The Turkish Straits

The book attempts to present –for the first time in the international bibliography– a detailed description of the historical life of Abydos (Άβυδος) of Hellespont (Ελλήσποντος, Δαρδανέλλια); the latter was an important ancient and medieval Greek city, situated on the Asiatic shore of Dardanelles, at the once narrowest part of the local Straits (usually named "Stenon of Abydos") and in the surrounding area of the promontory of Nara (an Ottoman and modern Turkish naval base, where free access is prohibited). The monograph also detects the  relations between Abydos and other known settlements in the wider region of northwestern Asia Minor (Troad, Hellespont, Mysia, Hellespontine Phrygia).

Αbydos was founded predominantly as a colony of Miletus (ca. 680-650 BC) and had a continuous historical life that lasted about 2.000 years (mid. 7th c. BC - early 14th c. AD). The prosperous ancient city minted various coins between 6th c. BC - 3rd c. AD. Its lively port was used for centuries as a key point for the passage from Europe to Asia and the cruise from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea (and vice versa) as well as a major customs station ("telonion Abydou" during the Roman imperial years, "demosion teloneion" or "kommerkion" or "dekateuterion Abydou" during the medieval period of the city). Byzantine Abydos was also an important administrative center, a military and naval base and an ecclesiastical seat (bishopric and later metropolis).

However, the long and turbulent history of Abydos and its region is virtually unknown in modern years, despite the fact that the city's reputation was particularly widespread during ancient and medieval times in the Mediterranean world. Moreover, for many reasons noted in the book, the settlement does not exist archaeologically in the last two centuries. In short, Abydos constitutes a very interesting case of a virtually lost city during the modern times.

For various reasons, also described in the book, the importance of Abydos had declined during the 13th c. AD and the city was finally abandoned by its population in the early 14th c. AD., mainly because of the Turkish threat in the area. From mid. 15th c. AD the new city of Çanakkale was established gradually (initially named as Kale-i Sultaniye) 5-6 km to the south of Abydos. The ruins of the abandoned urban area of ​​the latter have been systematically pillaged -mainly for construction and other purposes- between the 14th - early 19th c. AD.

For the reconstruction of  the long historical life of Abydos (mid. 7th c. BC - early 14th c. AD) and an in-depth analysis of its numerous and largely unknown institutions, the study relies though on the information providing by the written (ancient and medieval) texts but also on the scarce and dispersed epigraphic and the much richer numismatic (the city minted coins between 6th c. BC - 3rd c. AD) and sigillographic data and other archaeological findings regarding (or deriving from) the city. It also takes into account all the contemporary related publications.

[VANIAS publications,  Thessaloniki 2017,  752 pages,  ISBN: 978-960-288-342-6,  text in Greek language with an English summary]

Haritalar, dönemlerinin siyasi, ekonomik, askeri ve sosyal değerlerini aktarmalarının yanı sıra sanatsal ve kültürel özelliklerini de yansıtırlar. Bu bağlamda iki eski kıtayı Avrupa-Asya, iki büyük iç denizi Akdeniz-Karadeniz birleştiren konumuyla iç denizlerin en önemlilerinden biri olan Marmara Denizi, birçok tarihi haritaya konu olmuştur. Marmara Denizi'nin Karadeniz ve Akdeniz'le birleştiği İstanbul ve Çanakkale Boğazları ise Asya-Avrupa arasında bir köprü rolü üstlenmiştir. Marmara Denizi'nin kıyılarına antik çağlardan itibaren insanların yerleşmesi ve şehirlerin gelişimi çizilen haritalara da yansımıştır. Bu bağlamda yapılan araştırmada Marmara Denizi'ne ait tarihi nitelikte çok sayıda harita tespit edilmiştir. Çalışmada yaklaşık 1000 yıllık bir süreçte yer alan seçilmiş haritaların künye bilgileri (yapım yılı, haritacı, bulunduğu eser, basım yeri vb.) ve kaynakçaları ayrıntılı olarak verilerek, açıklamaları yer almış ve kaynaklar arasında ilişki kurularak Marmara Denizi'yle ilgili belirli dönemlerdeki izlenimlerin, bilgilerin ve verilerin doğruluk ve geçerliliği araştırılmıştır.

