviver – de um pensamento que, imerso nessa onipresença, seja, ainda assim, capaz de interrogá-la. Questões como a do salto (Sprung) e da reviravolta (Kehre) revelam a espécie de contorcionismo envolvido nessa noção de superação, levando a refletir, entre outras coisas, sobre a relação desse pensamento com a sua história. O desfecho é a identificação de um campo de preocupações no qual um pensamento posto diante da própria possibilidade de aniquilação coloca a si mesmo o problema hermenêutico de uma lúcida práxis pensante.

Abstract: We deal with a difficult question: the sense in which, after Heidegger, one can think of an overcoming of metaphysics. The background is the currency and omnipresence of its technical ending. Mainly focused is the problem of the possible way of being – or surviving – of a thought that, immersed in this omnipresence, is still able to inquire it. Questions such as that of the leap (Sprung) and the
reversal (Kehre) show the kind of contortionism attached to this notion
of overcoming. Among other issues, they call for a reflection on the
relation of this thought with its history. The outcome is the
identification of a field of matters which makes appear, for a thought
facing the possibility of its own annihilation, the hermeneutic problem
of a lucid thinking praxis.

Wonder (thaumazein) is the beginning of philosophy. This well-known formula can be grasped for the first time in Plato’s Theaetetus (155d). The standard interpretation of this passage takes wonder as a positively connoted, transitive starting point of the epistemic process insofar as wonder stimulates the will to investigate. The present article challenges this view by presenting an aspect of Theaetetus 155d that has been overlooked ever since. Via a reconstruction of the dialogue’s context, broader philological arguments and an implementation into Plato’s systematic approach, the article aims to show that the Platonic conception of thaumazein is to be understood first of all as a result of sophistry: Wonder isn’t a transitive starting point but a hermetic perplexity that remains gazing at the sophist in admiration (thaumazein) and that has to be overcome. Thus, wonder is also the beginning of philosophy because it is the result of sophistry and (Platonic) philosophy arises from opposition to the latter.

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