The integrity of the Ottoman Empire was a fundamental concern in nineteenth-century European politics, often referred to as ‘the Eastern Question’. The main military aspect of this question was how Istanbul and the Turkish Straits, namely the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, could be defended against a probable Russian attack by land, sea or both. The Russian seizure of Adrianople at the end of the Ottoman–Russian War of 1828–9 confirmed European doubts that the Ottomans were no longer able to defend their own capital against their northern rival. Politicians, diplomats, officers and intelligence agents of different countries such as Britain, Austria, Prussia/Germany and France were discussing this scenario in their public and confidential writings. This article aims to analyse the defence plans and intelligence reports produced throughout the long nineteenth century by British government agents who discussed probable scenarios of a Russian assault on the Turkish Straits and Istanbul on tactical, operational and strategic levels. As long as the British grand strategy necessitated naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, the defence of the Turkish Straits against Russia remained a strategic priority. By 1907 Britain concluded that even if Russia successfully took the Turkish Straits it would not alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean. Russia had also started to follow a new expansionist policy in the Far East and the century long fear of a Russian attack on the Bosphorus and Istanbul lost its context.

Title: From the Ottoman- Russian War in 1877-1878 to the NATO Membership: The Straits Question and Turkey’s “Alliance” with the West.

From the middle of the 19th century onwards, whose territorial integrity left to the Great Powers assurance, the Ottoman Empire remained in between the Russo-British struggle in the Near East. Britain tried to resist the Russian march towards the south by keeping the Ottoman territorial unity. After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, when the Ottomans were defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of St. Stefano, the British being disturbed by the new situation in the Balkans, initiated a congress in Berlin and modified it by the Berlin Treaty. Britain in doing this, did not consider the interests of the Ottoman Empire, but her own. In a similar condition, in 1945 when the USSR demanded a base in the Straits and revision of the Turkish northeastern borders, since it arouse old “Russian fear” in Turkey, they resorted to the US. In this period, having inherited the British Empire’s imperial mission, the Straits were also important for the US. Same as the British, the American would also not allow the Soviet Union crossing the Straits and penetrating to the Mediterranean. But Turkey did not recognize the US strategic vulnerability and by paying unnecessary prices, she got both economic and military aids from the US and bounded her to it. The prices paid for the security against the USSR to US are non-equivalent what Turkey gained from the US both military assistance and economic aid. However, how Britain did not allow the Russians to threaten the Straits in 1878 by herself, so would the US and her allies stop the USSR in the Straits in 1945 by themselves. Because, although the political conditions and states alters, geostrategic position does not change.

Historically, the U.S. strategy in the Black Sea region has been stable, limited, and not ambitious as American administrations prioritized certain foreign policy objectives over other interests. This careful strategy was transformed during the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s as the U.S. started following an extensive foreign policy framework, which included all American national interests, formulated by Bruce Jentleson in his 4Ps framework: power, peace, prosperity, and principles. The article argues that this transformation was problematic because of two obstacles-the illusion of the unipolar moment and the growing polarization in American domestic politics-which prevented the U.S. from following an effective policy in the Black Sea region.

At the Warsaw Summit of 9 July 2016, NATO heads of state and government for the first time after the end of the cold war period directly mentioned the “Russia’s aggressive actions, including provocative military activities “and defined these acts as damaging the Euro-Atlantic security. After referring to Russia’s destabilizing actions and policies including “the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea” and “provocative military activities near NATO borders, including in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea”, they announced their decision to enhance defense posture by forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance.  This paper deals with Turkey's current position in the Black Sea region as a NATO member.